THE

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

Translated into English
With analyses and introductions

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INTRODUCTION.

The genuineness of the Laws is sufficiently proved (1) by more than twenty citations of them in the writings of Aristotle, who was residing at Athens during the last years of the life of Plato, and who returned to Athens after the death of Plato, at the time when he was himself writing his Politics and Constitutions; (2) by the allusion of Isocrates\(^1\)—writing 346 B.C., a year after the death of Plato, and not more than two or three years after the composition of the Laws—who speaks of the Laws and Republics written by philosophers (sophists); (3) by the reference (Athen. 226 A) of the comic poet Alexis, a younger contemporary of Plato (fl. B.C. 356–306), to the enactment about prices, which occurs in Laws, xi. 917 B, viz. that the same goods should not be sold at two prices on the same day\(^2\); (4) by the unanimous voice of later antiquity and the absence of any suspicion among ancient writers

\(^1\) Oratio ad Philippum Missa, p. 85: Τὸ μὲν ταῖς παραγγέλεσιν ἐνοχλεῖν καὶ πρὸς ἀπαντᾶς λέγειν τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς οὐδένα λέγειν ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ὑμοῖοι ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων (sc. speeches in the assembly) ἀκουοι τυχάνονσιν ὡς τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γεγραμμέναις.

\(^2\) Οὗ γέγονε κρείττων νομοθέτης τοῦ πλουσίου Ἀριστοτέλους τίθησι γὰρ νυν νόμον τῶν ἰχθυσελάων ὡστε ἄν πωλῶν τινι ἰχθύν ἐπιτιθμῆσαι ἀποδώτι ἐλάττων ἢ εἴπε τιμής εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον εἴδος ἀπάγαγειν τοῦτον, ἵνα δεδοκιτέσ τῆς ἀξίας ἀγαπώσιν, ἢ τῆς ἐσπέρας σαπρώς ἀπαντᾶς ἀποφέρωσιν οἰκαδε.

worth speaking of to the contrary; for it is not said of Philippus of Opus that he composed any part of the Laws, but only that he copied them out of the waxen tablets, and wrote the Epinomis (Diog. Laert. iii. 25). That the longest and one of the most excellent writings bearing the name of Plato should be a forgery, even if the work were unsupported by external testimony, would be a singular phenomenon in ancient literature; and although the critical worth of the consensus of late writers is generally not to be compared with the express testimony of contemporaries, yet a somewhat greater value may be attributed to their consent in the present instance, because the admission of the Laws is combined with doubts about the Epinomis, a spurious writing, which seems to stand in nearly the same relation to the larger work in which the Timaeus Locrus stands to the Timaeus. This shows that the reception of the Laws was not altogether undiscriminating.

The suspicion which has attached to the Laws of Plato in the judgment of some modern writers appears to rest partly (1) on differences in the style and form of the work, and (2) on differences of thought and opinion which they observe in them. Their suspicion is increased by the fact that these differences are accompanied by resemblances as striking to passages in other Platonic writings. They are sensible of a want of point in the dialogue and a general inferiority in the ideas, plan, manners, and style. They miss the luminous and poetical flow, 'smoother than a river of oil,' the dramatic verisimilitude, the life and variety of the characters, the dialectic subtlety, the Attic purity, the exquisite urbanity; instead of which they find tautology, obscurity, self-sufficiency, sermonizing, rhetorical declamation, uncouth forms of sentences, and peculiarities in the use of words and idioms. They are unable to discover any unity in the patched, irregular structure. The speculative element both in government and education is superseded by a narrow economical or religious vein. The grace and cheerfulness of Athenian life have disappeared; and a spirit of moroseness and religious intolerance has taken their place. There is a cynical levity in them, and a tone of disappointment and lamentation over human things. They seem also to observe in them bad imitations of thoughts which are better expressed in Plato's other writings. Lastly, they wonder how the mind which conceived the Republic could have left the Critias, Hermocrates, and Philosophus incomplete or unwritten, and have devoted the last years of life to the completion of the Laws.
INTRODUCTION.

The questions which have been thus indirectly suggested may be considered by us under five or six heads: I, the characters; II, the plan; III, the style; IV, the imitations of other writings of Plato; V, the more general relation of the Laws to the Republic and the other dialogues; and VI, to the existing Athenian and Spartan states.

I. Already in the Philebus the character of Socrates has disappeared; and in the Timaeus, Sophist, and Politicus his function of chief speaker is handed over to the Pythagorean philosopher Timaeus, and to the Eleatic Stranger, at whose feet he sits, and is silent. More and more Plato seems to have felt in his later writings that the character and method of Socrates were no longer suited to be the vehicle of his philosophy. He is no longer interrogative but dogmatic; not 'a hesitating enquirer;' but one who speaks with the authority of a legislator. Even in the Republic we have seen that the dialogue is unreal, and that the argument which is carried on in the old style with Thrasymachus in the first book soon passes into the form of exposition.

The Laws are discussed by three representatives of Athens, Crete, and Sparta. The Athenian, as might be expected, is the protagonist or chief speaker, while the second place is assigned to the Cretan, who, as one of the leaders of a new colony, has a special interest in the conversation. At least four-fifths of the answers are put into his mouth. The Athenian talks to the two others, although they are his equals in age, in the style of a master discoursing to his scholars; he frequently praises himself; he entertains a very poor opinion of their understanding. Certainly the boastfulness and rudeness of the Laws is the reverse of the refined irony and courtesy which characterize the earlier dialogues. We are no longer in such good company as in the Phaedrus and Symposium.

The scene is laid in Crete, and the conversation is held in the course of a walk from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus, which takes place on one of the longest and hottest days of the year (iii. 683 C). The companions are said to start at dawn, and to arrive at the point in their conversation which terminates the fourth book, about noon (iv. 722 C). The God to whose temple they are going is the lawgiver of Crete, and may be supposed at this very cave to have given his oracles to Minos. But the externals of the scene, which are briefly and inartistically described, soon disappear, and we plunge abruptly into the subject of the dialogue. We are reminded by contrast of the higher art of the Phaedrus, in which the summer's day, and the cool stream, and the
chirping of the grasshoppers, and the fragrance of the agnus castus, and the legends of the place are present to the imagination throughout the discourse.

The typical Athenian apologizes for the tendency of his countrymen 'to spin a very long discussion out of slender materials,' and in a similar spirit the Lacedaemonian Megillus also apologizes (cp. Thucyd. iv. 17) for the Spartan brevity; he admits that long discourses may be sometimes necessary. The family of Megillus is the proxenus of Athens and Sparta; and he pays a beautiful compliment to the Athenian, significant of a certain Athenian element which is discernible in the Laws. A good Athenian, he says, is more than ordinarily good, because he is inspired by nature and not manufactured by law. The love of listening which is attributed to the Timocrat in the Republic (viii. 548 E) is also exhibited in him (iii. 683 C). The Athenian on his side has a pleasure in speaking to the Lacedaemonian 'of the struggle in which their ancestors were jointly engaged against the Persians. A connection with Athens is likewise intimated by the Cretan Cleinias. He is the relative of Epimenides, whom, by an anachronism of seventy or eighty years, he describes as coming to Athens, not after the attempt of Cylon, but ten years before the Persian war. The Cretan and Lacedaemonian can hardly be said to contribute to the argument of which the Athenian is the expounder; they only supply information when asked about the institutions of their respective countries. A kind of simplicity or stupidity is ascribed to them (x. 885 ff., 888 E). At first, they are dissatisfied with the free criticisms which the Athenian passes upon the laws of Minos and Lycurgus, but they acquiesce in his greater experience and knowledge of the world. They admit that there can be no objection to the enquiry; for in the spirit of the legislator himself, they are discussing his laws when there is no one present to hear them. They are unwilling to allow that the Spartan and Cretan lawgivers can have been mistaken in honouring courage as the first part of virtue (ii. 667 A), and are puzzled at hearing for the first time (ii. 661 D) 'that goods are only evil to the evil.' Several times they are on the point of quarrelling, and by an effort learn to restrain their natural feeling (cp. Shakespeare, Henry V, act iii. sc. 2). In Book vii. (806 D), the Lacedaemonian expresses a momentary irritation at the accusation which the Athenian brings against the Spartan institutions, of encouraging licentiousness in their women, but he is reminded by the Cretan that the permission to criticize them freely has
been given, and cannot be retracted. His only criterion of truth is the authority of the Spartan lawgiver; he is 'dumb-foundered' (i. 636 E.) at the speculations of the Athenian, but inclines to prefer the ordinances of I ycurgus.

The three interlocutors all of them speak in the character of old men, which forms a pleasant bond of union between them. They have the feelings of old men about youth, about the state, about human things in general. Nothing in life seems to be of much importance to them; they are spectators rather than actors, and men in general appear to the Athenian speaker to be the playthings of the Gods and of circumstances. Still they have a fatherly care of the young, and are deeply impressed by sentiments of religion. They would give confidence to the aged by an increasing use of wine, which, as they get older, is to unloose their tongues and make them sing. The prospect of the existence of the soul after death is constantly present to them; though they can hardly be said to have the cheerful hope and resignation which animates Cephalus in the Republic. We shall not be wrong in supposing that Plato is expressing his own feelings in remarks of this sort. For at the time of writing the first book of the Laws he was at least seventy-four years of age, if we suppose him, at p. 638 A, to allude to the victory of the Syracusans under Dionysius the Younger over the Locrians, which occurred in the year 356. Such a sadness was the natural effect of declining years and failing powers, which make men ask, 'after all, what profit is there in life?' They feel that their work is beginning to be over, and are ready to say, 'all the world is a stage'; or, in the actual words of Plato, 'let us play as many good plays as we can,' though 'we must be sometimes serious, which is not agreeable, but necessary.' These are feelings which have crossed the minds of reflective persons in all ages. And there is no reason to connect the Laws any more than other parts of Plato's writings with the very uncertain narrative of his life, or to imagine that this melancholy tone is attributable to disappointment at having failed to convert a Sicilian tyrant into a philosopher.

II. The plan of the Laws is more irregular and has less connection than any other of the writings of Plato. As Aristotle says in the Politics, 'The greater part consists of Laws'; in Books v, vi, xi, xii the dialogue almost entirely disappears. They seem to be rather the materials for a work, nearly but not quite complete, than a finished composition which may rank with the other Platonic dialogues. To use
his own image, 'Some stones are regularly inserted in the building; others are lying on the ground ready for use.' There is probably truth in the tradition that the Laws were not published until after the death of Plato. We can easily believe that he has left imperfections, which would have been removed if he had lived a few years longer. The arrangement might have been improved; the connection of the argument might have been made plainer, and the sentences more accurately framed. Something also may be attributed to the feebleness of old age. Even a rough sketch of the Phaedrus or Symposium would have had a very different look. There is, however, an interest in possessing one writing of Plato which is in the process of creation.

We must endeavour to find a thread of order which will carry us through this comparative disorder. The first four books are described by Plato himself as the preface or preamble. Having arrived at the conclusion that each law should have a preamble, the lucky thought occurs to him at the end of the fourth book that the preceding discourse is the preamble of the whole. This preamble or introduction may be abridged as follows:—

The institutions of Sparta and Crete are admitted by the Lacedaemonian and Cretan to have one aim only: they were intended by the legislator to inspire courage in war. To this the Athenian objects that the true lawgiver should frame his laws with a view to all the virtues and not to one only. Better is he who has temperance as well as courage, than he who has courage only; better is he who is faithful in civil broils, than he who is a good soldier only. Better, too, is peace than war; the reconciliation than the defeat of an enemy. And he who would attain all virtue should be trained amid pleasures as well as pains. Hence there should be convivial intercourse among the citizens, and a man's temperance should be tested in his cups, as we test his courage amid dangers. He should have a fear of the right sort, as well as a courage of the right sort.

At the beginning of the second book the subject of pleasure leads to education, which in the early years of life is wholly a discipline imparted by the means of pleasure and pain. The discipline of pleasure is implanted chiefly by the practice of the song and the dance. Of these the forms should be fixed, and not allowed to depend on the fickle breath of the multitude. There will be choruses of boys, girls, and grown-up persons, and all will be heard repeating the same strain, that 'virtue is
happiness.' One of them will give the law to the rest; this will be the chorus of aged minstrels, who will sing the most beautiful and the most useful of songs. They, too, will require a little wine, in order to mellow the austerity of age, and make them amenable to our laws.

After having laid down the first principle of politics, and briefly discussed music and festive intercourse, at the commencement of the third book Plato makes a digression, in which he speaks of the origin of society. He describes, first of all, the family; secondly, the patriarchal stage, which is an aggregation of families; thirdly, the founding of regular cities, like Ilium; fourthly, the establishment of a military and political system, like that of Sparta, with which he identifies Argos and Messene, dating from the return of the Heraclidae. But the aims of states should be good, or else, like the prayer of Theseus, they may be ruinous to themselves. This was the case in two out of three of the Heracleid kingdoms. They did not understand that the powers in a state should be balanced. The balance of powers saved Sparta, while the excess of tyranny in Persia and the excess of liberty at Athens have been the ruin of both.

This discourse on politics is suddenly discovered to have an immediate practical use; for Cleinias the Cretan is about to give laws to a new colony. The fancy which in the Critias was left incomplete, of locating the ideal state in the island of Atlantis, is partially realized in the Laws.

At the beginning of the fourth book, after enquiring into the circumstances and situation of the colony, the Athenian proceeds to make further reflections. Chance, and God, and the skill of the legislator, all co-operate in the formation of states. And the most favourable condition for the foundation of a new one is when the government is in the hands of a virtuous tyrant who has the good fortune to be the contemporary of a great legislator. But a virtuous tyrant is a contradiction in terms; we can at best only hope to have magistrates who are the servants of reason and the law. This leads to the enquiry, what is to be the polity of our new state. And the answer is, that we are to fear God, and honour our parents, and to cultivate virtue and justice; these are to be our first principles. Laws must be definite, and we should create in the citizens a predisposition to obey them. The legislator will teach as well as command; and with this view he will prefix preambles to his principal laws.

The fifth book commences in a sort of dithyramb with another and higher preamble about the honour due to the soul, whence are deduced
the duties of a man to his parents and his friends, to the suppliant and stranger. He should be true and just, free from envy and excess of all sorts, forgiving to crimes which are not incurable and are partly involuntary; and he should have a true taste. The noblest life has the greatest pleasures and the fewest pains. Having finished the pre-amble, and touched on some other preliminary considerations, we proceed to the Laws, beginning with the constitution of the state. This is not the best or ideal state, having all things common, but only the second best, in which the land and houses are to be distributed among 5040 citizens divided into four classes. There is to be no gold or silver among them, and they are to have moderate wealth, and to respect number and numerical order in all things.

In the first part of the sixth book, Plato completes his sketch of the constitution by the appointment of officers. He explains the manner in which guardians of the law, generals, priests, wardens of town and country, ministers of education, and other magistrates are to be appointed; and also in what way courts of appeal are to be constituted, and omissions in the law to be supplied. At this point (p. 772) the Laws strictly speaking begin, with enactments respecting marriage and the procreation of children, respecting property in slaves as well as of other kinds, respecting houses, married life, common tables for men and women. The question of age in marriage suggests the consideration of a similar question about the time for holding offices, and for military service, which had been previously omitted.

Resuming the order of the discussion, which was indicated in the previous book, from marriage and birth we proceed to education in the seventh book. Education is to begin at or rather before birth; to be continued for a time by mothers and nurses under the inspection of the state; finally, to comprehend music and gymnastics. Under music is included reading, writing, playing on the lyre, arithmetic, and a knowledge of astronomy and mathematics, sufficient to preserve the minds of the citizens from impiety in after life. Gymnastics are to be practised chiefly with a view to their use in war. The discussion of education, which was lightly touched upon in Book ii, is here completed.

The eighth book contains regulations for civil life, beginning with festivals, games, and contests, military exercises and the like. On such occasions Plato seems to see young men and maidens meeting together, and hence he takes occasion to discuss the relations of the sexes, the
INTRODUCTION.

evil consequences which arise out of the indulgence of the passions, and the remedies for them. Then he proceeds to speak of agriculture, of arts and trades, of buying and selling, and foreign commerce.

The remaining books of the Laws, ix—xii, are chiefly concerned with criminal offences. In the first class are placed offences against the Gods, especially sacrilege or robbery of temples: next follow offences against the state, beginning with thefts. The mention of thefts suggests a distinction between voluntary and involuntary, curable and incurable offences. Proceeding to the greater crime of murder, he distinguishes between mere homicide, manslaughter, and murder with malice prepense; murders by kindred, murders by slaves, wounds with or without intent to kill, actions done from passion, which are partly voluntary and partly involuntary, crimes of or against slaves, and insults to parents. To these various modes of purification or degrees of punishment are assigned, and the terrors of another world are also invoked against them.

At the beginning of Book x, all acts of violence, including sacrilege, are summed up in a single law. The law is preceded by an admonition, in which the offenders are informed that no one ever did an unholy act, or said an unlawful word, retaining his belief in the existence of the Gods; but either he denied their existence, or he believed that they took no care of man, or that they might be turned from their course by sacrifices and prayers. The remainder of the book is devoted to the refutation of these three classes of unbelievers, and concludes with the means to be taken for their reformation, and the announcement of their punishments if they continue obstinate and impenitent.

The eleventh book is taken up with laws and admonitions relating to individuals, which follow one another without any exact order. There are laws concerning deposits and the finding of treasure; concerning slaves and freedmen; concerning retail trade, bequests, divorces, enchantments, poisonings, magical arts, and the like. In the twelfth book the same subjects are continued. Laws are passed concerning violations of military discipline, concerning the censorship of magistrates, and of the citizens living and dead; concerning oaths and the violation of them, and the punishments of those who neglect their duties as citizens. Foreign trade is then discussed, and the permission to be accorded to citizens of travelling in foreign parts; the classes of strangers who may visit the city are spoken of, and
the manner in which they are to be received. Laws are added respecting sureties, searches for property, right of possession by prescription, abduction of witnesses, theatrical competition, plots against the state, and bribery in offices. Rules are also given respecting tribute, respecting economy in sacred rites, respecting judges, their duties and sentences, and respecting sepulchral places and ceremonies. Here (at p. 960) the laws end. Lastly, a nocturnal council is instituted for the preservation of the state, consisting of older and younger members, who are to exhibit in their lives that virtue which is the basis of the state, to know the one in many, and to be educated in divine and every other knowledge, which will enable them to fulfil their office.

III. The style of the Laws differs in several important respects from the other dialogues of Plato: (1) in the want of character, power, and lively illustration; (2) in the frequency of mannerisms (cp. Introduction to the Philebus); (3) in the form and rhythm of the sentences; (4) in the use of words. On the other hand, there are many passages (5) which are characterized by a sort of ethical grandeur; and (6) in which, perhaps, a greater insight into human nature, and a greater reach of practical wisdom is shown, than in any other of Plato’s writings.

1. The discourse of the three old men is described by themselves as an old man’s game of play, which is compared to a game of draughts. Yet there is little of the liveliness of a game in their mode of treating the subject. They do not throw the ball to and fro, but two out of the three are listeners to the third, who is constantly asserting his superior wisdom and opportunities of knowledge, and apologizing (not without reason) for his own want of clearness of speech. He will ‘carry them over the stream’; he will answer for them when the argument is too difficult for them to follow; he is afraid of their ignorance of mathematics, but admits that gymnastic is likely to be more intelligible to them;—he has repeated his words several times, and yet they cannot understand him (ii. 664 C). The subject did not properly take the form of dialogue, and also the dramatic vigour of Plato had passed away. The old men speak as they might be expected to speak, and in this there is a touch of dramatic truth, as well as judgment in the treatment of the subject. Plato has given the Laws that form which was most suited to his own powers of writing in the decline of life. There is no regular plan—none of that consciousness
INTRODUCTION.

of what has preceded and what is to follow, which makes a perfect style,—but there are several attempts at a plan; the argument is 'pulled up,' and frequent explanations are offered why a particular topic was introduced.

The fictions of the Laws have no longer that verisimilitude which we find in the Phaedrus and the Timaeus, or even in the Politicus. We can hardly suppose that an educated Athenian would have placed the visit of Epimenides to Athens ten years before the Persian war (i. 642 D); or have imagined that a war with Messene prevented the Lacedaemonians from coming to the rescue of Hellas (iii. 692 D). The narrative of the origin of the Dorian institutions (iii. 685 foll.), said to be due to fear of the growing power of the Assyrians and the assertion that Troy was a part of the Assyrian empire, are evidently audacious inventions, which may be compared with the tale of the island of Atlantis in the poem of Solon, but are not accredited by similar arts of deception. Nor is there anywhere in the Laws that lively ἐυρυγεία, that vivid mise en scène, which is as characteristic of Plato as of some modern novelists.

The old men are afraid of the ridicule which 'will fall on their heads more than enough' (vi. 781 D, vii. 790 A, 800 B), and they do not often indulge in a joke. In one of the few which occur, the book of the Laws if left incomplete is compared to a monster wandering about without a head (vi. 752 A). But we no longer breathe the atmosphere of humour which pervades the earlier writings of Plato, and which makes the broadest Aristophanic joke as well as the subtlest refinement of wit possible; and hence an impression of baldness and feebleness is left upon our minds. Some of the descriptions in the Laws, which to us are most amusing, as, for example, of children roaring for the first three years of life; or of the Athenians walking into the country with fighting-cocks under their arms; or of the slave doctor who knocks about his patients finely (iv. 720 C; cp. viii. 857 D), and the gentleman doctor who civilly persuades them; or of the way of keeping order in the theatre, seem not to have been intended to suggest anything ludicrous. The irony of the earlier dialogues, of which some traces occur in the tenth book, is replaced by a severity which hardly condescends to regard human things. 'Let us say, if you please, that man is of some account; but I was speaking of him in comparison with God.'

The imagery and illustrations are poor in themselves, and are not
assisted by the surrounding phraseology. We have seen how in the Republic, and in the earlier dialogues, figures of speech such as 'the wave,' 'the drone,' 'the chase,' 'the bride,' appear and reappear at intervals. Notes are struck which are repeated from time to time, as in a strain of music. There is none of this subtle art in the Laws. The illustrations, such as the two kinds of doctors, 'the three kinds of funerals,' the fear potion, the puppet, the painter leaving a successor to restore his picture, the 'young man standing to consider where three ways meet,' the 'channel of discourse from which he will not divert the water,' can hardly be said 'to do much credit to his invention.' The citations from the poets have lost that fanciful character which gave them their charm in the earlier dialogues. We are tired of images taken from the arts of navigation, or archery, or weaving, or painting, or medicine, or music. Yet the comparisons of life to a tragedy (vii. 817), or of the working of mind to the revolution of the self-moved (x. 897), or of the aged parent to the image of a God dwelling in the house (xi. 931), or the reflection that 'man is made to be the plaything of God, and that this rightly considered is the best of him' (vii. 803 C), have great beauty.

2. The clumsiness of the dialogue leads to frequent mannerisms and repetitions. The perfection of the Platonic dialogue consists in the accuracy with which the question and answer are fitted into one another, and the regularity with which the steps of the argument succeed one another. This finish of style is no longer discernible in the Laws. There is a want of variety in the answers; nothing can be drawn out of the respondents but 'Yes' or 'No'; the insipid form 'What do you mean?' is constantly recurring. Again and again the speaker is charged, or charges himself, with obscurity; and he repeats again and again that he will explain his views more clearly. In several passages the Athenian praises himself in the most unblushing manner, very unlike the irony of the earlier dialogues, as when he declares 'that the laws are a divine work given by some inspiration of the Gods,' and 'that youth should commit them to memory instead of the compositions of the poets.' The prosopopoeia which is adopted by Plato in the Protagoras and other dialogues is repeated until we are weary of it. The legislator is always addressing the speakers or the young of the state, and the speakers are constantly making addresses to the legislator. A tendency to a paradoxical manner of statement is also observable.
INTRODUCTION.

'We must have drinking,' 'we must have a virtuous tyrant,'—this is too much for the duller wits of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan, who at first start back in surprise. More than in any other writing of Plato the tone is hortatory; the laws are sermons as well as laws; they are considered to have a religious sanction, and to rest upon a religious sentiment in the mind of the citizens. The mannerism of attributing the words of the Athenian to the Lacedaemonian and Cretan, who are supposed to have made them their own, is still maintained. Resumptions of subjects which have been half disposed of in a previous passage constantly occur: the arrangement has neither the clearness of art nor the freedom of nature. Irrelevant remarks are made here and there, or illustrations used which are not properly fitted in. The dialogue is generally weak and laboured, and is in the later books fairly given up; apparently, because unsuited to the subject of the work. The long speeches or sermons of the Athenian, often extending over several pages, have never the grace and harmony which are exhibited in the earlier dialogues. For Plato is incapable of sustained composition; his genius is dramatic rather than oratorical; he can converse, but he cannot speak. Even the Timaeus, which is one of his most finished works, is full of abrupt transitions. There is the same kind of difference between the dialogue and the continuous discourse of Plato as between the narrative and speeches of Thucydides.

3. The perfection of style is variety in unity, freedom, ease, clearness, the power of saying anything, and of striking any note in the scale of human feelings without impropriety; and such is the divine gift of language possessed by Plato in the Symposium and Phaedrus. From this there are many fallings-off in the Laws: first, in the structure of the sentences, which are rhythmical and monotonous,—the formal and sophistical manner of the age is superseding the natural genius of Plato: second, they are often of enormous length, and the latter end frequently appears to forget the beginning of them,—they seem never to have received the second thoughts of the author; either the emphasis is wrongly placed, or there is a want of point in a clause; or an absolute case occurs which is not properly separated from the rest of the sentence; or words are aggregated in a manner which fails to show their relation to one another; or the connecting particles are omitted at the beginning of sentences: the use of the relative and antecedent is more indistinct, the changes of person and number more frequent,
examples of pleonasm, tautology, and periphrasis, unmeaning antitheses of positive and negative, and other affectations, are more numerous than in the other writings of Plato; there is also a more common and sometimes unmeaning use of qualifying formulae, ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, κατὰ δύναμιν, and of double expressions, παντῇ πάντως, οὐδάμως οὐδαμῆ, ὅπως καὶ ὅπη—these are too numerous to be attributed to errors in the text; again, there is an over-curious adjustment of verb and participle, noun and epithet—many forms of affected variety in cadence and expression take the place of natural variety: thirdly, the absence of metaphorical language is remarkable—the style is not devoid of ornament, but the ornament is of a debased rhetorical kind, patched on to instead of growing out of the subject; there is a great command of words, and a laboured use of them; forced attempts at metaphor occur in several passages,—e.g. viii. 844 A, παροχτεῖνες λόγους; ix. 858 C, τὰ μὲν τιθέμενα τὰ δὲ παρατιθέμενα; vi. 773 D, οἵνος κολαζόμενος ἐπὸ νήφοντος ἑτέρου θεοῦ; the plays on the word νόμος = νοῦ διανομῆ, iv. 714 A, ἀδη ἔτερα, iii. 700 B: fourthly, there is a foolish extravagance of language in other passages, ‘the swinish ignorance of arithmetic,’ vii. 819 D; ‘the justice and suitableness of the discourse on laws,’ vii. 811 C; over-emphasis at ix. 861 D; ‘best of Greeks,’ vii. 820, said of all the Greeks, and the like: fifthly, poor and insipid illustrations are also common, e.g. i. 638 C, 639 A, ii. 644 E: sixthly, we may observe an unmeaning use of climax and hyperbole, vii. 808 A, αἰσχρών λέγειν χρή πρὸς αὐτῶς δοῦλων τε καὶ δοῦλην καὶ παῖδα καὶ εἰ ποιον οἴδη τοῦ θέλην οἰκίαν; i. 636 B, δοκεὶ τοῖτω τὸ ἐπιστῆδεμα κατὰ φύσιν τὰς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἣδονᾶς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θηρίων διεφθαρκέναι.

4. The peculiarities in the use of words which occur in the Laws have been collected by Zeller and Stallbaum: first, in the use of nouns, such as ἀλλοδημία, ἀπεναύτησις, γλυκυθυμία, θραυσφεία, μεγαλόνων, παιδουργία, διαβέτρωρ, κόρος. Secondly, in the use of adjectives, such as ἄιστορ, βαύδοτος, ἐχθροδοτός, ἱδέως, χρόνως, and of adverbs, such as ἀνείδη, ἀνατεί, νηπουεί. Thirdly, in the use of verbs, such as ἀίσθενε (ἀἰσθείνε οἰπεῖν, iv. 709 A), εἰδημονεῖσθαι, παροποδιζεῖσθαι, τημελειν, τητάν. These words however, as Stallbaum remarks, are formed according to analogy, and nearly all of them have the support of some poetical or other authority.

Zeller and Stallbaum have also collected forms of words in the Laws, differing from the forms of the same words which occur in other places: e.g. βλάβως for βλάβη, ἄβιος for ἄβιωτος, ἀχάριστος for ἀχαρις, δοῦλειος for
INTRODUCTION.

Zeller has noted a fondness for substantives, ending in μα and σις, such as γεώργια, διά-

pαμα, ἐπιθύμημα, ζημίωμα, κωμόπθημα, ὀμλημα; βλάψις, λοιδόρησις, παράγ-

gελοις, and others; also a use of substantives in the plural, which are

commonly found only in the singular, μανία, ἀθέστητες, φθόνοι, φῶς, φύσεις. Also, a peculiar use of prepositions in composition, as in

ἕνεκα, ἀποδάπατο, διαμορφείτω, διείρηται, διεναλθείσθαι, and others:

also a frequent use of the Ionic dative plural in αοίσι and οοισι.

To these peculiarities he has added a list of peculiar expressions and constructions. The most characteristic are the following, viii. 841 D, ἄθνα παλλακῶν σπέρματα; ix. 855 C, ἀμορφοὶ ἔδραί; iii. 690 D, ὅσα ἄξωματα πρῶς ἄρχονται; vi. 744 B, οἱ κατὰ πόλιν καροί; μῦθος, used in several places of "the discourse about laws;" and connected with this the frequent use of παραμύθιων and παραμυθεῖσθαι in the general sense of 'addressing'; vii. 823 E, αἰμίλιος ἔρως; xii. 960 B, ἄπαφοι πράξεις; vi. 752 A, μύθος ἀκέφαλος; vi. 755 D, ἢδος εὐθύπορον. He remarks also on the frequent use of the abstract for the concrete; e.g. ἀπηρεσία for ἀπηρέται, φυγαί for φυγάδες, μηχαναί in the sense of contrivers, δουλεία for δουλοί, βασιλεία for βασιλείς, μανικέμα κηδεύματα for γυναίκα μανικέμην; ἡ χρεία τῶν παίδων in the sense of indigent children, and παίδων ἰκανότης; τὸ ἔθος τῆς ἀπερίας for ἡ εἰωθυνία ἀπερία; κυπαριστῶν ὑψη τε καὶ κάλλη θαμάσια for κυπάριστοι μᾶλα ὑψηλαι καὶ καλαί. He further notes some curious uses of the genitive case, e.g. φιλίας ὁμολογίας, μανίας ὄργης, λαμπρᾶς ἡδονής, χειμώνων ἀναστροφής; and of the dative, ὄμηλα ἔχθροις, νομοθείαι ἐπιτρόποις; and also some rather uncommon periphrases, θρέματα Νείλου, ἐνγεγενητερ τέκνων for ἄλοχος, Μόιησις λέξις for σοιησίς, ζωγράφων παίδες, ἀνθρώπων σπέρματα and the like; the fondness for particles of limitation, especially τις and ὡς, σὺν τις χάρις, τοῖς ἣν δυναμένοις and the like; the pleonastic use of ταῦτων, of ὁς, of ὁς ἦσπ τεῖν, of ἐκάστοτε; and the periphrastic use of the preposition περί. Lastly, he observes the tendency to hyperbata or transpositions of words; and to rhythmical uniformity as well as grammatical irregularity in the structure of the sentences.

For nearly all the expressions which are adduced by Zeller as arguments against the genuineness of the Laws, Stallbaum finds some sort of authority. There is no real ground for suspecting their genuineness, because several words occur in them which are not
found in the other writings of Plato. An imitator will often preserve
the usual phraseology of a writer better than he would himself. But,
on the other hand, the mere fact that authorities may be quoted in
support of most of these uses of words, does not show that the diction
is not peculiar. Several of them seem to be poetical or dialectical,
and exhibit an attempt to enlarge the limits of Greek prose, by the
introduction of Homeric and tragic expressions. Most of them do
not appear to have retained any hold on the later language of Greece.
Like several 'experiments in language' of the writers of the Elizabethan
age, they were afterwards lost; and though occasionally found in
Plutarch, and imitators of Plato, they have not passed current in
Aristotle or the common dialect of Greece.

5. Unequal as the style of the Laws is, they contain a few passages
which are very grand and noble. For example, the address to the
poets at vii. 817: 'Best of strangers, we also are poets of the best
and noblest tragedy; for our whole state is an imitation of the best
and noblest life, which we affirm to be indeed the very truth of tragedy.'
Or again, the sight of young men and maidens in friendly intercourse
with one another, suggesting the dangers to which youth is liable from
the violence of passion (viii. 835-841); or the eloquent denunciation
of unnatural lusts in the same passage; or the charming thought that
the best legislator 'orders war for the sake of peace and not peace for
the sake of war' (i. 628 E, foll.); or the pleasant allusion 'O Athenian—
inhabitant of Attica, I will not say, for you seem to me worthy to be
named after the Goddess Athene because you go back to first principles'
(i. 626 D); or the pithy saying 'many a victory has been and will be
suicidal to the victors, but education is never suicidal' (i. 641 C); or the
fine expression that 'the walls of a city should be allowed to sleep in
the earth, and that we should not attempt to disinter them' (vi. 778 D);
or the remark that 'God is the measure of all things in a sense far
higher than any man can be' (iv. 716 C); or that 'a man should be from
the first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long
as possible' (v. 730 C); or the principle repeatedly laid down, 'that the
sins of the fathers are not to be visited on the children,' e.g. ix. 856 C;
or the description of the funeral rites of those blessed persons who depart
in innocence (xii. 947 B, foll.); or the noble sentiment, that we should
do more justice to slaves than to equals, (vi. 777 D); or the curious
observation, founded, perhaps, on his own experience, that there are
INTRODUCTION.

a few 'divine men in every state however corrupt, whose conversation is of inappreciable value' (xii. 951 C); or the acute remark, that public opinion is to be respected, because the judgments of mankind about virtue are better than their practice (xii. 950 B); or the deep religious and also modern feeling which pervades the tenth book (whatever may be thought of the arguments); the sense of the duty of living as a part of a whole, and in dependence on the will of God (x. 903 D, E), who takes care of the smallest things as well as the greatest (x. 900 C); and the picture of parents praying for their children (x. 887 D, foll.) (not as we may say, slightly altering the words of Plato, as if there were no reality in the Gentile religions, but as if there were the greatest), are very striking to us. We must remember that the Laws are not, like the Republic, an ideal state, but are supposed to be on the level of human motives and feelings; hence there is an attempt made to show that the pleasant is also just. But, on the other hand, the priority of the soul to the body, and of God to the soul, is always insisted upon as the true incentive to virtue; especially with great force and eloquence at the commencement of Book v. And the work of legislation is carried back to the first principles of morals.

6. There is none of Plato's writings which shows so deep an insight into the sources of human evil as the Laws. That 'cities will never cease from ill until they are better governed,' is the text of the Laws as well as of the Politicus and Republic. The remark that the balance of power preserves states (iii. 691, 692); the reflection that no one ever passed his whole life in disbelief of the Gods (x. 888 C); the idea, original to the Greek, that the characters of men are best seen in convivial intercourse (i. 649 B); the observation that the people must be allowed to share not only in the government, but in the administration of justice (trial by jury); the desire to make laws, not with a view to courage only but to all virtue; the clear perception that education begins with birth, or even as he would say before birth (vii. 789 A); the attempt to purify religion; the modern reflections, that punishment is not vindictive (ix. 854 E), and that limits must be set to the power of bequest (xi. 922, 923); the impossibility of undeceiving the victims of quacks and jugglers (xi. 933 A); the necessity of sanitary measures (vi. 761 B); above all, perhaps, the distinct consciousness that under the actual circumstances of mankind the ideal cannot be carried out (v. 739 B, 746 B), and yet may be a guiding principle—will appear
to us, if we remember that we are still in the dawn of politics, to show a great depth of political wisdom.

IV. The Laws of Plato contain numerous passages which closely resemble other passages in his writings, as for example, the comparison of philosophy to a yelping she-dog, both in the Republic and in the Laws (Laws, xii. 967 D; Rep. x. 607 C): the remark that no man can practise two trades (Laws, viii. 846 D; Rep. iii. 394 E, etc.): or the advantage of the middle condition (Laws, v. 736 E; Rep. iv. 421 foll.): or the moulds (τίποτα) of religion (Laws, vii. 800 foll.; Rep. ii. 379 foll.): or the remark (Laws, xii. 945 E) that 'the relaxation of justice makes many cities out of one,' which may be compared with the Republic (Rep. iv. 422 E): or the description of lawlessness 'creeping in little by little in the fashions of music' (Laws, iii. 701 foll.; Rep. iv. 424 E). These are a few out of many examples which may be adduced of resemblances in the Laws to the other writings of Plato. They are far more numerous than the resemblances between other parts of his writings. No dialogues so nearly approach one another in thought as the Republic and the Politicus or the Laws, notwithstanding their differences. And at first sight a suspicion arises that the repetition shows the unequal hand of the imitator. For why should a writer say over again, in a more imperfect form, what he had already said in his most finished style and manner? And yet it may be urged on the other side that an author whose original powers are beginning to decay will be very liable to repeat himself, as in conversation, so in books. He may have forgotten what he had written before; he may be unconscious of the decline of his own powers. Hence arises a question of great interest, bearing on the genuineness of ancient writers. Is there any criterion by which we can distinguish the genuine from the spurious imitation, or, in other words, the repetition of a thought or passage by an author himself from the appropriation of it by another? The question has, perhaps, never been fully discussed; and, though a real one, does not admit of a precise answer. A few general considerations on the subject may be offered:—

(a) Is the difference such as might be expected to arise at different times of life or under different circumstances?—There would be nothing surprising in a writer, as he grew older, losing something of his own originality, and falling more and more under the spirit of his age. 'What a genius I had when I wrote that book!' was the pathetic exclamation of a famous English author, when in old age he chanced to take up one
of his early works. There would be nothing surprising again in his losing somewhat of his powers of expression, and becoming less capable of framing language into a harmonious whole. There would also be a strong presumption that if the variation of style was uniform, it was attributable to some natural cause, and not to the arts of the imitator. The imitation might be the result of feebleness and of want of activity of mind. As in the well-known instance of Milton’s ‘Paradise Regained,’ the decline of power which impaired the execution of a work might also enfeeble an author’s judgment about the child of his old age. In other words, he might be a worse writer and a worse critic of his own writings. But the natural weakness of a great author would be different from the artificial weakness of an imitator; whereas the forger would be unable to maintain this equality in the appearance of his writings. He would fill his work with irregular patches, sometimes taken verbally from the writings of the author whom he personated, but rarely acquiring his spirit. His imitation would be obvious, irregular, superficial. The patches of purple would be easily detected among his threadbare and tattered garments. He would rarely take the pains to put the same thought into other words. Speaking of ancient forgers generally, we may say that they were far from being masters in the art of deception, and had rarely any motive for being so.

(b) But, secondly, the imitator will commonly be least capable of understanding that which is really the most characteristic part of a great writer. In every man’s writings there is something like himself and unlike others, which gives individuality. To appreciate this latent quality would require a kindred mind, and minute study and observation. There are a class of similarities which may be called undesigned coincidences, which are so remote as to be incapable of being borrowed from one another, and yet when they are compared find a natural explanation in their being the work of the same mind. The imitator might imitate the turns of style—he might repeat images or illustrations, but he could not enter into the inner circle of Platonic philosophy. He would understand that part of it which became popular in the next generation, as for example, the doctrine of ideas or of numbers: he might criticise and condemn communism. But the higher flights of Plato about the science of dialectic, or the unity of virtue, or a person who is above the law, would have been unintelligible to him.

(c) The argument from imitation assumes a different character when
the supposed imitations are associated with other passages having the 
impress of original genius (cp. Introd. to Appendix, Vol. II). Then all 
the probabilities that can be urged on behalf of similar passages being 
the work of an original writer are greatly increased by their juxtaposition 
with other passages which certainly are so. The great excellence, not 
only of the whole, but even of the parts of writings, is a strong proof of 
their genuineness—for although the great writer may fall below, the forger 
or imitator cannot rise much above himself. Whether we can attribute 
the worst parts of a work to a forger and the best to a great writer,—as 
for example, in the case of some of Shakespeare's works,—depends upon 
the probability that they have been interpolated, or have been the joint 
work of two writers; and this can only be established by a comparison 
of other writings of the same class. If the interpolation or double 
authorship of Greek writings in the time of Plato could be shown to be 
common, then a question, perhaps insoluble, would arise, not whether the 
whole but whether parts of the Platonic dialogues are genuine, and, if 
parts only, which parts. And although Hebrew prophecies and Homeric 
poems and Laws of Manu may have grown together in early times, 
there is no proof of any such tendency in the later ages of Greece after 
authorship had become a regular profession.

It must be admitted that these principles, although real, are difficult of 
application. Yet a criticism may be worth making which rests only on 
probabilities or impressions. Great disputes will arise about the merits 
of different passages, about what is really characteristic and original or 
trivial and borrowed. Many have thought the Laws to be one of the 
greatest of Platonic writings, while in the judgment of Mr. Grote they 
hardly rise above the level of the forged epistles. The manner in which 
a writer would or would not have written at a particular age must be 
acknowledged to be a matter of conjecture. But enough has been said 
to show that similarities of a certain kind, whether criticism is able to 
detect them or not, may be such as must be attributed to an original 
writer, and not to a mere imitator.

(d) Applying these principles to the case of the Laws, we have now 
to point out that they contain the class of latent refined similarities which 
are indicative of genuineness. That these are found in a work which 
contains many beautiful and remarkable passages, will be admitted by 
any one who refers back to § III. 6. We may therefore begin by claim-
ing this presumption in their favour. Such undesigned coincidences, as
we may venture to call them, are the following. The conception of justice as the union of temperance, wisdom, courage (Laws, i. 631 C; Rep. iv. 433 foll.): the latent idea of dialectic implied in the notion of dividing laws after their kinds (Laws, i. 630 E); and again (xii. 965 C), the exaggerated approval of the method of looking at one idea gathered from many things, 'than which a truer was never discovered by any man': or again the description of the Laws as parents (Laws, ix. 859 A; Rep. vii. 538 D): the assumption that religion has been already settled by the oracle of Delphi (Laws, v. 738 B; Rep. iv. 427 B), to which an appeal is also made for the decision of disputes: the notion of the battle with self, a paradox for which Plato in a manner apologises both in the Laws and the Republic (Laws, i. 627 B; Rep. iv. 430 E, foll.): the remark (Laws, ix. 859 D) that just men, even when they are deformed in body, may still be perfectly beautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds (cp. Rep. iii. 402 D, E): the argument that ideals are none the worse because they cannot be carried out (Rep. v. 472 D; Laws, v. 746 B): the near approach to the idea of good in 'the principle which is common to all the four virtues,' a truth which the guardians must be compelled to recognise (Laws, xii. 965 D; cp. Rep. vii. 534 D): or again the recognition by reason of the right pleasure and pain, which had previously been matter of habit (Laws, ii. 653 B; Rep. iii. 402 A): or the blasphemy of saying that the excellency of music is to give pleasure (Laws, ii. 665 D; Rep. vi. 509 A, B): again the story of the Sidonian Cadmus (Laws, ii. 663 E), is a variation of the Phoenician tale of the earth-born men (Rep. iii. 414 C): the danger of altering the modes of music in the Republic (iv. 424 C) may be compared with the danger of altering the plays of children in the Laws (vii. 797 B): the apology for delay and diffuseness which occurs not infrequently in the Republic, is carried to an excess in the Laws: the remarkable thought (Laws, x. 899 A) that the soul of the sun is better than the sun, agrees with the relation in which the idea of good stands to the sun in the Republic, and with the substitution of mind for the idea of good in the Philebus: the passage about the tragic poets (Laws, vii. 817 A, foll.) agrees generally with the treatment of them in the Republic, but is more finely conceived, and worked out in a nobler spirit. Some lesser similarities of thought and manner should not be omitted, such as the mention of the thirty years old students in the Republic (vii. 539 B), and the fifty years old choristers in the Laws (ii. 670 A); or the image of the wax from which the citizens are to be
made in the Laws as in the Republic; or the number of the tyrant (729), which is nearly equal with the number of days and nights in the year (730), compared with the 'slight correction' of the sacred number 5040, which, 'if two families be deducted may be divided by all the numbers from one to twelve' (Laws, vi. 771 C); or once more, we may compare the ignorance of solid geometry of which he complains in the Republic (vii. 528 C), and the puzzle about fractions (vii. 524 E) with the difficulty in the Laws about commensurable and incommensurable quantities, (Laws vii. 819, 820)—and the malicious emphasis on the word γωνακευον (Laws, vii. 790 A) with the use of the same word (Rep. v. 469 E). These and similar passages tend to show that the author of the Republic is also the author of the Laws. They are echoes of the same voice, coincidences too subtle to have been invented by the ingenuity of any imitator. The force of the argument is increased, if we remember that no passage in the Laws is exactly copied,—nowhere do five or six words occur together which are found together elsewhere in Plato's writings.

Several passages in the Laws have parallels with other writings of Plato as well as with the Republic. In general, as we might expect, such resemblances occur chiefly in the dialogues, which, on other grounds, we may suppose to be of later date. The punishment of evil is to be like evil men (Laws, v. 728 B), as he says also in the Theaetetus (176 E). Compare again the dependence of tragedy and comedy on one another, of which he gives the reason in the Laws (vii. 816 D)—'For serious things cannot be understood without laughable, nor opposites at all without opposites, if a man is really to have intelligence of either;' here he puts forward the principle which is the groundwork of the thesis of Socrates (Symp. 223 C), 'that the genius of tragedy is the same as that of comedy, and that the writer of comedy ought to be a writer of tragedy also.' There is a truth and right which is above Law (Laws, ix. 875 C), as we learn also from the Politicus. That men are the possession of the Gods (Laws, x. 902 C), is a reflection which likewise occurs in the Phaedo (62 B). The remark, whether serious or ironical (Laws, xii. 948 C), that 'the sons of the Gods naturally believed in the Gods, because they had the means of knowing about them,' is found in the Timaeus (40 D). The reign of Cronos, who is the divine ruler (Laws, iv. 713 B), is the reminiscence of the Politicus (269 A, foll.). It is remarkable that in the Sophist and Politicus (Soph. 232 E), Plato, speaking in the character of the Eleatic stranger, has already put on
the old man. The madness of the poets, again, is a favourite notion of Plato's, which occurs also in the Laws (iv. 719 C), as well as in the Phaedrus (245 A) and elsewhere. There are traces in the Laws (iii. 685 A, foll.) of the same desire to base speculation upon history which we find in the Critias. Once more there is a striking parallel with the paradox of the Gorgias (472 E, foll.), that 'if you do evil, it is better to be punished than to be unpunished,' in the Laws (ii. 661 D), 'To live having all goods without justice and virtue is the greatest of evils if life be immortal, but not so great if the bad man lives but a short time.'

The point to be considered is whether these are the kind of parallels which would be the work of an imitator. Would a forger have had the wit to select the most peculiar and characteristic thoughts of Plato; would he have caught the spirit of his philosophy; would he, instead of openly borrowing, have half concealed his favourite ideas; would he have formed them into a whole such as the Laws; would he have given another the credit which he might have obtained for himself? Without pressing such arguments as absolutely certain, we must acknowledge that such a comparison affords a new ground of real weight for believing the Laws to be a genuine writing of Plato.

V. The relation of the Republic to the Laws is clearly set forth by Plato in Book v. 739. The Republic is the best state, the Laws is the best possible under the existing conditions of the Greek world. The Republic is the ideal, in which no man calls anything his own, which may or may not have existed in some remote clime, under the rule of some God, or son of a God (who can say?), but is, at any rate, the pattern of all other states and the exemplar of human life. The Laws distinctly acknowledge what the Republic partly admits, that the ideal is inimitable by us, but that we should lift up our eyes to the heavens and try to regulate our lives according to the divine image. The citizens are no longer to have wives and children in common, and are no longer to be under the government of philosophers. But the spirit of communism or communion is to continue among them; the sexes are to be as nearly on an equality as possible; they are to meet at common tables, and to share warlike pursuits (if the women will), and to have a common education. The legislator has taken the place of the philosopher, but a council of elders is retained, who are to fulfil the duties of the legislator when he has passed out of life. The addition of younger persons to this council by cooptation is an improvement on
the governing body of the Republic. The scheme of education in
the Laws is obviously of a far lower kind than that which he has
conceived in the Republic. There he would have his rulers trained
in all knowledge meeting in the idea of good, of which the different
branches of mathematical science are but the handmaidens or minis-
ters; here he stops short with the preliminary sciences, and they
are to be studied partly with a view to their practical usefulness,
which in the Republic he holds cheap; and still more with a view to
avoiding impiety, of which in the Republic he says nothing. Yet in the
Laws there remain traces of the old educational ideas. He is still for
banishing the poets; and as he finds the works of prose writers equally
dangerous, he would substitute for them the study of his own Laws. He
insists strongly on the importance of mathematics as an educational
instrument. He is no more reconciled to the Greek mythology than in
the Republic, though he would rather say nothing about it out of a pious
reverence for antiquity; and he is equally willing to have recourse to
fictions, provided they have a moral tendency. He harps back upon
a golden age in which the sanctity of oaths was respected and in which
men living nearer the Gods were more disposed to believe in them; but
we must legislate for the world as it is, now that the old beliefs have
passed away (xii. 948 C). Though he is no longer fired with dialectical
enthusiasm, he would compel the guardians to 'look at one idea gathered
from many things,' and to 'perceive the principle which is the same
in all the four virtues' (xii. 965 C). He still recognizes the enormous
influence of music, in which every citizen is to be trained for three years;
and he seems to attribute the existing degeneracy of the Athenian state
and the laxity of morals partly to musical innovation, manifested in the
unnatural divorce of the instrument and the voice, and partly to the
influence of the mob who ruled at the theatres. He assimilates the
education of the two sexes, as far as possible, both in music and
gymnastic, and, as in the Republic, he would give to gymnastic a purely
military character. In marriage, his object is still to produce the finest
children for the state. As in the Politicus, he would unite -in wedlock
dissimilar natures—the passionate with the dull, the courageous with
the gentle. And the virtuous tyrant of the Politicus, who has no place in
the Republic, again appears (iv. 709 E). In this, as in all his writings,
he has the strongest sense of the degeneracy and incapacity of the
rulers of his own time.
INTRODUCTION.

In the Laws, the philosophers, if not banished, like the poets, are at least ignored; and religion takes the place of philosophy in the regulation of human life. It must however be remembered that the religion of Plato is coextensive with morality, and is that purified religion and mythology of which he speaks in the second book of the Republic. There is no real discrepancy in the two works. In a popular treatise, he speaks of religion rather than of philosophy; just as he appears to identify virtue with pleasure, and rather seeks to find the common element of the virtues than to maintain his old paradoxical thesis that they are one, or that they are identical with knowledge. The dialectic and the idea of good, which even Glaucon in the Republic could not understand, would be obviously out of place in a more popular work.

Some confusion occurs in the passage in which Plato speaks of the Republic, occasioned by his reference to a third state, which he proposes (D.V.) hereafter to expound (v. 739 B, foll.). Like many other thoughts in the Laws, the allusion is obscure from not being worked out. The passage is explained by Aristotle (Polit. iv. 1), who supposes Plato to mean by the third state, neither the best absolutely, nor the best under existing conditions, but an imaginary state, inferior to either, destitute, as he supposes, of the necessaries of life: apparently such a beginning of primitive society as he describes in Laws iii. Aristotle, however, had no more power of divining the obscure hint than we have. And it is not improbable that Plato may have meant by his third state an historical sketch, bearing the same relation to the Laws which the unfinished Critias would have borne to the Republic; or he may, perhaps, have intended to describe a state more nearly approximating than the Laws to existing Greek states.

The Politicus is a mere fragment when compared with the Laws, yet combining a second interest of dialectic as well as politics, which is wanting in the larger work. Several points of similarity and contrast may be observed between them. In some respects the Politicus is even more ideal than the Republic, looking back to a former state of para-disiacal life, in which the Gods ruled over mankind, as the Republic looks forward to a coming kingdom of philosophers. Of this kingdom of Cronos there is also mention in the Laws (iv. 713 B). Again, in the Politicus, the Eleatic Stranger rises above law to the conception of the living voice of the lawgiver, who is able to provide for individual cases.
A similar thought is repeated in the Laws (ix. 875 C): 'If in the order of nature, and by divine destiny, a man were able to apprehend the truth about these things, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no law or order above knowledge, nor can mind without impiety be deemed the subject or slave of any, but rather the lord of all.' The union of opposite natures, who form the warp and the woof of the political web, is a favourite thought expressed under the same figure of speech in both dialogues.

VI. The Republic may be described as the Spartan constitution appended to a government of philosophers. But in the Laws an Athenian element is also introduced. Many enactments are taken from the Athenian; the four classes are borrowed from the constitution of Cleisthenes, which Plato regards as the best form of Athenian government, and the guardians of the law bear a certain degree of resemblance to the archons. Life is to wear, as at Athens, a joyous and festive look; there are to be Bacchic choruses, and men of mature age are encouraged in moderate potations. On the other hand, the common meals, the public education, the crypteia are borrowed from Sparta and not from Athens, and the superintendence of private life, which was to be practised by the governors, has also its prototype in Sparta. The extravagant dislike which Plato shows both to a naval power and to democracy is the reverse of Athenian.

The best-governed Hellenic states traced the origin of their laws to individual lawgivers. There can be no doubt that these were real persons, though we are uncertain how far they originated or only modified the institutions which are ascribed to them. But the lawgiver, though not a myth, was a fixed idea in the mind of the Greek,—as fixed as the Trojan war or the earth-born Cadmus. This was what 'Solon meant or said' was the form in which the Athenian expressed his own conception of right and justice, or argued a disputed point of law. And the constant reference in the Laws of Plato to the lawgiver is altogether in accordance with Greek modes of thinking and speaking.

There is also, as in the Republic, a Pythagorean element. The highest branch of education is arithmetic; to know the order of the heavenly bodies, and to reconcile the apparent contradiction of their movements, is an important part of religion; there is to be measure in the lives of the citizens, and also in their vessels and coins; the great blessing of the state is the number 5040. Plato is deeply impressed by the antiquity of
INTRODUCTION.

Egypt, and the unchangeableness of her ancient forms of song and dance. And he is also struck by the progress which the Egyptians had made in the mathematical sciences,—in comparison of them the Greeks appeared to him to be little better than swine. Yet he censures the Egyptian meanness and inhospitality to strangers. He has traced the growth of states from their rude beginning in a philosophical spirit; but of any life or growth of the Hellenic world in future ages he is silent. He has made the reflection that past time is the maker of states; but he does not argue from the past to the future, that the process is always going on, or that the institutions of nations are relative to their stage of civilization. If he could have stamped indelibly upon Hellenic states the will of the legislator, he would have been satisfied. The utmost which he expects of future generations is that they should supply the omissions, or correct the errors which younger statesmen detect in his enactments. When institutions have been once subjected to this process of criticism, he would have them fixed for ever.

THE PREAMBLE.

BOOK I. Stranger, let me ask a question of you—Was God or man the author of your laws? 'God, Stranger. In Crete, Zeus is said to have been the author of them, in Sparta, as Megillus will tell you, Apollo.' You believe, as Homer says, that Minos went every ninth year to converse with his Olympian sire, and gave you laws which he brought from him? 'Yes; and there was Rhadamanthus, his brother, who is reputed among us to have been the justest of men—he assisted in the work.' That is a reputation worthy of the son of Zeus. And as you and Megillus have been trained under their laws, I may ask you to give me an account of them. We can talk about them in our walk from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus. I am told that the distance is considerable, but probably there are shady places under the trees, at which, being no longer young, we may often rest and talk. 'Yes, Stranger, a little onward there are lofty groves of cypresses which are wonderfully beautiful, and green meadows in which we may repose.'

My first question is, why has the law ordained that you should have common meals, and practise gymnastics, and bear arms? 'My answer is, that our common meals are the life of the camp transferred to the
city; and we carry bows and arrows because our island home is rugged, and does not admit of cavalry. The legislator thought that war was the natural state and serious occupation of all mankind, and that peace is only a pretence; no possessions seemed to him to have any value which were not secured against enemies, and hence he arranged all our institutions with a view to war.' And do you think that superiority in war is the true aim of government? 'Certainly I do, and my Spartan friend will agree with me.' And are there wars not only of state against state, but of village against village, of family against family, of individual against individual? 'Yes.' And is a man his own enemy? 'There you come to first principles, like a true votary of the goddess Athene; and this is all the better, for you will the sooner recognise the truth of what I am saying—that all men everywhere are the enemies of all, and each individual of every other and of himself.' What do you mean? 'I mean what I say; and, further, that there is a victory and defeat—the best and the worst—which each man sustains, not at the hands of another, but of himself.' And does this extend to states and villages as well as to individuals? 'Certainly; there is a better in them which conquers the worse.' Whether the worse ever really conquers the better, is a question of words which may be left for the present; but your meaning is, that bad citizens do, under certain circumstances, overcome the good, and that the state is then conquered by herself, and that when they are defeated the state is victorious. Or, again, in a family there may be several brothers, the offspring of a single pair, and the bad may be a majority; and when the bad majority conquer the good minority, the family are worse than themselves. The use of the terms better or worse than him or themselves may be doubtful, but about the thing meant there can be no dispute. 'Very true.' Such a struggle might be determined by a judge. And which would be the better judge, he who destroys the worse and lets the better rule, or he who lets the better rule and makes the others voluntarily obey; or, thirdly, he who reconciles the two parties, and gives them laws which they mutually observe? 'The last, clearly.' But of such a legislator the object would not be war. 'That is true.' And as there are two kinds of war, one within a state and one without, of which the internal is by far the worse, will not the legislator direct his attention to this latter rather than to the other? He will reconcile the contending parties, and unite them against their external enemies. 'Certainly.' Every legislator will aim at the
INTRODUCTION.

greatest good, and the greatest good is not victory in war, whether civil or external, but mutual peace and good-will, as in the body, health is preferable to the purgation of disease. And the legislator who makes war his object instead of peace, or who pursues war except for the sake of peace, is not a true statesman. ‘And yet I am greatly mistaken, Stranger, if the laws of Crete and Sparta do not exclusively aim at war.’ Perhaps so; but that is no reason why we should quarrel with one another about your legislators instead of gently questioning them, for they are in earnest quite as much as we are. The poet Tyrtaeus (you have heard of his poems in Crete, and my Lacedaemonian friend is perfectly saturated with them)—he was an Athenian by birth, and a Spartan citizen;—well, he says, ‘I sing not, I care not about any man, however rich or happy, unless he is brave in war.’ Now I should like, in the name of us all, to ask the poet a question. O Tyrtaeus, I would say to him, are there not two kinds of war? Cleinias and Megillus and I are agreed with you in praising those who excel in war; but which kind of war do you mean? that dreadful war which is termed civil, or the milder sort which is waged against foreign enemies? ‘It is a milder sort.’ You say that you abominate those who are not eager to taste their enemies’ blood, and you seem to mean chiefly their foreign enemies? He will assent to this? ‘Certainly.’ Now we say that there are men better far than the heroes whom you, Tyrtaeus, celebrate, concerning whom another poet, Theognis the Sicilian, says that in a civil broil they are worth their weight in gold and silver. For in a civil war, not only courage, but justice and temperance and wisdom are required, and all virtue is better than a part. The mercenary soldier is ready to stand firm and die at his post; but he is a violent, senseless sort of animal. And the inspired legislator, or even the uninspired, will make laws with a view to the highest virtue; and this is not brute courage, but loyalty in the hour of danger. The virtue of Tyrtaeus, although needed at the time when he sang, is really of a very fourth-rate description. ‘Stranger, you are degrading our legislator to the level of the barbarians.’ Nay, I think that we should be degrading not him, but ourselves, if we believe that the laws of Lycurgus and Minos had a view to war only. A divine lawgiver must surely have had regard to all the different kinds of virtue, and he must have arranged his laws in classes corresponding to them, and not in the modern fashion, which only makes them after the want of them is felt, about matters of inheritance, assault,
and the like. As you truly said, virtue is the business of the legislator; but you went wrong when you referred all legislation to a part of virtue, and to an inferior part. For the object of laws, whether the Cretan or any other, is to make men happy. Now happiness or good is of two kinds—there are divine and there are human goods. And he who has the divine has the human ‘added to him’; but he who has lost the greater is deprived of both. The lesser goods are health, beauty, strength, and, lastly, wealth; not the blind God, but one who has the eye of sense; for sense or mind is the most divine of all goods. Then, comes temperance, and from the union of these with courage, which is the fourth or last, springs justice. These take precedence, and with a view to them the legislator will arrange all his ordinances, the human going back to the divine, and the divine to their leader mind. There will be enactments about marriage, about education, about all the states and feelings and experiences of men and women, at every age, in weal and woe, in war and peace; upon all the law will fix a stamp of praise and blame. There will also be regulations about property and expenditure, about contracts, about rewards and punishments, until the round of life is finished with the funeral rites and honours of the dead. The law will appoint guardians to preside over these things, some who walk by intelligence, others having true opinion only; and mind will harmonize the ordinances of the legislator, and show them to be in unison with the virtues. Now I want to know whether these are the principles observed in the laws of Lycurgus and Minos, or, as I should rather say, of Apollo and Zeus. We must go through the virtues, beginning with courage, and then we will show that what has preceded has relation to virtue.

Megillus, the Lacedaemonian, wishes that the Athenians should criticise Cleinias and the Cretan laws. Yes, is the reply, and I will criticise you and myself, as well as him. Tell me, Megillus, were not the common meals and gymnastic training instituted by your legislator with a view to war? ‘Yes, they were; and hunting comes third in the order of importance, and fourth the endurance of pain in gymnastic exercises and the institution of the crypteia. Marvellous is the power of enduring pain among our youth; they go about the country night and day without shoes on their feet, or beds to lie upon, and are their own servants; they wrestle and practise gymnastic exercises under the heat of a blazing sun, and they have many similar practices.’ Well, but
is courage only a combat against fear and pain, and not against pleasure and flattery? 'Against both, I should say.' And which is worse, to be overcome by pain or to be overcome by pleasure? 'The latter.' But did the divine lawgivers of Crete and Sparta legislate for a courage which is lame of one leg, able only to meet the attacks of pain, but not of pleasure, or able to meet both? 'For a courage which is able to meet both, I should say.' But if that is the case, where are the institutions which train your citizens to be equally brave against pleasure and pain, and superior to the enemies which are within as well as without them? 'We confess that neither in Sparta nor in Crete are there any institutions worth mentioning which are of this character.' I am not surprised, and will therefore only request forbearance on the part of us all, in case the love of truth should lead any of us to censure the laws of the others. Remember that I am more in the way of hearing criticisms of your laws than you can be; for in any well-ordered state, although an old man may sometimes speak of them in private to a ruler or elder, a similar liberty is not allowed to the young. But now being alone we shall not offend your legislator by a friendly examination of his laws. 'Take any freedom which you like.'

My first observation is, that your lawgiver ordered you to abstain from amusements and to endure hardships, because he thought that those who had not this discipline would run away from those who had. But he ought to have considered further, that those who had never been taught to resist pleasure would be equally at the mercy of those who could, and who are often among the worst of mankind. Pleasure, like fear, would overcome them, and take away their courage and freedom. 'There seems to be truth in that; but I should not like to be hasty in giving my assent to you.'

Next as to temperance, what institutions have you which are adapted to promote temperance? 'There are the common meals and gymnastic exercises.' These are partly good and partly bad, and, as in medicine, what is good at one time and for one person, is bad at another time and for another person. Now, although gymnastics and common meals do good, they are also a cause of sedition, and they appear to encourage unnatural love. The evil effect of them may be seen at Miletus, in Boeotia, and at Thurii. And the Cretans, who are supposed to be addicted to such love, are said to have invented the tale of Zeus and Ganymede in order to justify their evil practices by the example of the God who was
their lawgiver. Leaving the story, we may observe that all law has to
do with pleasure and pain; these are two fountains which are ever flow-
ing in human nature, and he who drinks of them when and as much as
he ought, is happy, and he who indulges in them to excess, is miserable.
‘I do not know how to answer you, but I still incline to think that the
Lacedaemonian lawgiver was right in forbidding pleasure, if I may judge
from the result. For there is no drunken revelry in Sparta, and any one
found in a state of intoxication is severely punished; he is not excused
as an Athenian would be at Athens on account of a festival. I myself
have seen the Athenians drunk at the Dionysia—and happening to be at
our colony, Tarentum, on a similar occasion, I have beheld the whole city
in a state of intoxication.’ Yes, I admit that these festivals should be
properly regulated. And I may reply, Yes, Spartans, that is not your
vice; but look at home and remember the licentiousness of your women.
And to all such accusations, whether brought against the Tarentines, or
us, or you, each of us may reply in turn:—‘Wonder not, Stranger; there
are different customs in different countries.’ And this may be a sufficient
answer; but we are speaking about the wisdom of lawgivers and not about
the customs of men. To return to the question of drinking: shall we
have total abstinence, as you have, or hard drinking, like the Scythians
and Thracians, or moderate potations like the Persians? ‘Give us
arms, and we send all these nations flying before us.’ My good friend,
be modest; you know that victories and defeats often arise from un-
known causes, and afford no proof of the goodness or badness of insti-
tutions. The stronger overcomes the weaker, as the Athenians have
overcome the Ceans, or the Syracusans the Locrians, which latter appear
nevertheless to be the best governed state in Magna Graecia. People
are apt to praise or censure practices without enquiring into the nature
of them. This is the way with drink: one person has a cloud of
witnesses, who sing the praises of wine; another declares that sober
men defeat drunkards in battle; and he again is refuted in turn. I should
like to conduct the argument on some other method; for here are two
cities on one side, and, if you regard numbers, there are ten thousand
on the other. ‘I am ready to pursue any method which is likely to lead
us to the truth.’ Let me put the matter thus: Somebody praises the
useful qualities of a goat; another has seen goats running about wild in
a garden, and blames a goat or any other animal who happens to be
without a keeper. There is no sense in this. ‘Certainly not.’ Is a pilot
who is sea-sick a good pilot? ‘No.’ Or is a general who is sick and drunk with fear and ignorant of war a good general? ‘A general of old women he ought to be.’ But can any one form an estimate of any society, which is intended to have a ruler, and which he only sees in an unruly and lawless state? ‘Not if he has never seen the orderly state also.’ There is a convivial form of society—is there not? ‘Yes.’ And has this convivial society ever been rightly ordered? Of course you Spartans have never seen anything of the kind, but I have had wide experience, and made many enquiries about such societies, and have hardly ever found anything right or good in them. ‘We acknowledge our want of experience, and desire to learn of you.’ Will you admit that in all societies there must be a leader? ‘Yes.’ And in time of war he must be a man of courage and absolutely devoid of fear, if this were possible. ‘Yes, he would be the right man.’ But we are talking now of a general who shall preside at meetings of friends—and this sort of meeting having a tendency to be uproarious, ought above all others to have a governor. ‘Very good.’ He should be a sober man and a man of the world, who will keep, make, and increase the peace of the society; a drunkard in charge of drunkards would be singularly fortunate if he avoided doing a serious mischief. ‘He certainly would.’ Suppose the case of a person censuring such meetings—he may be right in his censure, but there is also a possibility that he may have known them only in their disorderly state, when the master of the feast is drunk with the rest; and no one expects a drunken general or pilot to be the saviour of an army or of a ship. ‘That remark is true; but although I see the advantage of an army having a good general, I do not equally see the good of a feast being well managed.’ If you mean to ask what good accrues to the state from the right training of a single youth or a single chorus, I should reply, not much; but if you ask what is the good of education in general, I answer, that education makes good men, and that good men act nobly and overcome their enemies in battle. And though victory makes men insolent and is often suicidal to the victors, education is never suicidal. ‘You seem to mean that the regulation of convivial meetings is a part of education; how will you prove this?’ I will tell you. But first let me offer a word of apology. We Athenians are universally reputed among the Hellenes to be fond of talking, whereas the Lacedaemonian is celebrated for brevity, and the Cretan is considered to be sagacious and reserved. Now, I fear that I may be charged with
eliciting a long discourse out of slender materials. For drinking cannot be rightly ordered without correct principles of music, and music runs up into education generally, and if I am to discuss all these matters, I cannot avoid being tedious; I will, therefore, offer you the alternative of passing on to another part of our subject. ‘Do you know, Athenian, that our family is your proxenos at Sparta, and that from my boyhood I have regarded Athens as a second country, and having often fought your battles in my youth, I have become attached to you, and love the sound of the Attic dialect? And now I bethink me of the saying, that the best Athenians are more than ordinarily good, because they are genuinely and naturally good; therefore, be assured that I shall be glad to hear you talk as much as you please.’ ‘I, too,’ adds Cleinias, ‘have something to say about the Cretans, Stranger, which may give you confidence. You must have heard of Epimenides; he was a Cretan saint and hero, who came and offered sacrifices in your city by the command of an oracle ten years before the Persian war. The Athenians were in dread of the Persians, and he prophesied to them that the Persian host would not come for ten years, and would go away again, having suffered more harm than they had inflicted. Now, Epimenides was of my family, and when he visited Athens he formed ties of friendship with your forefathers.’ I see that you are willing to listen, and I have the will to speak, if I had only the ability. But, first, I must define the nature and power of education, and by this road we will travel on to the God Dionysus. • The man who is to be good at anything must have early training;—he who is to be a workman should have his box of tools when he is a child; the future soldier should learn to ride; the young carpenter should be taught to measure and use the rule,—all the thoughts and pleasures of children should bear on their after profession:—Do you agree with me? ‘Certainly.’ And we must remember further that the education of which we speak is not the education of a trainer, or of the captain of a ship, but of a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and how to obey; and such an education aims at virtue, and not at wealth or strength or mere cleverness. To the good man, education is of all things the most precious, and is also in constant need of renovation. ‘We agree.’ And we have before agreed that good men are those who are able to control themselves, and bad men are those who are not. Let me offer you an illustration which will assist our argument. Man is one; but in one and the same man are two
INTERVENTION.

foolish counsellors who contend within him—pleasure and pain, and of either he has expectations which may be termed hope and fear; and he is able to reason about good and evil, and reason, when affirmed by the state, becomes law. ‘We cannot follow you.’ Let me put the matter in another way: Every creature is the puppet of the Gods—whether he is a mere plaything or has any serious use we do not know; but this we know, that he is drawn different ways by cords and strings: there is a soft golden cord which draws him towards virtue—this is the law of the state. And there are other cords made of iron and hard materials drawing him other ways. The golden reasoning influence has nothing of the nature of force, and therefore requires ministers. I am giving an illustration of the doctrine that cities and citizens both conquer and are conquered by themselves. The individual follows reason, and the city law, which is embodied reason, either derived from the Gods or from the legislator. When this is made plain, education will be more clearly understood, and in particular the relation of education to convivial intercourse. And now let us try the experiment of setting wine before the puppet. ‘Very well.’ You admit that wine stimulates the passions? ‘Yes.’ And does wine equally stimulate the reasoning faculties? ‘No; it brings the soul back to a state of childhood.’ In such a state a man has the least control over himself, and is, therefore, worst? ‘Very true.’ The drunkard is, like the aged, in a second childhood? ‘Good.’ Then, can we ever bring ourselves to believe that drinking is right? ‘If you say so, I suppose that something may be urged on behalf of the paradox.’ And I am ready to maintain my position. ‘We should like to hear you prove that a man ought to make a beast of himself.’ Are you speaking of the degradation of the soul? ‘We are.’ And how about the body? Would any man willingly degrade or weaken that? ‘Certainly not.’ And yet if he goes to a doctor, does he not make himself ill in the hope of getting well, for no one would like to be always taking medicine, or always to be in training? ‘Very true.’ And may not convivial meetings have a similar remedial use? ‘Certainly.’ And if they have any such use, are they not to be preferred to other modes of training because they are painless? ‘But have they any such use?’ Let us see: are there not two kinds of fear—fear of evil and fear of public opinion? ‘There are.’ The latter kind of fear is opposed both to the fear of pain, and also to the love of pleasure. This is called by the legislator reverence, and is greatly encouraged by him
and by every good man; and shamelessness, which is the opposite of this, is the worst fault both of individuals and of states. This sort of fear or reverence is the chief cause of victory and safety in war, or at least one of the two chief causes, fearlessness of enemies being the other. 'True.' Then every one should be both fearful and fearless? 'Yes.' The right sort of fear is infused into a man when he comes face to face with shame, or cowardice, or the temptations of pleasure, and has to conquer them. He learns to take up arms against himself, over whom he must win many victories, if he is ever to be made perfect. 'That is reasonable enough.' And now, suppose that the Gods had given mankind a drug, of which the effect was to exaggerate every sort of evil and danger, so that the bravest man entirely lost his presence of mind and became a coward for a time:—would such a drug have any value? 'But is there such a drug?' No: but suppose that there were; might not the legislator use such a mode of testing courage and cowardice? 'To be sure he might.' You mean to say that the legislator would induce fear in order to implant fearlessness; and would give rewards and punishments to those who behaved well or the reverse, under the influence of the drug? 'Certainly he would.' And this mode of training,—whether practised in the case of one or many, whether in the solitude of the desert, out of sight of man, or in the presence of a large company,—if a man have sufficient confidence in himself to drink the potion amid his boon companions, leaving off in time and not taking too much,—would equally test his temperance. 'Very true.' Let us return to the lawgiver and say to him, Well, lawgiver, no such fear-producing potion has been given by God or invented by man, for 'witchcraft has no place at our feasts,' but a potion which will make men fearless has been given to men. 'Yes, you mean wine.' Yes; has not wine an effect the contrary of that which I was just now describing? First mellowing and humanizing a man, and then filling him with brave hopes, making him fearless and ready to say or do anything? 'Certainly.' Let us not forget that there are two qualities which should be cultivated in the soul—first, the greatest fearlessness; and, secondly, the greatest fear. 'Yes; you were saying that both are parts of reverence.' Courage and fearlessness are trained amid fears; but we have still to consider how fear is to be trained. For we desire to attain fearlessness and confidence without the insolence and boldness which commonly attend them. And do not love, ignorance, avarice, wealth, beauty, strength, while they stim-
ulate courage, also madden and intoxicate the soul, and are they not the causes of ten thousand crimes? What better and more innocent test of them can be devised than festive intercourse? Would you make a bargain with a man in order to try the experiment whether he is honest? or would you ascertain whether he is licentious by putting your wife or daughter into his hands? Neither Cretan nor any other man would deny that the test proposed is fairer, speedier, and safer than any other. And such a test will be most useful in the political science, which desires to know human natures and characters. "Very true."

BOOK II. And are there any other uses of well-ordered potations? There are; but, in order to explain them, I must repeat what I mean by right education, which, if I am not mistaken, depends on the due regulation of convivial intercourse. "A high assumption." I believe that virtue and vice are originally present to the mind of children in the form of pleasure and pain; later in life only do they arrive at reason and fixed principles, and happy is he who, even when he is old, possesses them, and the blessings which they confer. When pleasure and pain, and love and hate, are rightly implanted in the yet unconscious soul, and after the attainment of reason are discovered to be in harmony with her, this harmony of the soul is virtue, and the preparatory stage, anticipating reason, I call education. But the finer sense of pleasure and pain is apt to be impaired in the course of life; and therefore the Gods, pitying the toils and sorrows of mortals, have allowed them to have holidays, and given them the Muses and Apollo and Dionysus for leaders and playfellows. All young creatures are full of motion and frolic and utterance of the delight which is in them; but man only is capable of taking pleasure in rhythmical and harmonious movements. With these education begins; and the uneducated is he who has never known the discipline of the chorus, and the educated is he who has. The chorus is partly dance and partly song, and therefore the educated must sing and dance well. But when we say he sings and dances well, we mean that he sings and dances what is good. And if he thinks that to be good which is really good, he will have a much higher music and harmony in him, and be a far greater master of imitation in sound and gesture than he who has not this knowledge. "Yes, Stranger, he will be far better educated than the other." Then, if we know what is good and bad in
song and dance, we shall know what education is? 'Very true.' The next enquiry will relate to the figure, melody, song, and dance. Will the same figures or sounds be equally well adapted to the manly and the cowardly? 'How can they be, when the very colours of their faces are different?' Figures and melodies have a rhythm and harmony which are adapted to the expression of different feelings (I may remark, by the way, that the term 'colour,' which is a favourite word of music-masters, is not really applicable to music). And one class of harmonies is akin to courage and all virtue, the other to cowardice and all vice. 'We agree.' And do all men equally like all dances? 'Far otherwise.' How is this? Do some figures appear to be beautiful which are not? For no one will admit that he prefers the forms of vice to the forms of virtue, or that the choice of one or the other of them is a matter of opinion. Yet some persons say that the merit of music is to give pleasure. But this is impiety. There is, however, a more plausible account of the matter given by others, who make their likes or dislikes the criterion of excellence. Sometimes nature crosses habit, or conversely, and then they say that such and such fashions or gestures are pleasant, but they do not like to exhibit them before men of sense, although they enjoy them in private. 'Very true.' And do vicious measures and strains do any harm, or good measures any good to the lovers of them? 'I think that they must.' Say, rather, I am certain that they must have the effect of any indulgence shown to the vices of men, which are often censured by us gently and playfully, and with a sort of suspicion that the indulgence will one day be required by ourselves. And there can be no greater evil than this. 'I know of none.' Then in a city which has good laws, the poet will not be allowed to make the songs of the people just as he likes, or to corrupt the minds of youth as he pleases? 'Such a liberty is not to be thought of.' And yet he may do this anywhere except in Egypt. 'What is the custom of Egypt?' You will wonder when I tell you; ages ago they discovered the great truth which I am now asserting, that the youth of a people should be educated in forms and strains of virtue. These they fixed and consecrated in their temples; and no sculptor or painter is allowed to deviate from them. They are literally the same which they were ten thousand years ago. And this practice of theirs suggests the reflection that legislation about music is not an impossible thing. But the particular enactments must be the work of some divine man or God, as in Egypt their ancient chants are
INTRODUCTION.

said to be the composition of the goddess Isis. The melodies which have a natural truth and correctness should be embodied in a law, and then the desire of novelty is not strong enough to change the old fashions. Is not the origin of music as follows? We rejoice when we think that we prosper, and we think that we prosper when we rejoice, and at such times we cannot rest, but our young men dance dances and sing songs, and our old men, who have lost the elasticity of youth, regale themselves with the memory of the past, while they contemplate the life and activity of the young. 'Most true.' People say that he who gives us most pleasure at such festivals is to be crowned and receive the prize: are they right? 'Possibly.' Let us not be hasty in deciding, but first imagine a festival at which there are no distinct trials or contests; the lord of the festival, having assembled the citizens, makes a proclamation that he shall be crowned victor who gives the most pleasure, from whatever source derived. We will further suppose that there are various exhibitions of rhapsodists and musicians, tragic and comic poets, and we do not disdain marionette-players,—which of the innumerable pleasure-makers will win? 'I cannot say unless I see them.' Shall I answer for you? 'Very good.' The marionette-players will please the children; youths will be advocates of comedy; young men, educated women, and people in general will prefer tragedy; we old men are lovers of Homer and Hesiod. Now which of them is right? If you and I are asked, we must say that the old men are right, and that the Epic recitation which they approve is the best of all. 'Very true.' I am ready to admit that the excellence of music is to be measured by pleasure; but then the pleasure must be that of the good and educated, or better still, of one supremely virtuous and educated man. And the true judge, who is to lead the theatre and not be led by them, will have need of both wisdom and courage. For out of that mouth which has just appealed to the Gods in proof of his integrity, he ought not to give a false judgment, and he should be the enemy of all pandering to the popular taste. The ancient and common custom of Hellas, which still prevails in Italy and Sicily, left the judgment to the spectators, but this custom has been the ruin of the poets, and has degraded the theatre. For the spectators have their pleasures lowered to themselves. What is the inference from all this? The inference, at which we arrive for the fourth time, is that education is the training of the young idea in what the law affirms and the elders approve. And as the soul of a child
LAWS.

is too young to be trained in earnest, a kind of education has been invented which tempts him with fair and beauteous words and songs, as the sick are tempted by pleasant meats and drinks. ‘But is this the practice of states in general, or only of Crete and Lacedaemon? For in any other state, as far as I know, dances and music are constantly changed at the pleasure of the hearers. Their institutions are the reverse of the Egyptian.’ I am afraid that I misled you; not liking to be always finding fault with mankind as they are, I described them as they ought to be. But let me understand: you would say (would you not?) that such customs exist among the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and that the rest of the world would be improved by adopting them? ‘Much improved.’ And you would compel your poets to declare that the righteous are happy, and that the wicked man, even if he be as rich as Midas, is unhappy? Or, in the words of Tyrtaeus, ‘I sing not, I care not about him’ who is a great warrior not having justice; if he be unjust ‘I would not have him look calmly upon death or be swifter than the wind’; and may he be deprived of every good. For even if he have the goods which men regard, these are not really goods: first health; beauty next; thirdly wealth; and there are others. A man may have every sense purged and improved; he may be a tyrant, and do what he likes, and live for ever: But you and I will maintain that sight and hearing and immortality are goods to the just and evils to the unjust, and that the evil is lessened by the comparative shortness of life. If a man had health and wealth, and the power of a tyrant, and was insolent and unjust, his life would still be miserable; he might be fair and rich, and do what he liked, but he would live basely, and if basely evilly, and if evilly painfully. ‘There I cannot agree with you.’ Then may heaven give us the spirit of agreement, for I am as convinced of the truth of what I say as of the existence of the island of Crete; and, if I were a lawgiver, I would exercise a censorship over the poets, and I would punish them if they said that the wicked are happy, or that the unjust is the gainful. And these are not the only matters in which I should make my citizens speak in a different strain from the Cretans or Lacedaemonians, or the world in general. ‘Tell me,’ I would say to your legislators, ‘did the Gods who gave you laws, affirm the most just life to be also the pleasantest?’ If they say ‘no,’ which is an answer I should not like to put into the mouth of God, I would again ask the legislator which is the happier, the just or the pleasant life? And if he replies the
pleasanter, then I should say to him, 'O my father, did you not tell me that I should live as justly as possible; and if to be just is to be happy, what is that principle of happiness or good which is superior to pleasure? Is the approval of gods and men to be deemed good and honourable, but unpleasant, and their disapproval the reverse? Or is the neither doing nor suffering evil good and honourable, although not pleasant? But you cannot make men like what is not pleasant, and therefore you must make them believe that the just is pleasant. The business of the legislator is to clear up this mist and confusion which reigns in the minds of men as of children. He will, therefore, show the just and the unjust to be identical with the pleasurable and the painful, from the point of view of the just man. This is the judgment of the better soul and of the truth, and even if not the truth, is the best and most moral of fictions; and the legislator who desires to propagate this fiction, may be encouraged by remarking that mankind have believed the story of Cadmus and the dragon's teeth, and therefore he may be assured that he can make them believe anything, and effect the desired uniformity in hymns and tales, if he pleases, and need only consider what fiction will do the greatest good. That the happiest is also the holiest, this shall be our strain, which shall be sung by all three choruses alike. First will enter the choir of children, who will lift up their voices on high; and after them the young men, who will pray the God Paean to be gracious to the youth, and to testify to the truth of their words; then will come the chorus of elder men, between thirty and fifty or sixty; and, lastly, there will be the old men, preaching the same virtues in tales and discourses, as with the voice of an oracle. 'I do not understand about the third chorus; will you be a little plainer?' You remember how I spoke at first of the restless nature of young creatures, who jumped about and called out in a disorderly manner, and I said that no other animal attained any perception of rhythm; but that to us the Gods gave Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus to be our playfellows. Of the two first choruses I have already spoken, and I have now to speak of the third, or Dionysian chorus, which is composed of those who are between thirty and sixty years old. 'Will you explain?' We are agreed (are we not?) that men, women, and children should be always charming themselves with strains of virtue, and that there should be a variety in the strains, that they may not weary of them? Now the fairest and most useful of strains will be uttered by the elder men, and therefore we cannot let them off.
But then how can we make them sing? For a discreet elderly man is ashamed to hear the sound of his own voice in private, and still more in public. The only way is to give them drink; this will mellow the sourness of age. Children should be forbidden by law to drink wine; youths may take a little; but when men have reached forty years, they may be initiated into the mystery of drinking, and they will become softer and more impressionable. When a man's heart is warm within him, he will be more ready to charm himself with song. And what songs shall he sing? 'At Crete and Lacedaemon we only know choral songs.' Yes; that is because your way of life is military. Your young men are like wild colts feeding in a herd together; no one takes the individual colt and rubs him down, and tries to give him the qualities which would make a man a statesman as well as a soldier. He who was thus trained would be a greater warrior than those of whom Tyrtaeus speaks, for he would be courageous, and yet he would know that courage was not first but fourth in the scale of virtue. 'Once more, I must say, Stranger, that you run down our lawgivers.' Not intentionally, my good friend, but whither the argument leads I follow; and I am trying to find some style of poetry which we may assign to those who are ashamed of the common sort. 'Very good.' In all things which have a charm, either this charm is their good, or they have some accompanying truth or advantage. For example, in eating and drinking there is pleasure and also profit, that is to say, health; and in learning there is a pleasure and also truth. There is a pleasure or charm, too, in the imitative arts, as well as a law of proportion or equality; but the pleasure which they afford, however innocent, is not the criterion of their truth. The test of pleasure can only be applied to that which has no other good or evil, no truth or falsehood. But that which has truth must be judged of by the standard of truth, and therefore imitation and proportion are to be judged of by their truth, and by that only. 'Certainly.' And music is imitative? 'Yes.' Then music is not to be judged by the criterion of pleasure, and the Muse whom we seek is the muse not of pleasure but of truth, for imitation has a truth? 'Doubtless.' And if so, the judge must know what is being imitated before he decides on the quality of the imitation, and he who does not know what is true will not know what is good. 'He will not.' Will any one be able to imitate the human body, if he does not know the number, proportion, colour, or figure of the limbs? 'How can he?' But suppose we know some picture or figure to be an
INTRODUCTION.

exact resemblance of a man, should we not also require to know whether the picture is beautiful or not? for not every one can tell in what the beauty of a figure consists. ‘Quite right.’ The judge of the imitation, then, is required to know, first the original, secondly the truth, and thirdly the merit of the execution? ‘That appears to be the case.’ Then let us not weary in the attempt to bring music to the standard of the Muses and of truth. The Muses are not like human poets; they never spoil or mix rhythms or scales, or mingle instruments and human voices, or confuse the manners and strains of men and women, or of freemen and slaves, or of rational beings and brute animals. They do not practise the baser sorts of musical arts, such as the ‘matured judgments,’ of whom Orpheus speaks, would ridicule. But modern poets separate metre from music, and melody and rhythm from words, and use the instrument alone without the voice. The consequence is, that the meaning of the rhythm and of the time become doubtful. I am endeavouring to show how our fifty-year-old choristers are to be trained, and what they are to avoid. For the multitude are ridiculous judges of the proprieties of these matters; he who is only made to step in time by sheer force cannot be a critic of music. ‘He cannot.’ Then our newly-appointed minstrels must be trained in music sufficiently to understand the nature of rhythms and systems; and they should select such as are suitable to men of their age, and will enable them to give and receive innocent pleasure. This is a knowledge which goes beyond that either of the poets or of their auditors. For although the poet must understand rhythm and music, he need not necessarily know whether the imitation is good or not, which was the third point required in a judge; but our chorus of elders must know all three, if they are to be the instructors of our youth.

And now we will resume the original argument, which may be summed up as follows: A convivial meeting is apt to grow tumultuous as the drinking proceeds; every man becomes light-headed, and is ready to be an emperor. ‘Doubtless.’ And did we not say that the souls of the drinkers when fired with wine are made softer and more malleable at the hand of the legislator? the docility of childhood returns to them? At times however they become too valiant and disorderly, drinking out of their turn, and interrupting one another. And the business of the legislator is to infuse into them that divine fear, which we call shame, in opposition to this disorderly boldness. But in order to discipline them
there must be guardians of the law of drinking, and sober generals who
shall take charge of the private soldiers; they are as necessary in drink
as in war, and he who disobeys these Dionysiac commanders will be
equally disgraced. 'Very good.' If a drinking festival were well
regulated, men would go away, not as they now do, greater enemies,
but better friends. Of the greatest gift of Dionysus I hardly like to
speak, lest I should be misunderstood. 'What is that?' According to
our tradition Dionysus was driven mad by his stepmother Herè, and
in order to revenge himself he inspired others with Bacchic madness.
But these are stories which I do not like to repeat. However I do
acknowledge that all men are born in an imperfect state, and during the
first few years of life are mad, irrational, restless, roaring creatures: this,
as you will remember, has been already said by us when treating of the
origin of music and gymnastic. 'I remember.' And that Apollo and
the Muses and Dionysus gave us harmony and rhythm? 'Very true.'
The other story implies that wine was given to punish us and make
us mad; but we say that wine is a balm and a cure; a spring of modesty
in the soul, and of health and strength in the body. Again, the work
of the chorus is co-extensive with the work of education; rhythm and
melody answer to the voice, and the motions of the body correspond
to all three, and the sound enters in and educates the soul in virtue?
'Yes.' And the movement of the body which is termed dancing, when
studied according to regular rules, becomes gymnastic. Shall we now
proceed to speak of this? 'What Cretan or Lacedaemonian would
approve of your omitting gymnastic?' Your question implies assent;
and you will have no difficulty in understanding a subject which is
familiar to you. Gymnastic is based on the natural tendency of every
animal to rapid motion; to this man adds a sense of rhythm, which
is awakened by music; and music and dancing together form the choral
arts. But before proceeding I must add a crowning word about
drinking, which may be extended to other pleasures. There is a lawful
use of all of them; but if a state or individual is inclined to drink at will,
I cannot allow them. I would go further than Crete or Lacedaemon and
have the law of the Carthaginians, which is to the effect that no slave
of either sex should drink wine at all, and no soldier while he is on
a campaign, and no ruler or general or pilot or judge or counsellor while
he is on duty, and that no one should drink by daylight or on a bridal
night. And there are so many other occasions on which wine ought to
be prohibited, that there will not be many vines grown or vineyards required in the state.

**BOOK III.** If a man wants to know the origin of states and societies, he should behold them from the point of view of time. Thousands and thousands of cities have come into being and passed away again in infinite ages, rising and falling, waxing and waning; and if we could ascertain the cause of these changes in states, that would probably explain their origin. What do you think of ancient traditions about deluges and destructions of mankind, and the preservation of a remnant? 'Every one believes in them.' Then let us suppose the world to have been destroyed by a deluge. The survivors would be shepherds dwelling in the tops of mountains,—small sparks of the human race, who would be isolated, and unacquainted with the arts and vices of civilization. We may further suppose that cities on the plain and on the coast have been utterly destroyed, and that all inventions and implements, and every sort of knowledge, have perished. 'Why, yes, my friend; and if all things were as they now are, nothing would have ever been invented. All our famous discoveries, like those of Daedalus, have been made within the last thousand years, and many of them are but of yesterday.' Yes, Cleinias, and you must not forget the name of your friend Epimenides, who was really of yesterday; he practised the lesson of moderation and abstinence which Hesiod only preached. 'Yes, that is our tradition.' After the great destruction we may imagine that the earth was a vast desert, in which there were a herd or two of oxen and a few goats, hardly enough to support those who tended them; while of politics and governments the survivors would know nothing. And out of this state of things have arisen arts and laws, and a great deal of virtue and a great deal of vice; little by little the world has come to be what the world is. At first, the few inhabitants may be supposed to have had a natural fear of descending into the plains; although they would want to have intercourse with one another, they would have great difficulty in getting about, having lost the arts, and having no means of extracting metals from the earth, or of felling timber; for even if there were any tools found in the mountains, these would have soon been worn out, and they could get no more until in the course of generations the art of metallurgy had been rediscovered. Faction and war would be extinguished among them, for being solitary they would incline to be friendly;
and having abundance of pasture and plenty of milk and flesh, they would have nothing to quarrel about. We may assume that they had also dwellings and abundance of clothing, for the weaving and plastic arts do not require the use of metals. In those days they were neither poor nor rich, and there was no insolence or injustice among them; for they were of noble natures, and lived up to their principles, and believed what they were told; knowing nothing of land or naval warfare, or of legal practices or party conflicts, they were simpler and more temperate, and also more just than the men of our day. 'Very true.' I am showing whence the need of lawgivers arises, for in primitive ages they had none, and did not want them. Men lived according to the customs of their fathers, under a sort of patriarchal government, which still exists both among Hellenes and barbarians, and is described in Homer as existing among the Cyclopes:—

'They have no laws, and they dwell in rocks or on the tops of mountains, and every one is the judge of his wife and children, and they do not trouble themselves about one another.'

'That is a charming poet of yours, though I know little of him, for in Crete foreign poets are not much read.' 'He is well known in Sparta, though his description of life and manners is Ionian rather than Dorian, and he seems to take your view of primitive society.' May we not suppose that government arose out of scattered families who survived the destruction, and were under the rule of a patriarch, because they had originally descended from a single father and mother? 'That is very probable.' At a later period they increased in number, and tilled the ground, and protected themselves by walls and common households against wild beasts; each family had different laws and customs, which they received from their first parents. They would naturally like their own laws better than those of another family, and would be already formed by them when they met in a common society: thus legislation imperceptibly began among them. In the next stage the associated families would appoint plenipotentiaries or lawgivers, who would review their laws and choose the best of them. They would change the patriarchal or dynastic form into aristocracy or monarchy. 'That would be the next step.' In the third stage various forms of government would arise. This state of society is described by Homer, who in speaking of the foundation of Dardania says:—

'Dardania was built at the foot of many-fountained Ida, for Ilium, the city of the plain, as yet was not.'
Such is the history of primeval society which is given in this passage, and also in the account of the Cyclopes by the inspired writer, who is not only a charming poet but a true prophet. 'Proceed with your tale.' Ilium was built in a fair wide plain, on a low hill, which was surrounded by streams descending from Ida. This shows that many ages must have passed; for the men who remembered the deluge would never have placed their city at the mercy of the waters amid numerous streams, trusting to not very high hills either. When mankind began to multiply, many other cities were built in similar but less elevated situations, and even by the shores of the ocean, for the fear of the sea had been lost. These cities carried on a war against Troy which lasted ten years, and, in the meantime, while the chiefs of the army were at Troy, their homes fell into confusion. The youth revolted and refused to receive their own fathers; deaths, murders, exiles ensued. Under the new name of Dorians, which they received from their chief Dorieus, the exiles returned: the rest of the story is part of the history of Sparta.

Thus, after a digression which carried us away into the subject of music and drinking, we again come back to the settlement of Sparta which in laws and institutions is the sister of Crete. We have seen the rise of a first, second, and third state, which in infinite time have grown out of each other; and now we arrive at a fourth state, and out of the comparison of all four we propose to gather the nature of laws and governments, and the changes which may be desirable in them. 'If,' replies the Spartan, 'the speculations on which we are about to enter are likely to be as profitable as those which have preceded, I would go a long way to hear them, and think the longest day too short for such an employment.'

Let us imagine the time when Lacedaemon, and Argos, and Messenê, and the countries about them were all subject, Megillus, to your ancestors. Afterwards, they distributed the army into three portions, and made three cities—Argos, Messenê, Lacedaemon. 'Yes.' Temenus was the king of Argos, Cresphontes of Messenê, Procles and Eurysthenes of Lacedaemon. 'Just so.' And they all swore to assist any one of their number whose kingdom was subverted? 'Yes.' But did we not say, what we seem now to have forgotten, that kingdoms or governments can only be subverted by themselves? 'That is true.' Yes, and not only true, but proved by facts: there were certain conditions upon which the three kingdoms were to assist one another; the government was to
be mild and the people obedient, and the kings and people were to unite in assisting either of the two others when they were wronged; am I not correct? ‘Quite correct.’ The condition that the two states should unite against a third which transgressed, was a great source of security. ‘Clearly.’ Most persons say that lawgivers should make such laws as the people like; but we say that a physician might as well bid his patients to use only such remedies as are agreeable to them, whereas he is often too glad if he can effect a cure at the cost of a considerable amount of pain. ‘Very true.’ The early lawgivers had a great advantage—they were saved from the reproach which attends a division of land and abolition of debts. No one could quarrel with the Dorians for dividing the territory, and they had no debts of long standing. ‘They had not.’ Then what was the reason why their legislation signally failed? ‘How failed?’ Why, there were three kingdoms, and two of them quickly lost their original constitution. ‘What was the reason of their failure?’ That is a question which we cannot refuse to answer, if we mean to proceed with our old man’s game of enquiring into laws and institutions. And the Lacedaemonian institutions are more worthy of enquiry than any other, having been evidently intended to be a protection not only to the Peloponnese, but to all the Hellenes against the Barbarians; for Ilium was a part of the great Assyrian Empire, which was feared in those days just as we now fear the great King. The second capture of Troy was deeply resented by the Assyrians, who sought to retaliate; and, in order to meet this danger, the royal Heraclid brothers devised their military constitution, which was a far better organised plan than the old Trojan expedition; and the Dorian Heraclidae themselves were far superior to the old Achaeans, who had taken part in that expedition, and had been conquered by them. ‘Certainly.’ Such a scheme, undertaken by men who had shared with one another toils and dangers, sanctioned by the Delphian oracle, under the guidance of the Heraclidae, seemed to have a promise of permanence. ‘Naturally.’ And yet this promise of permanence has entirely failed. Instead of the three being one, they have always been at war; had they been united, in accordance with the original intention, they would have been invincible.

And what caused their ruin? Did you ever observe that there are beautiful things of which men often say, ‘What wonders they would have effected if rightly used!’ and yet, after all, this may be a mistake. And so I say of the Heraclidae and their expedition, which I may
INTRODUCTION.

perhaps have been justified in admiring, but which nevertheless suggests to me the general reflection,—‘What wonders might not strength and military resources have accomplished, if the possessor had only known how to use them!’ Apply this remark to the case which we are considering: if the generals of the army had only known how to arrange their forces, might they not have given their subjects everlasting freedom and dominion, and the power of doing what they would in all the world, and have themselves obtained glory? ‘Very true.’ Suppose a person to express his admiration of wealth or rank, does he not do so under the idea that by the help of these he will attain his desires? All men wish to obtain the control of all things, and what they desire to obtain for themselves they desire to obtain for those dear to them. ‘Certainly.’ We ask for our friends what they ask for themselves. ‘True.’ Dear is the son to the father, and yet the son will pray to obtain what the father will pray that he may not obtain. ‘Before the son has come to years of discretion, you mean?’ Yes; and when the father has passed them, the son, like Hippolytus, may have reason to pray that the vow of his father may not be fulfilled. ‘I understand. You mean to say that a man should pray to have right desires, before he prays that his desires may be fulfilled; and that wisdom is the first thing for which states and individuals ought to pray?’ Yes; and you will remember my saying that this was to be the first object of the legislator; but you said that defence in war came first. And to this I replied, that there were four virtues, whereas you acknowledged one only—courage, and not wisdom which is the guide of all the rest. And I repeat in jest if you like, or in earnest if you like, and I would rather that you should receive my words in earnest—that ‘the prayer of a fool is full of danger.’ I will prove to you, if you will allow me, that the ruin of those states was not caused by cowardice or ignorance in war, but by ignorance of human nature and evil ways of another sort. ‘Go on, Stranger: attention will show better than compliments that we prize your words.’ I maintain that ignorance is the ruin of states; and if this be true, the legislator should seek to implant in them wisdom, and banish ignorance; and the greatest ignorance is the love of what is known to be evil, and the hatred of what is known to be good; this is the last and greatest conflict of pleasure and reason in the soul. I say the greatest, because affecting the greater part of the soul. For the passions are in the individual what the people are in a state. And when they become opposed
to reason or law, and instruction is no longer of any use—that is the last and greatest ignorance of states; the errors and faults of craftsmen are more venial. ‘I understand and agree.’ Let this, then, be our first principle:—That the citizen who does not know how to choose between good and evil, must not be entrusted with authority; he may have great quickness and power of calculation, and many accomplishments, and yet be really ignorant. On the other hand, he who has this knowledge may be unable either to read or write; nevertheless, he shall be counted wise and permitted to rule. For how can there be even a shadow of wisdom where there is no harmony?—wisdom is the greatest harmony, and he who is devoid of wisdom is the ruin of states and households: let this be laid down. ‘Very good.’ The first claim of authority will be that of parents to rule over their children; the second, that of the noble to rule over the ignoble; thirdly, the elder must govern the younger; in the fourth place, the slave must obey his master; fifthly, there is the power of the stronger, which is indeed a rule not to be disobeyed, and which the poet Pindar declares to be according to nature; sixthly, there is the rule of the wiser, which is also according to nature, as I must inform Pindar, if he does not know, and is the rule of law over obedient subjects. ‘Most true.’ And there is a seventh kind of rule which the Gods love,—in this the ruler is elected by lot.

Now, turning to the legislator who is fancying that his task is to be an easy one, we playfully say to him:—You see, legislator, the many and inconsistent claims to authority; here is a spring of troubles which you must stay: And first of all you must help us to consider how the kings of Argos and Messenè destroyed that famous empire of olden time—did they forget the saying of Hesiod, that ‘the half is better than the whole’? And do we suppose that the ignorance of this truth is less fatal to kings than to peoples? ‘Probably the evil is increased by their way of life.’ The kings of those days transgressed the laws and violated their oaths. Their deeds did not agree with their words, and their folly, which seemed to them wisdom, was the ruin of the state. And what ought the legislator to have done in order to prevent this evil?—The remedy is easy to see now, but was not easy to foresee at the time. ‘What is the remedy?’ The institutions of Sparta may teach you, Megillus. Wherever there is excess, whether the sail has too much wind, or the body too much food, or the mind too much power, there is a probability of a downfall. No man is able to resist the temptation of arbitrary power. The despot is
quickly corrupted, and grows hateful to his dearest friends. In order to guard against this evil, the God who watches over Sparta gave you two kings instead of one, that they might balance and moderate one another; and further to lower the pulse of your body politic, some human wisdom, mingling with the divine power, tempered the strength and self-sufficiency of youth with the moderation of age in the institution of your senate. A third saviour bridled your rising and swelling power by ephors, whom he assimilated to officers elected by lot: and thus the kingly power was preserved. Had the constitution been arranged by Cresphontes and Temenus, not even the portion of Sparta would have been preserved; for they had no political experience, and were foolish enough to imagine that a youthful spirit might be bound by oaths. Now that God has instructed us in the arts of legislation, there is no merit in seeing all this, or in learning wisdom after the event. But if the coming danger could have been foreseen, and the union preserved, then no Persian or other enemy would have dared to despise Hellas; and indeed there was not so much credit to us in defeating the enemy, as discredit in our disloyalty to one another. For of the three cities one only fought on behalf of Hellas; and of the two others, one, Argos, which in old days had the precedence, refused to aid; and the other, Messenia, was actually at war with her: and if the Lacedaemonians and Athenians had not united, the Hellenes would have been absorbed in the Persian empire, and mingled with the barbarians. We lay these remarks of ours at the feet of the legislator, and proceed to enquire what else could have been done, reminding him of what we were saying before, that a state can only be free and wise and harmonious where there is a balance of powers. There are many words by which we express the aims of the legislator, who is equally desirous to promote temperance, wisdom, friendship, and the like; but we need not therefore be disturbed, for these names have all the same meaning. 'I should like to hear at which of them in your opinion the legislator should aim.' Hear me, then. There are two mother forms of states—one monarchy, and the other democracy: the Persians have the first, and the Athenians the second. Most other governments are made up of a union of the two; and any good government must include both of them. There was a time when both the Persians and Athenians had more the character of a constitutional state than they now have. In the days of Cyrus the Persians were freemen as well as lords of others, and their soldiers were
free and equal, and they used and honoured all the talent which they could find, and so the nation waxed in freedom and friendship and communion of soul. But Cyrus, though a great and patriotic general, never troubled himself about the education of his family, or the order of his household. He was a soldier from his youth upward, and left his children who were born in the purple to be educated by women, who honoured and flattered them, never allowing any desire which they had to be thwarted. 'A rare education, truly!' Yes, such an education as women, and especially princesses who had recently grown rich, might be expected to give in a country where the men were solely occupied with war and danger. 'Likely enough.' Their father had possessions of men and animals, and never considered that he was about to make them over to a race who had been brought up in a very different school, not like the Persian mountaineer, who was well able to take care of himself and his own. He never remembered that his children had been brought up in the Median fashion, under the superintendence of women and eunuchs. The consequence was that the son of Cyrus slew his brother, and lost the kingdom by his own folly. Observe, again, that Darius, who restored the kingdom, was not born a king, and had not received a royal education. He was one of the seven chiefs, and when he came to the throne he divided the empire into seven provinces, of which there yet remain traces; and he made equal laws, and implanted friendship among the people. Hence his subjects were greatly attached to him, and cheerfully extended the borders of his empire. Next followed Xerxes, who had received the same royal education as Cambyses; and this has been the fate of nearly every succeeding sovereign. We are tempted to say to him, 'O Darius, how could you with all your experience, have made such a mistake!' The ruin of Xerxes was not fate or fortune, but the evil life which is generally led by the sons of very rich and royal persons; and this is what the legislator has seriously to consider. Justly may the Lacedaemonians be praised for not giving special honour to any one in a state because he surpasses another in wealth any more than because he surpasses him in swiftness, strength, or beauty, if he be without virtue, or have virtue without temperance. 'Explain.' No one would like to live in the same house with a very courageous man who had no control over himself, nor with an artizan who was clever at his profession, but a rogue. Nor can justice and wisdom ever be separated from temperance. But considering these
qualities with reference to the meed of honour and dishonour which is to be assigned to them in states, would you say, on the other hand, that temperance without the other virtues, isolated in the soul of a man, is worth anything or nothing? 'I cannot tell.' You have answered well. It would be absurd to speak of temperance as belonging to the class of honoured or of dishonoured qualities, because all other things in their various classes require temperance to be added to them; having the addition, they are honoured not in proportion to that, but to their own excellence. And ought not the legislator to determine these classes? 'Certainly.' Suppose then, as we are playing at legislation, that, without going into details, we make three great classes of them. 'By all means.' Most honourable are the goods of the soul, always assuming temperance as a condition of them; secondly, those of the body; thirdly, external possessions. Any man who inverts or adds to these classes is no friend to the state.

These remarks were suggested to me by the history of the Persian kings; and to them I will now return. The ruin of their empire was caused by the loss of freedom and the growth of despotism, which destroyed the good-will of the people, and the disinterestedness of the government. Hatred and spoliation took the place of friendship; the people never fought heartily for their masters; their countless myriads were useless on the field of battle. They resorted to mercenaries as their only salvation, and were thus compelled by their circumstances to proclaim the stupidest of falsehoods—that virtue is a trifle in comparison of money. 'Very true.'

But enough of the Persians: a different lesson is taught by the opposite extreme of the Athenians, whose example shows that a limited freedom is far better than an unlimited. Ancient Athens, at the time of the Persian invasion, had such a limited freedom. They were divided into four classes, arranged according to a property census, and the love of order was their queen; moreover, the fear of the approaching host made them obedient and willing citizens. For, ten years previously, Darius had sent Datis and Artaphernes, commanding them under pain of death to subjugate the Eretrians and Athenians. A report came to Athens that all the Eretrians had been 'netted'; this report, which may or may not have been true, terrified the Athenians, and they sent all over Hellas for assistance. None came to their relief except the Lacedaemonians, who arrived a day too late, when the battle of Marathon
had been already fought. In process of time Xerxes came to the throne, and the Athenians heard of nothing but the bridge of the Hellespont, and the canal of Athos, and the innumerable host and fleet. They knew that these were intended to avenge the defeat of Marathon. Their case seemed desperate, for there was no one to help them; no Hellene was likely to assist them by land, and at sea they were attacked by more than a thousand vessels;—their only hope, however slender, was in victory; so they relied upon themselves and upon the Gods. Their common danger, and the influence of their old constitution, greatly tended to promote harmony among them: Reverence and fear—that fear which the coward never knows—made them fight for their country and for their country’s shrines and sepulchres. If they had not had such a fear, they would have been dispersed all over the world. ‘Your words, Athenian, are worthy of your country.’ Yes; and you, who have inherited the virtues of your ancestors, are worthy to hear them. Let me ask you to take the moral of my tale. The Persians have lost their liberty in absolute slavery, and we in absolute freedom. In ancient times the Athenian people were not the masters, but the servants of the laws. ‘Of what laws?’ In the first place, there were laws about music, and the music was of various kinds: there was one kind which consisted of hymns, another of lamentations; there was also the paean and the dithyramb, each of them having their own laws (νήματα) or strains, as they were termed. The regulation of such matters was not left to the whistling and clapping of a tasteless crowd; there was silence while the judges decided, and the boys, and the audience in general, were kept in order by raps of a stick. But after a while there arose a new race of poets, men of genius certainly, however careless of musical truth and propriety, who made pleasure the only criterion of excellence. That was a test which the spectators could apply for themselves; the whole audience instead of being mute became vociferous, and a theatrocracy took the place of an aristocracy. Could the judges have been free, there would have been no great harm done; a musical democracy would have been well enough—but conceit has been our ruin. Everybody knows everything, and is ready to say anything; the age of reverence is gone, and the age of irreverence and licentiousness has succeeded. ‘Most true.’ And with this freedom comes disobedience to rulers, parents, elders; in the latter days to the law also; the end returns to the beginning, and the old Titanic nature
INTRODUCTION.

reopen—men have no regard for the Gods or for oaths; and the evils of the human race seem as if they would never cease. Whither are we running away? Once more we must pull up the argument with bit and curb, lest, as the proverb says, we should fall off our ass. ‘Good.’

Our purpose in what we have been saying, is to show that the legislator ought to aim at securing for a state three things—freedom, friendship, wisdom. ‘Just so.’ And we chose two states;—one was the type of freedom, and the other of despotism; and we showed that their highest pinnacle of fortune coincided with the greatest moderation of their respective forms of government. In a similar spirit we spoke of the Dorian expedition, and of the settlement in the plains of Troy; and of music, and wine, and of all that preceded.

And now, has all this discussion been of any use? ‘Stranger, I can answer that question; for by a singular coincidence the Cretans are about to send out a colony. And the settlement of this colony has been committed to the Cnossians, who have appointed ten commissioners, of whom I am one, to give laws to the colonists. We may give them any laws which we please—Cretan or foreign. And therefore let us make a selection from what has been said for the benefit of the infant colony.’ I like your proposal, and I place myself at your service. ‘Very good.’

BOOK IV. And now what is this city? I do not ask what is or is to be the name of the place; for a river or some local deity will determine that. But I want to know what the situation is, whether maritime or inland. ‘The new city, Stranger, is about eleven miles from the sea.’ Are there good harbours? ‘Excellent.’ And is the surrounding country self-supporting? ‘Almost.’ Any neighbouring states? ‘No; and that is the reason for choosing the place, which has been deserted from time immemorial.’ And is there a fair proportion of hill and plain and wood? ‘Like the rest of Crete in that, more hill than plain.’ Then there is some hope for your citizens; had the city been on the sea, and dependent for support on other countries, a more than human power would have been required to preserve you from corruption. The distance of eleven miles is not enough, but is better than nothing; and I must be satisfied. For the sea, although an agreeable, is a dangerous companion, and a highway of strange morals and manners as well as of commerce. But as the country is moderately fertile there will be no great exports or imports, or returns of gold and
silver, which are the ruin of states. Is there timber for ship-building? ‘There is no pine or fir, and not much cypress; and very little stone-pine or planewood for the interior of ships.’ That is good. ‘Why?’ Because the city will be unable to imitate the bad ways of her enemies. ‘What is the bearing of that remark?’ To explain my meaning, I would ask you just to remember what I said about the Cretan laws, which, as you and I agreed, had an eye to war only; and I maintained that they ought to have included all virtue. And I hope that you in your turn will retaliate upon me if I am false to my own principle. For I consider that the lawgiver should go straight to the mark of virtue and justice, and disregard wealth and every other good when separated from virtue. What further I mean, when I speak of the imitation of enemies, I will illustrate by the story of Minos, which is so ancient that I hope our Cretan friend will not be offended at the mention of it. Minos, who was a great sea king, imposed upon the Athenians a cruel tribute, for in those days they were not a maritime power; they had no timber for ship-building, and therefore they could not ‘imitate their enemies’; and better far, as I maintain, would it have been for them to have lost many times over the lives which they devoted to the tribute than to have turned soldiers into sailors. Naval warfare is not a very praiseworthy art; men should not be taught, after running on shore, to throw away their arms, and to hurry back to their ships, as they do now; bad customs ought not to be gilded with fine words. And retreat is always bad, as we are taught in Homer, when he introduces Odysseus, setting forth to Agamemnon the danger of ships being at hand when soldiers are disposed to fly. An army of lions trained in such ways would fly before a herd of deer. Further, the rewards of valour have to be distributed among pilots and oarsmen, who do not deserve such honours, and the undue awarding of honours is the ruin of states. ‘Still, in Crete we say that the battle of Salamis was the salvation of Hellas.’ And that is the prevailing opinion. But I and Megillus say that the battle of Marathon began the deliverance, which the battle of Plataea completed; and that these battles made men better, whereas the battles of Salamis and Artemisium made them no better. And we further affirm that not the mere continuance of existence is the great political good of individuals or states, but the continuance of the best existence. ‘Certainly.’ Let us then endeavour to follow this principle in colonization and legislation.
INTRODUCTION.

And first, let me ask you who are to be the colonists? May any one come from any city of Crete which is overpeopled? for you would surely not send a general invitation to all Hellas. Yet I observe that in Crete there are people who have come from Argos and Aegina and other places. 'Our expedition is drawn from all Crete, and we invite Peloponnesians of Argos to join. As you observe, there are Argives among the Cretans; for example, the Gortynians, who are the best of all Cretans, have come from Gortys in Peloponnesus.'

Colonization is in some ways easier when the colony is drawn from one country, and goes out in a swarm like bees, owing to the pressure of population, or revolution, or war. There is an advantage in this mode of procedure, and also there are disadvantages. The advantage is, that the new colonists have a common language and laws, and a spirit of friendship diffused among them. But then again, they are less willing to obey the hand of the legislator; they are too fond of the laws and customs which have been the ruin of them at home. A mixed multitude is more tractable, although there is a difficulty in making them pull together. There is nothing, however, which perfects the virtue of men like legislation and colonization. And yet I have a word to say on the other side, which may seem to be depreciatory of legislators. 'What is that?'

I was going to make the saddening reflection, that accidents of all sorts are the true legislators; wars and pestilences and famines and the constant recurrence of bad seasons. He who observes the course of events will be inclined to say that almost all human things are chance; and this may certainly be said about navigation and medicine, and the art of the general. But there is another thing which may equally be said. 'What is it?' That God governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with Him. But according to a third view, art has part with them, for surely when there is a storm there must be an advantage in having a pilot. And of legislation we may say the same: however great the coincidence of fortunate circumstances, the hand of the legislator is still required. 'Most true.' All artists would pray for certain conditions under which to exercise their art. 'Certainly.' And the legislator would do the same? 'I believe that he would.' Come, legislator, let us say to him, and what are the conditions which you would have? Shall we put the conditions into his mouth? 'Yes.' He will say, Grant me a city which is in the possession of a tyrant; and let the tyrant be young, thoughtful, teachable, courageous, magnanimous; and
let him have the crowning condition of all virtue, which is temperance—not prudence, but that natural temperance which is the gift of children and animals, and is hardly reckoned among goods— with this he must be endowed, if the state is to acquire the form most conducive to happiness in the speediest manner. And I must add one other quality to the tyrant’s virtues: he must be fortunate, and his good fortune must consist in his being the contemporary of a great legislator. When the God has done this, he has done the best which he can for a state; not so well if he has given them two legislators instead of one, and less and less well if he has given them a great many. An orderly tyranny most easily passes into the perfect state; in the second degree, a monarchy; in the third degree, democracy; an oligarchy is worst of all. ‘I do not understand.’ I suppose that you have never seen a city which is subject to a tyranny? ‘And I have no desire to see one.’ You would have seen what I am describing, if you ever had. The tyrant can speedily change the manners of a state, and affix the stamp of praise or blame on any action which he pleases; for the citizens are eager to follow the example which he sets them. And this is the quickest way of making changes; but there is a counterbalancing difficulty. ‘What is that?’ The difficulty is to find the divine love of temperance and justice existing in any powerful forms of government, whether in a monarchy or an oligarchy of birth or of wealth. Nestor, who was the most eloquent and temperate of mankind, lived in the times of Troy, but there is no one like him now. If there is, has been, or ever shall be again, such an one among us, blessed is he, and blessed are they who listen to his words. And this may be said of power in general; where power and wisdom and temperance meet in one there are the best laws and constitutions. I am endeavouring to show you how easy under the conditions supposed, and how difficult under any other, is the task of giving a city good laws. ‘How do you mean?’ We shall see, if we try the experiment of giving a constitution to our new state, which will be an excellent amusement for our second childhood. ‘Proceed. What constitution shall we give—democracy, oligarchy, or aristocracy?’ To which of these classes, Megillus, do you refer your own state? ‘The Spartan constitution seems to me to contain all these elements; our state is a democracy and also an aristocracy; the power of the Ephors is tyrannical, and we have an ancient monarchy.’ ‘And the same,’ adds Cleinias, ‘may be said of Crete.’ The reason is that you have polities, but other states are mere aggregations of
INTRODUCTION.

citizens, which are named after their several ruling powers; whereas a state, if an 'ocracy' at all, should be called a theocracy. A tale of old will explain my meaning. In the primeval world there is a tradition of a golden age, in which all things were spontaneous and abundant. Cronos, the lord of the world, knew that man was not able to endure the temptations of power, and therefore he appointed demons or demigods, who are of a superior race, to have dominion over him, as he has dominion over the animals. They took care of us with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us; and the tradition says that only when God, and not man, is the ruler, can the human race cease from ill. This was the way of human life under Cronos, which should be imitated by us as far as the principle of immortality dwells in us, and is imitated by us when we live according to law and the dictates of right reason. But in an oligarchy or democracy, when the governing principle is athirst for pleasure, there is no possibility of salvation. The laws are trampled under foot. Are there not often said to be as many forms of laws as there are governments, and that they have no concern either with any virtue or with all virtue, but are relative to the state in which you live? Which is as much as to say that 'might makes right.' 'What do you mean?' I mean that governments make their own laws, and that every government regards first of all the law of self-preservation. 'Very true.' And he who transgresses this law is regarded as an evil-doer, and punished accordingly. 'Naturally.' This was the evil of which we were speaking when we said that parents should rule their children, the elder the younger, the noble the ignoble; and there were other principles of government, including 'the law justifying violence' of Pindar. To which of them is our state to be entrusted? For many a government is only a victorious faction which has a monopoly of power, and refuses any share in the government to the conquered, lest when they return to power they should remember their wrongs. Such governments are not polities, but parties; nor are any laws good which are made in the interest of particular classes only, and not of the whole. And in our state I mean to protest against making any man a ruler because he is rich, or strong, or noble. But he who is the most obedient to the laws, and who wins the victory of obedience, shall be the minister or servant of them according to the degree of his obedience. When I call the ruler the servant or minister of the law, this is not a mere paradox, but I mean to say that upon a willingness to obey the law the very
existence of the state depends. 'Truly, Stranger, you have a keen vision.' Why, yes; every man when he is old has his intellectual vision most keen. And now shall we call in our colonists and make a speech to them? Friends, we say to them, God holds in His hand the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and He moves in a straight line towards the full accomplishment of His will. Justice always follows Him, and punishes those who fall short of His laws. He who would be happy is obedient to Him; but he who is lifted up with pride, or money, or honour, or beauty, is soon deserted by God, and, being deserted, he takes to him others who are like himself, and dances about in wild disorder. But in a short time he is utterly destroyed, and his family and city with him. Wherefore, seeing these things, what ought we to do or think? 'Every man ought to follow God.' There is an old saying, that like agrees with like, and God is the measure of all things in a sense far higher than any man. Those who would be dear to Him must be like Him, and the temperate man is the friend of God because he is like Him, and the intemperate man is not his friend, because he is not like Him. And the inference is, that the best of all things for a good man is to pray and sacrifice to the Gods; but the bad man has a polluted soul, and from one who is polluted neither a good man nor God is right in receiving gifts. And therefore the unholy waste their service upon the Gods, but the good are accepted of them. I have told you the mark at which we ought to aim. You will say, how? and with what weapons? In the first place we affirm, that after the Olympian Gods and the Gods of the state, honour should be given to the Gods below, and to them should be offered everything in even numbers and of the second choice; while the auspicious odd numbers and everything of the first choice are reserved for the Gods above. Next to the Gods, demi-gods or spirits must be honoured, and then heroes, and after them family gods, who will have their seats of local worship and their ritual according to law. Further, the honour due to parents should not be forgotten; all that children have is derived from them, and they owe to them a debt of nurture. Their children should never utter an unbecoming word before them; for there is an avenging angel who hears them when they are angry, and the child should consider that the parent to whom he owes life, when he has been wronged has a right to be angry with him. After their death let them have sepulchral rites according to their wealth and rank; as they did to their fathers, so let us do to them; and there shall
be an annual commemoration of them. He does best who preserves their memory without incurring any very great expense. Living on this wise, we shall be accepted of the Gods, and shall pass our days in good hope. The law will determine all our various duties towards relatives and friends and other citizens, and the whole state will be happy and prosperous. If the legislator would persuade as well as command, he will add prefaces to his laws which will predispose our citizens to virtue. I want them to be in the right frame of mind when the legislator speaks to them. Even a little accomplished in the way of gaining the hearts of men is of great value. For most men do not wish to be made good speedily. Their case rather proves the saying of Hesiod:

'Long and steep is the first half of the way to virtue,
But when you have reached the top the other half is easy.'

'Those are excellent words.' Yes; but will you allow me to tell you the effect which the preceding discourse has had upon me? I will express my meaning in an address to the lawgiver:—O lawgiver, if you know what we ought to do and say, you can surely tell us—and were not you just now saying that the poet ought not to be allowed to do what he likes? And the poet may reply, that when he sits down on the tripod of the Muses he is not in his right mind, and that being a mere imitator he may be allowed to say two opposite things, and cannot tell which of them is true. But this licence cannot be allowed to the lawgiver. For example, let us suppose that there are three kinds of funerals; one of them is excessive, another mean, a third moderate, and you say that the last is always to be approved. Now, if I had a rich wife, and she told me to bury her, and I were to sing of her burial, I should praise the extravagant kind; a poor man would approve a funeral of the meaner sort, and a man of the middle class would find a moderate funeral suited to his resources. But you, as legislator, would have to determine the meaning of the words excessive, mean, moderate. 'Very true.' And is our lawgiver to have no preamble or interpretation of his laws, never offering a word of advice to his subjects, after the manner of some doctors? For of doctors are there not two kinds? the one gentle and the other rough, doctors and doctors' assistants, freemen who learn themselves and teach their pupils, and slaves who learn medicine at the bidding of their masters? 'Of course there are.' And did you ever observe that the gentlemen doctors practise upon freemen, and that slave doctors confine themselves to slaves? The latter go about the country and wait for the slaves at the
dispensaries. None of them holds any parley with his patients about their diseases or the remedies of them; they practise by the rule of thumb, and give their decrees, as if they knew all about the disorder, in a very arbitrary manner. When they have doctored one patient they run off to another, whom they treat with equal assurance, their duty being to relieve the master of the care of his sick slaves. But the other doctor, who practises on freemen, has quite another mode of proceeding. He takes counsel with his patient and learns from him, and never does anything until he has persuaded him of what he is doing. He trusts to influence rather than force. Now is not the use of both methods far better than the use of either alone? And both together may be advantageously employed by us in legislation.

We may illustrate our proposed way of proceeding by an example. The laws relating to marriage are the first of laws, and will therefore be the best for us to begin with. The simple law would be as follows:—A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five; if he do not, he shall pay a fitting penalty. The double law would add the reason why: Forasmuch as man desires immortality, which he attains by the procreation of children, none should deprive himself of his share in this good. He who obeys the law is blameless, but he who disobeys must not be a gainer by his celibacy; and therefore he shall pay a fine, and shall not be allowed to receive honour from the young. That is an example of what I call the double law, which may enable us to judge how far the addition of persuasion to threats is desirable. 'Lacedaemonians in general, Stranger, are in favour of brevity; in this case, however, I prefer length. But Cleinias is the real lawgiver, and therefore I think that he should be first consulted.' 'Thank you, Megillus.' Whether words are to be many or few, is a foolish question:—the best and not the shortest forms are always to be approved. And no legislator has ever thought of the advantage which he might derive from the employment of the two sources of power, which answer to the two sorts of doctors, persuasion as well as force. And I have something else to say about the matter. 'What is that?' A strange thought arises in my mind. Here have we been from the early dawn until noon, discoursing about laws, and all which we have been saying is only the preamble of them. I tell you this, because I want you to observe that songs and strains have all of them preludes, but that laws, though called by the same name (νημον), have never any prelude. Now I am disposed to give preludes to
INTRODUCTION.

laws, dividing them into two parts—one containing the despotic command, which I described under the image of the slave doctor—the other the persuasive part, which I term the preamble. The legislator should give preludes or preambles to his laws. 'That shall be the way in my colony.' I am glad that you agree with me; the law should be clearly explained at the beginning. All laws might have, but will not equally require a preamble; this must be left to the lawgiver, as the preamble of a strain or speech is left to the orator or musician. 'Most true: and now, having a preamble, let us make a second and better beginning.' Enough has been said of Gods and parents, and we may proceed to consider persons—their souls, bodies, properties,—their occupations and amusements; and so arrive at the nature of education.

The first word of the Laws somewhat abruptly introduces the thought which is present to the mind of Plato throughout the work, namely, that Law is of divine origin. In the words of a great English writer—'Her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world.' Though the particular laws of Sparta and Crete had a narrow and imperfect aim, this is not true of divine laws, which are based upon the principles of human nature, and not framed to meet the exigencies of the moment. They have their natural divisions, too, answering to the kinds of virtue (i. 630 E); very unlike the discordant enactments of an Athenian assembly or of an English Parliament. Yet we may observe two inconsistencies in Plato's treatment of the subject: first, a lesser one, inasmuch as he does not clearly distinguish the Cretan and Spartan laws, of which the exclusive aim is war, from those other laws of Zeus and Apollo which are said to be divine, and to comprehend all virtue. Secondly, we may retort on him his own complaint against Sparta and Crete, that he has himself given us a code of laws, which for the most part have a military character; and that we cannot point 'to obvious examples of similar institutions which are concerned with pleasure.' The military spirit which is condemned by him in the beginning of the Laws, reappears in the eighth and ninth books.

The mention of Minos the great lawgiver, and of Rhadamanthus the righteous administrator of the law, suggest the two divisions of the laws into enactments and appointments of officers (cp. vi. 751). The legislator and the judge stand side by side, and their functions cannot be wholly distinguished. For the judge is in some sort a legislator, at VOL. V.

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any rate in small matters (cp. ix. 875 E, foll.); and his decisions growing into precedents, must determine the innumerable details which arise out of the conflict of circumstances. These are what Plato proposes to leave to a younger generation of legislators. The action of courts of law in making law seems to have escaped him, probably because the Athenian law courts were popular assemblies; and, except in a mythical form, he can hardly be said to have had before his eyes the ideal of a judge. In reading the Laws of Plato, or any other ancient writing about Laws, we should consider how gradual the process is by which not only a legal system, but the administration of a court of law, becomes perfected.

There are other subjects on which Plato breaks ground, as his manner is, in the first book. First, he gives a sketch of the subject of laws; they are to comprehend the whole of human life, from infancy to age, and from birth to death, although the proposed plan is far from being regularly executed in the books which follow, partly owing to the necessity of describing the constitution as well as the laws of his new colony. Secondly, he touches on the power of music, which may exercise so great an influence on the character of men for good or evil; he refers especially to the great offences—on which he afterwards dilates at length, and which he has already condemned in the Republic—of separating the words from the music, and varying the modes and rhythms. Thirdly, he reprobates in energetic terms the prevalence of unnatural loves in Sparta and Crete, which he seems to attribute to the practice of syssitia and gymnastic exercises, when not accompanied by any higher training. To this subject he again returns in the sixth book. Fourthly, the virtues are shown to be inseparable from one another, even if not absolutely one; this, too, is a principle which he re-asserts at the conclusion of the work. As in the beginnings of Plato's other writings, we have here several 'notes' struck, which form the preludes of longer discussions, although the hint is less ingeniously given, and the promise more imperfectly fulfilled than in the earlier dialogues.

The distinction between ethics and politics has not yet dawned upon Plato's mind. To him, law is still floating in a region between the two. He would have desired that all the acts and laws of a state should have regard to all virtue. But he did not see that politics and law are subject to their own conditions, and are distinguished from ethics by natural differences. The actions of which politics take cognisance are neces-
INTRODUCTION.

sarily collective or representative; the actions of which law takes cognisance are necessarily external, and they affect others as well as the agents. But Plato has never made this analysis. He fancies that the life of the state is as plastic, and can be as easily fashioned, as that of the individual. He is favourable to a balance of power, but never seems to have considered that power might be so balanced as to produce an absolute immobility in the state. Nor is he alive to the evils of confounding vice and crime; or to the necessity of governments abstaining from excessive interference with their subjects. He would have set no limits to the power of legislation.

Yet this confusion of ethics and politics has also a better and a truer side. If unable to grasp some important distinctions, Plato is at any rate seeking to elevate the lower to the higher; he does not pull down the principles of men to their practice, or narrow the ideal of what the state may be to the immediate necessities of politics. Political ideals of freedom and equality, of a divine government which has been or will be in some other age or country, have greatly tended to educate and enoble the human race. And if not the first author of such ideals (for they are as old as Hesiod), Plato has done more than any other writer to impress them on the world. To those who censure his idealism we may reply in his own words—'He is not the worse painter who draws a beautiful figure, because no such figure ever had a real existence.'

A new thought about education suddenly occurs to him, and for a time exercises a sort of fascination over his mind, though in the later books of the Laws forgotten or overlooked. As true courage is allied to temperance, so there must be an education which shall train mankind to resist pleasure as well as to endure pain. No one can be on his guard against that of which he has no experience. The perfectly trained citizen should have been accustomed to look pleasure in the face, and to measure his strength against her. This education in pleasure is to be given partly by festive intercourse, chiefly by the song and dance. Youth are to learn music and gymnastics; their elders are to be trained and tested at drinking parties. According to the old proverb, in vino veritas, they will then be open and visible to the world in their true characters; and also they will be more amenable to the laws, and more easily moulded by the hand of the legislator. The first reason is curious enough, though not important; the second can hardly be thought deserving of much attention. Yet if Plato means to say that society
is one of the principal instruments of education in after life, he has expressed in an obscure fashion a principle which is true, and to his contemporaries was also new. He seems to be carried away by the really original thought which had occurred to him, and which he has not yet learned to present to his mind in an abstract form. He is sensible that moderation is better than total abstinence, and that asceticism is but a one-sided training. He makes the sagacious remark, 'that those who are able to resist pleasure may often be among the worst of mankind.' He is as much aware as any modern utilitarian that the love of pleasure is the great motive of human action. This cannot be eradicated, and must therefore be regulated, and the pleasure must be of the right sort. Such reflections seem to be the real, though imperfectly expressed, groundwork of the discussion. As in the juxtaposition of the Bacchic madness and the great gift of Dionysus, or where he speaks of the senses in which pleasure is and is not the object of imitative art, or in the illustration of the failure of the Dorian institutions from the vow of Theseus—we have to gather his meaning as well as we can from the connection.

The feeling of old age is discernible in this as well as in several other passages of the Laws. Plato has arrived at the time when men sit still and look on at life; and he is willing to allow himself and others the few pleasures which remain to them. Wine is to cheer them now that their limbs are old and their blood runs cold. They are the best critics of dancing and music, but cannot be induced to join in song unless they have been enlivened by drinking. Youth has no need of the stimulus of wine, but age can only be made young again by its healing influence. Total abstinence for the young, moderate and increasing potations for the old, is Plato's principle. The fire, of which there is too much in the one, has to be brought to the other. Drunkenness, like madness, had a sacredness and mystery to the Greek; if, on the one hand, as in the case of the Tarentines (i. 637 B), it degraded a whole population, it was also a mode of worshipping the god Dionysus, which was to be practised on certain occasions. Moreover, the intoxication produced by the fruit of the vine was very different from the grosser forms of drunkenness which prevail among some modern nations.

The physician in modern times would restrict the old man's use of wine within narrow limits. He would tell us that you cannot restore strength by a stimulus. Wine may call back the vital powers in disease,
but cannot reinvigorate old age. In his maxims of health and longevity, though aware of the importance of a simple diet, Plato has omitted to dwell on the perfect rule of moderation. His commendation of wine is probably a passing fancy, and may have arisen out of his own habits or tastes. If so, he is not the only philosopher whose theory has been based upon his practice.

Like the importance which he attaches to festive entertainments, his depreciation of courage to the fourth place in the scale of virtue, appears to be somewhat rhetorical and exaggerated. But he is speaking of courage in the lower sense of the term, not as including loyalty or temperance. He does not insist, as in the Protagoras, on the unity of the virtues; or as in the Laches, on the identity of wisdom and courage. But he endeavours to show how they all depend upon their leader mind, and how, out of the union of wisdom and temperance with courage, springs justice. Elsewhere he is disposed to regard temperance rather as a condition of all virtue than as a particular virtue. He generalizes temperance, as in the Republic he generalizes justice. The nature of the virtues is to run up into one another, and in the Laws Plato makes but a faint effort to distinguish them. He still quotes the poets, somewhat enlarging, as his manner is, or playing with their meaning. The martial poet Tyrtaeus, and the oligarch Theognis, furnish him with happy illustrations of the two sorts of courage. The fear of fear, the division of goods into human and divine, the acknowledgment that peace and reconciliation are better than military superiority, the analysis of temperance into resistance of pleasure as well as endurance of pain, the distinction between the education which is suitable for a trade or profession, and for the whole of life, are important and probably new ethical conceptions. Nor has Plato forgotten his old paradox, that to be punished is better than to be unpunished, when he says, that to the bad death is the only mitigation of his evil. He is not less ideal in many passages of the Laws than in the Gorgias or Republic. But his wings are heavy, and he is unequal to any sustained flight.

There is more attempt in the first book to carry out the dramatic interest than in the later parts of the work. The outburst of martial spirit in the Lacedaemonian, at p. 638 A, 'O best of men'; the anger which the Cretan expresses at the supposed insult to his lawgiver; the cordial acknowledgment on the part of both of them that laws should not be discussed publicly by those who live under their rule; the diffi-
ulty which they alike experience in following the speculations of the Athenian, are highly characteristic.

In the next book, Plato pursues further his notion of educating by a right use of pleasure. He begins by conceiving an endless power of youthful life, which is to be reduced to rule and measure by harmony and rhythm. Men differ from the lower animals in that they are capable of musical discipline. But music, like all art, must be truly imitative, and imitative of what is true and good. Art and life agree in rejecting pleasure as the criterion of good. True art is inseparable from the highest and most ennobling ideas. Plato is the enemy of songs without words, which he supposes to have some confusing or enervating effect on the mind of the hearer; and he is also opposed to the modern degeneracy of tragedy, which he would probably have illustrated, like Aristophanes, from Euripides and Agathon. From this passage we seem to gather a more perfect conception of art than from any other of Plato's writings. He understands that art is at once imitative and ideal, an exact representation of truth, and also a representation of the highest truth. The same double view of art may be gathered from a comparison of the third and tenth books of the Republic, but is here more clearly and pointedly expressed. We are inclined to suspect exaggeration of the influence which is attributed by him to the song and the dance. But we must remember also the susceptible nature of the Greek, and the perfection to which these arts were carried by him.

In speaking of the chorus of elders, Plato takes occasion to revert to his old proposal of the use of wine. There is not much point in this, which may be regarded as an illustration of an illustration. The use of wine was a particular instance of social intercourse, and this is a particular instance of the use of wine.

At the beginning of the third book, Plato abruptly asks the question, What is the origin of states? The answer is, Infinite time. We have already seen—in the Theaetetus, where he supposes that in the course of ages every man has had numberless progenitors, kings and slaves, Greeks and barbarians; or in the Critias, where he says that nine thousand years have elapsed since the ancient Athenian empire passed away—that Plato is no stranger to the conception of long periods of time. He supposes human society to have been interrupted by natural convulsions; and beginning from the last of these, he traces the steps
INTRODUCTION.

by which the family has passed into the state, and the original scattered society has received the impress of a military civilization. His conception of the origin of states is far truer in the Laws than in the Republic; but it must be remembered that here he is giving an historical, there an ideal account of the growth of society.

Modern enquirers, like Plato, have found in infinite ages the explanation not only of states, but of languages, men, animals, the world itself; they have also detected in later institutions the vestiges of a patriarchal state still surviving. Thus far Plato speaks as 'the spectator of all time and all existence,' who may be thought by some divine instinct to have guessed at truths which were hereafter to be revealed. He is far above the vulgar notion that Hellas is the civilized world, or that civilization only began when the Hellenes appeared on the scene. But as he approaches more historical times, in preparing the way for his own theory of mixed government, he argues very falsely and imperfectly.

He is desirous of showing the imperfection of the Dorian institutions, and hence he is led to attribute them to the Argives and Messenians. The decay of one of these Greek tribes, and the destruction of the other, are adduced by him as a manifest proof of their failure. But there is no more reason to suppose that the Dorian rule of life ever prevailed in Argos and Messene, than to assume that Dorian institutions were framed to protect the Greeks against the power of Assyria; or that the empire of Assyria was in any way affected by the Trojan war (this was not a part of any legend); or that the return of the Heraclidae was only the return of Achaean exiles, who received a new name from their leader Doricus. Such fancies were chiefly based, as far as they had any foundation, on the use of analogy, which played a great part in the dawn of historical and geographical research. Because there was a Persian empire which was the natural enemy of the Greek, there must also have been an Assyrian empire, which had a similar hostility; and not only the fable of the island of Atlantis, but the Trojan war, derived some features from the Persian struggle. The river Nile answered to the Ister, and the valley of the Nile to the Red Sea (Herod. ii. 119). In the Republic, Plato is flying in the air regardless of fact and possibility—in the Laws, he is making history by analogy. In the one, he appears to be like some modern philosophers, absolutely devoid of historical sense; in the other, he is on a level not with Thucydides, or the critical historians of Greece, but with Herodotus, or even with Ctesias.
The chief object of Plato in tracing the origin of society, is to show the point at which regular government superseded the patriarchal authority, and laws common to many families took the place of the old customs. The customs were systematized by legislators, and new forms of government began to spring up. According to Plato, the only sound principle on which any of them was based was a mixture or balance of power. The balance of power had saved Sparta, when the two other Heraclid cities fell into disorder. Here, again, is probably the first trace of a great political idea, which has exercised a vast influence both in ancient and modern times. And yet we might fairly ask, a little parodying the language of Plato—O legislator, is unanimity only mutual jealousy; or is the balance of powers in a state better than the harmony of them?

In the fourth book we approach the realities of politics, and Plato begins to ascend to the height of his great argument. The reign of Cronos has passed away, and various forms of government have succeeded, which are all based on self-interest and self-preservation. Right and wrong, instead of being measured by the will of God, are created by the law of the state. The strongest assertions are made of the purely spiritual nature of religion—'Without holiness no man is accepted of God'; and of family duties, ' Honour thy father and thy mother, if thou wouldst have a family.' The legislator must teach these precepts as well as command them. He is to be the educator as well as the lawgiver of future ages, and the laws are themselves to form a part of the education of the state. Unlike the poet, he must be definite and rational; he cannot say one thing at one time, and another thing at another—he must know what he is about. And yet legislation has a poetical or rhetorical element, and must find words which will wing their way to the hearts of men. Laws must be promulgated before they are put in execution, and mankind must be reasoned with before they are punished. The legislator will begin by entreating courteously those who are willing to hear his voice. Upon the rebellious only does the heavy blow descend. A sermon and a law in one, blending the secular punishment with the religious sanction, appeared to Plato a new idea which might have a great result in reforming the world. The experiment had never been tried of reasoning with mankind; the laws of others had never had any preambles, and Plato seems to have great pleasure in contemplating his discovery.
INTRODUCTION.

In these quaint forms of thought and language, great principles of morals and legislation are enunciated by him for the first time. They all go back to mind and God, who holds the beginning, middle, and end of all things in His hand. The adjustment of the divine and human elements in the world is conceived in the spirit of modern popular philosophy, differing not much in the mode of expression. At first sight the legislator appears to be impotent, for all things are the sport of chance. But we admit also that God governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with Him (compare the saying, that chance is the name of the unknown cause). Lastly, while we acknowledge that God and chance govern mankind, and provide the conditions of human action, experience will not allow us to deny a place to art. We know that there is a use in having a pilot, though the storm may overwhelm him; and a legislator is required to provide for the happiness of a state, although he will pray for favourable conditions under which he may exercise his art.

BOOK V. Hear now, all ye who heard the laws about Gods and ancestors: Of all human possessions the soul is most divine, and most truly a man's own. For in every man there are two parts—a better which rules, and an inferior which serves—and the ruler is to be preferred to the servant. And I tell every one next after the Gods to honour his own soul, and he can only honour her by making her better. A man does not honour his soul by flattery, or gifts, or self-indulgence, or conceit of knowledge, nor when he blames others for his own errors; nor when he indulges in pleasure or refuses to bear pain; nor when he thinks that life at any price is a good, because he fears the world below, which, far from being an evil, may be the greatest good: nor when he prefers beauty to virtue—not reflecting that the soul which came from heaven is more honourable than the body which is earth-born; nor when he desires money, of which no amount is equal in value to virtue—in a word, when he counts that which the legislator pronounces evil to be good, he misbehaves towards his soul, which is the divinest part of him. He does not consider the real punishment of evil, which is, that he grows like evil men, and is compelled to fly from the company of the good: and he who is joined to evil men, must do and suffer what such men by nature do and say to one another, which suffering is not justice but retribution. For justice is noble, but retribution is only the
attendant of injustice. And whether a man escapes or whether he is punished, he is equally miserable; for in the one case he is not cured, and in the other case he is destroyed that the rest of the world may be saved.

The glory of man is to follow the better and improve the inferior. And the soul is that part of man which is most inclined to avoid the evil and dwell with the good. Wherefore also the soul is second only to the Gods in honour, and in the third place the body is to be esteemed, which often has a false honour. For honour is not to be given to the fair or the strong, or the swift, or the tall, or the healthy, any more than to the opposite of these, but to the mean states; and the same of property and external goods. No man should heap up riches that he may leave them to his children. The best condition is a middle one, in which there is a freedom without luxury. And the best inheritance of children is modesty. But modesty cannot be implanted by admonition only—the elders must set the example.

He who honours his kindred and family, may fairly expect that the Gods will give him children. He who would have friends must think much of their favours to him, and little of his to them. He who prefers to an Olympic, or any other victory, the service of the laws, is also the best servant of his country. Engagements with strangers are to be deemed most sacred, because the stranger having no law to protect him is immediately under the protection of the God of strangers. A prudent man will avoid sinning against the stranger; and still more careful should he be of sinning against the suppliant, which is an offence never passed over by the Gods.

I will now speak of those particulars which are matters of praise and blame only, and which, although the law is not cognisant of them, greatly affect the disposition to obey the law. Truth has the first place among the gifts of Gods and men; for truth is faithfulness, and unfaithfulness is the voluntary love as ignorance is the involuntary reception of a lie: and he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. He who would lead a happy life must begin early, that he may partake of truth as long as possible. For he who is untruthful is in old age miserable and desolate, and has not a friend to close his eyes. Good is he who does no injustice—better who prevents others from doing any—best of all who joins the rulers in punishing injustice. And this is true of goods
and virtues in general; he who has and communicates them to others is the best of all; he who would, if he could, is second best; he who has them and is jealous of imparting them to others is to be blamed, but the good or virtue which he has is to be valued still. Let every man contend in the race without envy; for the unenvious man increases the strength of the city; himself foremost in the race, he harms no one with calumny. Whereas the envious man is weak himself, and drives his rivals to despair with his slanders, thus depriving the city of proper training for the contest of virtue, and tarnishing her glory. Every man should be gentle, but he should also be passionate; for against incurable and malignant evil he must fight, and to this end passion is required. But there is another kind of evil which is remediable, and ought to be dealt with more in sorrow than anger. He who is unjust is to be pitied in any case; for no man does evil or allows evil to exist or continue voluntarily in the highest part of his soul: and we can afford to forgive as well as pity the evil which can be cured: and therefore he who deals with the curable sort has need of gentleness—he should keep his temper, and not get into feminine rages; but the incurable shall have the vials of our wrath poured out upon him. The greatest of all evils is one which a man is always excusing in himself and never correcting—that is to say, self-love; which is thought to be natural and enforced as a duty, and yet is the cause of many errors. The lover of himself is blinded about the object of his affections; he is perverted in his judgments about good and evil, and prefers his own interests to the truth; for the truly great man is not a lover of himself but of justice. Self-love is the source of that ignorant conceit of knowledge which is always doing and never succeeding. Wherefore let every man avoid self-love, and condescend to follow the guidance of his betters. There are lesser matters of which a man should remind himself; for wisdom is like a stream, ever flowing in and out, and recollection is the flowing in of failing knowledge. Let no man be given to excess either of laughter or of tears; but let him control his feelings at the crisis of his fate, either when he is on 'sunlit heights' or falling over a precipice, believing that the Gods will diminish the evils and increase the blessings of good men. These are the thoughts which should ever occupy a good man's mind; he should feel the frailty of human life, and the probability of reverses, and should remember both in play and in seriousness, and remind others of the alternations of fortune, and await the end in hope.
So much of man's relation to God. But man is man, and dependent on pleasure and pain; and therefore to acquire a true taste respecting either is a great matter. And what is a true taste? This can only be explained by a comparison of one life with another. Pleasure is an object of desire, pain of avoidance; and the absence of pain is to be preferred to pain, but not to pleasure. There are infinite kinds and degrees of both of them, and we choose the life which has more pleasure and avoid that which has less; but we do not choose that life in which the elements of pleasure are either feeble or equally balanced. All the lives which we desire are pleasant, and if we choose any others, our choice is due to inexperience.

Now there are four lives—the temperate, the rational, the courageous, the healthful; and to these let us oppose four others—the intemperate, the cowardly, the foolish, the diseased. The temperate life has gentle pains and pleasures, the intemperate life has violent delights, and still more violent desires. And the pleasures of the temperate exceed the pains, while the pains of the intemperate exceed the pleasures. But if this is true, none are voluntarily intemperate, but all who lack temperance are either ignorant or wanting in self-control: for men always choose the life which exceeds in pleasure. The wise, the healthful, the courageous life have a similar advantage—they also exceed their opposites in pleasure. And, generally speaking, the life of virtue is far more pleasurable and honourable, fairer and happier far, than the life of vice. Let this be the preamble of our laws; the strain will follow.

As in a web the warp is stronger than the woof, so should the rulers be stronger than their half-educated subjects: in the constitution of a state there are two parts, the appointment of the rulers, and the rules which are prescribed for them. But, before proceeding to discuss them, there are some preliminary matters which have to be considered.

As of animals, so also of men, a selection must be made. The legislator must purify them, and if he be not a despot he will find even the mildest form of purification a difficult task. This milder process is as follows: When men are poor and show a disposition to attack the property of the rich, the legislator will despatch them to another land, and this is euphemistically termed the sending out of a colony. But our case will not require this remedy. We shall only need to purify the streams before they meet. This may often be a difficult process, but in
INTRODUCTION.

theory we may suppose the operation performed, and the desired purity attained. Evil men we will hinder from coming, and receive the good as friends with open arms.

Like the old Heracleid colony, we are fortunate in escaping the abolition of debts and the distribution of land, which are difficult and dangerous questions; the legislator may pray and hope, and may perhaps lessen the difficulty a little in a long period of years, but only when there is abundance of land. His aim will be to create a kindly spirit between creditors and debtors. Those who have should give to those who are in want; they should deem poverty to be not the diminution of a man's property, but the increase of his desires. Good will is the basis of a state: upon this alone can the political superstructure be safely reared. Among citizens there should be no outstanding quarrels: a legislator of sense will not proceed a step in the arrangements of a state until they are settled. For him to introduce fresh bones of contention would be the height of folly.

Let us now proceed to the distribution of our state, and determine the size of the territory and the number of the allotments. The territory should be sufficient to maintain the citizens in moderation, and the population should be numerous enough to defend themselves, and sometimes to aid their neighbours. We will fix the number of citizens at 5040, to which the number of houses and portions of land shall correspond. Let the number be divided into two parts and then into three; and again into four and five, and any number of parts up to ten. For the whole number is very convenient for the purposes of distribution, and is capable of fifty-nine divisions; ten of these proceed without interval from one to ten. Here are numbers enough for war and peace, and for all contracts and dealings. These properties of numbers are true, and should be ascertained with a view to use.

No man of sense will make any alterations in religious institutions, when they have been once settled by the oracles of Delphi and Dodona. All sacrifices, and altars, and temples, whatever may be their origin, whether derived from Tyrrhenia or Cyprus, or some other place, should remain as they are, and be supported by grants of land. Every division should have a patron God or hero; to these a portion of the domain should be appropriated, and at their temples those who are charged with their support should meet together from time to time, in their several divisions, for the sake of mutual help and friendship. All the citizens of
a state should be known to one another; for when there is darkness and
not light in the daily intercourse of life, there can be no justice or right
administration. Every man should be true and simple, and should not
allow others to take advantage of him.

And now the game opens, and we begin to move the pieces. At first
sight, our constitution may appear unsuitable to a legislator who has not
despotic power; but on second thoughts will be deemed to be if not the
very best, the second best. For there are three forms of government,
a first, a second, and a third best, out of which Cleinias has now to
choose. The first and highest form is that in which friends have all
things in common, including wives and property,—in which they have
common fears, hopes, desires, and do not even call their eyes or their
hands their own. This is the ideal state; than which there never can
be a truer or better—a state, whether inhabited by Gods or men, which
will make the dwellers therein blessed. Here is the pattern on which we
must ever fix our eyes; but we are now concerned with another, which
is next in degree, and we will afterwards proceed to a third.

Inasmuch as our citizens are not fitted either by nature or education
to receive the saying, Friends have all things in common, let them
retain their houses and private property, but use them in the service of
their country, who is their God and parent. Their first care should be
to preserve the number of their lots. This may be secured in the
following manner: where there is a family the lot shall be left to the
best-beloved child, who will become the heir of all the family interests
and duties, to Gods, home and country. Of the remaining children, the
females must be given in marriage according to the law, to be hereafter
enacted; childless males will have children assigned to them. How to
equalize families and allotments will be one of the chief cares of the
supreme council. When parents have too many children they may give
to those who have none, or couples may abstain from having children,
or take special care to obtain them; or if the number of citizens becomes
excessive, we may have recourse to our old plan of a colony. If, on the
other hand, a war, or flood, or plague diminish the number of the allot-
ments, new citizens will have to be introduced; and you certainly ought
not to introduce those who are ill-born and ill-educated. Still there may
be cases in which you cannot avoid doing so, for even God cannot fight
against necessity.

Wherefore we will say to our citizens: Good friends, honour order
and equality, and above all the number 5040. Secondly, respect the
original division, which must not be infringed by buying and selling; for
the law says that the land which a man has is sacred—God gave him
the lot, and He will assuredly punish the alienation of His gift. And
those who alienate either house or lot, shall be cursed by priests and
priestesses once and again, and their curses shall be written down on
tables of cypress for the instruction of posterity. The all-seeing eye of
the chief magistrate will be upon them, and he will punish those who
disobey God and the law.

To appreciate the benefit of such an institution a man requires to be
well educated; for he certainly will not make a fortune in our state. No
man will be allowed to exercise any illiberal occupation. The law also
provides that no man shall have gold or silver, but only some coin for
daily use, which will not pass current in other countries. The common
Hellenic currency is to be used in defraying the expenses of expeditions,
or of embassies, or when a man is on foreign travels; but he who uses
it is to deliver up what is over on his return home to the treasury from
which the issue came, on pain of losing the sum in question; and he
who does not inform against him is to be mulcted in an equal sum. No
money is to be given or taken as a dowry, or to be lent on interest, or
lent at all, except to an honest man. The law will not protect a man
in recovering either interest or principal. All these regulations imply
that the aim of the legislator is not to make the city as rich as possible,
or as mighty as possible, but the greatest virtue and the greatest hap-
piness are to be his principles. Now men can hardly be at the same
time very virtuous and very rich. Over-much honesty is not consistent
with excess of wealth. And why is this? Because he who makes
twice as much and saves twice as much as he ought, receiving where
he ought not and not spending where he ought, will be at least twice
as rich as he who makes money where he ought, and spends where he
ought. On the other hand, an utterly bad man is generally profligate
and poor, while he who acquires honestly, and spends what he acquires
on noble objects, can rarely be very rich. A very rich man is not a
good man, and therefore not a happy one. Now the object of our laws
is to make the citizens as friendly and happy as possible, which they
will be, not when there are the most wrongs and suits, but when there
are the fewest. And, therefore, we say that there is to be no silver or
gold in the state, nor the meaner sort of trade which is carried on by
usury or the rearing of stock, nor money-making, which will lead men to neglect that for the sake of which money is made, that is to say, the soul first and afterwards the body;—which are not good for much without music and gymnastic. Money is to be held in honour last or third; the highest interests being those of the soul, and in the second class are to be ranked those of the body. This is the true order of legislation, which would be inverted by placing health before temperance, or wealth before health. Let our citizens take the lot upon these conditions.

It might be well if every man could come to the colony having equal property; but equality is impossible, and therefore we must avoid causes of offence by valuations of properties, and proportionate taxation. To this end, let us make four classes in which the citizens may be placed according either to their original property, or to the changes of their fortune. The greatest of evils is revolution; and this, as the law will say, is caused by extremes of poverty or wealth. The limit of either shall be the lot, which must not be diminished, and may be increased fourfold, but not more. He who exceeds the limit shall be deprived of the surplus, which shall be divided between the informer and the Gods, and he shall pay as much again out of his own property. All property other than the lot must be inscribed in a register, so that any disputes which arise may be easily determined.

The city shall be in a suitable situation, and in the centre of the country, and shall be divided into twelve wards. First, we will erect an acropolis, encircled by a wall, within which shall be placed the temples of Hestia, and Zeus, and Athéné. From this shall be drawn lines dividing the city, and also the entire country, into twelve sections containing 5040 lots. Each lot shall be subdivided into two parts, and there shall be a residence on both. The distance of one part of the lot shall be compensated by the nearness of the other; the badness and goodness by the greater or less size. Twelve of the lots will be assigned to the twelve Gods, and they will give their names to the tribes. The divisions of the country shall correspond to those of the town.

The objection will naturally arise, that all the advantages of which we have been speaking will never concur. The citizens will not tolerate a settlement in which they are deprived of gold and silver, and have the number of their families regulated, and the sites of their houses fixed by law. They will say that our city is a mere image of wax. And the
INTRODUCTION.

legislator will answer 'I know it, but I maintain that we ought to set forth an ideal which is as perfect as possible. If difficulties arise in the execution of the plan, we must avoid them and carry out the remainder. But the legislator must first be allowed to complete his idea without interruption.'

The number twelve, which is the number of division, runs through all parts of the state, phratries, villages, ranks of soldiers, coins and measures wet and dry, which are all to be made commensurable with one another. There is no meanness in requiring that the smallest vessels should have a common measure, which may be used in all measurements of height and depth, as well as of sounds and motions, upwards or downwards, or round and round. And the use of such a measure should be duly imposed by the legislator on all the citizens. No instrument of education is more valuable than arithmetic; nothing more tends to sharpen and improve and inspire the dull intellect. But such an education presupposes a lofty and generous spirit; there must be no meanness in the mind of the student. Otherwise, what should make a wise man will go to the formation of a rogue; and this evil tendency may be actually observed among the Egyptians and Phoenicians, who, notwithstanding their knowledge of arithmetic, are degraded in their general character; whether this defect in them is to be attributed to misfortune or to the disastrous influence of their education. And do not let us be deceived into thinking that we can disregard physical causes, or that there are not great differences in the power of regions to produce good men: heat and cold, and water and food, are certainly productive of many and great effects on the souls and bodies of men; and greater still are the influences of particular places, in which the air is holy, and Gods and demi-Gods have taken up their abode. To all this the legislator must attend, so far as lies within the scope of human prudence.

BOOK VI. And now we are about to consider (1) the appointment of magistrates; (2) the laws by which their powers and rights are to be determined. I may observe by the way that laws, however good, are useless and also ridiculous unless the magistrates are able to execute them. And therefore (1) the intended rulers of our imaginary state should be tested from their youth upwards until the time of their election; and (2) those who are to elect them ought to be trained in habits of law, that they may form a right judgment of good and bad men. But
uneducated colonists who are unacquainted with each other, will not be likely to choose well. What, then, shall we do? I will tell you: The colony will have to be intrusted to the ten commissioners, of whom you are one, and I will help you and them, which is my reason for inventing this romance. And I cannot bear that the tale should go wandering about the world without a head,—left in this amorphous state, it will be such an ugly monster. 'Very good.' Yes; and I will be as good as my word, if God and old age will be gracious to me. And God will be gracious: but let us not forget what a great and daring creation this our city is. 'Why daring?' Why, surely our courage is shown in imagining that the new colonists will quietly receive our laws; for no man likes to receive laws when they are first imposed: could we only wait until those who had been educated under them were grown up, and of an age to vote in the public elections, there would be far greater reason to expect permanence in our institutions. 'Very true.' The Cnosian founders should take pains to clear themselves in the matter of the colony, and above all in the election of the higher officers. 'How would you appoint them?' In this way: The Cnosians who take the lead in the colony, together with the colonists, will choose thirty-seven persons, of whom nineteen will be colonists, and the remaining eighteen Cnosians—you must be one of the eighteen yourself, and become a citizen of the new state. 'Why do not you and Megillus join us?' Athens is proud, and Sparta too; and they are both a long way off. But let me proceed with my scheme. As time goes on, the mode of election will be as follows: All who are of full age in the various departments of the military service will be electors; and the election will be held in the most sacred of the temples. The voter will place on the altar a tablet, inscribing thereupon his vote, together with the name of his father, tribe, and ward, and his own name; and he may take away the tablet and replace it in the agora within thirty days. The 300 who obtain the greatest number of votes will be publicly announced, and out of them there will be a second election of 100; and out of the 100 a third election of thirty-seven, who have the greatest number of votes: these are to be the rulers; and the last election is to be accompanied by the solemnity of the electors passing through victims: But then who is to arrange all this? There is a common saying, that the beginning is half the whole; and I should say a good deal more than half. 'Most true.' The only way of making a beginning is from the parent city; and though in after ages the tie may be broken, and
INTRODUCTION.

quarrels may arise between them, yet in early days the child naturally looks to the mother for care and education. And, as I said before, the Cnosians ought to take an interest in the colony, and select 100 elders of their own citizens, to whom shall be added 100 of the colonists, to be their rulers; and when the colony has been started, the Cnosians may return home and leave the colonists to themselves. The thirty-seven shall have the following functions: first, they shall be guardians of the law; secondly, of the registers of property in the four classes—not including the two, three, four minae, which are allowed as a surplus. He who is found to possess what is not described in the registers, in addition to the confiscation of such property shall be proceeded against by law, and if he be cast he shall lose his share in the public property or distributions of property; he shall all his life long be confined to the lot; and his sentence shall be inscribed in some public place. The thirty-seven guardians are to continue in office twenty years only, and to commence holding office at fifty years, or if later, they are not to remain after seventy.

Generals have now to be elected, and commanders of horse and briga- diers of foot. The generals shall be natives of the city, proposed by the guardians of the law, and elected by those who are or have been of the age for military service. Any one may challenge the person nominated and start another candidate, whom he affirms upon oath to be better qualified. The three who obtain the greatest number of votes shall be elected. The generals thus elected shall propose the taxiaruchs or briga- diers, and the challenge may be made, and the voting taken, in the same manner as in the previous case. Assemblies for elections are to be held in the first instance, and until the Prytanes and Council come into being, by the guardians of the law in some holy place; and they shall divide the citizens into hoplites and cavalry, placing in a third division all the rest. All are to vote for general and cavalry officers. The brigadiers are to be voted for by those who carry shields. Next, the cavalry are to choose phylarchs in the presence of the army; but captains of archers and other irregular troops are to be appointed by the generals themselves. The generals of cavalry shall be proposed and voted upon by the same persons who vote for generals of the army. The two who have the greatest number of votes shall be leaders of all the horse. Disputes about the voting may be raised once or twice, but if oftener the presiding officers shall decide.
The council shall consist of 360, who may be conveniently divided into four sections of ninety each, making ninety councillors of each class. In the first place, all the citizens shall vote for members of the council taken from the first class; and they all shall be compelled to vote under pain of fine—this shall be the business of the first day. On the second day a similar election shall be made from the second class. On the third day, members of the council shall be elected from the third class; but the compulsion to vote shall only extend to the voters of the three first classes, who, if they fail to vote, shall pay a fine according to their class. On the fourth day, members of the council shall be elected from the fourth class; they shall be elected by all, but the compulsion to vote shall only extend to the second class, who shall pay a fine triple the fine which was exacted at first, and to the first class, who shall pay a quadruple fine. On the fifth day, the names shall be exhibited, and out of them every citizen shall choose 180 of each class: these are to be reduced by lot to ninety, and 90 x 4 will form the council for the year.

The mode of election which has been described is a mean between monarchy and democracy, and such a mean should ever be observed in the state. For servants and masters cannot be friends, and, although equality makes friendship, we must remember that there are two sorts of equality. One of them is the bare external rule of number and measure; but there is also a higher equality, which is the judgment of Zeus. This latter has little place in human affairs, but that little is the source of the greatest good to cities and individuals. This is that equality which gives more to the better and less to the inferior, and is the true political justice; to this the legislator looks, and we in our state desire to look, not to the interests either of tyrants or mobs. But justice cannot always be strictly enforced, and then equity and mercy have to be substituted: and for a similar reason, when true justice will not be endured, we must have recourse to the rougher justice of the lot, which God must be entreated to guide.

These are the principal means of preserving the state, but perpetual care will also be required. The sailor has to keep a look-out for the ship-night and day; and the vessel of state is tossing in a political sea, and therefore watch must succeed watch, and rulers must join hands with rulers, never allowing their vigilance to relax. Of the 360 senators, the greater part may be permitted to go and manage their own affairs,
but a twelfth portion must be set aside in each month for the administration of the state. Their business will be to receive information and answer embassies, also to prevent or heal internal disorders; wherefore they should exercise authority over all assemblies. These matters will be ordered by the monthly division of the council.

Besides the council, there ought to be wardens of ways, buildings, harbours, market-places, fountains, and the like. The temples should have their priests and priestesses, whether hereditary or appointed, and there should be officers having dominion over men and beasts; three kinds will be enough. The first may be called wardens of the city; the second, wardens of the agora; the priests are the third kind, and they will commonly hold family priesthoods; and if these do not exist in the new colony, let priests and priestesses be appointed. Some of our magistrates shall be elected by vote, some by lot; and the upper and lower classes shall be mingled in a friendly manner in the election to offices. The appointment of priests should be left to the God—that is, to the lot in which the God will manifest his will, the person elected undergoing a scrutiny, in proof of his being in his own person sound of body and legitimate, and his family as well as himself free from impurity and homicide. The laws which are to govern the temples should be brought from Delphi, and executed under the direction of the interpreters of them. Priests and priestesses are to be of sixty years of age, and shall hold office for a year only; the twelve tribes shall be formed into bodies of four, who will elect three apiece, making twelve in all. The three who have the greatest number of votes shall be appointed, and undergo a scrutiny; the remaining nine shall go to Delphi, in order that the God may select one out of each triad—and they shall be appointed for life. When any one dies, another shall be elected from the tribe of the deceased. There shall also be treasurers of the temples and groves, having authority over the produce and the letting of them.

The defence of the city should be committed to the generals, and other officers of the army, and to the wardens of the city and agora. The defence of the country shall be on this wise: there are twelve districts and twelve tribes, and in each there shall be five wardens of the country, and each of the five shall select twelve others out of their own district, of not more than thirty or less than twenty-five years of age. Every month they shall have one of the twelve portions of the country allotted to them, and go from one to the other, and back again from
west to east, and from east to west, changing the stations in their pro-
gress backwards and forwards in different months, that they may know
the country at all seasons of the year. Every third year they shall have
new wardens of the country, and commanders of the watch. While on
service, their first duty will be to see that the country is well fortified,
trenching and throwing up works in different places, with the assistance
of the inhabitants; they will use the beasts of burden and the labourers
whom they find on the spot, taking care however to interfere as little
as possible with the regular course of agriculture. They will keep the
roads in good order, and render every part of the country as inaccessible
as possible to enemies, and as accessible as possible to friends. They
will restrain and preserve the rain which comes down from heaven,
making the barren places fertile, and the wet places dry. They will
ornament the fountains with plantations and buildings, and guide the
streams to the temples and groves of the gods; providing water by
irrigation at all seasons of the year. In sacred places the youth should
make gymnasia for themselves, and warm baths for the aged; there the
weary frame of the rustic, worn with toil, will be kindly received, and
experience far better treatment than at the hands of a country doctor.

The duties of the service will be useful as well as ornamental, for the
sixty police will be the guardians of the several portions of the country
assigned to them; the five monthly rulers shall decide small matters,
and the seventeen, composed of the five and the twelve, shall decide
greater matters up to three minae. Every judge except the highest of
all is to give an account. If the wardens of the country do any wrong
to the inhabitants, let them submit to the decision of the villagers in the
neighbourhood, where the question is only of a mina; but in suits of a
greater amount, or in cases of appeal, the injured party may bring his
suit into the common courts, and, if he obtain a verdict, may exact
a double penalty.

The wardens, while on their two years' service, shall live and eat
together, and he who is absent from the daily meal without permission
or sleeps out at night, shall be regarded as a deserter, and be liable
to be punished by any one who meets him. If any of the rulers is
guilty of such an irregularity, the whole company of sixty shall have
him punished; and he of them who screens him shall be liable to a
still heavier penalty. He who is not a good servant will not be a good
master; and a man should pride himself more upon serving well than
upon commanding: (1) upon serving the laws and the Gods; and (2) upon serving ancient and honourable men. The twelve and the five should serve themselves and one another, determining not to use the labour of the villagers for their private advantage, but only for the good of the public. Let them search the country through, and acquire a perfect knowledge of every locality; with this view, hunting and field sports should be encouraged. The service to whom these duties are committed, may be called the secret or rural police.

Next we have to speak of the elections of the wardens of the agora and of the city. The wardens of the city shall be three in number, and they shall have the care of the streets, roads, buildings, also of the water supply, which they will provide pure and abundant. They shall be chosen out of the highest class, and when the number of candidates has been reduced to six, three out of the six shall be taken by lot, and, after being tested by a scrutiny, shall be admitted to their office. The wardens of the agora shall be five in number—ten are to be first elected, and every one shall vote for all of them; the ten shall be afterwards reduced to five, as in the former election. The first and second class shall be compelled to go to the assembly, but not the third and fourth, unless they are specially summoned. The wardens of the agora shall have the care of the temples and fountains which are in the agora, and shall punish those who injure them by stripes and bonds, if they be slaves or strangers; and by fines if they be citizens. And the wardens of the city shall have a similar power of inflicting punishment and fines in their own department.

In the next place, there must be ministers of music and gymnastic; one class of them superintending gymasia and schools, and the education and housing of youth, male and female—the other having to do with contests of music and gymnastic. In musical contests there shall be one set of judges of solo singing or playing, who will judge of rhapsodists, flute-players, harp-players and the like, and another of choruses. Each chorus of men, and boys, and maidens, must have a leader—one will be enough, and he should not be less than forty years of age; secondly, there must be a master of monody, aged not less than thirty years; he will introduce the competitors to the stage, and refer the judgment of them to the judges. The choregus is to be elected for a year in an assembly at which all who take an interest in music are compelled to attend, and no one else. Anybody may challenge on the
ground that so and so is unfit; and to this the other party may reply that he is fit. One is to be chosen by lot out of ten who are elected by vote. Next shall be elected out of the second and third classes the judges of gymnastic contests, who are to be three in number, chosen, after they have been tested, out of twenty who have been elected by the three highest classes—these being compelled to attend at the election.

One minister remains, who will have the general superintendence of the education of either sex. Let him be not less than fifty years old, and the father of children born in wedlock, of one sex if not of both; and let him and the electors agree in regarding his office as the highest in the state. For the right growth of the first shoot in plants and animals, tame or wild, including man, is the chief cause of matured perfection. Man is supposed to be a tame animal, but he is made either the gentlest or the fiercest of all creatures, accordingly as he is well or ill educated. Wherefore he who is elected to preside over education should be the best man possible. He shall hold office for five years, and shall be elected out of the guardians of the law, by the votes of the other magistrates with the exception of the senate and prytanes; and the election shall be held by ballot in the temple of Apollo.

When a magistrate dies before his term of office has expired, another shall be elected in his place; and, in case the guardian of an orphan dies, another shall be appointed by the relations within ten days; and they shall be fined a drachma a day for every day which they delay.

The city which has no courts of law will soon cease to be a city; and a judge who is silent and leaves the enquiry wholly to the litigants, as in arbitrations, is not a good judge. For making enquiry, a few judges are better than many, but the few must be good. The matter in dispute should be clearly elicited from the contending parties; time and examination will find out the truth. Before going to law, causes should first be tried among neighbours who know the circumstances, and if they cannot be settled by them, let them be referred to a higher court; and if the two courts do not agree, to a higher still, of which the decision shall be final.

Every magistrate is a judge, and every judge is a magistrate, on the day on which he is deciding a suit. The best tribunal will be that on which the litigants agree; and let there be two other tribunals, one for public and the other for private causes. The high court of appeal shall be composed of all the officers of state; they shall meet on the last day
of the year, and choose one judge for each court, to be their first-fruits: and those who are elected, after they have undergone a scrutiny, shall decide causes and judge appeals. They shall give their votes openly, in the presence of the magistrates who have elected them; and if any one charges another with deciding against him unfairly, he shall lay his accusation before the guardians of the law, and if the judge be found guilty he shall pay damages to the extent of half the injury, unless the guardians of the law deem that he is worthy of a severer judgment.

As the whole people are injured by offences against the state, they should share in the trial of them. Such causes should be decided by any three of the highest magistrates upon whom the defendant and plaintiff can agree. Also in private suits all should judge as far as possible, and therefore there should be a court of law in every ward; for he who has no share in the administration of justice, appears to himself to have no share in the state. The final judgment shall rest with that court which, as we maintain, has been established in the most incorruptible form possible. And so, having done with the appointment of courts and the election of rulers, we may proceed to make our laws.

'I like your way, Stranger, and particularly approve your manner of joining the beginning to the end.'

Then so far our old man's game of play has gone off well.

'Say, rather, our serious and noble pursuit.'

Perhaps; but let me ask you whether you have ever observed the manner in which painters put in and rub out colour: I want you to remark that their endless labour will last but a short time, unless they leave behind them some successor who will restore the picture, and make good the ravages of time. 'Certainly.' And is not this what you and I have to do at the present moment? We are in the evening of life ourselves, and therefore we must leave our work of legislation to be improved and perfected by the next generation; not only making laws for them, but making them lawgivers. 'We must do our best.' Let us address them as follows: Beloved saviours of the laws, we give you an outline of legislation which you must fill up, according to a rule which we will prescribe for you: Megillus and Cleinias and I are agreed, and we hope that you will agree with us in thinking, that the whole energies of a man should be devoted to the attainment of manly virtue, whether this is to be gained by study, or habit, or some kind of acquirement, or desire, or opinion, or knowledge. He must admit of no impediments.
And rather than accept institutions which tend to degrade and enslave him, he should fly his country and endure any hardship. These are our principles, and we would ask you to judge of our laws, and praise or blame them accordingly as they are or are not capable of implanting this character.

And first of laws concerning religion. In the consideration of these we shall have to return to the number $5040$, of which the twelfth part is $420 = 20 \times 21$; this division corresponds to the number of the twelve tribes, and each tribe may be further subdivided by $12$. Every divisor is a gift of God, and corresponds to the months of the year and to the movement of the universe. Every city has a number, but some numbers are more fortunate than others, and nothing can be more fortunate than our own, which can be divided by all numbers up to $12$, with the exception of $11$, and even by $11$, if two families are deducted. The truth of this may be easily proved when we have leisure. But leaving the proof for the present, we will proceed to assign to each division some God or demigod, who shall have altars raised to them, and sacrifices offered twice a month; and assemblies shall be held in their honour, twelve for the tribes, and twelve for the city. The object of them will be first to promote religion, secondly to encourage friendship and family intercourse; for families must be acquainted before they marry; if they are not, great mistakes will arise. Let there be innocent dances of young men and maidens, who may have the opportunity of seeing one another in modest undress. To the details of all this the masters of choruses and the guardians will attend, embodying in laws the results of their experience; and after ten years making the laws permanent, with the consent of the legislator, if he be alive, or, if he be not alive, the guardians of the law shall perfect them and settle them once for all. At least, if any further changes are required, the magistrates must take the whole people into counsel, and obtain the sanction of all the oracles.

Whenever any one who is between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five wants to marry, let him do so; but first let him hear the strain which we will address to him —

Son of a virtuous sire: you ought to marry, but not for wealth—even a little inferiority in this respect may be well; nor should you avoid poverty, for your object is to have a well-balanced and harmonious home. A man is commonly disposed to marry some one who
INTRODUCTION.

is like himself in property and character. But the interests of the state require that he should do the contrary, for by equal marriages a society becomes unequal. And yet to enact a law that the rich and mighty shall not marry the rich and mighty, that the passionate shall be united to the dull, or the dull to the passionate, will arouse anger in some persons and laughter in others; for they do not understand that the state is a cup in which two elements mingle, the one frothing wine, the other sober water,—the admixture of these is an excellent drink. The object at which we aim must therefore be left to the influence of public opinion. And do not forget our former precept, that every one should seek to attain immortality and raise up a fair posterity to serve God:—This is the prelude of the law, to which if a man will not listen, and at thirty-five years of age is still unmarried, let him pay an annual fine: if he be of the first class, 100 drachmas; if of the second, 70; if of the third, 60; and if of the fourth, 30. This fine shall be consecrated in the temple of Herè; and if he refuse to pay, a tenfold penalty shall be exacted by the treasurer of Herè, who shall be responsible for the payment. Further, the unmarried man shall receive no honour or obedience from the young, and he shall not retain the right of punishing others. A man is neither to give nor receive a dowry beyond a certain fixed sum; and in our state he will not grow old in poverty, for every one is provided with the necessaries of life. If the woman is not rich, her husband will not be her humble servant. He who obeys this law does well, and he who disobeys shall pay a fine according to his class, which shall be exacted by the treasurers of Herè and Zeus.

The betrothal of the parties shall be made by the next of kin in various degrees, or if there are none, by the guardians. The offerings and ceremonies of marriage shall be determined by the interpreters of sacred rites. Let the wedding party be moderate, and never exceed a man's means; five male and five female friends, and a like number of kinsmen, are enough. The expense should not exceed, for the first class, a mina; and for the second class, half a mina. Extravagance is to be regarded as vulgarity and ignorance of nuptial proprieties. Much wine is only to be drunk at the festivals of Dionysus, and certainly not on the occasion of a marriage. The bride and bridegroom, who are taking a great step in life, ought to have all their wits about them; they should be especially careful of the night on which God may give them the
seeds of increase, and which this will be none can tell. Their bodies and souls should be in the most temperate condition; they should abstain from all that partakes of the nature of disease or vice, which will otherwise become hereditary. There is an original divinity in man which preserves all things, if used with proper respect. He who marries should make the second house the nest and nursery of his young; he should leave his father and mother, and then he will have more affection for them; "there ought to be desiderium to get rid of offense." He will go forth as to a colony and will beget and bring up his children in another place, handing on the torch of life to another generation.

About property in general there is little difficulty, with the exception of property in slaves, which is an institution of a very doubtful character. The slavery of the Helots is affirmed by some to be the greatest good, and by others the greatest misfortune of Sparta. To a certain extent there is the same doubt about the slavery of the Mariandynians at Heracléa and of the Thessalian Penestae. This makes us ask, What shall we do with our slaves? to which every one would agree in replying, Let us have the best and most attached whom we can get. All of us have heard stories of slaves who have saved the lives and properties of their masters, and been better to them than a son or a brother. "Certainly." Yet there is an opposite doctrine, that slaves are good for nothing, and not to be trusted; as Homer says, "Slavery takes away half a man's understanding." And different persons treat them in different ways: there are some who never trust them, and beat them like dogs, until they make them not thrice, but many times as slavish as they were before; and others pursue the opposite plan. Man is a troublesome animal, as has been often shown, Megillus, in your Messenian wars; and great mischiefs have arisen in countries where there are large bodies of slaves who speak a common language. Two rules may be given for their management: first that those of them who come from the same country should be dispersed; and secondly, that they should be treated by their master with perfect justice, even more than equals, and for his own sake quite as much as theirs. For the truly just man is he who hates injustice when easy; and he who is righteous in the treatment of his slaves, or of any inferiors, will sow in them the seed of virtue. Masters should never play with their slaves: this, which is a common practice, is a great piece of folly, and increases
the difficulty and painfulness of managing them to both parties. ‘You
are quite right.’

Next as to habitations. These ought to have been spoken of before;
for no man can marry a wife, and have slaves, who has not a house
for them to live in. Let us supply the omission. The agora
should be in the centre of the city, and the temples in the neighbour-
hood of the Acropolis. Near them should be the residences of
the magistrates, and the courts of law in which capital offences are
to be tried. Matters serious in themselves are rendered more serious
by their proximity to the Gods. As to walls, Megillus, let them sleep
in the earth, as at Sparta; ‘cold steel is the best wall,’ as the poet
tells us. Besides, what an absurdity there would be in sending our
youth to dig fosses and raise buildings in defence of the borders of
our country, and then to build a city wall, which is very unhealthy,
and is apt to make people fancy that they may run there and rest in
idleness, not knowing that true rest must always follow toil, and that toil
of another sort is the consequence of idleness. If, however, there
must be a wall, the private houses had better be so arranged as to
form one wall; this will have an agreeable aspect, and the building will
be safer and more defensible. The inhabitants will keep the wall in
repair under the superintendence of the aediles, who will enforce
cleanliness, and preserve the public buildings from the encroachments
by buildings or diggings of individuals. The aediles will also take care to
let the rains flow off easily, and will regulate other matters concerning
the general administration of the city. What remains may be left to
the guardians of the law.

And now, having provided buildings, and having married our citizens,
we will proceed to speak of their mode of life. In a well-constituted
state, individuals cannot be allowed to live as they please. Why do
I say this? Because I am going to enact that the bridegroom shall
not absent himself from the common meals. They were instituted
originally on the occasion of some war, and, though deemed singular
when first founded, they have tended greatly to the security of states.
There was a difficulty in introducing them, but there is no difficulty
in them now. There is, however, another institution about which I
would speak, if I dared. I may preface my proposal by remarking
that disorder in a state is the source of all evil, and order of all good.
Now in Sparta and Crete there are common meals for men, and this,
as I was saying, is a divine and natural institution. But the women are left to themselves; they live in dark places, and, being weaker, and therefore wickeder, than men, they are at the bottom of a good deal more than half the evil of states. This must be corrected, and the institution of common meals extended to both sexes. But who can establish them where they are lost; and still more, who can compel women to eat and drink in public? They will dare the legislator to come and take them out of their holes. And in any other state such a proposal would be drowned in clamour, but in our own I think that I can show the attempt to be just and reasonable. ‘There is nothing which we should like to hear better.’ Listen, then; having plenty of time, we will go back to the beginning of things, which is an old subject with us. ‘Right.’ Either the race of mankind never had a beginning and will never have an end, or the time which has elapsed since man first came into being is all but infinite. ‘No doubt.’ And in this infinity of time there have been constitutions and destructions of states, and all kinds of order and disorder, desires of meats and drinks of all sorts, and vicissitudes of the seasons, affecting animals in numberless ways. ‘Certainly.’ Vines and olives were at length discovered, and the blessings of Demeter and Persephone, of which one Triptolemus is said to have been the minister; before his time the animals had been eating one another. And there are nations in which mankind still sacrifice their fellow men, and other nations in which they will not sacrifice animals, or so much as taste of a cow—they offer fruits or cakes moistened with honey; and some have led a sort of Orphic existence, abstaining from everything that has animal life, and eating only that which is without life. Perhaps you will ask me what is the bearing of these remarks? ‘That is certainly passing in my mind.’ I will endeavour to explain their drift. I see that the virtue of human life depends on the due regulation of three wants or desires: the first is the desire of meat, the second of drink; these begin with birth, and refuse to listen to any voice other than that of pleasure and pain. The third and fiercest and greatest need is felt latest; this is love, which is a madness setting men’s whole nature on fire. These three disorders of mankind we must endeavour to restrain by three mighty influences—fear, and law, and reason, which, with the aid of the Muses, and the Gods of contests, may extinguish our lusts.

But to return. After marriage let us proceed to the generation of
INTRODUCTION.

children, and then to their nurture and education — thus gradually approaching the subject of syssitia. There are, however, some other points which are suggested by the three words — meat, drink, love. 'Proceed.' The bride and bridegroom ought to set their mind on having a brave offspring. Now a man only succeeds when he takes pains; wherefore the bridegroom ought to take special care of the bride, and the bride of the bridegroom, at the time when their children are about to be born. And let there be a jury of matrons who shall meet at the command of the magistrates, and shall attend at the temple of Eilithyia until noon, and inform against any man or woman who does not observe the laws of married life. The time of begetting children and the supervision of the parents shall last for ten years only; if at the expiration of this period they have no children, they may part, with the consent of their relatives and the official matrons, and with a due regard to the interests of either; if a dispute arise, the matrons shall enter the houses of the young people, and advise and threaten them. If their efforts fail, let them go to the guardians of the law; and if they too fail, the offender, if he be a man, shall lose the privileges of citizenship, and both men and women shall be forbidden to be present at all family ceremonies. If when the time for begetting children has ceased, either husband or wife have connection with others who are of an age to beget children, they shall be liable to the same penalties as those who are still having a family. But when both parties have ceased to beget children there shall be no penalties; men and women ought to live soberly and maintain a good reputation; but recourse is to be had to punishment only if there is great disorder of manners.

The first year of children's lives is to be registered in their ancestral temples; the name of the archon of the year is to be inscribed on a whitened wall in every phratry, and the names of the living members of the phratry at the side, and to be erased at their decease. The proper time of marriage for a woman shall be from sixteen years to twenty; for a man, from thirty to thirty-five (cp. Rep. v. 460 E). The age of holding office for a woman is to be forty, for a man thirty years. The time for military service for a man is to be from twenty years to sixty; for a woman, from the time that she has ceased to bear children until fifty.

BOOK VII. Now that we have married our citizens and brought their children into the world, we have to find nurture and education
for them. This is a matter of precept rather than of law, and cannot be precisely regulated by the legislator. For minute regulations are apt to be transgressed, and frequent transgressions impair the habit of obedience to the laws. I speak darkly, but I will try to exhibit my wares in the light of day. Am I not right in saying that a good education tends to the improvement of body and mind? 'Certainly.' And the comeliness of the body ought to begin as soon as possible after birth. 'Very true.' And we observe that the first shoot of every living thing is the greatest, and there are many who contend that man is not at twenty-five twice the height that he was at five. 'True.' And growth without symmetrical exercise of the limbs is the source of endless evils in the body. 'Yes.' The body should have the most exercise when growing most. 'What, the bodies of young infants?' Nay, the bodies of unborn infants. I should like to explain to you the sort of gymnastics which may be used during the process of gestation. The Athenians are fond of cock-fighting, and in our country the people who keep cocks, far from thinking that they have enough movement in fighting one another, take them out for long walks, holding them in their hands or under their arms; this is done for the sake of health, that is to say, not their own health, but the health of the cocks. Here is a proof of the use and glory of motion, whether of rocking, swinging, riding, or tossing upon the wave; for all these kinds of motion have a great effect in increasing strength and the powers of digestion. Hence we infer that our women, when they are with child, should walk about and fashion the embryo; and the children, when born, should be carried by stout nurses—one or more—and not suffered to walk until they are three years old, lest they should grow rickety. Shall we impose penalties for the neglect of these rules? The greatest penalty, that is, ridicule, and the difficulty of making the nurses do as we bid them, will be incurred by ourselves. 'Then why speak of these matters?' In the hope that heads of families may learn that the due regulation of them is the foundation of law and order in the state.

And now, leaving the body, let us proceed to the soul; but we must first repeat that perpetual motion by night and by day is good for all, and especially for the infant; his life should be borne upon the wave. This is proved by the Corybantian cure of motion, and by the practice of nurses who rock children in their arms, lapping them at the same time in sweet measures. What is the reason of this? The reason is
obvious. The affections, both of the Corybantes and of the children arise from fear, and this fear is occasioned by something wrong which is going on within them. Now a violent external commotion tends to calm the violent internal one; it quiets the palpitation of the heart, giving sleep to some, and bringing back others who are awake to their right minds by the help of religious dances and acceptable sacrifices. There seems to be reason in that. 'No doubt.' Observe also that the mind of a child which is habitually in a state of terror will be likely to grow up timorous, and the overcoming of fear in childhood will become courage. 'Very true.' The motion of children will inspire their souls with the virtue of cheerfulness. 'Of course.' Softness enervates and irritates the temper of the young, and violence renders them mean and misanthropical. 'But how is the state to educate them when they are as yet unable to understand the meaning of words?' Why, surely they roar and cry, like the young of any other animal, and the nurse knows the meaning of these intimations of the child's likes or dislikes, and the occasions which call them forth. About three years is passed by children in a state of imperfect articulation, and this is no insignificant portion of human life, quite long enough to make them either good or ill tempered. Now you should contrive that, during these first three years, the infant should be as free as possible from fear and pain. 'Yes, and he should have as much pleasure provided for him as possible.' There I cannot agree with you; for I consider the influence of pleasure in the beginning of education to be fatal. 'Explain.' My principle is that a man should neither pursue pleasure nor wholly avoid pain. He should embrace the mean, and cultivate that state of calm which the religious feeling of mankind, taught by inspiration, attributes to God; and he who would be like God should neither be too fond of pleasure himself, nor should he permit any other, male or female, young or old, to be thus given; above all, not the infant, who in infancy is being fashioned and formed more than at any other time. I shall be laughed at for saying that a woman in her pregnancy should be carefully watched, and not suffered to indulge in excitement; her ways should be gentle and gracious.

'I quite agree with you about the duty of avoiding extremes and following the mean.'

Let us now consider a further matter. The unwritten customs or usages of our ancestors are made up of details which are not laws, but they...
fill up the interstices of law, and are the props and ligatures on which the strength of the whole building depends. Laws without customs never last. No wonder, then, that habit and custom overflow into the domain of law. 'Very true.' And there may be great advantage in the influence exercised by custom upon three-years-old children. From three to six their minds have to be amused; and they must receive gentle chastisement, about which the same rule holds as in the case of slaves — neither to punish them in hot blood, nor by sparing to spoil them. Children at that age invent amusements for themselves when they meet, and the nurses should bring parties of them to their own village temple, and be careful to keep good order among them, being responsible themselves to one of the twelve matrons annually chosen by the women who have authority over marriage. These shall be appointed, one out of each of the twelve tribes, and when appointed, they shall go to the temples, and reprove and chastise offenders; and, in case their authority is disputed, shall bring them before the magistrates. After six years of age there shall be a separation of the sexes; the boys going to learn riding and the use of arms, and the girls may, if they please, also learn. Here I note a practical error in early training. The folly of mammas and nurses believes that the left hand is by nature different from the right, whereas the left leg and foot are acknowledged to be the same as the right. But the truth is that nature made all things to balance, and the use of the other hand, which is of little importance in the case of the spectrum of the lyre, may make a great difference in the art of the warrior, who should be a sort of pancratiaist, in every part of his body whole and perfect, and able to fight and balance himself in any position. If a man were a Briareus, he should be able to hurl a hundred darts with a hundred hands; at any rate, let him make good use of two. To all these matters the magistrates, male and female, should attend; the women superintending the nursing and amusement of their children, and the men superintending their education, that all of them, boys and girls alike, may be sound, wind and limb, and not spoil the gifts of nature by bad habits.

Education has two branches—gymnastic, which is concerned with the body; and music, which is designed for the improvement of the soul. And gymnastic has two parts, dancing and wrestling. Dancing aims at the preservation of stateliness and freedom; wrestling is concerned with
the training of the limbs and parts of the body, and gives the proper flexure and extension to each of them, diffusing harmony throughout the frame. There is no military use in the complex systems of wrestling which pass under the names of Antaeus and Cercyon, or in the science of boxing, which is attributed to Amycus and Epeius; but good wrestling and the habit of extricating the neck, hands, and sides, should be diligently learnt and taught; and in our dances imitations of war should be practised, as in the dances of the Curetes in Crete and of the Dioscuri at Sparta, or as in the dances in complete armour which were taught and practised by the goddess Athene, and are still performed in her honour. Youths who are not yet of an age to go to war should take part in religious processions armed and on horseback, moving slower or faster, chanting prayers to the Gods; and there should be games and rehearsals, which, whether in war or peace, are of great political importance.

Next follows music, to which we will once more return; and here I shall venture to repeat my old paradox, that amusements have great influence on laws. He who has been taught to play at the same games and with the same playthings will be content with the same laws. There is no greater evil in a state than the spirit of innovation. Even in external nature change is a dangerous thing; in the changes of the seasons and winds, there is danger to our bodies and the habits of our minds; changes of diet are also dangerous. And in everything but what is bad the same rule holds. Every one venerates and acquiesces in the laws to which he is accustomed; and if they have continued during long periods of time owing to some providential arrangement, and there is no knowledge or memory of any other, people are absolutely afraid to change them. Now by what device shall we create this spirit of immobility in the laws? I say, by not allowing innovations in the plays and games of children. The children who are always changing their plays, when grown up, will change their laws. Changes in mere fashions are not serious evils, but changes in the praise and blame of characters are most serious; and rhythms and music are representations of characters, and therefore we must avoid novelties in dance and song; and no better method can be imagined of securing permanence than that of the Egyptians. ‘What is their method?’ The consecration of dances and hymns at appointed festivals and in honour of certain Gods; having been first selected by
individuals, they should be solemnly ratified by all the citizens, and an 'act of uniformity' passed. He who introduces other hymns or dances shall be excluded by the priests and priestesses, with the help of the guardians of the law; and if he refuses to submit, he may be prosecuted. But we must not be too ready to speak about such great matters. Even a young man, when he hears something new and strange, stands and looks this way and that, and, like a traveller in an unknown land, tries to find out where he is and whither he is going; and at our age a man ought to be very sure of his ground in so singular an argument. 'Very true.' Then, leaving the point which we are considering to receive further examination at some other time, let us look forward to the end of our laws about education, for that may probably throw light upon our present difficulty. 'Let us do as you say.' The ancients used the term νόμον to signify harmonious strains, and perhaps they dreamed or fancied that there was a connection between the songs and laws of a country. And we say—Whosoever shall transgress the strains by law established is a transgressor of the laws, and shall be punished by the guardians of the law and by the priests and priestesses. 'Let this be as you say.' How can we legislate about them so as to command respect? Moulds or types of them must be first made, and one of the types shall be, Abstinence from evil words at sacrifices. When a son or brother blasphemes at a sacrifice there is a sound of ill omen heard in the family. 'Very true.' Yet this is a common practice. Many a chorus stands by the altar uttering inauspicious words, and he is crowned victor who excites the hearers most with lamentations. Such lamentations should be reserved for evil days, and if they are ever uttered should be uttered only by hired mourners, like those who accompany a funeral with barbarous Carian chants; and let them not have circlets or ornaments of gold. To avoid every evil word shall be the first of our types. 'Agreed.' Our second law or type shall be, that prayers ever accompany sacrifices; and our third, that prayers shall be only for good, for they are requests, and our poets must be made to understand this. 'Certainly.' Were we not saying just now that the golden and silver images of Plutus were not to be allowed in our city? and did not this show that we were dissatisfied with the poets; and may we not reasonably fear that, if they are allowed to compose prayers which are bad prayers, they will bring the greatest misfortunes on the state? And we must therefore make a law that the poet is not to contradict the laws or
INTRODUCTION.

ideas of the state; nor is he to show his poems to any private persons until they have first received the *imprimatur* of the director of education. After prayers to the Gods, there naturally follow hymns to the Gods; and after these, prayers and hymns to the heroes and demigods. There will be no danger in praising the dead, but until a man’s life is finished we must wait. And men and women may be equally deserving of praise. Many ancient songs, poems, figures of the dance, are excellent, and out of these a selection will be made by judges, who ought not to be less than fifty years of age. They will choose some, and reject or amend others, sometimes with the aid of the poets themselves, their object being to bring the hymns and dances into accordance with the intentions of the legislator. The regular and temperate music is the style in which to educate children, who, if they are used to this, will deem the opposite kind to be illiberal, or, if they are used to the other, will count this to be cold and unpleasing. ‘Very good.’ Further, a distinction should be made between the melodies of men and women. Nature herself seems to teach that the grand or manly style should be assigned to men, and to women the temperate and orderly. How this is to be carried out in detail is a further consideration. I am only, like the shipwright, laying down the keel of the vessel of the soul in which we are to sail through life. Human affairs are hardly serious, and yet to be serious about them is a disagreeable necessity; and if we can discover how to be serious, that will best be seem us. ‘Very true.’ I say then, that concerning the serious we should be serious, and that the nature of God is a serious reality. But man is a piece of mechanism and the plaything of the Gods; and therefore his aim should be to pass through life, not in grim earnest, but in play; and he should play as many good plays as he can—man and woman alike—in an opposite way to that which is now in vogue. ‘How is that?’ The common opinion is, that work is for the sake of play, war of peace; whereas in war there neither is, nor ever will be, lesson or amusement worth speaking of. The life of peace is that which men should chiefly desire to lengthen out and improve. They should live sacrificing, singing, and dancing, with the view of propitiating Gods and heroes. I have already told you the type which they should follow:—

‘Some things,’ as the poet says, ‘you will devise for yourself—others, God will suggest to you.’

These words of his may be applied to our pupils. They will teach
themselves, and God will teach them the art of propitiating Him; for they are His puppets, and have only a small portion in truth. ‘You have no great opinion of human nature.’ You must not wonder at my depreciating man when I compare him with God; but, if you are offended, I will place him a little higher.

Next follow the buildings; there will be gymnasia and schools in the midst of the city, and outside the city circuses and open spaces for riding and archery. In all of these there ought to be instructors of the young, drawn from foreign parts by pay, and they will teach them music and war. Education shall be compulsory; parents shall not be allowed to send their children to school or not, as they please; for they belong to the state more than to their parents. And I say further, without fear or scruple, that the same education in riding and gymnastic shall be given both to men and women. The ancient traditions about the female hosts of the Sauromatidae, who practise the art of riding as well as archery and the use of arms, is an entirely credible tradition which confirms me in this view; and if I am right, nothing can be more foolish than our modern fashion of training men and women differently, whereby one-half of the power of the city is lost. For reflect—if women are not to have the education of men, some other must be found for them, and what other can we propose? Shall they, like the women of Thrace, tend cattle and till the ground; or, like our own, spin and weave, and take care of the house? or shall they follow the Spartan custom, which is between the two?—there the maidens share in gymnastic exercises and in music; and the grown women no longer engaged in spinning, weave the web of life, although they are not like the Amazons, trained to the use of spear and shield; nor can they imitate the warrior goddess, even in the extremity of their country’s need. Compared with our women, the Sauromatian women are like men. But your legislators, Megillus, as I maintain, only half did their work; they took care of the men, and left the women to take care of themselves.

‘Shall we suffer the Stranger, Cleinias, to run down Sparta in this way?’

‘Why, yes; for we cannot retract the liberty which we have already conceded to him.’

What will be the manner of life of men in moderate circumstances, freed from the toils of agriculture and business, and having common
INTRODUCTION.

meals for both sexes; from which they are dismissed by the magistrates, male and female, who will inspect their conversation, and at whose bidding, when libations have been offered, they will return home? Are men who have these institutions only to eat and fatten like beasts? He who lives like a fatted beast will share the fate of a fatted beast, which is to be torn in pieces by some other more valiant beast than himself. True, theirs is not the perfect way of life, for they have not all things in common; but the second best way of life also confers great blessings; and those who live in the second state have a work to do far greater, or rather twice as great as the work of any Pythian or Olympic victor; for they indeed work for the body only, but we both for body and soul. And this higher work ought not to be interfered with by any bye-work, but should be pursued night and day; for life is not long enough for the completion of it. The watchman of the city should not sleep, and the master of the household should be up early and before all his servants; and the mistress, too, should awaken her handmaidens, and not be awakened by them. Much sleep is not required either for our souls or bodies. When a man is asleep, he is no better than if he were dead; and he who loves life and wisdom will have no more sleep than is necessary for health, which is not much. Magistrates who are wide awake at night are terrible to the bad; but they are respected by the wise and good, and useful to themselves and the state.

When the morning dawns, let the boy go to school. As the sheep need the shepherd, so the boy needs a master; he may be called animal ferae naturae, and is the most unmanageable and deceitful of all creatures; for he has the springs of intelligence in him not yet regulated. Let him be taken out of the hands of mothers and nurses, and tamed with bit and bridle, being treated as a freeman in that he learns and is taught; but as a slave in that he is chastised and smitten by all other freemen; and the freeman who neglects to chastise him, shall himself be reprimanded by the director of education.

We must now give instructions to our director of education—him we will address as follows: We have spoken to you, O illustrious teacher of youth, of the song, the time, and the dance, and of martial exercises; but of prose writings, and of music, and of the use of calculation for military and domestic purposes we have not spoken, nor yet of the higher use of numbers in reckoning divine things—
such as the revolutions of the stars, or the arrangements of days in months, or of months in years, of which the true calculation is necessary to the knowledge of the order of seasons and festivals, which enliven and wake up a city, rendering to the Gods their due, and making men know them better. There are many things about which we have not as yet instructed you—and first, as to reading and the lyre: Shall the pupil be a perfect scholar and musician, or not even enter on the study? He should certainly enter on the study, and apply himself to letters from the age of ten to thirteen. At thirteen he will begin to handle the lyre, and continue to learn music until he is sixteen, and no longer, however fond he or his parents may be of the pursuit. The study of letters he should carry to the extent of reading and writing, without caring for calligraphy and tachygraphy, if he has no natural taste for them and cannot acquire them in three years. And here arises a question as to the learning of compositions, whether in poetry or prose, when unaccompanied with music. They are a dangerous species of literature. Speak then, O guardians of the law, and tell us what we shall do about them. ‘You seem to be in a difficulty.’ Why, yes; there is a difficulty in setting a single voice against the opinion of all the world. ‘But have we not already disregarded the opinion of the world in many of our enactments?’ Very true. I see that you would marshal me on the unpopular road, which the many hate, and you would have me cast in my lot with the few who are better than the many. ‘Certainly.’ Then I will begin by observing that we have many poets writing in hexameters, trimeters, and various other metres, comic as well as tragic, with whose compositions, as all the world affirms, youth are to be imbued and saturated. Some would have them learn by heart entire poets, while others prefer extracts; and this is supposed to constitute a gentleman’s education. Now I am of opinion, and, if I am not mistaken, everybody would agree with me, that some of the things which they learn are good, and some bad. ‘Then how shall we reject some and select others?’ A happy thought suddenly occurs to me; this discourse, which has lasted the live-long day, is just a sample of what we want, and is moreover an inspired work and a kind of poem. I am naturally pleased in looking back at all this creation of mine, which appears to me to have a wonderful propriety, and is just the thing for a young man to hear. I would venture, then, to offer to the legislator this
INTRODUCTION.

treatise of laws as a sample of what he wants; and in case he should find any compositions of the same family, written or oral, I would have him preserve them with the utmost care, and commit them in the first place to the teachers who are willing to learn them (he should turn off the teacher who refuses), and let them communicate the lesson to the young.

I have said enough of reading and writing; and now we will proceed to the teachers of the lyre. The teacher of the lyre must be reminded of the advice which was given by us to the sexagenarian minstrels; like them he should be quick to perceive the rhythms suited to the expression of virtue, and to reject the opposite. With a view to perfecting the imitation, the pupil and his instructor are to use the lyre on account of the distinctness of the notes; the voice and note should coincide note for note: nor should there be harmonies and contrasts of intervals, or variations of times or rhythms. Three years' study is not long enough to give a knowledge of these complexities. And when so many subjects of education are necessary, the pupil should not be overwhelmed with the unnecessary. The tunes and hymns which are to be consecrated for each festival, and to be handed down in after ages, have been already determined, and the regulation of them may be left to our director of music.

Let us now proceed to dancing and gymnastic, which must also be taught to boys and girls by masters and mistresses. Our minister of education will have a great deal to do. Being an old man how will he get through so much work? There is no difficulty; for the law will provide him with assistants, male and female, as many as he pleases; and he will consider how important his office is. For if education prospers, the vessel of state sails merrily along; or if education fails, the very mention of the consequences in an infant state would be ill-omened. Of dancing and gymnastics something has been said already. We include under them the various uses of arms, and the movements and positions of the body corresponding to them, as well as military tactics. There should be public teachers of both arts, paid by the state, and women as well as men should be trained in them. The maidens should learn the armed dance, and the grown-up women be practised in the drill and use of arms, if only in case of extremity, when the men are gone out to battle, and they are left to guard their families. Birds and beasts defend their young, but women instead
of fighting run to the altars, thus degrading man below the level of the animals. There is something unseemly in such cowardice, to say nothing of the real harm. And therefore women are enjoined by law to learn the art of war.

Wrestling is to be pursued as a military exercise, but the meaning of this, and the nature of the art, can only be explained when action is combined with words. Next follows dancing, which is of two kinds; imitative, first, of the serious and beautiful; and, secondly, of the ludicrous and grotesque. The first kind may be further divided into the dance of war and the dance of peace; the first of the two is the Pyrrhic, in which the movements of attack and defence are imitated—the postures of hurling, slinging, shooting, striking, or again of escape and guard. Of all these the true style is manly and direct, and indicates strength and sufficiency of body and mind. The second is the dance of peace; and is sometimes attended with Dionysiac revelry of a debatable sort, personifications of Pan and Silenus, and of nymphs and satyrs in their cups. This latter is a dance which can hardly be tolerated in a civilized state, and cannot be characterized either as warlike or peaceful. But with this exception the two kinds may be admitted. The first of them is the more violent, being an expression of joy and triumph after toil and danger; the other is more tranquil, symbolizing the continuance and preservation of good. In speaking or singing we naturally move our bodies, and gesture is the imitation of words. As the dancer has more or less courage or self-control the dance becomes more or less violent and excited. Every one must imitate harmonically or inharmonically, and this is the origin of the art of dancing. The warlike kind is appropriately called the Pyrrhic, and the peaceful kind with equal propriety Emmeleia, or the dance of order. The types of these dances are to be fixed by the legislator, and the guardians of the law should assign them to the several festivals, and consecrate them to the good of the state.

Thus much of the fair forms and noble souls which are personated in choral dances. Comedy, which is the opposite of them, remains to be considered. For the serious implies the ludicrous, and opposites cannot be understood without opposites. But a man of repute will desire to avoid doing what is ludicrous. He should leave such performances to slaves: they are not serious, and there should be some element of novelty in them. Concerning tragedy, let our law
be as follows: When the inspired poet comes to us with a request to be admitted into our state, we will reply in courteous words—We also are tragedians and your rivals; and the drama which we enact is the best and noblest, being the imitation of the truest and noblest life, with a view to which our state is ordered. You are poets, and we are poets and rivals of yours, and our hope is to perform a play which is the creation of perfect law. And we cannot allow you to pitch your stage in the agora, and make your voices be heard above ours, or suffer you to address our women and young men, and people in general, on opposite principles to our own. Come then, soft sirs, children of the Lydian Muse, and present yourselves first to the magistrates, and if they decide that your hymns are as good or better than ours, you shall have your chorus; but if not, not.

There remain three kinds of knowledge which are to be learnt by freemen—arithmetic, geometry of surfaces and of solids, and thirdly, astronomy. Few can make an accurate study of such sciences; and of special students we will speak at another time. But the many must be content with the study of them which is absolutely necessary, and may be said to be a divine necessity, very unlike our human necessities, being of that sort against which God himself is unable to contend. ‘What are these divine necessities of knowledge?’ Necessities of a knowledge without which neither gods, nor demi-gods, can govern mankind. Far is he from being a divine man who cannot distinguish one, two, odd and even; who cannot number day and night, and is ignorant of the revolutions of the stars; for to every higher knowledge a knowledge of number is necessary—a fool may see this; how much, is a matter requiring more careful consideration. ‘Very true.’ But the legislator cannot enter into such details, and therefore we must defer the more careful consideration of the subject to a better opportunity. ‘You seem to fear our habitual want of training in these subjects.’ Still more I fear the danger of bad training, which is far worse than none at all. ‘Very true.’ I think that a gentleman and a freeman may be expected to know as much as an Egyptian child. In Egypt, arithmetic is a game which is taught children by a distribution of apples or garlands in numbers which admit of division and subdivision; or a calculation is made of the various combinations which are possible among a set of boxers or wrestlers; or gold, brass, and silver are put into vessels, mixed and unmixed, and the child counts
them. The knowledge of arithmetic which is thus acquired is a great help, either in drawing up an army or in the management of a household; and wherever measure is employed, men are more wide-awake in their dealings, and they get rid of their ridiculous ignorance. 'What do you mean?' I have observed the existence of this ignorance among my countrymen—they are as bad as pigs—and I am heartily ashamed both on my own behalf and on that of all the Hellenes. 'In what respect?' I will endeavour to explain by asking you a question. You know that there are such things as length, breadth, and depth? 'Yes.' And the Hellenes imagine that they are commensurable (1) with themselves, and (2) with each other; whereas they are not always commensurable with themselves, and never with each other. But if this is true, then we are in an unfortunate case, and may well say to our compatriots that not to possess necessary knowledge is a disgrace, though to possess such knowledge is nothing very grand. 'Certainly.' The discussion of arithmetical problems is a much better amusement for old men than their favourite game of draughts. 'Yes, mathematics and the game of draughts seem to me to have much in common.' These are the subjects in which youth should be trained. They may be regarded as amusements, and will do great good and no harm; I think that we may include them provisionally. 'Yes; they will fill up the details which are wanting in our laws.' The next question is, whether astronomy shall be made a part of education. About the stars there is a strange notion prevalent. 'What is that?' There is said to be an impiety in investigating the nature of God and the world, whereas the very reverse is the truth. 'What do you mean?' The idea may seem absurd and at variance with the usual language of age, and yet if true and advantageous to the state, and pleasing to God, ought not to be withheld. 'Of what knowledge are you going to speak?' My dear friend, what falsehoods we and all the Hellenes tell about the sun and moon. 'What falsehoods?' We are always saying that they and certain of the other stars go different ways, and we term them planets. 'Yes; and I have seen Lucifer and Hesperus go all manner of ways, and the sun and moon doing what we know that they always do. But I wish that you would explain your meaning further.' You will easily understand what I have had no difficulty in understanding myself, though we are both of us past the time of learning. 'True; but what is this marvellous knowledge
which youth are to learn, and of which we are ignorant?" Men say
that the sun, moon, and stars are planets or wanderers; but this is
the reverse of the fact. Each of them moves in one orbit only, and
not in many; nor is the swiftest of them the slowest as appears to
human eyes. What a great insult should we offer to Olympian racers
if we were to put the first last and the last first! And if that is a
ridiculous error in speaking of men, how much more in speaking of
the Gods? 'Yes; worse than ridiculous.' Certainly, the Gods cannot
be very well pleased at our telling falsehoods about them. 'Certainly
not.' Then people should at least learn so much about them as will
put a stop to blasphemy.

Enough of education. Similar principles should regulate hunting
and other matters. Something of a mixed kind, which is neither law
nor yet admonition, has often entered into our discourse, as we found
in speaking of the nurture of young children. And therefore the whole
duty of the citizen will not consist in mere obedience to the laws.
The perfect citizen is he who regards not only the laws but the precepts
of the legislator. This may be illustrated by the example of hunting.
Now of this there are many kinds—hunting of fish and fowl, man and
beast, enemies and friends; but the legislator cannot include in his
enactments all these varieties. He must praise and blame hunting,
having in view the discipline and exercise of youth. And the young
man will regard his praises and censures much more than his penalties;
neither the love of pleasure nor the fear of pain will hinder him. The
legislator will proceed to express himself in the form of a pious wish—
O my young friends, he will say, may you never be induced to hunt
for fish in the sea, either by day or night; or for men, whether by
sea or land. Never let the wish to steal enter into a corner of your
minds; neither be ye fowlers, for this is not a gentlemanlike occupation.
Land animals remain, which may be hunted by night in a good-for-
nothing way, and also by day, likewise in indolent fashion, resting at
intervals, and using snares and nets. The only mode of hunting
which the legislator can praise is with horses and dogs, running,
shooting, striking at close quarters. There is no other kind which
is esteemed by men of courage. The law, then, shall be as follows:

Let no one hinder the holy order of huntsmen; but let the nightly
hunters who lay snares and nets be everywhere prohibited. Let the
fowler confine himself to waste places and to the mountains. The
fisherman is also permitted, except in harbours and sacred streams, and pools and lakes; but in all other places he may fish, provided he does not defile the waters by the use of poisonous mixtures.

**BOOK VIII.** Next, with the help of the Delphian Oracle, we will appoint festivals and sacrifices. The times and number of them may be left to us. 'The number, yes.' Then let us determine the number of them to be 365, one for every day in the year. There shall always be one magistrate daily sacrificing according to rites prescribed by a convocation of priests and interpreters, who shall co-operate with the guardians of the law, and supply what the legislator has omitted. For the law will only appoint twelve festivals to the twelve Gods after whom the twelve tribes are named. These shall be celebrated every month with musical and gymnastic contests appropriate to the Gods and the seasons. There shall also be female festivals in honour of the goddesses who are worshipped by women only, and a festival of the Gods below. Pluto shall have his own in the twelfth month. He is not the enemy, but the friend of man, who releases the soul from the body, which is at least as good a work as to unite them. Further, consider that our state has leisure and abundance, and wishing to be happy, like an individual, should lead a good life, and a good life is immunity from doing or receiving injury, of which the first is very easy, and the second very difficult of attainment, and is only to be acquired by perfect virtue. A good city has peace, but the evil city is full of wars within and without. Wherefore the citizens should practise war at least one day in every month, and should have contests and sacrifices and hymns in praise of victory—the victory which they celebrate being the victory in the battle of life, as well as the victory of the festival. Let poets celebrate them; not, however, every poet—but he should be a man of fifty years old at least, and himself a distinguished person, who has done great deeds. Of such an one the poems may be sung, even though they are not quite equal to his deeds. To the director of education and the guardians of the law shall be committed the judgment, and no song which has not been licensed by them, even though sweeter than those of Thamyras and Orpheus, shall be recited, but only the praises or censures which they approve. These regulations about poetry, and about military expeditions, apply equally both to men and to women.

The legislator may be conceived to make the following address to
INTRODUCTION.

himself:—With what object am I training my citizens? Are they not strivers for mastery in combats? Certainly, will be the reply. And if they were boxers or wrestlers, would any man in his senses think of entering the lists without many days' practice? And would he not as far as possible imitate all the circumstances of the contest, putting on gloves and using the weapons of the contest; and if he had no one to box with, would he not practise on a shadow, heedless of the laughter of the spectators? 'That would be the way to learn.' And shall the soldiers go to the greatest of all contests, and fight for life and kindred and property unprepared, because sham fights are thought to be ridiculous? Will not the legislator require that his citizens shall practice war daily, performing lesser exercises without arms, while the combatants on a greater scale will carry arms, and take up positions, and lie in ambush? And let their combats be not without danger, that opportunity may be given for distinction, and the brave man and the coward may receive their meed of honour or disgrace. If occasionally a man is killed, there is no great harm done; the homicide did not mean to kill him. There are others as good as he is, and the state can better afford to lose a few than to lose the only means of testing them.

'We agree, Stranger, that the state should legislate about warlike exercises.' But then, why have such military amusements become obsolete? Do we not all know the reasons, which are (1) the inordinate love of wealth? This absorbs the soul of a man, and leaves him no time for any other pursuit. Knowledge and action are valued by him only as they tend to the attainment of wealth. All is lost in the desire of heaping up gold and silver; anybody is ready to do anything, right or wrong, for the sake of eating and drinking, and the indulgence of his animal passions. 'Most true.' This is one of the causes which prevents a man being a good soldier, or anything else which is good; he becomes a shopkeeper or a servant, and sometimes, if he happens to be brave, a burglar or a pirate. Many of these latter are men of fine character, and greatly to be pitied, because their souls are hungering and thirsting all their lives long. The bad forms of government (2) are another reason—democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, which, as I was saying, are not states, but states of discord, in which the rulers are afraid of their subjects, and therefore do not like them to become rich, or valiant, or indeed soldiers at all. Now the state for which we are legislating has escaped these two causes of evil; the society is per-
fectly free, and has plenty of leisure, and is not allowed by the laws to be absorbed in the pursuit of wealth: hence we have an excellent field for a perfect education, and for the introduction of martial pastimes. Let us proceed to describe the character of these pastimes. Activity of body— quickness of foot to escape or take— quickness of hand or arm to grasp—are, in the strictest sense, military qualities; and yet you have not the greatest military use of them unless the competitors are armed. The runner should enter the lists in armour, and in the races which our heralds proclaim, no prize is to be given except to armed warriors. Let there be five courses—first, the stadium; secondly, the diaulos or double course; thirdly, the horse course; fourthly, a long course; fifthly, a race between a heavy-armed soldier, who shall pass over sixty stadia and finish at the temple of Ares, and an archer, who shall go among the mountains across country a distance of a hundred stadia, and his goal shall be the temple of Apollo and Artemis. The contests of each kind shall be in number three—one for boys, another for youths, a third for men in heavy and light armour; the course for the boys we will fix at half, and that for the youths at two-thirds of the entire length. Women shall join in the races: young girls who are not grown up shall run naked, and shall continue to run from thirteen to eighteen or until marriage; they may run up to twenty, but after thirteen shall be suitably dressed. As to trials of strength, single combats in armour, or battles between two and two, or of any number up to ten, shall take the place of wrestling and the heavy exercises. And there must be experts, as there are now in wrestling, to determine what is a fair hit and who is conqueror. Instead of the pancratium, let there be contests in which the combatants carry bows and wear light shields and hurl javelins and throw stones. The next provision of the law will relate to horses, which, as we are in Crete, need be rarely used by us, and chariots never; our horse-racing prizes will only be given to single horses, whether foals, half-grown, or full-grown. Their riders are to wear armour, and they may also be archers; a Cretan archer or javelin-man does good service. Women, if they have a mind, may join in the exercises of men.

But enough of gymnastics, and nearly enough of music. All musical contests will take place on holy days, months, and years, whether every third or every fifth year, which are to be fixed by the guardians of the law, the judges of the games, and the director of education, who for
this purpose shall become legislators and arrange times and persons. The principles on which such contests are to be ordered have been often repeated by the first legislator; no more need be said of them, nor are the details of them important. But there is another subject of the highest importance, which, if possible, should be determined by the laws, not of man, but of God; or, if a direct revelation is impossible, there is need of some bold and sincere man who, alone against the world, having reason for his guide, will speak plainly of the corruption of human nature, and go to war with the passions of mankind. 'I do not know what you mean.' I dare say, and therefore I will make my meaning plainer. In speaking of education, I seemed to see young men and maidens in friendly intercourse with one another; and there arose in my mind a natural fear about a state, in which, as I reflected, the young of either sex are well fed, and have little to do, and have their time chiefly occupied in festivals and dances. How can the voice of reason be lifted up, as with the force of a law, against those passions which are the ruin of numbers of both sexes? The prohibition of wealth, and the influence of education, and the all-seeing eye of the ruler, have a good effect in promoting temperance; but they will not wholly extinguish the temptation to the unnatural loves of both sexes, which have been the destruction of states; and against this evil what remedy can be devised? Lacedaemon and Crete, excellent as are many of their institutions, afford us no help here; on the subject of love, as I may whisper in your ear, they are against us. Suppose a person were to urge that you ought to follow nature and the example of animals, and restore the natural use which existed before the days of Laius; he would be quite right, but he would not be supported by public opinion in either of your states. Or try the matter by another test, which we always apply to all laws, the test of virtue; who will say that the permission of such things tends to virtue? Will the spirit of courage pass into the soul of him who gives up his person to another? Will the seducer be gifted with temperance? And will any one, who has a notion of law, be found to praise such actions, or to make them legal?

But to judge of this matter truly, we must understand the nature of love and friendship, which may take very different forms. For we speak of friendship, first, when there is some similarity or equality of virtue; secondly, when there is some want; and either of these, when
in excess, is termed love. The first kind is gentle and communicable; the second is fierce and unmanageable; and there is also a third kind, which is ambiguous, and is under the dominion of opposite principles—the one urging the lover to take his fill of the bloom of youth, the other forbidding him. The one is of the body, and has no regard for the character of the beloved; but he who is under the influence of the other disregards the body, and is a looker rather than a lover, and has a true reverence for the modesty and courage and wisdom of his friend, with whom he would fain associate in holy purity. Here are three kinds of love: ought the legislator to prohibit all of them equally, or to allow the virtuous love to remain? 'The latter, clearly.' I expected to gain your approval, and therefore I need not go out of my way to censure the Spartan custom. I will reserve the task of persuading Cleinias for another occasion. 'Very good.' How we are to make right laws on this subject is in one point of view easy, and in another most difficult; for we know that most men do abstain in some cases, and for the most part willingly, from intercourse with the fair. 'When do they?' There is an unwritten law which prohibits members of the same family from such intercourse. And this law is willingly obeyed, and no thought of anything else ever enters into the minds of men in general. 'Very true.' A little word is enough to put out the fire of their lusts. 'What is it?' The declaration that they are hateful to the Gods, and of all abominable things the most abominable and unholy. The reason is that everywhere, in jest and earnest alike, this is the doctrine which is repeated to all from their earliest youth. They see on the stage that such monsters as Oedipus and Thyestes, when detected, are put to death. There is an undoubted power in public opinion when no breath is heard adverse to the law. And the legislator who would enslave these slavish passions must consecrate such a public opinion all through the city. 'Good: but how will you set about creating this public opinion?' You are right in asking that question, for I promised to try and find some means of restraining loves to their natural objects. Men should not be the destroyers of their kind, spilling the power of life upon the ground; and they should abstain from the women whom they do not intend to make mothers. A law which would accomplish this as effectually as incest is at present prohibited by law, would be of endless benefit, first, as being in accordance with nature, and getting rid of excesses in meats and drinks and adulteries and frenzies, making men love
their wives, and having other excellent effects. I can imagine that some lusty youth overhears what we are saying, and roars out in abusive terms that we are legislating for impossibilities. And so a person might have said of the syssitia, or common meals; but this is refuted by facts, although even now they are not extended to women. 'True.' There is no impossibility or super-humanity in my proposed law, as I shall endeavour to prove. 'Do so.' Will not a man find abstinence more easy when his body is sound than when he is in some peculiar or diseased condition? 'Yes; when he is in good condition he will find abstinence more easy.' Have we not heard of Icus of Tarentum and other famous wrestlers who abstained wholly? And they had not the benefits of education which we bestow on the minds of our citizens, and in their bodies they were far more lusty. 'Yet the fact remains.' And shall they have abstained for the sake of an athletic contest, and our citizens be incapable of a similar endurance for the sake of a victory which is higher and nobler far—the highest and noblest of all? 'What victory do you mean?' The victory over pleasure, which is true happiness; whereas the slavery to pleasure is misery. Will not the fear of impiety enable us to conquer that which many who are inferior to us have conquered? 'It ought to do so.' And therefore the law must say right out, that our citizens should not fall below the other animals, who dwell together in great flocks, and are pure and chaste until the time of procreation comes, when they marry, and are ever after faithful to their contract. Our citizens may be expected to be a little better than the brutes; and if the corruption of public opinion and the practice of lawless love is too great to allow our first law to be carried out, then our guardians of the law must turn legislators, and try their hand at a second law. They must minimize the appetites, diverting the strength of youth into other channels, and making the practice of love secret and shameful. Three higher principles or elements may be brought to bear on the single principle which is corrupt. 'What are they?' Religion, honour, and the love of the higher qualities of the soul. Perhaps this is a dream only, yet the best of dreams; and if not the whole, yet, by the grace of God, a part of what we desire may be realized. Either men may learn to abstain wholly from any loves, natural or unnatural, except of their wedded wives; or, at least, they may give up unnatural loves; or, if detected, may be punished with
loss of citizenship, as aliens from the state in their morals. 'I entirely agree with you,' said Megillus, 'but I should like to hear what Cleinias says.' 'I will give my opinion bye-and-bye.'

We were speaking of the syssitia, which will be a natural institution in a Cretan colony. Whether the institution is to follow the model of Crete or Lacedaemon, or one different from either, is not a question of much importance. The manner of them will be determined without difficulty. We may, therefore, proceed to speak of the mode of life among our citizens, which in other cities will be far more complex, and must at any rate be twice as complex as in this; a state which is inland and not maritime requires only half the number of laws. There is no trouble about retail traders, merchants, hotels, mines, customs, loans, compound interest, or a thousand other things. The legislator has only to regulate the affairs of husbandmen and shepherds, and keepers of bees, and the makers of implements, who will be easily managed, now that the principal questions relating to marriage, education, and government have been settled.

Let us begin with husbandry: First, let there be a law of Zeus, the God of boundaries, against removing a neighbour's landmark, which is the real impiety of 'moving the immovable.' The least stone which marks an agreement is more sacred than the greatest rock which is not a boundary. Zeus, the God of kindred, witnesses to the wrongs of citizens, and Zeus, the God of strangers, to the wrongs of strangers—and their wrath is terrible. The impiety of removing a boundary shall receive two punishments—the first will be inflicted by the God himself; the second will be a fine imposed by the judges. In the second place, the differences between neighbours about encroachments must be guarded against. He who encroaches shall pay twofold the price of the injury; of all such matters the wardens of the country shall be cognizant, or in greater cases the military force of the division. The injury done by cattle, the decoying of bees, the firing of your own wood without thinking of your neighbour, the encroachment on his plantations, shall all be visited with proper damages. Such details have been determined by previous legislators, and need not now be mixed up with greater matters. Ancient husbandmen made excellent rules about streams and waters; and we need not let the stream of our discourse diverge from them. Anybody may take water from the main stream, if he does not cut below the open well of his neighbour; but he must not do any damage or take the
INTRODUCTION.

water through a house or temple. If land is without water the occupier
shall dig down to the clay, and if at this depth he find no water, he shall
have a right of getting water from his neighbours to supply his house-
hold; and if their supply is limited, he shall receive from them a
measure of water, fixed by the wardens of the country. When two
persons live on lands, one above and the other beneath, or one of
the two has a common wall, the upper must not turn the heavy falls
of rain on the under at his pleasure, or the under refuse an exit. If
they cannot agree in the matter they shall go before the wardens of
the city or country, and if a man refuses to abide by their decision,
he shall pay double the damage which he causes.

In autumn God gives us two boons—one the joy of Dionysus not to
be laid up—the other to be laid up. About the fruits of autumn let the
law be as follows: He who gathers the storing fruits of autumn, whether
grapes or figs, before the time of the vintage, which is the rising of Arcturus,
shall pay fifty drachmas as a fine to Dionysus, if he gathers on his own
ground; if on his neighbour’s one-third of a mina, and two-thirds of a mina
if on that of another. The vine or fig not used for storing a man may
gather when he pleases on his own ground, but on that of others he
must pay the penalty of removing what he has not laid down. If he be
a slave who has gathered, he shall receive a stroke for every grape or fig.
A metic may purchase the cultivated fruits, and a stranger may pluck for
himself and his attendant. This right of hospitality, however, does not
extend to storing grapes. A slave who eats of the storing grapes or
figs shall receive a stroke for every grape or fig, and the freedman shall
receive an admonition. Pears, apples, pomegranates, may be taken
secretly, but he who is detected in the act of taking them shall be lightly
beaten off, if he be not more than thirty years of age. An exception to
this law must be made for the stranger and the elder; the latter, however,
if he goes beyond the law, and carries away as well as eats, shall fail in
the competition of virtue, if anybody brings up his offence against him.

Water is also in need of protection; being, unlike the other elements
—soil, air, and sun—which conspire in the growth of plants, easily
corrupted. And therefore he who spoils another’s water, whether in
springs or reservoirs, either by trenching, or by any sort of pollution or
poisonous impurity, shall pay a penalty and repair the damage. At the
getting-in of the harvest everybody shall have a right of way over his
neighbours’ ground, provided he is careful to do no damage beyond the
LAWS.

trespass, unless any damage which he does is attended with three times the benefit to himself. Of all this the magistrates are to take cognizance, and they are to have the power of fining where the injury done is not more than three minae; any greater damage can only be tried in the public courts. A charge against a magistrate is to be referred to the public courts, and any one who is found guilty of deciding corruptly shall pay twofold to the aggrieved person. Matters of detail relating to punishments and modes of procedure, and summonses, and the number of witnesses, do not require the mature wisdom of the aged legislator; the younger generation may determine them according to their experience; but when once determined, they shall be unaltered.

The following are to be the regulations respecting handicrafts: No citizen, or servant of a citizen, is to practise them. For the citizen has already a trade and mystery, which is the care of the state; and no man can practise two trades, or practise one and superintend another. For the same reason, no smith should be a carpenter, and no carpenter having many slaves who are blacksmiths should look after them himself; but let each man practise one art which is to be his livelihood. Every man is to be one man and not many. The wardens of the city should see to this, punishing the citizen who offends with temporary deprivation of his rights—the foreigner shall be imprisoned, fined, exiled. Any disputes about contracts shall be determined by the wardens of the city up to fifty drachmae—above that sum by the public courts. No customs are to be exacted either on imports or exports. Nothing unnecessary is to be imported from abroad, whether for the service of the Gods or for the use of man—neither purple, nor other dyes, nor frankincense,—and nothing needed in the country is to be exported. These things are to be decided on by the twelve guardians of the law who are next in seniority to the five elders. Arms and the materials of arms are to be imported and exported only with the consent of the generals, and then only by the state. There is to be no retail trade in anything. For the distribution of the produce of the country, the Cretan laws afford a rule which may be usefully followed. All shall be required to distribute corn, grain, animals, and other valuable produce, into twelve portions. Each of these shall be subdivided into three parts—one for freemen, another for servants, and the third shall be sold for the supply of artizans, strangers, and others. And where the produce of the land exceeds the average, let what is over be again distributed
INTRODUCTION.

into three portions, and let the citizens determine how much they will give to slaves or freemen, and how much they will distribute among the animals.

Next as to houses—there shall be twelve villages, one in the centre of each of the twelve portions; and in every village there shall be temples and an agora—also shrines for heroes or for any old Magnesian deities who linger about the place. In every division there shall be temples of Hestia, Zeus, and Athene, surrounded by buildings on eminences, which will be the guard-houses of the police. The rest of the country shall be arranged in thirteen portions, corresponding to as many bands of artizans. One of these bands will be settled in the city, and divided into twelve parts, for the town districts; the remainder will be settled in the country. And the magistrates will fix them on the spots where they will be most serviceable in supplying the wants of the husbandmen.

Next in importance to the regulation of the temples, is the fair dealing and good order of the markets—this will be the care of the wardens of the agora. They will also see that the sales effected by the citizens to strangers are legally made. The law shall be, that on the first day of each month the auctioneers to whom the sale is entrusted shall offer grain; and at this sale a twelfth part of the whole shall be exposed, and the foreigner shall supply his wants for a month. On the tenth, there shall be a sale of liquids, and on the twenty-third of animals, skins, woven or woollen stuffs, and other things which husbandmen have to sell and foreigners want to buy. None of these commodities, any more than barley or flour, or any other food, may be retailed by a citizen to a citizen; but foreigners may sell them to one another in the foreigners' market. There must also be butchers who will sell parts of animals to foreigners and craftsmen, and their servants; and foreigners may buy firewood wholesale of the commissioners of woods, and may sell retail to foreigners. All other goods must be sold in the market, in the presence of the magistrates, and in the place indicated by them, and shall be paid for on the spot. He who gives credit, and is cheated, will have no redress. In buying or selling, any excess or diminution of what the law allows shall be registered. The same rule is to be observed about the property of metics. Anybody who has a handicraft may come and remain twenty years from the day on which he is enrolled, at the expiration of which time he shall
take what he has and depart. The only condition which is to be imposed upon him as the tax of his sojourn is good conduct; and he is not to pay any tax for being allowed to buy or sell. But if he wants to extend the time of his sojourn, and has done any service to the state, and he can persuade the ecclesia to grant his request, he may remain. The children of metics may also be metics; and the period of twenty years, during which they are permitted to sojourn, is to count, in their case, from their fifteenth year.

No mention occurs in the Laws of the doctrine of Ideas. The will of God, the standard of the legislator, and the dignity of the soul, have taken their place in the mind of Plato. If we ask what is that truth or principle which, towards the end of his life, seems to have absorbed him most, like the idea of good in the Republic, or of beauty in the Symposium, or of the unity of virtue in the Protagoras, we should answer the priority of the soul to the body: his later system mainly hangs upon this. In the Laws, as in the Sophist and Politicus, we pass out of the region of metaphysical or transcendental ideas into that of psychology.

The opening of the fifth book, though abrupt and unconnected in style, is one of the most elevated passages in Plato. The religious feeling which he seeks to diffuse over the commonest actions of life, the blessedness of living in the truth, the great mistake of a man living for himself, the pity as well as anger which should be felt at evil, the kindness due to the suppliant and the stranger, have the temper of Christian philosophy. The remark that elder men, if they want to educate others, should begin by educating themselves; the necessity of creating a spirit of obedience in the citizens; the desirableness of limiting property; the relative nature of political equality, have also the tone of a modern writer. In many of his views of politics, Plato seems to us like some modern politicians, to be half socialist, half conservative.

In the Laws, we remark a change in the place assigned by him to pleasure and pain. There are two ways in which even the ideal systems of morals may regard them: either like the Stoics, and other ascetics, we may say that pleasure must be eradicated; or if this seems unreal to us, we may affirm that virtue is the true pleasure; and then, as Aristotle says, 'to be brought up to take pleasure in what we ought, exercises
INTRODUCTION.

a great and paramount influence on human life.' Or as Plato says in the Laws, 'A man will recognize the noblest life as having the greatest pleasure and the least pain, if he have a true taste.' If we admit that pleasures differ in kind, the opposition between these two modes of speaking is rather verbal than real. The Greek philosopher may speak of the 'contemplation of the ideas,' or the Christian father of the *fruitio Dei*, as the first of pleasures. Throughout the greater part of the writings of Plato, these two views seem to alternate with each other. In the Republic, the mere suggestion that pleasure may be the chief good, is received by Socrates with a cry of abhorrence; but in the Philebus, innocent pleasures vindicate their right to a place in the scale of goods. In the Protagoras, speaking in the person of Socrates rather than in his own, Plato admits the calculation of pleasure to be the true basis of ethics, while in the Phaedo he indignantly denies that the exchange of one pleasure for another is the exchange of virtue. So wide of the mark are they who would attribute to Plato entire consistency in thoughts or words.

He acknowledges that the second state is inferior to the first—in this, at any rate, he is consistent; and he still casts longing eyes upon the ideal. Several features of the first are retained in the second: the education of men and women is to be as far as possible the same; they are to have common meals, though separate, the men by themselves, the women with their children; the citizens, if not actually communists, are in spirit communistic; they are to be lovers of equality; only a certain amount of wealth is permitted to them, and their burdens and also their privileges are to be proportioned to this. The constitution in the Laws is a timocracy of wealth, modified by an aristocracy of merit. Yet the political philosopher will observe that the first of these two principles is fixed and permanent, while the latter is uncertain and dependent on the opinion of the multitude. Wealth, after all, plays a great part in the Second Republic of Plato. Like other politicians, he deems that a property qualification will contribute to the stability of the state. The four classes seem to be derived from the constitution of Cleisthenes, just as the form of the city which is clustered around a citadel set on a hill, is suggested by the Acropolis at Athens. Plato, writing under Pythagorean influences, seems really to have supposed that the well-being of the city depended almost as much on the number 5040 as on justice and moderation. But he is not prevented by Pythagoreanism
from observing the effects which climate and soil exercise on the characters of nations.

He was doubtful in the Republic whether the ideal or communistic state could be realized, but was at the same time prepared to maintain that whether it existed or not made no difference (Rep. ix. 592 B). He has now altogether lost faith in the practicability of his scheme—he is speaking to 'men, and not to Gods or sons of Gods.' Yet he still maintains it to be the true pattern of the state which we must approach as nearly as possible. As Aristotle says, 'after having created a more general form of state, he gradually brings it round to the other' (Pol. ii. 3, 2). He does not seem to be aware, either here or in the Republic, that in such a commonwealth there would be less room for the development of individual character. In several respects the second state is an improvement on the first, especially in being based more distinctly on the dignity of the soul. The standard of truth, justice, temperance, is as high as in the Republic;—in one respect higher, for temperance is now regarded, not as a virtue, but as the condition of all virtue. The treatment of moral questions is less speculative but more human. The idea of good has disappeared; the excellence of individuals—of the true patriot, of the perfect guardian of the law, are the patterns to which the life of the citizens is to conform. Plato is never weary of speaking of the honour of the soul, which can only be honoured truly by being improved. To make the soul as good as possible, and to prepare here for communion with the Gods in another world by communion with them in this, is the end of life (Laws, x. 904 D). If the Republic is far superior to the Laws in form and style, and perhaps in reach of thought, the Laws leave on the mind of the modern reader much more strongly the impression of a struggle against evil, and an enthusiasm for human improvement. When Plato says that he must carry out that part of his ideal which is practicable (Laws, v. 746), he does not appear to have reflected that part of an ideal cannot be detached from the whole.

The great defect of both his constitutions is the fixedness which he seeks to impress upon them. He had seen the Athenian empire, almost within the limits of his own life, wax and wane, but he never seems to have asked himself what would happen if, a century from the time at which he was writing, the Greek character should have as much changed as in the century which had preceded. He fails to perceive that the greater part of the political life of a nation is not that which
is given them by their legislators, but that which they give themselves. He has never reflected that without progress there cannot be order, and that mere order can only be preserved by an unnatural and despotic repression. The possibility of a great nation or of an universal empire arising never occurred to him. He sees the enfeebled and distracted state of the Hellenic world in his own later life, and thinks that the remedy is to make the laws unchangeable. The same want of insight is apparent in his judgments about art. He would like to have the forms of sculpture and of music fixed as in Egypt. He does not consider that this would be fatal to the true principle of art, which, as Socrates had himself taught, was to give life (Xen. Mem. iii. 10. 6). We wonder how, familiar as he was with the statues of Phidias, he could have endured the lifeless and half monstrous works of Egyptian sculpture. The 'chants of Isis,' we might imagine, would have been barbarous in an Athenian ear. But although he is aware that there are some things 'which are not so well among the children of the Nile,' he is deeply struck with the stability of Egyptian institutions. Both in politics and in art Plato seems to have seen no way of bringing order out of disorder, except by taking a step backwards. Antiquity, compared with the world in which he lived, had a sacredness and authority for him: the men of a former age were supposed by him to have retained a sense of reverence which was wanting among his own contemporaries. He could imagine the early stages of civilization; he never thought of what the future might bring forth. His experience is limited to a century or two, to a few Greek states, and to an uncertain report of Egypt and the East. There are many ways in which the limitations of their knowledge affected the genius of the Greeks; above all in depriving them of the power of criticism.

The colony is to receive from the mother-country her first constitution, and some of her guardians of the law. The guardians of the law are to be ministers of justice, and the president of education is to take precedence of them all. They are to take measures for the defence of the country; they are to enforce the education of their children upon unwilling parents; they are to provide for the supply and purity of the waters, and in general for the public health; they are to superintend buildings, to keep the registers of property, to hear appeals from inferior courts; and they are to be superannuated at seventy years of age. Several questions of modern politics seem to be anticipated by Plato in the
functions which he assigns to them. He hopes that in his state will be found neither poverty nor riches; and therefore neither the legislator, nor his subjects, have any need to consider the danger of falling into poverty. Almost in the spirit of the Gospel he would say, 'how hardly can a rich man dwell in a perfect state.' For he cannot be a good man who is always gaining too much and spending too little (cp. Arist. Eth. iv. 2, 3). Plato, though he admits wealth as a political element, would deny that material prosperity can be the foundation of a really great community. A man's soul, as he often says, is more to be esteemed than his body; and his body than the things of his body. He repeats the complaint which has been made in all ages, that the love of money is the corruption of states. He has a sympathy with pirates and burglars, 'many of whom are men of fine character and greatly to be pitied, because their souls are hungering and thirsting all their lives long,' but he has no sympathy with shopkeepers or retailers. For traders and artisans a moderate gain was, in his opinion, best. He has never, like modern writers, idealized the wealth of nations, any more than he has worked out the problems of political economy, which among the ancients had not yet grown into a science. The isolation of Greek states, their constant wars, the want of a free industrial population, and of the means of exchange usually termed 'credit,' prevented any great extension of commerce among them: and so prevented them from forming a theory of the laws which regulate the accumulation and distribution of wealth.

The constitution of the army is democratic; the soldiers are supposed to be the best judges of their leaders. The way of carrying out the democratic principle is as follows: The guardians of the law nominate generals, and the generals retain the nomination of the inferior officers. But if any one is ready to swear that he knows of a better man, he may put the claims of the candidate for the office of general to the vote either of the whole army, or of the division of the service which he is destined to command. Except at these military elections, in which all who have ever borne arms take part, there is no assembly or general meeting of the people. In the election of the council, the legislator attempts to mix aristocracy and democracy. This is effected first, as in the Servian constitution, by balancing wealth and numbers; the people are divided into four classes, of whom the first, though inferior in numbers, has an equal vote with the three others. Secondly, all classes are compelled to vote for the first and second class; but the fourth class is not compelled
INTRODUCTION.

to vote for the third, nor the third and fourth for the fourth. Thirdly, out of the 180 persons who are thus chosen from each of the four classes, 720 in all, 360 are to be taken by lot; these form the council for the year.

These political adjustments of Plato's will be criticised by the practical statesman as being for the most part fanciful and ineffectual. He will observe, first of all, that the only real check on democracy is the division into classes. The second of the three proposals, though ingenious, and receiving some light from the apathy to politics which is often shown by the higher classes in a democracy, would have little power in times of excitement and peril, when the precaution was most needed. At such political crises, all the lower classes would vote equally with the higher. The subtraction of half the persons chosen at the first election by the chances of the lot would not raise the character of the senators, and is open to the objection of uncertainty, which necessarily attends this and similar double schemes of representative government. The voters cannot be expected to retain the continuous political interest which would be required for carrying them out. Who could select 180 persons of each class, fitted to be senators? And whoever were chosen in the first instance, by a particular vote, his wishes might be neutralized by the action of the lot. Yet the scheme of Plato is not really so extravagant as the actual constitution of Athens, in which all the senators appear to have been elected by lot (ἀπὸ κυάμου βουλευταί); at least, after the revolution made by Cleisthenes, for the constitution of the senate which was established by Solon probably had some aristocratic features, though their precise nature is unknown to us. The ancients knew that election by lot was the most democratic of all modes of appointment, seeming to say in the objectionable sense, 'that one man is as good as another.' Plato, who is desirous of mingling different elements, makes a partial use of the lot which he applies to candidates already elected by vote.

The functions of the council are administrative rather than legislative. The whole number of 360, as in the Athenian constitution, is distributed among the months of the year according to the number of the tribes. Not more than one-twelfth is to be in office at once, so that the government would be made up of twelve administrations succeeding one another in the course of the year. They are to exercise a general superintendence, and, like the Athenian counsellors, are to preside in monthly divisions over all assemblies. But neither in Plato's Laws nor in his Republic, is
there any mention of an ecclesia. Nothing is less in his mind than a House of Commons, carrying on year by year the work of legislation. For he supposes the laws to be already provided; what is omitted is to be supplied by the eldest guardians of the law, who are to partake of the spirit of the legislator. As little would he approve of a body like the Roman Senate. The people and the aristocracy alike are to be represented, not by assemblies, but by officers elected for one or two years, except the guardians of the law, who are elected for twenty years.

The evils of this system are obvious. If in any state, as Plato says in the Politicus (292 E), it is easier to find fifty good draught-players than fifty good rulers, the greater part of the 360 who compose the council must be unfitted to rule. The unfitness would be increased by the short period during which they held office. There would be no traditions of government among them, as in a Greek or Italian oligarchy, and no individual would be responsible for any of their acts. Everything seems to have been sacrificed to a false notion of equality, according to which all have a turn of ruling and being ruled. In the constitution of the Magnesian state Plato has not emancipated himself from the limitations of ancient politics. His government may be described as a democracy of magistrates elected by the people. He never troubles himself about the political consistency of his scheme. He does indeed say that the greater part of the good of this world arises, not from equality, but from proportion, which he calls the judgment of Zeus (Aristotle’s Distributive Justice, N. E. v. 6), but he hardly makes any attempt to carry out the principle in practice. There is no body in his commonwealth which represents the life either of a class or of the whole state. The manner of appointing magistrates is taken chiefly from the old democratic constitution of Athens, of which it retains some of the worst features, such as the use of the lot, while by the omission of the popular assembly the mainspring of the machine is taken out. The guardians of the law, thirty-seven in number, of whom the ten eldest reappear as a part of the nocturnal council at the end of the twelfth Book, are to be elected by the whole people as in a democracy, but they are to hold office for twenty years, and would therefore have the character of an oligarchy. Nothing is said of the manner in which the functions of the council are to be harmonized with those of the guardians of the law.

Similar principles are applied to inferior offices. In the elections to
INTRODUCTION.

them, Plato endeavours to mix or balance in a friendly manner 'demus and not demus.' Only the priests are to be directly appointed by God, that is, by the lot. The commonwealth of the Laws, like the ideal state, cannot dispense with a spiritual head, which is the oracle of Delphi. To this the choice of some of the higher officers, and the settlement of disputes about ceremonies and purifications, as well as changes in the law, are to be referred. Plato is not disposed to encourage amateur attempts to revive religion in states. For, as he says in the Laws, 'To institute religious rites is the work of a great intelligence only.'

Though the council is framed on the model of the Athenian Boulé, the law courts of Plato do not equally conform to the pattern of the Athenian dicasteries. Plato thinks that the judges should speak and ask questions:—this is not possible if they are numerous; he would, therefore, have a few judges only, but good ones. He is nevertheless aware that both in public and private suits there must be a popular element. This he proposes to supply by an elective judiciary, than which, in the opinion of modern political writers, no form of appointment can be worse. The ingenious expedient of dividing the questions of law and fact between a judge and jury did not occur to him or to any other ancient political philosopher. He might thus have combined the popular element with the judicial. Though desirous to have a few good judges, he does not seem to have understood that a body of law must be formed by decisions as well as by legal enactments.

He remarks truly that some cases are better decided on the spot and from local knowledge. But in such cases he would allow an appeal to a superior court; and this seemed to him to involve the necessity, where the two decisions differed, of a further reference to a final court. This final court of appeal is to be composed of three magistrates, upon whom the plaintiff and defendant might agree; or if they could not agree, the judges were to be chosen by the council. Plato's judges are not appointed for life, but only for a year, and they are liable to be called to account before the guardians of the law.

Returning to the subject in Book ix, he proposes to leave the modes of procedure to a younger generation of legislators. But he insists that the vote of the judges shall be given openly, and before they vote they are to hear speeches from the plaintiff and defendant. They are then to take evidence in support of what has been said, and to examine witnesses. The eldest judge is to ask his questions first, and then the second, and
then the third. They are not to be silent, and he would not prevent them from communicating with one another (cp. Arist. Pol. ii. 5, 8). The interrogatories are to continue for three days, and the evidence is to be written down. Apparently he does not expect the judges to be professional lawyers, any more than he expects the members of the council to be trained statesmen.

In forming marriage connections, Plato supposes that the public interest will prevail over private inclination. There was nothing in this very shocking to the notions of Greeks, among whom the feeling of love towards the other sex was almost deprived of sentiment or romance. Married life is to be regulated solely with a view to the good of the state. The newly married couple are not allowed to absent themselves from their respective syssitia, even during their honeymoon; they are to give their whole mind to the procreation of children; their duties to one another at a later period of life is not a matter about which the state is equally solicitous. Divorces are readily allowed for incompatibility of temper. As in the Republic, physical considerations seem almost to exclude moral and social ones. To modern feelings there is a degree of coarseness in his treatment of the subject. Yet Plato also makes some shrewd remarks on marriage, as for example, that he who does not marry for money will not be the humble servant of his wife. And he shows a true conception of the nature of the family, when he requires that the newly married couple 'should leave their father and mother,' and have a separate home. He also provides against extravagance in marriage festivals; which in some states of society, as appears to be the case among the Hindoos, has been a social evil of the first magnitude.

In treating of property, Plato takes occasion to speak of property in slaves. They are to be treated with perfect justice; but, for their own sake, to be kept at a distance. The motive is not humanity towards the slave, of which there are hardly any traces (although Plato allows that many in the hour of peril have found a slave more attached than members of their own family), but the self-respect which the freeman and citizen owes to himself (cp. Rep. viii. 549 A). If they commit crimes, they are doubly punished; only if they inform against treasonable and illegal practices of their masters, they are to receive a protection, which would probably be ineffectual, from the guardians of the law. Plato still breathes the spirit of the old Hellenic world, in which
slavery was a necessity, because leisure must be provided for the citizen.

The education propounded in the Laws differs in several points from the Republic. Plato seems to have reflected as deeply and earnestly on the importance of infancy as Rousseau, or Jean Paul (cp. the saying of the latter—'not the moment of death, but the moment of birth, is probably the more important'). He would fix the amusements of children in the hope of fixing their characters in after-life. In the spirit of the statesman who said, 'Let me make the ballads of a country, and I care not who make their laws,' Plato would have said, 'Let the amusements of children be unchanged, and they will not want to change the laws.' The 'Goddess Harmonia' plays a great part in Plato's ideas of education. The natural restless force of life in children, 'who do nothing but roar until they are three years old,' is gradually to be reduced to law and order. As in the Republic, he fixes certain forms in which songs are to be composed: (1) they are to be strains of peace; (2) they are to be hymns or prayers addressed to the Gods; (3) they are to sing only of the lawful and good. The poets are again expelled, or rather ironically invited to depart; and those who remain are required to submit their poems to the censorship of the magistrates. Youth are no longer compelled to commit to memory many thousand lyric and tragic Greek verses; yet, perhaps, a worse fate is in store for them. Plato has no belief in the 'liberty of prophesying'; and having guarded against the dangers of poetry, he remembers that there is an equal danger in prose writers. He cannot leave his old enemies, the Sophists, in possession of the field; and therefore he proposes that youth shall learn by heart, instead of the compositions of poets or prose writers, his own inspired work on laws. These, and music and mathematics, are the chief staple of his education.

Mathematics are to be cultivated, not as in the Republic with a view to the higher science of the idea of good, but rather with a religious and political aim. They are a sacred study which teaches men how to distribute the portions of a state, and which is to be pursued in order that they may learn not to blaspheme about astronomy. Against three errors Plato is in profound earnest. First, the error of supposing that the three dimensions of length, breadth, and height, are really commensurable with one another. The difficulty which he feels is analogous to the difficulty which he formerly felt about the connection of ideas, and
equally characteristic of ancient philosophy: he fixes his mind on the point of difference, and cannot at the same time take in the similarity. Secondly, he is puzzled about the nature of fractions: like the arithmeticians in the Republic, 525 E, he is disposed to deny the possibility of their existence. Thirdly, his optimism leads him to insist (unlike the Portuguese king who thought that he could have improved on the mechanism of the heavens) on the perfect or circular movement of the heavenly bodies. He appears to mean, that instead of regarding the stars as overtaking or being overtaken by one another, or as planets wandering in many paths, a more comprehensive survey of the heavens would enable us to infer that they all alike moved in a circle around a centre (cp. Timaeus, fol. 40; Rep. x. 617). He probably suspected, though unacquainted with the true cause, that the appearance of the heavens did not agree with the reality: at any rate, his notions of what was right or fitting easily overpowered the results of actual observation. To the early astronomers, who lived at the revival of science, as to Plato, there would have seemed to be nothing absurd in à priori astronomy, and they would probably have made fewer real discoveries if they had followed any other track. (Cp. Introduction to the Republic, p. 94 foll.)

The science of dialectic is nowhere mentioned by name in the Laws, nor is anything said of the education of after-life; the child is to begin to learn at ten years of age: he is to be taught reading and writing for three years from ten to thirteen, and no longer; and for three years more, from thirteen to sixteen, he is to be instructed in music. The great fault which Plato finds in the contemporary education is the almost total ignorance of arithmetic and astronomy, in which the Greeks would do well to take a lesson from the Egyptians. (Cp. Rep. vii. 525 foll.) Dancing and wrestling are to have a military character, and women as well as men are to be taught the use of arms. The military spirit which Plato has vainly endeavoured to expel in the first two books returns again in the seventh and eighth. His genius has evidently a sympathy with the soldier, as he has with the poet, and he is no mean master of the art, or at least of the theory of war (cp. Laws, vi. 760 foll.; Rep. v. 467-470), though inclining rather to the Spartan than to the Athenian practice of it (Laws, iv. 706, 707). Of a supreme or master science which was to be the ‘coping stone’ of the rest, few traces appear in the Laws. He seems to have lost faith in it, or perhaps to have realized that the time for such a science had not yet come, and that he was unable to fill up the outline
which he had sketched. There is no requirement that the guardians of the law shall be philosophers, nor are we told how the leisure of the citizens, when they are grown up, is to be employed. In this respect we note a falling off from the Republic. Their public and family duties were, probably, to be their main business, and they would, no doubt, take up a great deal more time than in the modern world we are willing to allow to either of them. But of any regular training to be pursued under the superintendence of the state from eighteen to thirty, or from thirty to thirty-five, he no longer entertains the idea; he has taken the first step downwards on 'Constitution Hill.' (Rep. viii. 547, 548.) Few among us are either able or willing to carry education into later life; five or six years spent at school, three or four at a university, or in the preparation for a profession, an occasional attendance at a lecture to which we are invited by friends when we have an hour to spare from housekeeping or money-making—these comprise, as a matter of fact, the education even of the educated; and then the lamp is extinguished 'more truly than Heracleitus' sun, never to be lighted again.' (Rep. vi. 497 B.) The description which Plato gives in the Republic of the state of adult education among his contemporaries may be applied almost word for word to our own age. But in the Laws he no longer entertains the idea that the deficiency can be corrected, or that a regular course of study is possible in mature years. He does not, however, go on to remark, that the education of after-life is of another kind, and must consist with the majority of the world rather in the improvement of character than in the acquirement of knowledge. It comes from the study of ourselves and other men: from moderation and experience: from reflection on circumstances: from the pursuit of high aims: from a right use of the opportunities of life. It is the preservation of what we have been, and the addition of something more. The power of abstract study or continuous thought is very rare, but such a training as this can be given by every one to himself.

The singular passage in Book vii. (803 C), in which Plato describes life as a pastime, like many other passages in the Laws, is imperfectly expressed. Two thoughts seem to be struggling in his mind: first, the reflection to which he returns at the end of the passage (804 B), that men are playthings or puppets, and that God only is the serious aim of human endeavours; this suggests to him the afterthought that, although playthings, they are the playthings of the Gods, and that this is the best
of them. The cynical ironical fancy of the moment insensibly passes into a religious sentiment. Life is a play in the higher sense, as well as a sort of mystery in which we have the Gods for playfellows. Men imagine that war is their serious pursuit, and they make war that they may return to their amusements. But neither wars nor amusements are the true satisfaction of men, which is to be found only in the society of the Gods, in sacrificing to them and propitiating them. Like a Christian ascetic, Plato seems to suppose that life should be passed wholly in the enjoyment of divine things.

In one of the noblest passages of Plato, he speaks of the relation of the sexes (viii. 835-842). Natural relations had been established of old; a 'little word' had put a stop to incestuous connections between members of the same family. But unnatural unions still continued to prevail at Crete and Lacedaemon, and were even justified by the example of the Gods. They, too, might be banished, if the feeling that they were unholy and abominable could sink into the minds of men. The legislator is to cry aloud, and spare not, 'Let not men fall below the level of the beasts.' Plato does not shrink, like some modern philosophers, from 'carrying on war against the mightiest lusts of mankind'; neither does he expect to extirpate them, but only to confine them to their natural use and purpose, by the enactments of law, and by the influence of public opinion.

**BOOK IX.** Punishments of offences, and modes of procedure, will be our next subject. The idea that in a well-ordered state there will be great criminals who require to be punished by the law, is a disgrace to us; but as we are legislating for men and not for Gods, there will be no uncharitableness in apprehending that there may be some rampant citizen, whose heart, like the seed which has touched the ox's horn, will be hardened against the law. None who are well-educated will be guilty of such a crime, but one of their servants may, and with a view to him, and at the same time with a remoter eye to the general infirmity of human nature, I will lay down the law concerning the robbing of temples, beginning with a prelude. To the robber we will say—O sir, the complaint which troubles you is not human; but some curse or plague has fallen upon you, inherited from the crimes of your ancestors, of which you must purge yourself: go and sacrifice to the Gods, frequent the society of the good, avoid the wicked; and if you are cured of the
fatal impulse, well; but if not, acknowledge death to be better than life, and depart.

These are the accents, soft and low, in which we address the criminal. And if he refuse to listen to them, then cry aloud as with the sound of a trumpet: Whosoever robs a temple, if he be a slave or foreigner shall be branded in the face and hands, and scourged, and then cast naked beyond the border. And perhaps this may improve him: for the law aims either at the reformation of the criminal, or the repression of crime, and no punishment is designed to inflict useless injury. But if the offender be a citizen, he must be incurable, and death is the least penalty which he deserves. His iniquity, however, shall not be visited on his children; nor is his property to be confiscated, or any fine inflicted upon him or upon any one which will interfere with the integrity or cultivation of the lot: the guardians of the law are to be careful about this.

If a fine is inflicted upon a man which he cannot pay, and for which his friends are unwilling to be security, he shall be imprisoned and chastised, but not exiled or deprived of citizenship; though he may be put to death, or imprisoned, or beaten, or fined, or pilloried, or removed to some temple on the borders. Capital offences shall come under the cognizance of the guardians of the law, and a college of the best of the ex-archons of the previous year. The mode of procedure we shall leave to the lawgivers of the future, and only determine the mode of voting. The votes are to be given openly, in the presence of an audience of the citizens: on the first day the plaintiff and defendant shall make their speeches; and the judges, beginning with the eldest, shall ask questions and collect evidence during three days, which, at the end of each day, shall be deposited in writing on the altar of Hestia; and when they have evidence enough, after a solemn declaration that they will decide justly, they shall vote and end the case.

Next to religion, the preservation of the constitution is the first object of the law. The greatest enemy of the state is he who attempts to set up a tyrant, or breeds plots and conspiracies; not far below him in guilt, is a magistrate who either knowingly, or in ignorance, fails to bring the offender to justice. Any one who is good for anything will give information against traitors. The mode of proceeding in such cases will be the same as in cases of sacrilege; the penalty, death. But neither in this case nor in any other is the son to bear the iniquity of the father, unless father, grandfather, great-grandfather, have all of them been capital
convicted, and then the family are to be sent off to the mother country, retaining their property, with the exception of the lot and its fixtures. And ten are to be selected from the second sons of the other citizens—one of whom is to be chosen by the oracle of Delphi to be heir of the lot. This third law about the judges and processes of treason, and the removal of families, shall apply equally to the traitor, the sacrilegious, and the conspirator.

A thief, whether he steals much or little, must refund twice the amount, if he is able to do so without impairing his lot; if he cannot, he must go to prison until he either pays or satisfies the plaintiff, or in case of a public theft, the city. 'But should all the different kinds of thefts incur the same penalty?' You remind me of what I know—that legislation is never perfect. The men for whom laws are made may be compared to the slave who is being doctored, according to our old image, by the unscientific doctor. For he, if he chance to meet the educated physician and gentleman talking to his patient, and entering into the philosophy of his disease, would burst out laughing and say, as doctors delight in doing, 'You old fool, instead of curing the patient you are educating him!' And he would be quite right, and not far wrong, if he went on to observe, that he who legislates in our fashion preaches to the citizens instead of legislating for them. 'Perhaps.' There is, however, one advantage which we possess—that being amateurs only, we may either take the most ideal, or the most necessary and utilitarian view. 'But why offer such an alternative? as if all our legislation must be done to-day, and nothing put off until the morrow. Like builders, or other constructors, we may surely rough-hew them first, and shape and place them afterwards.' That will be the best way of getting the most general view of our laws. The writings of legislators are like any other writings in prose or verse, or rather they are the most important of all. The legislator should determine the nature of good and evil, and how they should be studied with a view to our instruction. What these are the legislator should teach, and how they are to be pursued. Are not Solon and Lycurgus as much disgraced as Homer and Tyrtaeus, when they write ill about the institutions of life? The laws of states ought to be the models of writing, and what is at variance with them should be deemed ridiculous. And we may further imagine them to express the affection and good sense of a father or mother, and not to be the fiats of a tyrant? 'Very true.'
INTRODUCTION.

Let us enquire more particularly about sacrilege, theft and other crimes, for which we have already legislated in part. And this leads us to ask, first of all, whether we are agreed or disagreed about the nature of the honourable and just. 'To what are you referring?' I will endeavour to explain. All are agreed that justice is honourable, whether in men or things, and no one who maintains that a very ugly man who is just, is in his mind fair, would be thought extravagant. 'Very true.' But if honour is to be attributed to justice, are just sufferings honourable, or only just actions? 'What do you mean?' Why, our own laws supply a case in point; for we enacted that the robber of temples, and the enemy of our laws, should die; and this was just, but the reverse of honourable. 'That is true.' But are we consistent in holding this language? I have already said that the evil are involuntarily evil; and the evil are the unjust. Now the voluntary cannot be the involuntary; and if you two come to me and say, 'Shall we legislate?' of course, I shall reply—'Then will you distinguish what crimes are voluntary, and what involuntary, and shall we impose lighter penalties on the first, and heavier on the latter? Or shall we refuse to determine what is the meaning of voluntary and involuntary, and maintain that our words have come down from heaven, and that they should be at once embodied in a law?' All states legislate under the idea that there are two classes of actions, the voluntary and the involuntary, but there appears to be great confusion about them reigning in the minds of men; and the law can never act unless they are distinguished. 'That is true, Stranger.' And we must either abstain from affirming that unjust actions are involuntary, or explain the meaning of this statement: for not to speak the truth is impiety. Believing, then, that acts of justice cannot be divided into voluntary and involuntary, I must endeavour to show that they must be divided on some other principle. 'Do so by all means.' Hurts may be voluntary, or involuntary; and involuntary hurts, whether great or small, are not injuries: and, on the other hand, a benefit may be an injury. An act which gives or takes away anything is not simply just; but the legislator has to consider the animus of the agent, and to provide satisfaction and retribution with a view to the reconciliation of the parties. 'Excellent.' Where injustice, like disease, is remediable, there the remedy must be applied in word or deed, with the assistance of pleasures and pains, of bounties and penalties, or any other influence
which may inspire man with the love of justice, or hatred of injustice; and this is the noblest work of law. When the legislator perceives the evil to be incurable, he will consider that the death of the offender will be a good to himself, and in two ways a good to society: first, as he becomes an example to others; secondly, because the city will be quit of a rogue; and in such a case, but in no other, the legislator will punish with death. 'I think that there is truth in what you say. I wish, however, that you would distinguish more clearly the difference of injury and harm, and the complications of voluntary and involuntary.' I will.—You will admit that anger is of a violent and destructive nature? 'That cannot be denied.' And further, that pleasure is different from anger, and is derived from an opposite source to anger, working by persuasion and the force of deceit? 'Yes.' Ignorance is the third source of error; this the legislator may note as being of two kinds—simple ignorance and ignorance doubled by conceit of knowledge; the latter, when accompanied with power, is a source of terrible errors, but excusable when only weak and childish. We are in the habit of saying that one man masters, and another is mastered by pleasure and anger. 'Just so.' But no one says that one man masters, and another is mastered by ignorance. 'Very true.' All these motives actuate men and sometimes drive them in different ways. 'That is often the case.' Now, then, I am in a position to define the nature of just and unjust. By injustice I mean the dominion of anger and fear, and pleasure and pain, and envy and desire in the soul, whether doing harm or not: by justice I mean the rule of the opinion of the best, whether in states or individuals, extending to the whole of life; although actions done in error are often thought to be involuntary injustice. No controversy need be raised about names at present; we are only desirous of fixing in our memories the heads of error. And the pain which is called fear and anger is our first head of error; the second is the class of pleasures and desires; and the third, of hopes which aim at true opinion about the best, the latter falling into three divisions, accordingly as they proceed from anger, desire, ignorance, making in all five. And the laws relating to them may be summed up under two heads. 'What are they?' Deeds of violence and irregularity, deeds of darkness and deceit; to which may be added the combination of both, and these last should be visited with the utmost rigour of the law. 'Very properly.'
Let us now return to the enactment of laws. We have treated of sacrilege, and of treason, and of sedition. Any of these crimes may be committed by a person not in his right mind, or in the second childhood of old age. And if this is proved before the select tribunal, the person in question shall only have to pay for the injury, and not be punished further. In case of homicide he shall be exiled for a year, and if he return before the expiration of the year, shall be retained in the public prison two years.

Homicides may be divided into voluntary and involuntary: and first of involuntary homicide. He who unintentionally kills another man at games or at gymnastics duly authorized by the archons, whether death follow immediately or after an interval, shall be acquitted, subject only to the purification required by the Delphian Oracle. Any physician whose patient dies against his will shall in like manner be acquitted. Any one who unintentionally kills a slave, with or without weapons, shall bear the master of the slave harmless, or pay a penalty amounting to twice the value of the slave, and to this let him add a purification greater than in the case of the deaths at the games. If a man kill his own slave, a purification only is required of him. If he kill a freeman unintentionally, let him also make purification, not forgetting the ancient tradition which says that the murdered man is indignant at seeing his murderer walk about in his own former haunts, and that he terrifies him with the consciousness of his crime. And therefore the homicide should go into exile for a year, and keep away from his own land or that of the murdered man. If he complies with this condition, the nearest kinsman of the deceased shall take pity upon him and be reconciled to him; but if he refuses to remain in exile, or attempts to go and sacrifice before he has been purified, then let the kinsman proceed against him, and demand a double penalty. Or if the kinsman neglects this duty, then he himself shall incur a curse, and any one who likes may proceed against him, and compel him to leave his country for five years. If a stranger involuntarily kill a stranger, any one may proceed against him in the same manner: and the homicide, if he be a metic, shall be banished for a year; but if he be an entire stranger, whether he have murdered metic, citizen, or stranger, he shall be banished for ever; and if he return, he shall be punished with death, and his property shall go to the next of kin of the murdered man. If he come back by sea against his will, he
shall be kept with his feet in the water waiting for a vessel to sail; or if he be brought back by land, the magistrates shall send him unharmed beyond the border.

Next follows murder done from anger, which is of two kinds—either arising out of a sudden impulse, and attended with remorse; or retaliation of an injury, which is unattended with remorse. The cause of both is anger, and both are intermediate between voluntary and involuntary. The one which is committed from sudden impulse, though not wholly involuntary, bears the image of the involuntary, and is therefore the more excusable of the two, and should receive a gentler punishment. The act of him who nurses his wrath is more voluntary, and therefore more culpable. The degree of culpability depends on the presence or absence of intention, to which the degree of punishment should correspond. For the first kind of murder, that which is done from anger, let two years exile be the penalty; for the second, that which is accompanied with malice prepensé, three. When the time of exile has expired, the judges shall send twelve of their number to enquire into the manner of life of the exiles; and they shall impose a rule upon them which shall be binding. He who after returning repeats the offence, shall be exiled and return no more. He who in a fit of anger kills his own slave, shall purify himself; and in the case of another man's slave, he shall pay to him double the value. Any one may proceed against the offender if he appear in public places, not having been purified; and may bring to trial both the next of kin to the dead man and the homicide, and shall compel the one to exact, and the other to pay, a double penalty. If a slave kill his master, or a freeman who is not his master, in anger, the kindred of the murdered person may do what else they please with him, but they must not spare his life. If a father or mother kill their son or daughter in anger let them remain in exile for three years; and on their return let them separate, and not continue to cohabit, or have the same sacred rites with those whom they have deprived of a brother or sister. The same penalty is decreed against the husband who murders his wife, or the wife who murders her husband. Let them be absent three years, and on their return never join in the sacred rites or meals of their children. Nor is a brother or sister who have lifted up their hands against a brother or sister, ever to partake of the hearth or sacrifices of their parents. If a son feels such violent hatred against his father or
INTRODUCTION.

mother as to take the life of either of them, then, if the father forgive him before his death, he shall only suffer the penalty due to involuntary homicide; but if he be unforgiven, there are many laws against which he has offended; he is guilty of outrage, impiety, sacrilege all in one, and deserves to be put to death many times over. If the law will not allow him to kill the author of his being even in defence of his own life, no other penalty can be inflicted upon him. If a brother kill a brother in self-defence, or a citizen a citizen, or a slave a slave, or if a citizen kill a citizen, or a stranger a stranger, let them be free from blame, as he is who slays an enemy in battle. But if a slave kill a freeman, let him be as a parricide. In all cases, however, the forgiveness of the injured party may acquit the agents; and then they shall only be purified, and remain in exile for a year.

Enough of actions that are involuntary, or done in anger; let us proceed to voluntary and premeditated actions. The great source of voluntary crime is the desire of money, which is begotten by evil education; and this arises out of the false praise of riches, common both among Hellenes and barbarians, which, although in the third rank of goods, is placed by them in the first. For the body is not for the sake of wealth, but wealth for the body, as the body is for the soul. If this were better understood, the crime of murder of which avarice is the chief cause, would soon cease among men. Next to avarice, ambition is a source of crime, dangerous to the ambitious man himself, as well as to the chief men of the state. And next to ambition, base fear is a motive which has led many an one to commit murder in order that he may get rid of the witnesses of his crimes. Let this be said as a prelude to all enactments about crimes; there may be added a doctrine of revenge or retaliation in the world below: and if a man is deterred by the fear of a future state of punishment, he will have no need of the law; but in case he disobey, let the law be declared against him as follows:—He who of malice prepense kills one of his kindred, shall in the first place be outlawed; neither temple, harbour, nor agora shall be polluted by his presence. And if a kinsman of the deceased refuse to proceed against his slayer, he shall take the curse of pollution upon himself, and also be liable to suffer punishment at the hands of any one who will avenge the dead. Let him who is willing, after due sacrifices and purifications, carry out the process of justice appointed by the legislator. The exact mode will be best determined by a conclave
of prophets and guardians of the law, and the judges of the cause shall be the same as in cases of sacrilege. He who is convicted shall be punished with death, and not be buried within the limits of the country of the murdered person. He who runs away shall undergo perpetual banishment; and if he return, he may be put to death with impunity by any of the citizens, or bound and delivered to the archons. He who brings an accusation shall demand satisfactory bail of the accused, and if this is not forthcoming, the magistrate shall keep him in prison against the day of trial. If a man commit murder by the hand of another, he shall be tried in the same way as in the cases previously supposed, but if the offender be a citizen, he shall not be deprived of burial in the land.

If a slave kill a freeman, or conspire to kill him, let him be taken to the grave of the murdered man, and there receive as many stripes at the hand of the public executioner as the person who took him pleases; and if he survive he shall be put to death. If a slave be put out of the way to prevent his informing of some crime, his death shall be punished like that of a citizen. If the putting of him to death have arisen out of some of those horrible crimes which occur in families where there is a bad state of society, of which the legislator, however unwilling, cannot avoid taking cognizance, he will repeat the old saw or myth of the divine vengeance against the perpetrators of such atrocities. The myth will say that the murderer must suffer what he has done: if he have slain his father, he must be slain by his children; if his mother, he must become a woman and perish at the hands of his offspring in another age of the world. Such a preamble announcing the anger of the Gods may terrify him; but if, notwithstanding, he falls into the recklessness of crime, and murders father or mother or brethren or children, the mode of proceeding shall be as follows:—Him who is convicted, the officers of the judges shall slay, and expose naked without the city in a place where three ways meet; and all the magistrates shall cast a stone upon his head and justify the city, and he shall be thrown unburied beyond the border. But what shall we say of him who deprives destiny of her right, and takes the life which is dearest to him, that is to say, his own; and this not from any disgrace or calamity, but from cowardice and indolence? The manner of his burial and the purification of his crime is a matter for God to decide and for his kinsmen to execute. Let him, at any rate, be buried alone
INTRODUCTION.

in some undistinguished spot, and be without name or monument. If a beast kill a man, not in a public contest, let him be slain and carried without the border by the relations of the deceased. Also inanimate things which have caused death, except in the case of lightning and other visitations from heaven, shall be carried without the border. If the body of a dead man is found, and the murderer, after every effort to detect him, remains unknown, the trial shall take place all the same, and the unknown murderer, if found guilty, shall be warned not to set foot in the temples or come within the borders of the land; if discovered, he shall die the death, and his body shall be cast out. A man is justified in taking the life of a thief entering the house by night, of a footpad, of a violator of women or youth; and he may take the life of another in defence of father, mother, brother, or other relations.

The nurture and education which are necessary to the existence of men have been considered, and the punishment of acts of violence which destroy life. There remain maimings, wounding, and the like, which admit of a similar division into voluntary and involuntary. About this class of actions the preamble shall be: Whereas men would be like wild beasts unless they obeyed the laws, the first duty of citizens is the care of the public interests, which unite and preserve states, as private interests distract them. A man may know what is for the public good, but if he be undisciplined, human nature will impel him to seek pleasure instead of virtue, and so darkness will come over his soul and over the state. If he had knowledge, he would have no need of law; for knowledge is the perfection of law. But such a freeman, 'whom the truth makes free,' is hardly to be found; and therefore law and order are necessary, which are the second best, and they regulate many things, but not everything. For actions have innumerable characteristics, which must be partly determined by the law and partly left to the judge. The judge must determine the fact; nor can the law always prescribe the punishment. What shall the law prescribe, and what shall be left to the judge? A city is unfortunate in which the tribunal is either secret and speechless, or, what is worse, noisy and public, and like a theatre, resounding with the applause and censure of the advocates. Such courts a legislator would rather not have; but if he must have them, he will speak plainly himself, and leave as little as possible in the power of the court. But where the courts are good; and presided over by well-trained judges, the penalties to be inflicted
may be in a great measure left to them; and as there are to be good courts among our colonists, there will be no need for us to determine beforehand the exact proportion of the penalty and the crime. Returning, then, to our legislator, let us indite a law about wounding, which shall run as follows:—He who wounds with intent to kill, and fails in his object, shall be tried as if he had succeeded. But since God has favoured both him and his victim, instead of being put to death, he shall be allowed to go into exile and take his property with him, the damage due to the sufferer having been previously estimated by the court, which shall be the same as would have tried the case if death had ensued. If a child intentionally wound its parent, or a servant his master, or if brother or sister wound brother or sister with malice prepense, the penalty shall be death. If a husband or wife wound one another with intent to kill, the penalty which is inflicted upon them shall be perpetual exile, and if they have children not yet grown up their property shall be placed in the hands of trustees. If they have no children, their kinsmen male and female shall meet, and after a consultation with the priests and guardians of the law, shall appoint an heir of the house; for the house and family belong to the state, being a 5040th portion of the whole. And the state is bound to preserve her families happy and holy; therefore, when the heir of a house has committed a capital offence, or is in exile for life, the house is to be purified, and then the kinsmen of the house and the guardians of the law are to enquire about those who are conspicuous for virtue, and introduce one of them to be the heir and priest of the house. He shall assume the fathers and ancestors of the family, while the first son dies in dishonour and his name is blotted out.

Some actions are intermediate between the voluntary and involuntary, and differ in degree. Those done from anger are of this class. If a man wounds another in anger, let him pay double the value of the injury, if curable; or fourfold, if curable, and at the same time dishonourable; and fourfold, if incurable; the payment is to be assessed by the judges. If the wounded person is rendered incapable of military service, besides the other penalties which he undergoes the injurer shall serve in his stead, or be liable to a suit for refusing to serve. If brother wounds brother, then their parents and kindred, of both sexes, shall meet and judge the crime. The damages shall be assessed by the parents; and if the amount fixed by them is disputed, an appeal
INTRODUCTION.

shall be made to the male kindred; or in the last resort to the guardians of the law. Parents who wound their children are to be tried by judges of at least sixty years of age, who have children of their own; and they are to determine whether death, or what greater or in any degree less punishment, is to be inflicted upon them—no relatives are to take part in the trial. If a slave in anger smite a freeman, he is to be delivered up by his master to the injured person. If the master suspect collusion between the slave and the injured person, he may try the matter. And if he fail he shall pay three times the injury; or if he obtain a conviction, the contriver of the conspiracy shall be made his slave. He who wounds another unintentionally, shall pay single and not double damages. The lawgiver cannot control accidents.

In all outrages and acts of violence, the elder is to be more regarded than the younger; as among the Gods so also among men. An injury done by a younger man to an elder is abominable and hateful; but the younger man who sustains an injury at the hands of an elder is to bear with him patiently, considering that he who is twenty years older is loco parentis. Let him keep his hands, too, from the stranger; instead of taking upon himself to chastise him when he is insolent, he shall bring him before the wardens of the city, who, not without thought of the God who protects strangers, shall inflict upon him as many blows as he has given; or if he be innocent, they shall warn and threaten his accuser. When an equal strikes an equal, whether an old man an old man, or a young man a young man, let them use only their fists and have no knives. He who being above forty years of age commences a battle, or retaliates, shall be counted mean and base.

To this preamble, let the law be added: If a man smite another who is his elder by twenty years or more, let the bystander, in case he be older than the combatants, part them; or if he be younger than the person struck, or of the same age with him, let him defend him as he would a father or brother; and let the striker be brought to trial, and if convicted imprisoned for a year or more at the discretion of the judges. If he be a stranger, he shall be imprisoned for two years, and if a metic for three. He who is standing by and gives no assistance, shall be punished according to his class in one of four penalties—a mina, fifty, thirty, twenty, drachmas. The generals and other superior officers of the army shall form the court who try this class of offences. Laws are made to instruct the good, and in the hope that there may
be no need of them; also to control the bad, whose hardness of heart will not be hindered from crime. The uttermost penalty is reserved for the parricide and the matricide, who despise the universal moral sense and tradition of mankind; for such there are reserved tortures worse than death in the world below. These, however, are not believed by them, else there would be no such criminals—wherefore the tortures which will then await them must be anticipated in life. Let the law be as follows:—

If a man, being in his right mind, dares to smite his father and mother, or his grandfather and grandmother, let the passer-by come to the rescue; and if he be a metic or stranger who comes to the rescue, he shall have the first place at the games; or if he do not come to the rescue, he shall be a perpetual exile. Let the citizen in the like case be praised or blamed, and the slave receive freedom or a hundred stripes. The wardens of the agora, the city, or the country, shall see to the execution of the law. And he who is an inhabitant of the same place and is present shall help; or if he do not he shall be under a curse.

If a man be convicted of assaulting his parents, let him be banished from the city into the country, and let him abstain from sacrificing; and if he do not abstain, let him be punished by the wardens of the country; and if he return to the city, let him be put to death. If any freeman consort with him, let him be purified before he return to the city. If a slave strike a freeman, whether citizen or stranger, let the bystander be bound to seize and deliver him into the hands of the injured person, who may inflict upon him as many blows as he pleases, and shall then return him safely to his master. The law will be as follows:—The slave who strikes a freeman shall be bound by his master, and not set at liberty without the consent of the person whom he has injured. All these laws apply to women as well as to men.

BOOK X. The greatest wrongs arise out of youthful insolence, and the greatest of all are committed against public temples: they are in the second degree great when private rites and sepulchres are insulted; in the third degree, when committed against parents; in the fourth degree, when they offend against the authority or property of the rulers; in the fifth degree, when the rights of individuals are violated. Most of these offences have been already considered; but there remains the question of admonition and punishment of offences against the
INTRODUCTION.

Gods. Let the admonition be in the following terms:—No man who ever did or said anything impious, had a true belief in the existence of the Gods; but, either he thought that there were no Gods, or that they did not care about men, or that they were easily appeased by sacrifices and prayers. 'What shall we say or do to such persons?' My good sir, let us first hear the jests which they in their superiority will make upon us. 'What will they say?' Probably something of this kind:—'Strangers, you are right in thinking that some of us do not believe in the existence of the Gods; while others assert that they do not care for us, and others that they are propitiated by prayers and offerings. But we want you to preach to us before you threaten; you should prove that there are Gods, and that they are too good to be bribed. Poets, priests, prophets, rhetoricians, even the best of them, speak to us of atoning for evil, and not of avoiding evil. From gentle legislators we ask for instruction, which may, at least, have the persuasive power of truth, if no other.' What have you to say? 'Well, there is no difficulty in proving the being of the Gods. The sun, and earth, and stars, moving in their courses, the recurring seasons, are evidences of their existence; and there is the general opinion of mankind.' I am afraid that the unbelievers—not that I have any respect for them—will despise us. You do not seem to see that their impiety proceeds, not from sensuality, but from ignorance taking the garb of wisdom. 'What do you mean?' At Athens there are current tales, written both in metre and out of metre, of a kind which are not tolerated in a well-regulated state like yours. The oldest of them speak of the origin of the world, and they go on to tell of the birth and life of the Gods. Now these narratives have not a good influence on family relations; but as they are old we will let them pass, and consider another kind of tales, invented by a younger generation of wiseacres, who are fond of repeating that the Gods are earth and stones, which can have no care of human things, and that theology is a cooking-up of words. 'One such teacher is bad enough, and alas! you imply that there are many of them.' What shall we say or do? Shall we suppose some impious man to charge us with assuming the existence of the Gods, and make a defence? Or shall we leave the preamble and go on to the laws? 'No man hurries us, and we have often said that the shorter and worse method should not be preferred to the longer and better. The proof that there are Gods who are good, and the friends of justice, is the preamble of all law.' Come, then, and
let us talk with the impious, who have been brought up from their infancy in the belief of religion, and have heard their own fathers and mothers praying for them and talking with the Gods as if they were convinced of their existence; who have seen mankind prostrate before the rising and setting sun and moon at every turn of fortune, and have despised and disbelieved all this. Can we keep our temper with them, when they compel us to argue on such a theme? We must; or like them we shall go mad, though with more reason. Let us address them as follows:

O my son, you are young; time and experience will make you change many of your opinions. Do not be hasty in forming a conclusion about the divine nature; and let me mention to you a fact which I know. You and your friends are not the only or the first persons who have held these opinions about the Gods. There are always a considerable number who are infected by them: I have known many of these persons, and can assure you that no one who was an unbeliever in his youth ever persisted till he was old in denying the existence of the Gods. The two other opinions, first, that the Gods exist and have no care of men, secondly, that they care for men, but may be propitiated by sacrifices and prayers, may indeed last through life in a few instances, but even this is not common. I would beg of you to be patient, and learn the truth of the legislator and others; in the mean time abstain from impiety. ‘Thus far your address is admirable.’

I will now speak of a strange doctrine, which is regarded by many as the crown of philosophy. They say that all things come into being either by art or nature or chance, and that the greater things are done by nature and chance, and the lesser things by art, which receives from nature the larger creations and fashions them in detail. ‘What do you and they mean?’ They mean to say that fire, water, earth, and air all exist by nature and chance, and not by art; and that out of these the sun, moon, stars, and earth were afterwards framed, and are inanimate substances, moved by chance, according to a natural kindred of hot and cold, hard and soft.

Thus, in their opinion, the heaven and earth were created, as well as the animals and plants, and by these two causes—nature and chance. Art came later, and is of mortal birth; by her power were invented certain images and partial imitations of the truth, of which kind are music and painting: but they say that there are other arts which combine with nature, and have a deeper truth, such as medicine,
INTRODUCTION.

husbandry, gymnastics. Also the greater part of politics they imagine to co-operate with nature, but in a less degree, having more of art, and that legislation is wholly a work of art. 'How do you mean?' In the first place, they say that the Gods exist neither by nature nor by art, but by the laws of states, which are different in different countries; and that virtue is one thing by nature and another by convention; and that justice is altogether conventional, and made by law. This is repeated to young men, both in prose and verse, and leads to all manner of impieties, and the pretended life according to nature and in disobedience to law; for nobody believes the Gods to be such as the law affirms. 'Too true; and oh! how injurious to states and to families!' But then, what should the lawgiver do? Should he stand up in the state and threaten all mankind with the dire consequences of unbelief, at the same time making no attempt to calm and persuade them? 'Nay, Stranger, a legislator who is worth anything ought never to weary of endeavouring to help the people in their belief that there are Gods; law and art should be affirmed by him to be the creations of mind.' Yes, Cleinias; but we are entering on questions which are difficult and tedious. 'And shall our patience, which was not exhausted in the enquiry about music or drink, weary now of discoursing about the Gods? Laws may be difficult, but when written down they remain, and time and diligence will decipher them; if they are useful there would be neither reason nor religion in rejecting them on account of their length.' Most true. And the general spread of unbelief shows that the legislator should do something in vindication of the laws, when they are being undermined by bad men. 'He should.' You agree with me, Cleinias, that the heresy consists in supposing earth, air, fire, and water to be the first of all things. These the heretics call nature, and conceive them to be prior to the soul. 'I agree.' You would further agree that natural philosophy is the source of this impiety—the study appears to be pursued in a wrong way. 'In what way do you mean?' The error consists in transposing first and second causes. 'I do not yet understand your meaning.' I mean to say that they err in not knowing that the soul is before the body, and before all other things, and the author and ruler of them all in their vicissitudes. And if the soul is prior to the body, then the things of the soul are prior to the things of the body. 'Certainly.' In other words, opinion, attention, mind, art, law, are prior to sensible qualities; and the first and greater works of creation are the results of art and mind, whereas the works of nature, as
they are improperly termed, are secondary and subsequent. 'Quite true.' When they speak of nature they seem to mean the generation of the first elements. And if the soul is first, and not fire and air, then the soul may be truly said to have a creative power. But this can only be on the supposition that the soul is prior to the body. 'Most true.' Shall I go to the point? 'By all means.' I fear that the greenness of our argument will ludicrously contrast with the ripeness of our ages. But as we must go into the water, and the stream is strong, I will first try the experiment of crossing by myself, and if I arrive at the bank, you shall follow. Remembering that you are not in the habit of answering questions, I will interrogate myself with the view of establishing the priority of the soul to the body. 'Do so.' I must first pray the Gods to assist at the demonstration of their own existence—never was there a more fitting occasion. Let me now hold fast to the rope, and enter into the depths: Shall I put the question to myself in this form?—Are all things at rest, and is nothing in motion? or are some things in motion, and some things at rest? 'The latter.' And are they moving or resting in some place or places? 'Yes.' There may be motion in the same place, as in revolution on an axis, which is imparted swiftly or slowly to the lesser and larger circle; and there may be motion in different places, having sometimes one centre of motion and sometimes more. When bodies in motion come against other bodies which are at rest, they are divided by them, and when they meet other bodies coming from an opposite direction they unite with them; and they grow by union while their constitution remains the same, but are destroyed either by union or division, when their constitution is lost. There is a growth from one dimension to two, and from a second to a third, which then becomes perceptible to sense; and these are all the motions possible with the exception of two. 'What are they?' Just the two with which our enquiry is concerned; for our enquiry relates to the soul. Now there is one kind of motion which is only able to move other things; there is another which can move itself as well. 'Granted.' That which moves and is moved by another is the ninth kind of motion; that which is self-moving and moves others is the tenth. And this tenth kind of motion is the mightiest, and is really the first, and is followed by that which was improperly called the ninth. 'How do you mean?' Must not that which is moved by others finally depend upon that which is moved by itself? Nothing can be effected by any transition prior to
self-motion. Then the first and eldest principle in motion, whether in things at rest or not at rest, will be the principle of self-motion; and that which is changed by others and moves others will be the second. ‘True.’ Let me ask another question:

What is the name which is given to self-motion when manifested in any material substance? ‘Life.’ The soul is life? ‘Very good.’ And are there not three kinds of knowledge — a knowledge (1) of the essence, (2) of the definition, (3) of the name? And sometimes the name leads us to ask the definition, sometimes the definition to ask the name; for example, number may be defined as that which is divisible into two equal parts, and when thus divided is termed even, and the definition of even and the word ‘even’ have the same meaning? ‘Very true.’ And what is the definition of that which is named ‘soul’? Must we not reply the self-moved? And have we not proved that the self-moved is the source of motion in other things? ‘That has been proved.’ And the motion which is not self-moved will be inferior to this? ‘True.’ And if so, we shall be right in saying that the soul is prior and superior to the body, and the body by nature subject and inferior to the soul. ‘Quite right.’ And we agreed that if the soul was prior to the body, the things of the soul were prior to the things of the body? ‘Certainly.’ And therefore desires, and manners, and thoughts, and true opinions, and recollections, are prior to the length and breadth and force of bodies. ‘Of course.’ In the next place, we acknowledge that the soul is the cause of good and evil, just and unjust, if we suppose her to be the cause of all things. ‘Certainly.’ And the soul which orders all things must also order the heavens? ‘Of course.’ One soul or more? More, I will answer for you; less than two are inconceivable, one good, the other evil. ‘Most true.’ The soul directs all things in heaven and earth and sea by her movements, which we call will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion true and false, joy, sorrow, courage, fear, hatred, love, and similar affections. These are the primary movements, and they receive the secondary movements of the body, and guide all things to increase and decline, separation and union, and to all the qualities which accompany them — cold, hot, heavy, light, hard, soft, white, black, sweet, bitter; and the soul, herself a goddess, uses these and other qualities, and by the help of the divine mind guides all things into truth and happiness, or under the impulse of folly works out an opposite result. For the controller of heaven and earth and the circle of the world is
either the wise and good soul, or the foolish and vicious soul, working in
them. ‘What do you mean?’ If we say that the whole course and
motion of heaven and earth is in accordance with the workings and
reasonings of mind, clearly the best soul must have the care of the
heaven, and guide it along that better way. ‘True.’ But if the heavens
move wildly and disorderly, then they must be under the guidance of
the evil soul. ‘True again.’ What is the nature of the movement of
the soul? We must not lead people to suppose that they can see and
know the soul with their bodily eyes, any more than they can see objects
in the midday sun; they had better look at an image only. ‘How do
you mean?’ Let us find in the ten kinds of motion an image of the
motion of the mind. You remember, as we said, that all things are
divided into two classes; and some of them were moved and some at
rest. ‘Yes.’ And of those which were moved, some were moved in
the same place, others in more places than one. ‘Just so.’ The motion
which was in one place was circular, as in the motion of a top; this is
akin to the course of mind. ‘What do you mean?’ The motion of the
top in the same place, and in the same relations, is an excellent and
ingenious image of the motion of mind. ‘Very true.’ The motion of
the other sort, which has no fixed place or manner or relation or order
or proportion, is a species of motion akin to folly and nonsense. ‘Very
true.’ After what has been said, there is no difficulty in distinctly stating
that, since the soul carries round all things, some soul which is either very
good or the opposite, carries round the circumference of heaven. But
we cannot suppose that soul to be other than the best. Again, the soul
carries round the sun, moon, and stars, and there is good reason for be-
lieving that if the sun has a soul, then either the soul of the sun is within
and moves the sun as the soul moves the body; or, secondly, the sun is
contained in some external air or fire, which the soul provides; or,
thirdly, the course of the sun is given by the soul acting in some
miraculous manner without the body. ‘Yes, in one of those ways the
soul must guide all things.’ And this soul of the sun, which is better
than the sun, whether driving him in a chariot or employing any other
agency, is by every man called a God? ‘Yes, by every man who has
any sense.’ And of the seasons, stars, moon, and year, in like manner,
it may be affirmed that the soul or souls from which they derived their
excellence are divine; and without insisting on the manner of their
working, no one can deny that all things are full of Gods. ‘No one.’
INTRODUCTION.

And now let us offer an alternative to him who denies that there are Gods. 'What alternative?' Either he must show that the soul is not the origin of all things, or he must live for the future in the belief that there are Gods.

Next, as to the man who believes in the Gods, but refuses to acknowledge that they take care of human things—let him too have a word of admonition. 'Best of men,' we will say to him, 'some affinity to the Gods leads you to honour them and to believe in them. But there are strokes of fortune, which you have observed; the rewards of wicked men are often praised by poets and approved by the world, and these draw you away from your natural piety. Perhaps you have seen the wicked growing old in prosperity, and leaving great offices to their children; or you have watched the tyrant succeeding in his career of crime; and seeing all these things you were led to believe in an irrational way that the Gods take no care of human things. That your error may not increase, I will endeavour to purify your soul.' Do you, Megillus and Cleinias, make answer for the youth, and when we come to a difficulty, I will carry you over the water. 'Very good.' There is no difficulty in proving to him that the Gods care for the small as well as the great, for he heard what was said of their goodness and of their having all things under their hand. 'He certainly heard.' Then now let us enquire what is meant by the virtue of the Gods. To possess mind belongs to virtue, and the contrary to vice. 'That is what we say.' And is not courage a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice? 'Certainly.' And to the Gods we ascribe virtues; but are idleness and indolence virtues? 'Of course not.' And is God to be conceived of as a careless, indolent fellow, whom the poet would compare to a drone? 'Impossible.' Can we be right in praising any one who cares for great matters and leaves the small to take care of themselves? Whether God or man, he who does so, must either think the neglect of such matters to be of no consequence, or he is indolent and careless. But no one would say that he neglects them because he is unable to attend to them. 'Certainly not.'

And now we will examine both classes of offenders against the Gods—the one who say that they may be appeased, the other that they take no care of small matters: do they not acknowledge that the Gods know all things, and have all power, human and divine, and that they are best? 'Certainly.' Then they cannot be indolent, for
indolence is the offspring of idleness, and idleness of cowardice, and there is no cowardice in God. ‘True.’ If they neglect small matters, they must either know or not know that such things are not to be regarded. But of course they know, and knowing they cannot be supposed to neglect their duty, overcome by the seductions of pleasure or pain? ‘Impossible.’ Have not all human things a soul, and is not man the most religious creature in the earth, and the possession of the Gods, as the heavens are also their possession? And the Gods, being the most provident beings, should take care of their property, whether small or great. Consider further, that the greater the power of perception, the less the power of action. ‘What do you mean?’ It is harder to see and hear the small than the great, but easier to control them. Suppose a physician who had to cure a patient—would he ever succeed if he attended to the great and neglected the little? ‘Impossible.’ And is not life made up of littles?—the pilot, general, householder, statesman, all attend to small matters; and the builder will tell you that large stones will not lie without small ones. Let us not then suppose God to be inferior to mortal craftsmen, who in proportion to their skill are careful in the details of their work; or that the best and wisest is a lazy good-for-nothing, who wants a holiday, and thinks small and easy matters to be beneath his notice. ‘Never, never!’ He who charges the Gods with neglect has been forced to admit that he is in error; but I should like further to persuade him that the author of all has put all together for the preservation of the whole, and that the smallest part has an appointed state of action or passion, and that the least action or passion of any part has a presiding minister. You, we say to him, are a minute fraction of this universe, created with a view to the whole; the blessed world is not made for the sake of you, but you are made to increase the blessedness of the whole; for the good physician and the good artist regard the whole first, and afterwards the parts. And you are annoyed at not seeing how that which is best for you is best also for the universe. The soul has many changes of bodies; and all that the player can do is to put the pieces into their right places. ‘What do you mean?’ I mean that God acts in the way which is simplest and easiest. Where change is ever going on, and new forms and fashions of life are springing up, the transposition of the Cosmos is endless; and yet there is not much trouble in the government of the world. ‘What do you mean?’ I mean to
INTRODUCTION.

say that when the king saw the actions of the living souls and bodies, and the virtue and vice which were in them, and the indestructibility of them, (although they were not eternal,) he contrived to place them where virtue might conquer and vice be overcome as far as possible; and with this view he gave them a place and seat adapted to them, leaving the direction of their separate actions to men's own wills and characters, which make us to be what we are. 'That is very reasonable.' All things which have a soul are changing, and possess in themselves the principle of change, and so move according to the law and order of fate; when they change gradually they move along the surface of the ground; when they change greatly for the worse, they are weighed down into Hades and the infernal world. And in all great changes in the direction of good and evil which are produced by the will of the soul and the mighty influence of others, there is a change of place. The good soul, which has intercourse with the divine nature, passes into a holier and better place. The evil soul, in like manner, as she grows worse changes her place for the worse. This is the law of the Gods in heaven—the worse to the worse, the better to the better, like to like, in life and in death, and in every state of being or of suffering. You, O youth, who fancy yourself unnoticed by the Gods, shall depart to more unrighteous souls, and shall endure what those who are like you see fit to impose upon you. That is the law which will govern you, and which no man will ever boast that he has escaped. Thou art not so little that thou canst creep into the earth, or so high that thou canst mount to heaven; but either here, or in the world below, or in some yet more savage place, you shall pay the penalty. This is also the explanation of the prosperity of the wicked, in whose actions as in a mirror you seemed to see the neglect of the Gods, not considering the end of these men and their relation to the whole. And yet without knowing these things how can you form any idea of their real happiness? If Cleinias and Megillus and I succeed in persuading you that you know not what you say about the Gods, God will help you; but if there is still any deficiency of proof, hear our answer to, the third opponent.

Enough has been said to prove that the Gods exist and care for us; that they can be propitiated, or that they receive gifts is not to be allowed or admitted for an instant. 'Let us proceed.' Tell me, by the Gods, I say, how the Gods are to be propitiated by us? Are they
not rulers, charioteers, pilots, perhaps generals, or physicians healing
the strife of bodily disease, husbandmen observing the perils of the
seasons, shepherds watching their flocks? To whom shall we compare
them? We acknowledged that the world is full both of good and
evil, but having more of evil than of good. There is an immortal
conflict going on, in which Gods and demigods are our allies; and the
most extraordinary care is required to save the property of the Gods,
that is to say, the soul of man, which is preserved by justice and
virtue, and destroyed by folly and wickedness. There is little of the
first to be found on earth; and brutal and unjust natures fawn upon
their keepers, who may be dogs or shepherds, as they may be also
the best and most perfect of masters. But we affirm that dishonesty
is to human souls what disease is to human bodies, what plague or
pestilence is to the seasons, what injustice is to states. 'Just so.' And
they who maintain that the Gods can be appeased, must say that they
forgive the sins of men, if they are allowed to share in their dishonesties;
as you might suppose wolves to throw the dogs a bit, and then to be
left by them in peace, that they may devour the flock. 'That is the
argument.' But let us apply our images to the Gods—are they the
pilots who eat and are drunken and wreck their own ships—or the
charioteers who are bribed to lose the race—or the generals, or doctors,
or husbandmen, who are perverted from their duty—or the dogs who
are seduced by wolves? 'God forbid.' Are they not rather our best
guardians; and shall we suppose them to fall short even of a moderate
degree of human and canine virtue, which will not pervert justice for
reward? 'Impossible.' He, then, who maintains such a doctrine, is
the most blasphemous of mankind.

And now our three points are proven; and we are agreed (1) that
there are Gods, (2) that they have a care for man, (3) that they are
inflexible in justice. I have spoken warmly, from a fear lest this
impiety of theirs should lead to a perversion of life. And our warmth
will not have been in vain, if we have succeeded in persuading these men
to abominate themselves, and to change their ways. 'There may be
a hope of doing so; and, at any rate, the sermon does credit to the
lawgiver.' Then now that the preamble is completed, we will make
a proclamation commanding the impious to leave their ways; and in
case they refuse, the law shall be added: If a man is guilty of impiety
in word or deed, let the bystander inform the rulers, and let the rulers
INTRODUCTION.

bring him before the court. If any of the rulers refuse to act, he also shall be tried for impiety; and if he be found guilty, he shall be fined for each offence. All such criminals are to be imprisoned. There shall be three prisons—one for common offences against life and property; another, in connection with the nocturnal council, which is to be called the house of improvement; a third, in some desolate and wild region in the centre of the country, which shall be the house of vengeance. There are three causes of impiety, and from each of them spring two kinds of impiety, six in all. First, there is the impiety of those who deny the existence of the Gods; these may be honest men, haters of evil, who are only dangerous because they talk loosely about the Gods and make converts; but there is also a vicious and self-indulgent class of them, who are full of craft and licentiousness. To this latter belong diviners and enchanters, despots and demagogues, generals, hierophants of private mysteries, and cunning sophists. The first class shall be only imprisoned and admonished. The second class should be put to death, if they could be, many times over. The two other sorts of impiety, first of those who deny the care of the Gods, and secondly, of those who affirm that they may be propitiated, have similar subdivisions, varying in degree of guilt. Those who have learnt to blaspheme from ignorance or evil education, shall be imprisoned in the house of improvement for five years at least, and not allowed to see any one but members of the council, who shall converse with them touching their souls' health. If any of the prisoners come to their right mind, at the end of five years let them be restored to sane company; but he who again offends shall die. As to that class of monstrous natures who not only believe that the Gods are negligent, or may be propitiated, but pretend to practise on the souls of quick and dead, and promise to charm the Gods, and to effect the overthrow of houses and states—he, I say, who is guilty of these things, shall be bound in the central prison, and shall have no intercourse with any freeman, receiving only his daily rations of food; and if he die, let him be cast beyond the border. But his sins shall not be visited upon his children, who, like other orphans, shall be educated by the state. Further, let there be a general law which will have a tendency to repress actions of impiety. A man shall not be allowed to have religious services in his house, but he shall go with his friends to pray and sacrifice in the temples. The reason of this is, that religious institutions can only be framed by a great intelligence.
But women and weak men are always consecrating the event of the moment; they are under the influence of dreams and visions, and awakenings, and they build altars and temples in every village, and on every open spot. The law is designed to prevent this, and also to deter men from the practice of propitiating the Gods by secret sacrifices, which only multiply their sins. Therefore let the law run—No one shall have private religious rites; and if a man or woman who has not been previously noted for any impiety offend in this way, let him be admonished to remove his rites to a public temple; but if he be one of the impious sort, and has offered a sacrifice which is impure, supposing him to be of full age and serious purpose, he shall be brought to trial before the guardians, and if he be found guilty, let him die.

**BOOK XI.** As to dealings between man and man, the principle of them is simple—Thou shalt not take what is not thine; and may I do to others as I would that they should do to me. First, of treasure trove:—May I never find, or desire to find, or be induced by the counsel of diviners, to lift a treasure which one who was not my ancestor has laid down; for I shall not gain so much in money as I shall lose in virtue. The saying, 'Move not the immovable,' may be repeated in a new sense; and there is a common belief which asserts that such deeds prevent a man from having a family. To him who is careless of such consequences, and, despising the word of the wise, reaps where he has not sown, and lifts a treasure which is not his—what will be done by the hand of the Gods, God only knows,—but I would have him who sees the offender, inform the magistrates in town or country; and they, when they have received the information, shall send to Delphi and act upon the decision of the oracle. If the informer be a freeman, he shall be honoured; if a slave, he shall be enfranchised; but if the freeman do not inform, he shall be dishonoured, and the slave if he does not inform, shall be put to death. If a man leave anything great or small, intentionally or unintentionally, in the possession of another, let him who finds the property deem the deposit sacred to the Goddess of ways. And he who appropriates the same, if he be a slave, shall be beaten with many stripes; if a freeman, he shall pay tenfold, and be held to have done a dishonourable action. If a person says that another has something of his, and the other allows that he
has, but maintains the property in dispute to be his own, let the
ownership be proved out of the registers of property; and, if the
property is registered as belonging to some one who is absent,
possession shall be given to him who offers the best security on behalf
of the absentee; or if the property is not registered, let it remain with
the three eldest archons, and if the thing be an animal, the defeated
party must pay the cost of its keep to the archons. A man may carry
off his own runaway slave or the runaway slave of a friend for safe
keeping. If any one claims a slave he must produce three responsible
persons as securities; and if he do not, he will be liable, if he be cast,
to pay double damages for violence. A freedman who does not pay
due respect to his patrons, may also be seized. Due respect consists
in going three times a month to the house of his patron, and offering
to do what he can for him; promising to marry whom he will, and
not get any richer than his master; or if he does, giving the excess
to his master. He is not to remain in the state, except with the consent
of the archons, for more than twenty years; and whenever his census
exceeds that of the third class, he must in any case leave the state
within thirty days, taking his property with him. If he is convicted
of offending against this law he is to die, and his property to be
confiscated. All suits about these matters are to be decided in the
tribes, unless the parties have made the matter up, or appointed arbiters.
If anybody claims a beast, or anything else, let the possessor refer
to the seller or giver of the property within thirty days, if in the city,
or within five months—of which the middle month is to be reckoned
from the summer solstice—if the goods have been received from a
stranger. All purchases and exchanges are to be made in the agora,
and paid for on the spot; no credit is allowed. If credit is given,
or purchases are made elsewhere, no law shall enforce payment. No
law shall protect the money subscribed for clubs. He who sells
anything of greater value than fifty drachmas, shall abide in the city
for ten days, and let his whereabouts be known to the buyer, in case
of any reclamation. When a slave is sold who is subject to epilepsy,
stone, or any other invisible disorder, the buyer, if he be a physician
or trainer, or if he be warned, shall have no redress; but in other cases
within six months, or in epileptic disorders within twelve months, he
may have a jury of physicians to be agreed upon by both parties; and
the seller who loses the suit, if he be an expert, shall pay twice the
price; or if he be a private person the bargain shall be rescinded, and he shall refund. If a person knowingly sells a homicide to another, who is informed of his character, there is no redress. But if the judges—who are to be the five youngest guardians of the law—decide that the purchaser was not aware, then the seller is to pay threefold, and to purify the house of the buyer. He who exchanges money for money, or beast for beast, must warrant either of them to be sound and good. As in the case of other laws, let us have a preamble, relating to all this class of crime. Adulteration is a kind of falsehood about which the many are in the habit of saying, that at proper times the practice is right. But the legislator will tell them, that no man should invoke the Gods when he is practising deceit or fraud in word or deed. For he is the enemy of heaven, first, who swears falsely, not thinking of the Gods by whom he swears, and secondly, he who lies in the presence of his superiors: and superiors are better in relation to worse, the elders to the younger, parents to children, men in relation to women, and rulers to subjects. The trader who cheats in the agora, outrages the names and presence of Gods and rulers. If after hearing this he will still be dishonest, let him listen to the law: The seller shall not have two prices on the same day, neither must he praise his goods, nor offer to swear about them. If he break the law, any citizen not less than thirty years of age may smite him. If he sell fraudulent goods, the slave or metic who informs against him shall have the goods; the citizen, if he fail in proving the charge, shall be dishonoured; or if he succeed, shall offer up the goods in question to the Gods of the agora. The cheating tradesman, if he is detected, shall be deprived of his goods, and shall have a stripe inflicted upon him for every drachma of their value, after proclamation has been made by a herald of the offence. The wardens of the agora and the guardians of the law shall learn of experienced persons the roggeries and tricks of the vendors, and write on a column the laws and regulations of the agora.

Next in order follows the subject of retail trades, which in their natural use are the reverse of mischievous; for every man is a benefactor who reduces what is unequal to symmetry and proportion. Money is the instrument by which this is accomplished, and the shop-keepers, and merchants, and hotel-keepers do but supply and equalise the wants of mankind. Why, then, does any dishonour attach to a beneficent occupation? Let us consider the fact first, and then
speak of the remedy. 'What is your drift?' Dear Cleinias, there are few men in the world who are so gifted by nature, and improved by education, as to be able to control their desires; or who, when they might have wealth, keep their heads and prefer moderation to accumulation. But the great majority think that they can never have enough, and the consequence is that retail trade has fallen into disrepute and become a reproach. Whereas, however ludicrous the idea may seem, if noble men and noble women could be induced to open a shop, and to trade upon incorruptible principles, then the aspect of things would change, and retail traders would be regarded as nursing fathers and mothers. Now, when the trader goes and settles in remote and distant places, he receives the sea-tossed sailor hospitably at first, but in the end he treats him as an enemy and a captive, whom he only liberates for an enormous ransom. This is what has brought retail trade into disrepute, and against this the legislator ought to provide. Men have said of old, that to fight against two enemies of opposite kinds is beyond the strength of mortals; and the two enemies whom I mean are wealth and poverty—the one corrupting men by luxury; the other, through misery, depriving them of the sense of shame. What remedies are there for this disease in the body politic? The first remedy is, to have as few retail traders as possible; the second is, to give retail trade over to a class whose corruption will not injure the state; and the third is, to restrain the insolence and meanness of the retailers.

Let us make the following laws:—(1) In the city of the Magnetes which the God is founding anew, none of the 5040 citizens shall be a retailer or merchant, or do any service to any private persons who are not his equals, except to his father and mother, or to any of his elder kindred, being freemen. He who follows an illiberal calling may be cited for dishonouring his family, and kept in bonds for a year; and if he offend again, he shall be bound for two years; and for every offence his punishment shall be doubled: (2) Every retailer shall be a metic or a foreigner: (3) The guardians of the law shall have a special care of this part of the community, which, not having received the benefit of education, has peculiar temptations. They shall consult with those who have experience in the different trades, as in the similar case of fraud, and find out what prices will yield the traders a moderate profit, and fix them.

When a man does not fulfil his contract, he being under no legal or
other impediment, the case shall be brought before the court of the tribes, if not previously settled by arbitration. The makers of household implements are sacred to Hephaestus and Athene; the makers of weapons to Ares and Athene: all of whom, remembering that the Gods are their ancestors, should be ashamed to deceive in the practice of their craft. If any man is lazy in the fulfilment of his work, and fancies, like a fool, that the God who gave him the means of life will forgive him because he is an acquaintance, he will be punished by the God; and let the law follow: He who fails in his undertaking shall pay the value, and do the work gratis in a specified time. The contractor, like the seller, is enjoined by law to charge the simple value of his work; in a free city; art should be a true thing, and the artist should not be practise in the ignorance of others. If, on the other hand, he who has ordered the work does not pay the workman according to agreement, and, for the sake of making a little money, dishonours Zeus and Athene, and breaks the bonds of society, the law shall punish him. If he does not pay at the time agreed, let him pay double; and although interest is forbidden in other cases, let the workman receive after the expiration of a year compound interest at the rate of an obol a month for every drachma (equal to 200 per cent. per annum). And we may observe, by the way, in speaking of craftsmen, that if our military craft do their work well, the state will praise those who honour them, and blame those who do not honour them. Not that the first place of honour is to be assigned to the warrior; a higher still is reserved for those who obey the laws.

Most of the dealings between man and man are now settled, with the exception of such as relate to orphans and guardianships. These lead us to speak of the intention of the dying, about which we must make regulations. I say 'must'; for mankind cannot be allowed to do absolutely what they will with their own, in opposition to the laws and customs of the living. For a dying person is a strange being, and is not easily managed. 'What do you mean?' He wants to be master of all he has, and is apt to use angry words. 'What does he say?' He says, I ought to be allowed to do what I will with my own, and to give much to those who deserve well of me, and little to those who deserve ill. 'There is reason in that.' O Cleinias, in my judgment the older lawgivers were too softhearted, and wanting in insight into human affairs. 'What do you mean?' I mean to say that they were too ready to listen to the outcry of a dying man, and hence they were induced to give him an
INTRODUCTION.

absolute power of bequest. But I would say to him,—O creature of a
day, you know neither the nature of your property, nor your own nature.
For you are not your own, and your property is not your own, but
belongs to your whole family, who have preceded and will follow you,
and property and family alike belong to the State. And therefore,
fearing that you may make an indiscreet will, I will take out of your
hands the charge of what you leave behind you, with a view to the
interests of all. And I hope that you will not quarrel with us, for you
are going the way of all mankind. Let this be our address to the living
and dying, and let the law be as follows:—The father who has sons shall
appoint one of them to be the heir of the lot; and the lot of any other
son who shall be adopted by another shall also be recorded; and if he
has still a son who has no lot, and has a chance of going to a colony,
he may give him what is over; or if he has more than one son, he may
divide the money between them. A son who has the family inheritance,
and a daughter who is betrothed, are not to share in the bequest of
money; and the son or daughter who, having inherited one lot, acquires
another, is to give back the first inheritance to the next of kin. If a man
has only daughters, he may adopt their husbands; or if he have lost
a son, he may adopt another in his will. If he have no children, he
can give away a tenth of his acquired property to whomsoever he will;
but he must adopt an heir to inherit the lot, and leave the remainder
to him. Also he may appoint guardians for his children; or if he
die without appointing them or without making a will, the nearest
kinsmen,—two on the side of the father, and two on the side of the
mother, and one friend of the departed,—shall be appointed guardians
under the authority of the fifteen eldest guardians of the law, who are
to be the special trustees of the orphan. The whole number of fifteen
shall be divided into committees of three, who will succeed one
another every year for five years. If a man dying intestate have
daughters, the dead must not be offended at the law looking, first to
relationship, and secondly to the preservation of the lot. The legislator
cannot regard the character of the heir, which to the father is the first
consideration. The law will therefore run as follows:—If the intestate
leave daughters, they are to marry, first, their father's brothers, who
shall take possession of the dead man's lot; secondly, the sons of
brothers, if they are of suitable age; thirdly, of their sisters; fourthly,
their great-uncles; fifthly, their cousins by a paternal uncle; sixthly,
their cousins by a paternal aunt. They will first take the male line and then the female, and they must suit in point of age. Concerning this the judge shall decide, after having made an inspection of the youth naked, and of the maiden naked down to the waist. If the maiden has no relations within the degree of third cousin, she may choose whom she likes, with the consent of her guardians; even a colonist may return home and become heir to her father's lot. If he be a kinsman, he will take the lot by law; if not, he must have her guardian's consent, and also hers. When a man dies without children and without a will, let a young man and a young woman, being the nearest of kin and of the same family, go forth and take up their abode in the desolate house. The legislator foresees that laws such as those about the marriage of relations will sometimes press heavily, and that there may be innumerable obstacles to his intention being fulfilled; as for example, when there are mental and bodily defects in the persons who are enjoined to marry. He is aware of these impediments, and he must be excused for not being always able to reconcile the general principles of public interest with the particular circumstances of individuals; and he is willing to allow the same excuse in the individual, who is not always able to bear the burden which the lawgiver has in ignorance imposed upon him. And then arbiters must be chosen, who will determine equitably the causes which arise under the law. 'How will that be?' A rich cousin may sometimes have an eye to a grander match, or the requirements of the law can only be fulfilled by marrying a madwoman. To meet such cases let the law run as follows:—If any one comes forward and says of a testamentary law, respecting marriage or any other matter, that the lawgiver, had he been alive, would not have required the carrying out of the law, and that he has left the fifteen eldest guardians of the law to be the trustees for the orphan; to the fifteen let them go; and their decision shall be final in smaller cases, but in the greater causes there shall be an appeal to the court of select judges, and he who fails in his cause shall suffer loss of reputation.

Orphans shall have in a manner a second birth in order to make their sad condition as light as possible. The 'guardians of the law shall be their parents, who shall be admonished to take care of them. And what admonition can be more appropriate than the assurance which we formerly gave that the souls of the dead watch over mortal affairs? About this there are many tales and ancient traditions, which may be
INTRODUCTION.

taken on trust from the legislator. Let men fear, in the first place, the Gods above; secondly, the souls of the departed, who naturally care for their own descendants; thirdly, the aged living, who are quick to hear of any neglect of family duties, especially in the case of orphans, who are the holiest and most sacred of all deposits, and the special care of guardians and magistrates. And those who bring them up well will receive a return in the care of themselves and their families. He who listens to the preamble of the law will never know the severity of the legislator; but he who disobeys, and injures the orphan, will pay twice the penalty he would have paid if the parents had been alive. More laws might have been made about orphans, did we not suppose that the guardians have children of their own and property of their own which are protected by the laws; and the duty of the guardian is the same as that of a father, though his honour or disgrace is greater. A legal admonition and threat may, however, be of service: the guardian of the orphan and the guardian of the law who is over him, shall love the orphan as his own child, and take more care of his or her property than of his own. If he neglect his duty the archon shall fine him; and the guardian shall have him tried. And the guardian may also have the archon tried in the court of select judges, and he shall pay, if convicted, a double penalty. Also the guardian of the orphan who is careless may be fined on the information of any of the citizens in a fourfold penalty, half to go to the orphan and half to the prosecutor of the suit. When the orphan is of age, if he thinks that he has been ill-used, his guardian may be brought to trial by him within five years. Or if the archon has neglected the orphan, he shall pay damages to him; but if he have defrauded him, he shall be deposed.

If irremediable differences arise between fathers and sons, the father may want to renounce his son, or the son may indict his father for imbecility: such violent separations only take place when the family are 'a bad lot'; if only one of the two parties is bad, the differences do not grow to so great a height. But here arises a difficulty. Although in any other state a son who is disinherited does not cease to be a citizen, in this he does; for the number of citizens cannot exceed 5040. And therefore he who is to suffer such a penalty ought to be abjured, not only by his father, but by the whole family. The law therefore should run as follows:—If any man's evil fortune or temper lead him to disinherit his son, let him not do so lightly or on the instant; but let him
have a council of his relations male and female, including the maternal relations of his son, and set forth to them the propriety of disinheriting him, and allow his son to answer. And if more than half his relations male and female, being of full age, condemn him, let him be disinherited. If any other citizen desires to adopt him, he may, for young men's characters often change in the course of life. But if, after ten years, he remains unadopted, let him be sent to a colony. If disease, or old age, or evil disposition drive a man out of his senses, and he is ruining his house and property, and his misfortune is only known to those who live with him, and his son doubts about trying his lunacy, let him lay the case before the eldest guardians of the law, and consult with them. And if, after the cause has been heard, the father is decided to be insane, he shall live like a child in the house, and have no more control over his property.

If a man and his wife are of incompatible tempers, ten guardians of the law and ten of the matrons shall take their case in hand, and reconcile them, if possible. If, however, their swelling souls cannot be pacified, the wife may try and find a new husband, and the husband a new wife; probably they are not very gentle creatures, and should therefore be joined to milder natures. Married persons may separate and marry again when they have few or no children, or when in old age they require special care. If a woman dies, leaving children male or female, the law would advise, though unwilling to compel, the widower to abstain from a second marriage; but if she leave no children, he shall be compelled to marry. Also a widow, if she is old enough to live honestly without marriage, is not to marry; but in case a widow or widower have no children, they may marry for the sake of them. There is sometimes an uncertainty which parent the offspring is to follow: in unions of a female slave with a male slave, or with a freedman or freeman, or of a freewoman with a male slave, the offspring is to belong to the master; but if the master or mistress be themselves the parent of the child, the slave and the child are to be sent away to another place. Concerning duty to parents, let the preamble be as follows:—We honour the Gods in their lifeless images, and believe that we propitiate them. But he who has an aged father or mother has a far more sacred and living image, of which the cherishing will do him much more good than the worship of any other image. 'What do you mean by cherishing them?' I will tell you. Oedipus and Amyntor and Theseus cursed
INTRODUCTION.

their children, and their curses took effect. This proves that the Gods hear the curses of parents who are wronged; and shall we doubt that they hear and fulfil their blessings too, when in the joy of their hearts they pray for their children's good? 'Surely not.' And, as we were saying, we cannot possess any image which the Gods count more honourable than a withered father and mother; and when honour is done to them, the God who hears their prayers is rejoiced, and their influence is greater than that of any lifeless image; they pray that good or evil may come to us in proportion as they are honoured or dishonoured, but the image is silent. 'That is excellent.' Every man of sense fears and reverences the prayers of parents, because he knows that they are often fulfilled. Aged relatives are a blessing to the good, whereas the bad fear them. Wherefore let every one honour his parents, and if this preamble fails of influencing him, let him hear the law:—If any one cares not for his parents more than he cares for himself and his children, let the aggrieved person go or send to the three eldest guardians of the law and three of the women who are concerned with marriages. Women up to forty years of age, and men up to thirty, who are found guilty of thus offending, shall be beaten with stripes. After that age they are to be brought before a court composed of the eldest citizens, who may inflict any punishment upon them which they please. If the injured party is unable to inform, some other freeman shall be bound to inform; and if a slave informs he shall be set free,—if the slave of one of the parties, by the magistrate,—if owned by another, at the cost of the state.

The injuries which one person does to another by the use of incantations and magic potions, whether given in food, ointments, or any other form, are of two kinds; they affect either the body or the mind. There is no use in arguing with a man who can be affected by waxen images set at doors or sepulchres, or in places where three ways meet. But to the wizards themselves we must address a solemn preamble, begging them not to treat mankind like children, or compel the legislator to expose their imposture, and show that the doctor who is ignorant of medicine and the wizard who is not a prophet or diviner, are equally quacks. Let the law be as follows:—He who does any injury not fatal to a man or his servants, or any injury whether fatal or not to another's cattle or bees, is to be punished with death if he be a physician, and if he be a private person he is to suffer the punishment awarded by the
court. And the wizard or conjuror, whether he be a diviner or not shall be put to death. Any one who injures another shall pay damages at least equal to the injury; and every one who does wrong is to suffer punishment by way of admonition. The foolish youth who is incited by others is to have a lighter punishment; and he whose folly is occasioned by his own jealousy or desire or anger is to suffer more heavily. Punishment is to be inflicted not for the sake of vengeance, for what is done cannot be undone, but for the sake of prevention and information. And there should be a proportion between the punishment and the crime, in which the judge, having a discretion left him, must, by estimating the crime, second the legislator, who gives the outlines, which he, like a painter, must fill up. That is just the work which remains to be done, if Gods and heroes are propitious to us in our legislation.

A madman is not to be allowed to go about the city, but is to be taken care of by his relatives. Neglect on their part is to be punished in the first class by a fine of a hundred drachmas, and proportionally in the others. Now madness is of various kinds; in addition to that which arises from disease there is the madness of passion. No one is to speak evil of another, but when men differ in opinion they are to instruct one another without speaking evil; for out of a little heat and a few harsh words there often spring up most serious evils. No one should seek to rouse the passions which education has calmed. He who feeds and nurses his wrath is liable to fall into ribald jests at the expense of his opponent, with a loss of character or dignity to himself. And for this reason no one may use any ribald word in a temple, or at sacrifices, or games, or other public places; and he who offends shall be censured by him who has charge of such matters; and the magistrate, if he fail to censure him, shall not claim the prize of virtue. In any other place the reviler who indulges in anger, whether he be the beginner or not, may be chastened by an elder. No man shall use ridicule in anger; and even without anger ridicule is equally culpable. Nor can we allow the comic poet to ridicule our citizens, under a penalty of expulsion from the contest or a fine of three minae. There may be comic fun in which there is no offence; but the question of offence shall be determined by the director of education, who is to be the licenser of theatrical performances.

The righteous man who is in adversity will not be allowed to starve in
INTRODUCTION.

a well ordered city; he will never be a beggar. Therefore let the law
be as follows:—No beggar shall be allowed; and he who begs shall be
expelled by the magistrates both from town and country.

If a slave, male or female, does any harm to the property of another,
who is not himself a party to the harm, the master shall compensate the
injury or give up the offending slave. But if the master says that there
was complicity in the sufferer of the injury, he may put him on his trial
for malpractices, and recover from him twice the value of the slave; or
if he is cast he must make good the damage and deliver up the slave.
The damage done by a horse or other animal shall be compensated in
like manner.

A witness who will not come of himself may be summoned, and if he
fail in appearing, he shall be liable to punishment: if he swears that he
does not know, he may leave the court. A judge who is called upon as
a witness must not vote. A free woman may witness, and plead, and
bring her action, if she have no husband, and be more than forty years
of age, but while her husband lives, she can only be a witness. A slave,
male or female, and a child may witness and plead, but they must give
sureties that they will appear at the trial; for they may be charged with
false witness. Such charges are to be proceeded with, pending the trial,
and the other accusations shall be kept under seal by the archons until
the trial for perjury comes off. He who is twice convicted of perjury is
not to be compelled, and if three times, is not to be allowed to witness,
or, if he persists, is to be punished with death. When more than half
the evidence is proved to be false there must be a new trial.

The best things in human life are liable to be defiled and perverted.
And justice, which has been the civilizer of mankind, is no exception to
this principle. Fair though she be, she has fallen into an evil name.
An art has sprung up which is said to make the worse appear the better
cause, and only requires money in return for the service of the advocate.
Such an art will be banished by the legislator, and requested to de-
part to another city. To the disobedient let the voice of the law be
heard saying:—He who tries to pervert justice in the minds of the
judges, or to increase litigation, shall be brought before the supreme
court. If he does so from contentiousness, let him be silenced, and,
if he offend again, put to death. If he have acted from a love of
gain, let him be exiled if he be a foreigner, or if he be a citizen let
him be put to death.
BOOK XII. If a false message be taken to or brought from other states, whether friendly or hostile, by ambassadors or heralds, who are the ministers of Hermes and Zeus, they shall suffer a fixed penalty. Stealing is mean; plundering is shameless. Let no man deceive himself by the example of the Gods, for no God or son of a God ever practised either force or fraud. On this point the legislator is better informed than all the poets and mythologers put together. He who listens to him shall be for ever happy, but he who will not listen shall have the following law directed against him:—He who steals much, or he who steals little of the public property is deserving of the same penalty; for they are both impelled by the same evil motive. When the law punishes one more lightly than the other, this is done under the idea, not that he is less guilty, but that he is more curable. Now a thief who is a foreigner or slave may be curable; but the thief who is a citizen, and has had the advantages of education, should be put to death, for he is incurable.

Many laws have been made about military expeditions; the great principle of all is that no one, male or female, in war or peace, in great matters or small, shall be without a commander. Whether a man stands or walks, or exercises, or pursues, or retreats, or washes, or eats, he must do everything according to a common rule. We should practise from our earliest youth every one to obey, every one to command. All dances, relaxations, endurances of meats and drinks, of cold and heat, and of hard beds, should have a view to war, and care should be taken not to destroy the natural covering and use of the head and feet by wearing shoes and caps; for the head is the lord of the body, and the feet are the best of servants. The soldier should have thoughts like these; and let him hear the law:—He who is enrolled shall serve, and if he fail to serve, or return home before the expedition is finished, he shall be indicted for cowardice before his own arm of the service, and if he be found guilty he shall suffer the penalty which the courts award, and never be allowed to contend for any prize of valour, or to accuse another of misbehaviour. After the courts for the failure of service and desertion have been held, the generals shall hold another court, in which the several arms of the service will award prizes for the expedition which has just concluded. The prize is to be a crown of olive, and he who obtains a first, second, or third prize shall offer up the prize at the temple of his favourite war God. Let the indictment be scrupulously true, for justice is an honourable maiden, to whom falsehood is naturally hateful. When
men have lost their arms, care should be taken to distinguish between cases in which they have been lost from necessity and from cowardice. For example, the hero Patroclus, if instead of being dead he had been brought back alive from the field, might have been reproached with having lost the divine armour. And a man may lose his arms in a storm at sea, or from a fall, and under many other circumstances, which should be carefully distinguished. Language has made the distinction for us in the use of the two terms, ‘thrower away of a shield’ (ῥήψαστις), and ‘loser of arms’ (ἀποβολέως διπλωμένος), one being the voluntary, the other the involuntary relinquishment of them. Let the law be as follows:—If any one is overtaken by the enemy, having arms in his hands, and he leaves them behind him voluntarily, choosing base life instead of honourable death, he shall receive an appropriate punishment. The old legend of Caeneus the Thessalian, who was changed by the Gods from a woman into a man, may teach by contraries the right sort of punishment. Let him be changed from a man into a woman—that is to say, let him be all his life out of danger, and never again be admitted by any commander into the ranks of his army; and let him pay a heavy fine according to his class.

All magistrates, whether temporary or permanent, must give an account of their magistracy. But where shall we find the magistrate who is worthy to supervise them, or to judge of the crooked ways into which they may have been driven by the difficulties of their position? For there are many causes of the dissolution of states; which like ships or animals have their cords, and girders, and sinews easily relaxed, and fall into a state of atony. Nothing tends more to the good and preservation of states, than the supervision of them by examiners who are better than the magistrates; failing in this they fall to pieces, and become many states instead of one. Wherefore let the people meet after the summer solstice, in the precinct of Apollo, and in his presence appoint three men of not less than fifty years of age; each citizen voting, not for himself, but for him whom he thinks the best. The persons selected shall be reduced to one half, who have the greatest number of votes, if the number named be an even number; but if an odd number, he who has the smallest number of votes shall be withdrawn. The division shall continue until three only remain; and if the number of their votes be equal, a distinction between the first, second, and third shall be made by lot. The three shall be crowned with an olive wreath, and
proclamation made, that the city of the Magnetes, once more preserved by the Gods, presents her three best men to Apollo and the Sun, to whom she dedicates them as long as their lives answer to the judgment formed of them. They shall choose in the first year of their office twelve examiners, to continue until they are seventy-five years of age; afterwards three a year, who, while they hold office, shall dwell within the precinct of the God. They are to divide all the magistracies into twelve classes, and may apply any methods of enquiry, and inflict any punishments which they please; in some cases singly, in other cases together, announcing the acquittal or punishment of the magistrate in the agora. There may be an escape from their judgment by an impeachment; but if the appellant is cast, and he is not condemned to death, his punishment shall be doubled. Those who have been selected by the state for their pre-eminence in virtue, shall have the first place at all sacrifices, and in all assemblies and public places, and on sacred embassies, and have the exclusive privilege of wearing a crown of laurel. They are priests of Apollo and the Sun, and he of their number who is chosen first shall be high priest, and give his name to the year. Their manner of burial, too, shall be different from that of the other citizens. The colour of their funeral array shall be white, and, instead of the voice of lamentation, around the bier shall stand a chorus of fifteen youths and fifteen men, chanting hymns in honour of the deceased all day long; and in the morning a band of a hundred youths, to be selected by the relatives from the palaestra, shall carry the bier to the place of sepulture marching in armour, or if they are horsemen, with their horses, and the youths around and in front of the bier shall sing their national hymns, while the maidens and women past child-bearing follow after. Priests and priestesses may also follow, for the funeral rites are pure, unless the Pythian oracle forbids. The sepulchre shall be a long tomb of stone intended to last for ever, and having many resting-places, in one of which they shall deposit the remains of the departed saint, surrounding the place of interment with a mound and with groves of trees, except on one side, where an opening shall be left for other tombs in case they shall be hereafter needed. There shall be annual games—musical, gymnastic, or equestrian, in honour of those who are acquitted by the examiners. But if any one, confident in having been acquitted, begin to show the wickedness of human nature, he may be tried again by any one who pleases in a court composed of the guardians of the law, and of select
INTRODUCTION.

judges, and of any of the former examiners who are alive. If he fail he shall be deprived of his honours, and if the accuser fail he shall pay a fine according to his class.

What is called the judgment of Rhadamanthus is suited to 'ages of faith,' but not to our days. He knew that his contemporaries believed in the Gods, for there were many of them who were the sons of Gods; and he thought that the easiest and surest method of ending litigation was to commit the decision to Heaven. In our own day, men either deny the existence of Gods or their care of men, or maintain that they may be bribed by attentions and gifts; and this mode of proceeding would therefore be out of date. When the religious ideas of mankind change, their laws should also change. Thus oaths should no longer be taken from plaintiff and defendant, instead of simple statements of affirmation and denial. For there is something dreadful in the thought, that nearly half the citizens who meet one another in society are perjured men. There is no objection to an oath, where a man has no interest in forswearing himself; as, for example, in holding an election for a magistracy, or in the judgment of games and contests. But where there would be a premium on perjury, oaths and imprecations should be prohibited as irrelevant, like appeals to feeling. Let the principles of justice be learned and taught without words of evil omen. The oaths of a stranger against a stranger may be allowed, because they are not likely to breed or become inveterate in our state.

Trials for minor matters are to be regulated by the same rules. The non-attendance at a chorus or sacrifice, or the omission to pay a war-tax, may be regarded as in the first instance remediable, and the defaulter may give security; if the tax remains unpaid, the goods pledged shall be made over to the state. But for obstinate disobedience, the magistrate shall have the power of inflicting greater penalties.

A city which is without trade or merchandise, must consider the subject of emigration and reception of strangers. For out of intercourse with strangers there arises great confusion of manners, which in most states is not of any consequence, because the confusion exists already; but in a well-ordered state may be a great evil. Yet the absolute prohibition of foreign travel, or the exclusion of strangers, is impossible, and would appear barbarous to the rest of mankind. Now public opinion should never be lightly regarded, for mankind are not so far wrong in their judgments as in their lives. Even the worst of men have often a divine
instinct, which enables them to distinguish good from bad. States are rightly advised when they desire to have the praise of men; and the greatest and truest praise is that of virtue. And a state formed after the model of Crete should, and probably will, have a character for virtue, such as few cities have under the sun. Let this, then, be our law about foreign travel and the reception of strangers:—No one shall be allowed to leave the country who is under forty years of age—of course military service abroad is not included in this—and no one at all on any private occasion. To the Olympic, and Pythian, and Nemean, and Isthmian games, shall be sent the fairest and best and bravest, who shall support the dignity of the city in peace. These, when they come home, shall teach the youth the inferiority of all other governments. And if any citizen have the curiosity to know the manners of other states, no law shall hinder him. For a state which has no experience, and no knowledge of the reason of things, however innocent of evil, will never be perfectly civilized. Moreover, in all states, bad as well as good, there are men of genius who are inspired by heaven; and in the footsteps of these incorruptibles the good citizen should strive to follow, over the water and over the land; and learn from them what laws are good, with a view to their firmer establishment, and what laws are bad, with a view to their improvement. ‘How can these two objects be accomplished?’ In the first place, let the visitor of foreign countries be between fifty and sixty years of age, and let him be a citizen of repute, and especially of military repute. On his return he shall appear before the legislative council: this is the council which sits early in the morning, before the sun is high in the heavens, and includes amongst its members the priests who have gained the prize of virtue, and the ten oldest guardians of the law, and the director and past directors of education; and each of them shall bring with him a younger friend of his own selection, who is between thirty and forty years of age. The assembly thus constituted is to consider the laws of their own and other states, and to gather information which may throw light on the subject of law. The elder senators are to make a selection of extracts, which the younger members may learn by heart. These latter, if they are worthy, shall also be made guardians of the state, and receive reward or punishment according to their merits. This is the assembly to which the visitor of foreign countries shall come and tell anything which he has heard in the course of his travels, or himself observed relative to the laws. If
he be neither improved nor deteriorated, let him be praised for his zeal; and yet more praised if he be improved, and be also honoured after death by the authority of the council. But if he be deteriorated by his travels, let him be prohibited from speaking to any one; and if he submit, he may live as a private individual: but if he be convicted of making innovations in education and the laws, let him die.

Next, as to the reception of strangers. Of these there are four classes: merchants, who find their way over the sea at a certain time of the year, that they may exhibit their wares. These should be received in markets and public buildings without the city, by proper officers, who shall see that they receive justice, and shall also watch against any political designs which they may entertain; no more intercourse is to be held with them than is absolutely necessary. Secondly, there are the visitors at the festivals, who shall be entertained by hospitable persons at the temples for a reasonable time; the priests and ministers of the temple shall be their judges and protectors. Thirdly, there are ambassadors of foreign states; these are to be honourably received by the generals and prytanes, and placed under the care of the persons with whom they are lodged. Fourthly, there is the philosophical stranger, who will rarely make his appearance; he, like our own foreign commissioners, will come to see whatever is great and noble in our state. Like them he must be fifty years of age: let him be received with honour, and be a welcome guest at the houses of the rich and wise; for example, at the house of the director of education and other noble persons, who are to instruct and be instructed by him. These are the rules of missions into foreign countries, and of the reception of strangers. Let Zeus, the God of hospitality, be honoured; and let not the stranger be driven away, as in Egypt, by distinctions of meats and sacrifices, and by savage proclamations.

Let guarantees be clearly given in writing and before witnesses. The number of witnesses shall be three when the value is under a thousand drachmas, or five when above. The seller at first and second hand shall be equally liable. He who would search another man’s house must swear that he expects to find something there; and he shall enter naked, or having on a single garment. The owner shall place at his disposal all his goods, sealed as well as unsealed; if he refuse, he shall be liable in double the value of the property proved to have been in his possession. If the owner be absent, he may counter-seal
the property which is under seal, and place watchers. In case of
prolonged absence, he shall take the magistrates, and open the sealed
places, and seal them up again in the presence of the magistrates.
The recovery of goods disputed, except in the case of lands and
houses, is to be barred by time. The public and unimpeached use
of anything for a year in the city, or for five years in the country,
or the private possession and domestic use for three years in the city,
or for ten years in the country, is to give a right of ownership. But
in a foreign country there is no bar as to time. The proceedings
of any trial are to be void, in which either the parties or the witnesses,
whether bond or free, have been forcibly prevented from attending.
In the case of a slave the suit shall be invalid; in the case of
a freeman, he who is guilty of this violence shall be made a slave
and imprisoned for a year. If one competitor forcibly prevents another
from attending at the games, the other may be inscribed as victor in
the temples, and the first, whether victor or not, shall be subjected
to an action for damages. The receiver of stolen goods is to be
punished as well as the stealer. The receiver of an exile shall be
put to death. A man shall have the same friends and enemies as
his country; and he who makes war or peace for himself shall be
put to death. And if a party in the state make war or peace, their
leaders shall be put on their trial by the generals, and, if convicted,
put to death. The ministers of a country ought not to receive gifts;
the doctrine that we may be paid for deciding justly is liable to abuse.
He who will not be persuaded let him die.

Taxes may be demanded either upon income or upon property,
whether the wardens of the country choose to levy the tax upon an
annual return, or upon a proportion of the whole value.

The good man will offer moderate sacrifices to the Gods; every
man’s land and hearth is consecrated to the Gods, and no second
temple is required. Gold and silver, whether in houses or temples,
are not the true riches; ivory, which is taken from the dead body
of an animal, is unholy; iron and brass are materials of war. Wood
and stone of a single piece may be offered, also woven work which
has not occupied one person more than a month in making. White
colours are always acceptable to the Gods; figures of birds and similar
offerings are the best of gifts, but they must be such as the sculptor can
make in a day.
INTRODUCTION.

Next concerning lawsuits. Judges, or rather arbiters, may be agreed upon by the plaintiff or defendant; and if no decision is obtained from them, their fellow-tribesmen or townsmen shall judge, and the court shall consist of a twelfth part of them. At this stage they shall demand an increased penalty, and the defendant, if he be cast, shall pay a fifth more than the assessed damages. If he further persist, and appeal a third time, the case shall be heard before a court of select judges; and he shall pay, if beaten, half as much again as the penalty. If the pursuer appeal he shall receive, and if beaten he shall pay, a fifth part; and if he appeal again and fail, he shall pay half of the assessed damages. Other matters relating to trials have been already determined; lesser points, such as the allotment of suits, the times of sitting, the modes of pleading and procedure, may be supplied by younger legislators.

These are to be the rules of private courts; and there are many states which have excellent modes of procedure in their public courts which may serve for a model, and these also, when duly tested by experience, should be ratified and made permanent.

Let the judge be accomplished in the laws. He should possess writings about them, that he may learn them; for laws are the highest instrument of mental improvement, and derive their name from mind. They afford a measure of all censure and praise, whether in verse or prose, in conversation or in books, and are an antidote to the vain disputes of men and their equally vain assents and agreements. The just judge is he who has imbibed their spirit, and is seeking to establish the continuance of justice for the good, and to change the tempers of the bad, if they can be changed, or to denounce death, which is the only remedy, to the incurable, the thread of whose life cannot be reversed.

After the judgments of the year are over, execution is to follow. The court is to award the property of the defendant who loses to the plaintiff, reserving to him only the bare means of life. If the plaintiff is not satisfied within a month, the court shall put into his hands the property of the defendant. If the defendant fails in payment to the amount of a drachma, he shall lose the use and protection of the court; or if he defraud the court, he who suffers by the fraud shall bring the offender before the guardians of the law, and if he be found guilty, he shall be put to death.

Man having been born, educated, having begotten and brought up
children, and gone to law, is at last gathered to his fathers. The rites
which are to be celebrated after death in honour of the Gods above
and below shall be determined by the interpreters. Places of sepulture
shall be chosen with reference to the convenience of the living; they
shall be out of sight and on barren spots. For no one either in life
or after death has any right to deprive the living of the sustenance which
mother earth provides for them. No sepulchral mound is to be raised
higher than the labour of five men in five days can accomplish, and the
stone tablet which is placed upon it is not to be larger than will contain
an inscription of four heroic verses. The dead are only to be exposed
for three days, which is long enough to test the reality of death. The
legislator will instruct the people that the body is a mere eidolon, and
that the soul, which is our true being, is gone to give an account of
herself before the Gods below. When they hear this, the good are full
of hope, and the evil are terrified, knowing that there will not be much
help for them after death. And therefore in life all men's relatives
should help them to live innocently and holily, that they may depart
in peace. When a man loses a son or a brother, he should consider
that the true man has gone away to fulfil his destiny in another life,
and not waste money over his lifeless remains. Let the law then order
a moderate funeral of five minae for the first class, three for the second,
two for the third, one for the fourth. The magistrates, or one of them
selected by the relatives, are to assist the relatives in arranging the
affairs of the deceased. There would be a want of delicacy in pre-
scribing that there should be or should not be mourning for the dead.
But, at any rate, such mourning should be confined to the house, and
the dead body should be taken out of the city before daybreak. Other
regulations relating to the burial or non-burial of parricides and other
sacrilegious persons have already been laid down. The work of
legislation is therefore nearly completed, and that work is the pre-
servation of the state.

Do you remember the names of the Fates? Lachesis is the first of
them; Clotho the second, Atropos the third and last—she makes the
threads of the web irreversible. We too want to make our laws irrevers-
ible, for the unchangeable quality in them is the salvation of the State,
and the source of health and order in the bodies and souls of our citizens.
'But can such a quality be implanted?' I think that it may; and at any
rate we must try; for, after all our labour, to have been piling up a fabric
INTRODUCTION.

which has no foundation would be too ridiculous. 'What foundation would you lay?' Have we not already instituted an assembly which was composed of the ten oldest guardians of the law, and secondly, of those who have received prizes for virtue, and thirdly, of the travellers who had gone abroad to enquire into the laws of other countries. These were to form a synod, and each of the members was to choose a young man, of not less than thirty years of age, to be approved by the rest. The meeting was to be held at dawn, when all the world is at leisure—that was our proposal; and this assembly was to anchor the vessel of State, and provide the means of permanence; for the governments of States, like all other things, have their proper saviours, which are to them what the head and soul are to the living being. 'How do you mean?' Mind in the soul, and sight and hearing in the head, or rather, the perfect union of mind and sense, may be justly called every man's salvation. 'Certainly.' Yes; but of what nature is this union? In the case of a ship, for example, are not the senses of the sailors added to the intelligence of the pilot? These together save themselves and the ship. Or, to offer another illustration: The physician and the general have their objects; and the object of one is health, of the other victory. And States have their objects, and the ruler must understand, in the first place, the nature of them, and secondly, the means of attaining them, whether in laws or men. The State which is wanting in this knowledge cannot be expected to be wise when the time for action arrives. Now what class or institution is there in our State which secures the object of the State? 'I suspect that your words have reference to the nocturnal council.' Yes, to that council which is to have all virtue, and whose members are to aim directly at the mark. 'Very true.' The inconsistency of legislation in most States is not surprising, when the variety of their objects is considered. One of them makes their rule of justice the government of a class, without regard to good or bad; another aims at wealth, whether with or without freedom; another at freedom, or at freedom and power; and some who are supposed to be philosophers maintain that you should seek for all of them at once. But our object is unmistakeably virtue, and virtue is of four kinds. 'Yes; and we said that mind is the head and ruler of the three other kinds of virtue and of all else.' Yes, Cleinias, and having already declared the object which is present to the mind of the pilot, the general, the physician, we will now interrogate the mind of the statesman. Tell me, I say, as the physician

VOL. V.

N
and general have told us their object, what is the object of the statesman? Can you tell me? 'We cannot.' Did we not say that there are four virtues — courage, wisdom, and two others, which are called by the common name of virtue, and are in a sense one? 'Certainly we did.' The difficulty is not in understanding the differences of the virtues, but in apprehending their unity. Why do we call virtue, which is a single thing, by the two names of wisdom and courage? To this I have no difficulty in replying that courage is concerned with fear, and is found in children, and is common to brutes; for the soul may be courageous without reason, but no soul was, or ever will be, wise without reason. 'That is true.' I have explained to you the difference, and do you explain to me the unity. But first let us consider whether the knowledge of names can be separated from the knowledge of the ideas which they represent. Is not the knowledge of words without ideas a disgrace to a man of sense? and can any subject be more worthy of the attention of our legislators than the four virtues of which we are speaking—courage, temperance, justice, wisdom? And ought not they and all other guardians and interpreters of the law to instruct him who needs instruction in the nature of virtue and vice, instead of leaving them to be taught by some chance poet or schoolmaster? A city which is without instruction suffers the usual fate of cities in our day. What then shall we do? How shall we perfect the ideas of our guardians about virtue? how shall we give our State a head and eyes? 'Yes; how shall we accomplish what is thus described by you in a figure?' The city will be the body or trunk; the best of our young men will mount into the acropolis and be our eyes; these will look about them, and inform the elders, who are the mind, and will use the younger men as their instruments: together they will save the State. Shall this be our constitution, or shall all be alike, and the special training be given up? 'Impossible; the inequality in their duties requires that they should be differently educated.' Let us then attain to some more exact idea of education. Did we not say that the true artist or guardian ought to have an eye, not only to the many, but to the one, and to order all things with a view to the one? Can there be any more philosophical speculation than how to reduce many things which are unlike to one idea? 'Perhaps not.' Say rather, 'Certainly not'; for no more philosophical method was ever attained by the wit of man. And the rulers of our divine State ought to have an exact knowledge of that common
principle in courage, temperance, justice, wisdom, which is called by the name of virtue; and unless we know whether virtue is one or many, we shall hardly know what virtue is. Shall we contrive some means of engrafting this knowledge on our State or give the matter up? ‘Anything rather than give up.’ But how are we to effect our object? Let us begin by making an agreement. ‘By all means, if we can.’ Well, are we not agreed that our guardians ought to think that the good and the honourable are not only many, but also one? ‘Yes, they are one.’ And can we give no account of this? ‘If we cannot, we are slaves.’ The true guardian ought to know the truth, and should also be able to interpret and execute the truth. ‘Certainly.’ And is there any higher knowledge than the knowledge of the existence and power of the Gods? The people may be excused for following tradition only; but the guardian must not be admitted to his office if he is unable to give a reason of the faith which is in him. He who is careless or incapable in such matters is out of the pale of the good. And there are two great evidences of religion—the priority of the soul and the order of the heavens, which, if rightly understood, are far from tending to the substitution of necessity for reason and will. For the truth is diametrically opposed to the opinions of those who maintain that they are inanimate beings. The men of a former generation (Anaxagoras) wondered at them, and a suspicion arose, which later investigations have confirmed, that things inanimate could never without mind have attained such scientific accuracy; and some even in those days ventured to assert that mind had ordered all things in heaven; but they had no idea of the priority of mind, and they turned the world, or more properly themselves, upside down, and filled the universe with stones, and earth, and other inanimate bodies. This led to great impiety, and the poets said many foolish things against philosophy, which they compared to a yelping she-dog. No man can now be religious who does not believe that the soul is eternal, and prior to the body, and the ruler of all bodies, and does not perceive also that there is mind in the stars; or, who has not heard the connection of them with music, and harmonized them with manners and laws, giving a reason of things which are matters of reason. He who is unable to acquire this knowledge as well as the ordinary virtues of a citizen, can only be a servant, and not a ruler in the State.

Let us then add to our other laws a law respecting the nocturnal council, which has been associated with us in our education. ‘Very
good.' To establish this will be my aim, and I hope that you and others will assist me. ‘Let us proceed along the road in which God seems to guide us.’ We cannot, Megillus and Cleinias, anticipate the details which will hereafter be needed; they must be supplied by experience. ‘What do you mean?’ First of all a register will have to be made of all those whose aim, character, or education would qualify them to be guardians. The subjects which they are to learn, and the order in which they are to be learnt, are mysteries which cannot be explained beforehand, but not mysteries in any other sense. ‘If that is the case, what is to be done?’ We must run a risk, in which I am willing to share, in coming to any determination about education. And I would have you, Cleinias, who are the founder of the Magnesian State, and will incur the greatest glory if you succeed, and will be praised for your courage, if you fail, take especial heed of this matter. Soon the State will have to be handed over to the nocturnal council. The dream will then become a reality; and our citizens, if they are carefully chosen and educated, will be saviours such as the world has hitherto never seen.

The want of completeness in the Laws becomes more apparent in the later books. There is less arrangement, and the transitions are more abrupt from one subject to another. The discourse concerning religion is introduced as a prelude to offences against the Gods, and this is the only remaining portion of the work which is fully executed.

In the last four books of the Laws, several questions occur for consideration: (I) the proportion of punishments to offences; (II) the nature of the voluntary and involuntary; (III) the arguments against atheism, and against the opinion that the Gods have no care of human affairs; (IV) the remarks upon retail trade and adulteration of goods; (V) the institution of the nocturnal council.

I. The weakest point in the Laws of Plato is the amount of inquisition into private life which is to be made by the rulers. The magistrate is always watching and waylaying the citizens. He is constantly to inform or to receive informations against improprieties of life. Plato does not seem to be aware that espionage can only have a negative effect. He has not yet discovered the boundary line which parts the domain of law from that of morality or social life. Men will not tell of one another; nor will he ever be deemed the most virtuous citizen, who gives the most frequent information about offenders to the magistrates.
INTRODUCTION.

As in some writers of fiction, so also in philosophers, we may observe the effect of age. Plato becomes more conservative as he grows older, and he would govern the world entirely by men like himself, who are above fifty years of age; for in them he hopes to find a principle of stability. He is like the old man (xi. 922 B, foll.) who insists that he shall 'tie up' his property after his death—all his efforts are directed towards maintaining the institutions of the legislator in after ages. But he does not observe that, in destroying the freedom he is destroying also the life of the State. While he differs from mere conservatives in his love of truth, he is impatient of the extravagances to which the love of truth almost necessarily leads. He seems to have forgotten what he once knew—that the wise man is sure to be in opposition to the rest of mankind; for some degree of eccentricity generally accompanies originality; as Democritus said, 'the philosopher, if we could see him, would appear to be a strange being.' In the Magnesian state all the citizens are to be reduced to rule and measure; there would have been none of those great men 'whose acquaintance is beyond all price;' and Plato would have found that in the worst-governed Hellenic State, there was more of a carrière ouverte for extraordinary genius and virtue than in his own. The first principle of Plato's laws, borrowed apparently from the Spartan military system, 'that no one is to be without a commander,' is literally that of the Jesuit order.

Plato's judicial system has several characteristic features. He has an evident dislike of the Athenian dicasteries, and prefers a few good judges who make pertinent remarks on the case, to a great number. He allows of numerous appeals—from the neighbours who are to judge because they know the circumstances, to the magistrates of the town; and from the magistrates of the town to the guardians of the law; in each case exacting a double penalty. Modern jurists would disapprove of the redress of injustice being purchased only at an increasing risk; though indirectly the burden of legal expenses, which seems to have been little felt among the ancients, has a similar effect. The love of litigation, which is a remnant of barbarism quite as much as a corruption of civilization, and was inherent in the Athenian people, is diminished in the new state by references to arbitration.

In the Laws the crime of murder, and indeed almost all offences, have a religious character; they are pollutions rather than crimes. Regarded from this point of view, the heinousness of offences is apt to depend on
accidental circumstances, such as the shedding of blood, and not on the real guilt or injury to society. They are measured by the horror which they arouse in a barbarous age. For there is a superstition in law as well as in religion, and the superstitious feelings of a primitive age have a traditional hold on the mass of the people. On the other hand, Plato is absolutely free from the crime of visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children, and he is quite aware that punishment has an eye to the future, and not to the past. Compared with that of most European nations in the last century his criminal code is reasonable and humane.

A defect in Plato's criminal jurisprudence, is his remission of the punishment when the offender has obtained the forgiveness of the murdered person; as if crime were a personal affair between individuals, and not an offence against the State. There is also a ridiculous disproportion in his punishments. Because a slave may fairly receive a blow for stealing a fig or a bunch of grapes, or a tradesman for defrauding to the amount of a drachma, that is no reason why a slave should receive as many blows as he has taken grapes or figs, or why a tradesman who has defrauded to the amount of a thousand drachmas should receive a thousand blows. The punishments to be inflicted on slaves are suggested by the cruelty of fear. Though Plato is aware that the distinction between Greeks and barbarians is due to Hellenic vanity, he is fully imbued with the Greek spirit about slavery. Yet he makes the acknowledgment, that many a one in the hour of danger has found a slave better to him than a son or a brother.

II. Before punishment can be inflicted at all, the legislator must determine the nature of the voluntary and involuntary. The great question of the freedom of the will, which in modern times has been worn threadbare with purely abstract discussion, was approached both by Plato and Aristotle—first, from the judicial; secondly, from the sophistical point of view. Their want of clearness in treating the subject is to be attributed to the difficulty which they experienced in disentangling the abstract from the concrete.

In attempting to distinguish between hurt and injury, Plato says that mere hurt is not injury; but that a benefit when done in a wrong spirit may sometimes injure, e.g. when conferred without regard to right and wrong, or to the good or evil consequences which may follow. He means to say that the good or evil disposition of the agent is the principle which characterizes actions; and this is not sufficiently
described by the terms voluntary and involuntary. You may hurt another involuntarily, and no one would suppose that you had injured him; and you may hurt him voluntarily, as in inflicting punishment—neither is this injury; but if you hurt him under the impulse of passion or desire, this is injury. In other words, injustice is the victory of desire or passion or self-conceit over reason, as justice is the subordination of them to reason. Plato is so far from allowing voluntary hurt to be injury, that he is disposed to affirm, in some paradoxical sense, all injustice to be involuntary; because no man would do injustice who could calculate the consequences of what he is doing. Yet, on the other hand, he admits that the distinction of voluntary and involuntary, taken in another and more obvious sense, is the basis of legislation. His conception of justice and injustice is complicated (1) by the want of a distinction between justice and virtue, that is to say, between the quality which primarily regards others, and the quality in which self and others are equally regarded; (2) by the confusion of doing and suffering justice; (3) by the unwillingness to renounce the old Socratic paradox, that evil is involuntary.

III. The Laws rest on a religious foundation; in this respect they bear the stamp of primitive legislation. They do not escape the almost inevitable consequence of making irreligion penal. If laws are based upon religion, the greatest offence against them must be irreligion. Hence the necessity for what in modern language, and according to a distinction which Plato would scarcely have understood, might be termed persecution. But the spirit of persecution in Plato, unlike that of modern religious bodies, arises out of the desire to enforce a true and simple form of religion, and is directed against the superstitions which tend to degrade mankind. Sir Thomas More, in his Utopia, is in favour of tolerating all except the intolerant, though he would not promote to high offices those who disbelieved in the existence of the soul after death. Plato has not advanced quite so far as this in the path of toleration. But in judging of his enlightenment, we must remember that the evils of necromancy and divination were far greater than those of intolerance in the ancient world. Human nature is always having recourse to the first; but only when organized into some form of priesthood falls into the other; although in primitive as in later ages the institution of a priesthood may claim probably to be an advance on some form of religion which preceded. The laws would, no doubt,
have rested on a sounder foundation, if Plato had ever distinctly realized to his mind the difference between crime and sin or vice. Of this, as of many other controversies, a clear definition might have been the end. But such a definition belongs to a later age of philosophy.

The arguments which Plato uses for the being of a God, have an extremely modern character: first, the consensus gentium; secondly, the argument which has already occurred in the Phaedrus, of the priority of the selfmoved.¹ The answer to the second class of objectors is, that God governs the world by general laws; but that he who takes care of the great will assuredly take care of the small. Plato did not feel, and has not attempted to consider, the difficulty of reconciling the special with the general providence of God. Yet he is unconsciously on the true road to the solution, when he regards the world as a whole, of which all the parts work together towards the final end.

We are surprised to find that the dangers of scepticism, which are supposed to exist among young men now, existed then (cp. Rep. vii. 538); that the Epicureanism expressed in the lines of Horace—

‘Namque Deos didici securum agere aevum,’

was already prevalent in the age of Plato; and that the terrors of another world were freely used in order to gain advantages over other men in this. The same objection which struck the Psalmist—‘Then saw I the wicked in great prosperity’—is supposed to lie at the root of the better sort of unbelief. And the answer is substantially the same which the modern theologian would offer:—that the ways of God in this world cannot be justified unless there be a future state of rewards and punishments. Yet this future state of rewards and punishments is not any addition of happiness or suffering imposed from without, but the permanence of good and evil in the soul: here Plato is in advance of many modern theologians.¹ The Greek, too, had his difficulty about the existence of evil, which in one solitary passage, remarkable for being inconsistent with his general system, Plato explains, after the Magian fashion, by a good and evil spirit (896 D; cp. Theact. 176 A, Polit. 269). This passage is also remarkable for being at variance with the general optimism of the Tenth Book—not ‘all things are ordered by God for the best,’ but some things by a good, others by an evil spirit.

The Tenth Book of the Laws presents a picture of the state of belief among the Greeks singularly like that of the world in which we live.
Plato is disposed to attribute the incredulity of his own age to several causes. First, to the bad effect of mythological tales, of which he still retains his disapproval; but he has a weak side for antiquity, and is unwilling, as in the Republic, wholly to proscribe them. Secondly, he remarks the self-conceit of a younger generation of philosophers, who declare that the sun, moon, and stars, are earth and stones only; and who also maintain that the Gods are made by the laws of the state. Thirdly, he notes a confusion in the minds of men arising out of their misinterpretation of the appearances of the world around them: they do not always see the righteous rewarded and the wicked punished. So in modern times there are some whose infidelity has arisen from doubts about the inspiration of ancient writings; others who have been made unbelievers by physical science, or again by the seemingly political character of religion; while there is a third class to whose minds the difficulty of 'justifying the ways of God to man' has been the chief stumblingblock. Plato is very much out of temper at the impiety of some of his contemporaries; yet he is determined to reason with the victims, as he regards them, of these illusions before he punishes them. His answer to the unbelievers is twofold: first, that the soul is prior to the body; secondly, that the ruler of the universe being perfect has made all things with a view to their perfection. If we compare the Gods with men at all, we must compare them not with the least but with the highest of human beings. The difficulties arising out of ancient sacred writings were far less serious in the age of Plato than in our own.

We too have our popular Epicureanism, which would allow the world to go on as if there were no God. When the belief in him, whether of ancient or modern times, begins to fade away, men relegate him either in theory or practice into a distant heaven. They do not like expressly to deny God when it is more convenient to forget him; and so the theory of the Epicurean becomes the practice of mankind in general. Nor can we be said to be free from that which Plato justly considers to be the worst unbelief—of those who put superstition in the place of true religion. For the larger half of Christians continue to assert that the justice of God may be turned aside by gifts, if not by the 'odour of fat, and the sacrifice steaming to heaven,' still by another kind of sacrifice placed upon the altar, and by masses for the quick and dead, by dispensations, by building churches, by rites and ceremonies—by the same means which the heathen used, taking other names and
shapes. And the indifference of Epicureanism and unbelief is in two ways the parent of superstition, partly because it permits, and also because it creates a necessity for its development in religious and enthusiastic temperaments. If men cannot have a rational belief, they will have an irrational. And hence the most superstitious countries are also at a certain point of civilization the most unbelieving, and the revolution which takes one direction is quickly followed by a reaction in the other. So we may read 'between the lines' ancient history and philosophy into modern, and modern into ancient. Whether we compare the theory of Greek philosophy with the Christian religion, or the practice of the Gentile world with the practice of the Christian world, they will be found to differ more in words and less in reality than we might have supposed. The greater opposition which is sometimes made between them seems to arise chiefly out of a comparison of the ideal of the one with the practice of the other.

To the errors of superstition and unbelief Plato opposes the simple and natural form of religion; the best and highest, whether in the form of a person or a principle, as the divine mind or the idea of God, is regarded by him as the true basis of human life. That all things are working together for good to the good and evil to the evil in this or in some other world to which human actions are transferred, is the sum of his faith or theology. Unlike Socrates, he is absolutely free from superstition. Religion and morality are one and indivisible to him. He nowhere speaks of omens or of sacrifices. He dislikes the 'heathen mythology,' which, as he significantly remarks, was not tolerated at Sparta. He gives no encouragement to individual enthusiasm; 'the establishment of religion could only be the work of a mighty intellect.' Like the Hebrews, he prohibits private rites; for the avoidance of superstition, he would transfer all worship of the Gods to the public temples. He would not have men and women consecrating the accidents of their good or bad fortune. He trusts to human punishments and not to divine judgments; though he is not unwilling to repeat the old tradition that certain kinds of dishonesty 'prevent a man from having a family.' He considers that the 'ages of faith' have passed away and cannot now be recalled. Yet he is far from wishing to extirpate the sentiment of religion, which he sees to be common to all mankind—Barbarians as well as Hellenes. He remarks that no one passes through life without, sooner or later, experiencing its power. To
which we may add the further remark that the greater the irreligion, the more violent has often been the religious reaction.

It is remarkable that Plato's account of mind at the end of the Laws goes beyond Anaxagoras, and beyond himself in any of his previous writings. Aristotle, in a well-known passage (Met. i. 3) which is an echo of the Phaedo (p. 97), remarks on the inconsistency of Anaxagoras in introducing the agency of mind, and yet having recourse also to the lesser agencies of material causes. But Plato makes the further criticism, that the error of Anaxagoras consisted not in denying the universal agency of mind, but in denying the priority, or, as we should say, the eternity of it. Yet in the Timaeus he had himself allowed that God made the world out of pre-existing materials: in the Politicus he says that there were seeds of evil in the world arising out of the remains of a former chaos which could not be got rid of; and even in the Tenth Book of the Laws he had admitted that there were two souls, a good and evil. In the Meno, the Phaedrus, and the Phaedo, he had spoken of the recovery of ideas from a former state of existence. But now he has attained to a clearer point of view: he has discarded these fancies. From meditating on the priority of the human soul to the body, he has learnt the nature of soul absolutely. The power of the best, of which he gave an intimation in the Phaedo and in the Republic, now, as in the Philebus, takes the form of an intelligence or person. He no longer, like Anaxagoras, supposes mind to be introduced at a certain time into the world and to give order to a pre-existing chaos, but to be prior to the chaos, everlasting and evermoving, and the source of order and intelligence in all things. This appears to be the last form of Plato's religious philosophy, which might almost be summed up in the words of Kant, 'the starry heaven above and the moral law within.' Or rather, perhaps, 'the starry heaven above and the harmony of mind in the world.'

IV. The remarks about retail trade, about adulteration, and about mendicity, have a very modern character. Greek social life was more like our own than we are apt to suppose. There was the same division of ranks, the same aristocratic and democratic feeling, the same preference for land and for agricultural pursuits. Plato may be claimed as the first free-trader, when he prohibits the imposition of customs on imports and exports, though he was clearly not aware of the importance of the principle which he enunciated. The discredit
of retail trade he attributes to the rogueries of traders, and is inclined to believe that if a nobleman would keep a shop, which heaven forbid! retail trade might become honourable. He has hardly lighted upon the true reason, which appears to be the essential distinction between buyers and sellers, the one being necessarily in some degree dependent on the other. When he proposes to fix prices ‘which would allow a moderate gain,’ and to regulate trade in several minute particulars, we must remember that this is by no means so absurd in a city consisting of 5040 citizens, in which almost every one would know and become known to everybody else, as in our own vast population. Among ourselves we are very far from allowing every man to charge what he pleases. Of many things the prices are fixed by law. Do we not often hear of wages being adjusted in proportion to the profits of employers? The objection to regulating them by law and thus avoiding the conflicts which continually arise between the buyers and sellers of labour, is not so much the undesirableness as the impossibility of doing so. Wherever free competition is not reconcileable either with the order of society, or, as in the case of adulteration with common honesty, the government may lawfully interfere. The only question is, Whether the interference will be effectual, and whether the evil of interference may not be greater than the evil which is prevented by it.

He would prohibit beggars, because in a well-ordered state no one will be allowed to starve. This again is a prohibition which might be easily enforced, for there is no difficulty in maintaining the poor when the population is small. Among modern nations the difficulty of pauperism is rendered far greater, (1) by the enormous numbers, (2) by the facility of locomotion, (3) by the increasing tenderness for human life and suffering. And the only way of meeting the difficulty seems to be by modern nations subdividing themselves into small bodies having local knowledge and acting together in the spirit of ancient communities.

V. Regarded as the framework of a polity the Laws are deemed by Plato to be a decline from the Republic, which is the dream of his earlier years. He nowhere imagines that he has reached a higher point of speculation. He is only descending to the level of human things, and he often returns to his original idea. His guardians of the law are not expected to have any special training; but he adds to them
a select body, who are supposed to retain the spirit of the legislator dwelling in them. These are the nocturnal council, who, although they are not trained in dialectic, must know the relation of the one to the many in virtue. Plato has been arguing throughout the Laws that temperance is higher than courage, peace than war, and that the love of both must enter into the character of the good citizen. And at the end the same thought is summed up by him in an abstract form. The true artist or guardian must be able to reduce the many to the one, than which, as he says with an enthusiasm worthy of the Phaedrus or Philebus, 'no more philosophical method was ever attained by the wit of man.' But the sense of unity in difference can only be acquired by study; and Plato does not explain to us the nature of this study, which we may reasonably infer, though there is a remarkable omission of the word, to be akin to the dialectics of the Republic.

The nocturnal council is to consist of the three citizens pre-eminent in virtue, and the ten eldest guardians of the law; each of whom is to elect for approval a younger coadjutor, making twenty-six in all. This council of twenty-six is not the administrative but the legislative body, who are to make legislation a study; they have an exceptional power, probably suggested by the power which a similar council exercised in the Pythagorean city of Crotona. And they are supposed to share in the education of the State, which is declared to be a great advantage; although Plato has provided no special training for them, alleging that he will not anticipate in detail the previous studies which experience may hereafter show to be best fitted for them.

The Laws of Plato contain the latest phase of his philosophy, showing in many respects an advance, and in others a decline, in his views of life and the world. ~His doctrine of ideas passed among his disciples into a theory of numbers, the nature of which we gather chiefly from the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Of the speculative side of this theory we find no traces in the Laws, but doubtless Plato found, or seemed to find, a wonderful confirmation of his arithmetical speculations in the possibility of applying number and measure to the revolution of the heavens, and to the regulation of human life. In this there appears to be rather a retrogression than an advance; for the most barren logical abstraction is of a higher nature than number and figure. Again, there is less enthusiasm for the higher education, which is now confined to the thirty-seven members of the council. The speculative truth which
was the food of the guardians in the Republic, is for the majority of the citizens restricted to practical truth. The law, which is the expression of mind written down, takes the place of the living word of the philosopher. (Compare the contrast of Phaedrus 275 E, and Laws x. 891 A; also the plays on the words νοές νόμος νοῦ διανοή;) The State is based on virtue and religion rather than on knowledge; and virtue is no longer identified with knowledge, being of the commoner sort, and spoken of in the sense generally understood. Yet there are many traces of advance as well as retrogression in the Laws of Plato. The attempt to reconcile the ideal with actual life is an advance; to 'have brought philosophy down from heaven to earth,' is a praise which may be justly claimed for him as well as for his master Socrates. And the nocturnal council are to continue students of the 'one in many' and of the nature of God.

Plato's increasing appreciation of the difficulties of human affairs, and of the element of chance which so largely influences them, is an indication not of a narrower, but of a more matured mind, which had become more conversant with realities. Nor can we fairly attribute any want of originality to him, because he has borrowed many of his provisions from Sparta and Athens. He has freely intermingled the spirit of the one with the laws of the other, while in many points he has departed equally from both. The praise of obedience, the authority assigned to elders, the prohibition of dowries, the enforcement of marriage, the common meals, the distribution and inalienability of land, the institution of the Crypteia, the freedom of bequest to a favourite son, the dislike of city walls,—all reflect the customs of Sparta. In one or two points he seems to prefer the form which the Dorian institutions had assumed in Crete. The syssitia are to be maintained at the public expense, and the produce of the land to be divided in fixed proportions, which Aristotle (Polit. ii. 7, 4) declares to have been the custom in Crete. Plato denounces the Spartan practice of expelling strangers; he condemns the licentiousness of their women; also their preference of war to peace, and of gymnastic exercises to music, which was characteristic of Cretans as well as Lacedaemonians, while he raises his voice against the unnatural vices allowed by public opinion to exist in both states.

The use of the lot, the scrutiny of the magistrates, the monthly courses of the council, the election of the generals, the pardon of the forgiven
homicide, most of the regulations about testaments and the guardianship of orphans, the degrees of consanguinity recognised by law, correspond with Athenian laws and customs. (Cp. Hermann, 'De Vestigiis Institutorum veterum per Platonis de Legibus libros indagandis.') But there seems to be little which we can add with certainty from the Laws of Plato to our knowledge either of Athenian or Spartan institutions. Only the proposed division of land in the city of the Magnetes affords a strong reason for supposing that a similar institution already existed at Sparta, which of late years has been doubted by Mr. Grote and others. Though Plato is smitten with some features of government which he finds in Egypt, and especially with the immutability of their laws, which he vainly hopes to create in the ever-changing minds of his own countrymen, the Laws, like the Republic, and unlike the Cyropedia of Xenophon, are in spirit essentially Greek. They are the correction of the laws of Lycurgus and Solon; in the phraseology of modern times they may also be said to form a code or digest of them. They contain some enactments, as for example the refusal of credit, borrowed from Charondas; and other provisions which at first sight appear singular are probably taken from other ancient legislators. They do not rest, like the lost Politics of Aristotle, on an analysis of three hundred constitutions; but Plato makes good use of three. And although he falls short of Aristotle in the observation of facts, he is superior to him in some other respects, and in two especially: (1) the attempt to raise the female sex by education, and (2) to base politics on morals and religion.

Thus we have arrived at the end of the writings of Plato, and at the last stage of philosophy which was really his. For in what followed, which we chiefly gather from the uncertain intimations of Aristotle, the spirit of the master no longer survived. The doctrine of ideas passed into one of numbers—instead of advancing from the abstract to the concrete, the theories of Plato were taken out of their context, and either asserted or refuted with a provoking literalism; the Socratic or Platonic element in his teaching was absorbed into the Megarian or Pythagorean; his poetry was converted into mysticism; his unsubstantial visions were assailed secundum artem by the rules of logic. His political speculations lost their interest when the freedom of Hellas had passed away. Of all his writings the Laws were the furthest removed from the traditions
of the Platonic school in the next generation. Both his political and his 
metaphysical philosophy are for the most part misinterpreted by Aristotle. 
The best of him—his love of truth, and his 'contemplation of all time 
and all existence,' was soonest lost; and some of his greatest thoughts 
have slept in the ear of mankind almost ever since they were first uttered. 

We have followed him during his forty or fifty years of authorship, 
from the beginning when he first attempted to depict the teaching of 
Socrates in a dramatic form, down to the time at which the character 
of Socrates had disappeared, and we have the latest reflections of Plato's 
own mind upon Hellas and the world. He, who was 'the last of the 
poets,' in his book of Laws writes prose only; he has himself fallen 
under the rhetorical influences which in his earlier dialogues he was 
combating. The progress of his writings is also the history of his life; 
for we have no other authentic life of him. The great effort which he 
makes is first to realize abstractions, and secondly to connect them. 
In the attempt to realize them, he was carried into a transcendental 
region in which he isolated them from experience, and we pass out 
of the range of science into poetry or fiction. The fancies of mythology 
for a time cast a veil over the gulf which divides phenomena from 
ona. In his return to earth Plato meets with a difficulty which has 
long ceased to be a difficulty to us. He cannot understand how these 
obstinate, unmanageable ideas, residing alone in their heaven of 
abstraction can be either combined with one another, or adapted to 
phenomena. That which is the most familiar process of our own 
minds, to him appeared to be the crowning achievement of the dialectical 
art. For by his conquests in the world of mind not only are our 
thoughts widened, but he has furnished us with the instruments of 
thought. We have endeavoured to see him as he truly was, a great 
original genius struggling with unequal conditions of knowledge, not 
prepared with a system nor evolving in a series of dialogues ideas which 
he had long conceived, but inconsistent, contradictory, enquiring as 
he goes along, following the argument from one point of view only, and 
therefore arriving at opposite conclusions, hovering around the light, and 
sometimes dazzled with excess of light, but always moving in the same 
element of ideal truth. We have seen him also in his decline, when 
the wings of his imagination have begun to droop, but his experience 
of life remains, and he turns away from the contemplation of the 
eternal to take a last sad look at human affairs.
LAWS.

BOOK I.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

Megillus, a Lacedaemonian.

Athenian Stranger.  Tell me, Strangers, is God or man supposed to be the author of your laws?

Cleinias.  God, Stranger; nothing truer can be said of them than that they are the work of God: among us Cretans the author of them has been supposed to have been Zeus, but in Lacedaemon, as our Lacedaemonian friend will tell you, they say that Apollo is their lawgiver.

Megillus.  Just so.

Ath.  And do you believe, as Homer says, that Minos went every ninth year to converse with his Olympian sire, and was inspired by him to make laws for your cities?

Cle.  Yes, that is our tradition; and there was Rhadamanthus, a brother of his, with whose name you are familiar; he also is reputed to have been the justest of men, and we Cretans are of opinion that he derived his reputation from his righteous administration of justice when he was alive.

Ath.  Yes, and a noble reputation too, and worthy of a son of Zeus.  As you and Megillus have been trained in these institutions, I dare say that you will not be unwilling to give an account of your government and laws; on our way we can pass the time pleasantly in talking about them, for I am told that the distance from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus is considerable; and doubtless there are shady places under
the lofty trees, which will protect us from this scorching sun. Being no longer young, we may often stop to rest beneath them, and so beguile the walk by conversation.

Cle. Yes, Stranger, and if we proceed onward we shall come to groves of cypresses, which are of rare height and beauty, and there are green pastures, in which we may repose and converse.

Ath. Very good.

Cle. Yes, very good, and better still when we see them; let us move on cheerily.

Ath. I am willing.—And first, I want to know why the law has ordained that you shall have common meals and gymnastic exercises, and wear arms.

Cle. I think, Stranger, that the aim of our institutions is easily intelligible to any one. Look at the character of our country: Crete is not like Thessaly, a large plain; and for this reason they have horses there, and we have runners on foot here—the inequality of the ground in our country is more adapted to locomotion on foot; but then, if you have runners you must have light arms,—no one can run carrying a heavy weight, and the lightness of bows and arrows is convenient for running. Now all these regulations have been made with a view to war, and the legislator appears to me to have looked to war in all his arrangements; and the common meals, if I am not mistaken, were instituted by him for a similar reason, because he saw that while they are in the field the citizens are compelled to take their meals together for the sake of mutual protection. He seems to me to have thought the world foolish in not understanding that all men are always going to war with one another; and if in time of war there ought to be common meals under military authority, having regular guards for the sake of defence, they should be continued in peace; for what men in general term peace is, as he said, only a name; in reality every city is in a natural state of war with every other, not indeed proclaimed by heralds, but everlasting. And if you observe, you will find that this was the intention of the Cretan legislator; all institutions, private as well as public, were arranged by him with a view to war; and he gave his laws to be observed with this intent, because he thought that all possessions or
institutions ceased to be of any value if a man was defeated in war; for all the good things of the conquered pass into the hands of the conquerors.

_Ath._ You appear to me, Stranger, to have been thoroughly trained in the Cretan institutions, and to be well informed about them; will you tell me a little more explicitly what is the principle of government which you would lay down? You seem to imagine that a state ought to be so ordered as to conquer all other states in war: am I right in supposing this?

_Cle._ Certainly; and my Lacedaemonian friend also, if I am not mistaken, will say the same.

_Meg._ Why, my good friend, how could any Lacedaemonian say anything else?

_Ath._ And does what you are saying apply only to states, or also to villages?

_Cle._ To both alike.

_Ath._ The case is the same?

_Cle._ Yes.

_Ath._ And in the village will there be the same war of family against family, and of individual against individual?

_Cle._ The same.

_Ath._ And are we to conceive each man as warring against himself: or how is that to be?

_Cle._ O Athenian Stranger, inhabitant of Attica I will not call you, who seem to me worthy to be named after the goddess Athene, because you go back to first principles; you from the light which you have thrown upon the argument, will more readily recognise the truth of my assertion, when I said just now that all men are the enemies of all other men, both in public and private, and every individual of himself.

_Ath._ My good sir, what do you mean?

_Cle._ I mean what I say; and, further, that there is a victory and defeat,—the first and best of victories, the lowest and worst of defeats,—which each man gains or sustains at the hands, not of another, but of himself; this shows that there is a war against ourselves going on in every one of us.

_Ath._ Let us now reverse the order of the argument: Seeing that every individual is either his own superior or his own
inferior, may we say that there is the same principle in the house, the village, and the state?

_Cle._ You mean that in each of them there is a principle of superiority or inferiority to self?

_Ath._ Yes.

_Cle._ You are quite right in asking that question, for there certainly is such a principle, and above all in states; and the state in which the better citizens win a victory over the mob and over the inferior classes, may be truly said to be better than itself, and may be justly praised, where the victory is gained, or censured in the opposite case.

_Ath._ Whether the better is ever really conquered by the worse, is a question which requires more discussion, and may be therefore left for the present. But I quite understand your meaning when you say that citizens who are of the same race and live in the same cities, may unjustly conspire, and having the superiority in numbers may overcome and enslave the few just; and when they prevail, the state may be truly called its own inferior and therefore bad; and when they are defeated, superior and therefore good.

_Cle._ Your remark, Stranger, is very singular, and yet must be admitted to be true.

_Ath._ Here is another case for consideration;—in a family there may be several brothers, who are the offspring of a single pair; very possibly the majority of them may be unjust, and the just may be in a minority.

_Cle._ Very possibly.

_Ath._ And you and I ought not to raise a question of words as to whether this family and household are rightly said to be superior when they conquer, and inferior when they are conquered; for we are not considering what may or may not be the proper or customary way of speaking, but we are considering the natural principles of right and wrong in laws.

_Cle._ That, Stranger, is most true.

_Meg._ Excellent, I say, in my opinion too, as far as we have gone.

_Ath._ Again; might there not be a judge over these brethren, of whom we were speaking?

_Cle._ Certainly.
Atth. Now, which would be the better judge,—one who destroyed the bad and required the good to govern themselves; or one who, while allowing the good to govern, let the bad live, and made them voluntarily submit? Or lastly, there might be a third excellent judge, who, finding the family distracted, not only did not destroy any one, but reconciled them to one another for ever after, and gave them laws which they mutually observed, and was able to keep them friends.

Cle. The last would be by far the best sort of judge and legislator.

Atth. And yet the aim of all the laws which he gave would be the reverse of war.

Cle. Very true.

Atth. And will he who constitutes the state and orders the life of man have in view external war, or that sort of intestine war called civil, which no one, if he could prevent, would like to have occurring in his own state; and when occurring, every one would wish to get rid of as soon as possible.

Cle. He would have the latter chiefly in view.

Atth. And would he prefer that war should be terminated by the destruction of one of the parties, and by the conquest of the other, or that peace and friendship should be re-established among them; for then they would be able to give undivided attention to their foreign enemies?

Cle. Every one would desire the latter in the case of his own state.

Atth. And would not that also be the desire of the legislator?

Cle. Certainly.

Atth. And would not every one always make laws for the sake of the best?

Cle. To be sure.

Atth. But war, whether external or civil, is not the best, and the need of either is to be deprecated; but peace with one another, and good will, are best. Nor is the victory of the state over itself to be regarded as a really good thing, but as a necessity; a man might as well say that the body was in the best state when sick and purged by medicine, forgetting that there is also a state of the body which needs no purge. And in like manner no one can be a true statesman, whether he aims at
the happiness of the individual or state, who looks only, or first of all, to external warfare; nor will he ever be a sound legislator who orders peace for the sake of war, and not war for the sake of peace.

Cle. I suppose that there is truth, Stranger, in that remark of yours; and yet I am greatly mistaken if war is not the entire aim and object of our institutions, and also of the Lacedaemonians.

Ath. I dare say; but there is no reason why we should rudely quarrel with one another about your legislators, instead of gently questioning them, seeing that they as well as ourselves are quite in earnest. Let me take you with me; and first we will summon Tyrtaeus, who was an Athenian by birth, and also a Spartan citizen, and who of all men was most eager about war. 'Well,' he says,

'I sing not, I care not, about any man, even if he were the richest of men, and possessed every good (and then he gives a list of them), unless he be the bravest in war.' I imagine that you, too, must have heard his poems; our Lacedaemonian friend has probably heard too much of them.

Meg. Very true.

Cle. And they have found their way from Lacedaemon to Crete.

Ath. Come now and let us all join in asking this question of Tyrtaeus: O most divine poet, we will say to him, the excellent praise which you have bestowed on those who excel in war sufficiently proves that you are wise and good, and I and Megillus and Cleinias of Cnosus do, as I believe, entirely agree with you. But we should like to be quite sure that we are speaking of the same men; tell us, then, do you agree with us in thinking that there are two kinds of war; or what would you say? A far inferior man to Tyrtaeus would have no difficulty in replying quite truly, that there are two kinds of war,—one which is universally called civil war, and is, as we were just now saying, of all wars the worst; the other, as we should all admit, in which we fall out with other nations who are of a different race, is a far milder form of warfare.

Cle. Certainly, far milder.

Ath. Well, now, when you praise and blame war in this high-
flown strain, whom are you praising or blaming, and to which kind of war are you referring? I suppose that you must mean foreign war, if I am to judge from expressions of yours in which you say that you abominate those

‘Who refuse to look upon fields of blood, and will not draw near and strike at their enemies.’

And we shall naturally go on to say to him,—You, Tyrtaeus, certainly appear to praise those who distinguish themselves in external and foreign war; and he must admit this.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. They are good; but we say that there are still better men whose virtue is displayed in the greatest of all battles. And we too have a poet whom we summon as a witness, Theognis, citizen of Megara in Sicily, who says:—

‘Cyrnus,’ he says, ‘he who is faithful in a civil broil is worth his weight in gold and silver.’

And such an one is far better, as we affirm, than the other in a more difficult kind of war, much in the same degree as justice and temperance and wisdom, when united with courage, are better than courage only; for a man cannot be faithful and good in civil strife without having all virtue. But in the war of which Tyrtaeus speaks, many a mercenary soldier will take his stand and be ready to die at his post, and yet they are generally and almost without exception insolent, unjust, violent men, and the most senseless of human beings. You will ask what the conclusion is, and what I am seeking to prove: I maintain that the divine legislator of Crete, like any other who is worthy of consideration, will always in making laws have regard to the greatest virtue; which, according to Theognis, is loyalty in the hour of danger, and may be truly called perfect justice. Whereas, that virtue which Tyrtaeus highly praises is well enough, and was sung of by the poet in the hour of need, yet in place and dignity may be said to be only fourth-rate.

Cle. Stranger, we are degrading our inspired lawgiver to a very low rank in the scale of legislators.

Ath. Nay, I think that we degrade not him but ourselves, if we imagine that Lycurgus and Minos laid down laws both in Lacedaemon and Crete mainly with a view to war.
Cle. What ought we to say then?

Ath. What truth and what justice require of us, if I am not mistaken, when speaking in behalf of divine excellence,—that the legislator when making his laws had in view not a part only, and this the lowest part of virtue, but all virtue, and that he devised classes of laws answering to the kinds of virtue; not in the way in which modern inventors of laws make the classes, for they only investigate and offer laws of which the want is being felt, and one man has a class of laws about inheritances in part or sole, another about assault; others about ten thousand other matters of a similar nature. But we say that the right way of enquiry is to proceed as we have now done, and I admired the spirit of your exposition; for you are quite right in beginning with virtue, and saying that this was the aim of the giver of the law, but I thought that you went wrong when you added that he referred all to a part, and a most inferior part of virtue, and my subsequent observations had a bearing on this. Will you allow me then to explain how I should have liked to have heard you expound the matter?

Cle. By all means.

Ath. You ought to have said, Stranger,—The Cretan laws are with good reason famous among the Hellenes; for they fulfil the object of laws, which is to make those who use them happy, for all goods are derived from them. Now goods are of two kinds: there are human and there are divine goods, and the human hang upon the divine; and the state which attains the greater, at the same time acquires the less, or not having the greater loses both. Of the lesser goods the first is health, the second beauty, the third strength, including swiftness in running and bodily agility generally, and the fourth is wealth, not the blind god [Pluto], but one who is keen of sight, because he has wisdom for his companion. For wisdom is chief and leader of the divine class of goods, and next follows temperance; and from the union of these two with courage springs justice, and fourth in the scale of virtue is courage. The four naturally take precedence of the other goods, and this is the order in which the legislator must place them, and after them he will enjoin the rest of his ordinances on the citizens having a view to these, the human looking to the divine, and the divine looking to their leader mind. Some
of his ordinances will relate to contracts of marriage, which they make one with another, and to the procreation and education of children, both male and female; the duty of the lawgiver will be to take charge of his citizens, in youth and age, and at every time of life, and to give them punishments and rewards; and in reference to all their intercourse with one another, he ought to consider their pains and pleasures and desires, and the vehemence of all their passions; he should keep a watch over them, and blame and praise them rightly by the mouth of the laws themselves. Also with regard to anger and terror, and the other perturbations of the soul, which arise out of misfortune, and the deliverances from them which prosperity brings, and the experiences which come to men in diseases, or in war, or poverty, or the opposite of these; in all these states he should determine what is the good and evil of the condition of each. In the next place, the legislator has to watch over the property and expenditure of the citizens, and their mutual contracts and cessations of contracts, whether voluntary or involuntary: he should see how they order all this, and consider among whom justice as well as injustice is found or is wanting; and honour those who obey the law, and impose fixed penalties on those who disobey, until the round of civil life is ended, and the time has come for the consideration of the proper funeral rites and honours of the dead. And the lawgiver reviewing his work, will appoint guardians to preside over these things,—some who walk by intelligence, others by true opinion only, and then mind will bind together all his ordinances and show them to be in harmony with temperance and justice, and not with wealth or ambition. This is the spirit, Stranger, in which I was and am desirous that you should pursue the subject. And I want to know how all these matters are, and are arranged in the laws of Zeus, as they are termed, and in those of the Pythian Apollo which Minos and Lycurgus gave; and how the order of them is discovered to his eyes, who has experience and skill in laws, although they are far from being self-evident to the rest of mankind like ourselves.

Cle. How shall we proceed, Stranger?

Ath. I think that we must begin again as before, and first discuss the habit of courage; afterwards we will go through
the other forms of virtue, if you please. Then we shall have a model of the whole; and with these and similar discourses we will beguile the way. And when we have gone through all the virtues, we will show, by the grace of God, that what has preceded has relation to virtue.

Meg. Very good; and suppose that you first criticise this praiser of Zeus and the laws of Crete.

Ath. I will try to criticise you and myself, as well as him, for we are all concerned in the argument. Tell me,—were not the common meals, and secondly the gymnasia, invented by your legislator with a view to war?

Meg. Yes.

Ath. And what comes third, and what fourth, in the order of your legislation? For that, I think, is the sort of enumeration which ought to be made of the parts of virtue, no matter whether you call them parts or what their name is, provided the meaning is clear.

Meg. Then I, or any other Lacedaemonian, would reply that hunting is third in order.

Ath. Let us see if we can discover what comes fourth and fifth.

Meg. I think that I can get as far as the fourth head, which is the frequent endurance of pain, exhibited by them in certain hand-to-hand fights; also in stealing with the prospect of getting a beating; there is, too, the so-called Crypteia, or secret service, in which wonderful endurance is shown,—they wander over the whole country by day and by night, and even in winter have not any shoes on their feet, and are without beds to lie upon, and have no one to attend them. Marvellous, too, is the endurance which our citizens show in their gymnastic exercises, contending against the violent summer heat; and there are many similar practices, to speak of which in detail would be endless.

Ath. Excellent, O Lacedaemonian stranger. But how ought we to define courage? Is that to be regarded only as a combat against fears and pains, or also against desires and pleasures, and against flatteries; which exercise such a tremendous power, that they make the hearts even of respectable citizens to melt like wax?

Meg. I should say the latter.
In what preceded, as you well remember, our Cnosian friends spoke of a man or a city being inferior to themselves?

Cle. I did so.

Ath. Now, which is in the truest sense inferior, the man who is overcome by pleasure or by pain?

Cle. I should say the man who is overcome by pleasure; for all men deem him to be inferior in a more disgraceful sense, than the other who is overcome by pain.

Ath. But surely the lawgivers of Crete and Lacedaemon have not legislated for a courage which is lame of one leg, able only to meet attacks which come from the left, but impotent against the insidious flatteries which come from the right?

Cle. Able to meet both, I should say.

Ath. Then let me once more ask, what institutions have you in either of your states which give a taste of pleasures, and do not avoid them any more than they avoid pains; but which set a person in the midst of them, and compel or induce him by motives of honour to get the better of them? Where is an ordinance about pleasure similar to that about pain to be found in your laws? Tell me what there is of this nature among you:—What is there which makes your citizen equally brave against pleasure and pain, conquering what they ought to conquer, and superior to the enemies who are most dangerous and nearest home?

Meg. I was able to tell you, Stranger, many laws which were directed against pain; but I do not know that I can point out any great or obvious examples of similar institutions which are concerned with pleasure; there are some lesser parts of laws, however, which I might mention.

Cle. No more can I show anything of that sort which is at all prominent in the Cretan laws.

Ath. No wonder, my dear friends; and if, as is very likely, in our search after the true and good, one of us may have to censure the laws of the others, we must not take offence, but be gentle to one another.

Cle. You are quite right, Athenian Stranger, and we will do as you say.

Ath. At our time of life, Cleinias. there should be no feeling of irritation.
Certainly not.

I will not at present determine whether he who censures the Cretan or Lacedaemonian polities is right or wrong. But I believe that I can tell better than either of you what the many say about them. For assuming that you have reasonably good laws, one of the best of them will be a law forbidding any young men to enquire which of them are right or wrong; but with one mouth and one voice, they must all agree that the laws are all good and of divine origin; and any one who says the contrary is not to be listened to. But an old man who remarks any defect, may communicate his observation to a ruler or to an equal when no young man is present.

Exactly so, Stranger; and like a diviner, although not there at the time, you seem to me quite to have hit the meaning of the legislator, and to say what is most true.

As there are no young men present, and the legislator has given old men free licence, there will be no impropriety in our discussing these matters now that we are alone.

True. And therefore you may be as free as you like in your censure of our laws, for there is no discredit in knowing what is wrong; he who receives what is said in a generous and friendly spirit will be the better for it.

Very good; however, I am not going to censure your laws until to the best of my ability I have examined them, but I am going to raise doubts about them. For you are the only people known to us, whether Greek or barbarian, whom the legislator commanded to eschew all great pleasures and amusements; whereas in the matter of pains or fears which we have just been discussing, he thought that they who from infancy had always avoided the pains and fears and sorrows which must be, when they were compelled to face them would run away from those who were hardened in them and become their subjects. Now the legislator ought to have considered that this was equally true of pleasure; he should have said to himself, that if our citizens are from their youth upward unacquainted with the greatest pleasure, and unused to endure amid the temptations of pleasure, and are not disciplined to refrain from all things evil, the sweet feeling of pleasure will overcome them just as fear would overcome the former class; and in
another, and even a worse manner, they will be the servants of those who are able to endure amid pleasures, and have had the opportunity of enjoying them, they being often the worst of mankind. One half of their souls will be a slave, the other half free; and they will not be worthy to be called in the true sense men and freemen. Tell me whether you assent to my words?

Cle. On first hearing, what you say appears to be the truth; but to be hasty in coming to a conclusion about such important matters, would be very childish and simple.

Ath. Suppose, Cleinias and Megillus, that we consider the virtue which follows next of those which we intended to discuss (for after courage comes temperance), what institutions shall we find in our three states about temperance, which like our military institutions we call those of other ordinary states.

Meg. That is not an easy question to answer; still I should say that the common meals and gymnastic exercises have been excellently devised for the promotion both of temperance and courage.

Ath. There seems to be a difficulty, Stranger, in so ordering acts and words in politics, that there should be no dispute about them. As in the human body, the manner of life which does good in one way does harm in another; and we can hardly say that any one course of treatment is adapted to a particular constitution. Now the gymnasia and common meals do a great deal of good, and yet they are a source of evil in civil troubles; as is shown in the case of Milesian, and Boeotian, and Thurian youth, among whom these institutions seem always to have had a tendency to degrade the ancient and natural custom of love below the level, not only of man, but of the beasts. The charge may be fairly brought against your cities above all others, and is true in general of states which especially cultivate gymnastics. Whether such matters are to be regarded jestingly or seriously, I think that the pleasure is to be deemed natural which arises out of the intercourse with men and women; but that the intercourse of men with men, or of women with women, is contrary to nature, and that the bold attempt was originally due to unbridled lust. The Cretans are always accused of having invented the story of Ganymede and Zeus because they
wanted to justify themselves in the enjoyment of unnatural pleasures by the practice of the god whom they believe to have been their lawgiver. Leaving the story, we may observe that any speculation about laws turns almost entirely on pleasure and pain, both in states and in private characters: these are two fountains which nature lets flow, and he who draws from them where and when, and as much as he ought, is happy; and this holds of men and animals—of individuals as well as states; and he who indulges in them ignorantly and in excess, is the reverse of happy.

Meg. I admit, Stranger, that your words are well spoken: at the same time, I hardly know what to say, and I still think that the Spartan lawgiver was quite right in forbidding pleasure. Of the Cretan laws, I shall leave the defence to my Cnosian friend. But the laws of Sparta, in as far as they relate to pleasure, 65 appear to me to be the best in the world; for that which leads mankind in general into the wildest pleasure and licence, and every other folly, the law has clean driven out; and neither in the country nor in towns which are under the control of Sparta, will you find revelries and the many incitements of every kind of pleasure which accompany them; and any one who meets a drunken and disorderly person, will immediately have him most severely punished, and will not let him off on any pretence, not even at the time of a Dionysiac festival; although I have remarked that this may happen at your performances 'on the cart,' as they are called; and among our Tarentine colonists I have seen the whole city drunk at a Dionysiac festival; but nothing of the sort happens among us.

Ath. O Lacedaemonian Stranger, these festivities are praiseworthy where there is a spirit of endurance, but are very senseless when they are under no regulations. In order to retaliate, an Athenian has only to point out the licence which exists among your women. To all such accusations, whether they are brought against the Tarentines, or us, or you, there is one answer which exonerates the practice in question from impropriety. When a stranger expresses wonder at the singularity of what he sees, any inhabitant will naturally answer him:—Wonder not, O stranger; this is our custom, and you may very likely have some other custom about the same things.
Now we are speaking, my friends, not about men in general, but about the merits and defects of the lawgivers themselves. Let us then discourse a little more at length about them, and about the nature of intoxication at large, which is a very important matter, and will seriously task the discrimination of the legislator. I am not talking of the mere practice of drinking or not drinking wine in general, but about downright intoxication: are we to follow the custom of the Scythians, and Persians, and Carthaginians, and Celts, and Iberians, who are all warlike nations, or, that of your countrymen, who, as you say, wholly abstain? Whereas the Scythians and Thracians, both men and women, drink unmixed wine, which they also pour on their garments, and this they think a happy and glorious institution. The Persians again, are much given to other practices of luxury which you reject, but they have more moderation in them than the Thracians and Scythians.

Meg. O best of men, we have only to take arms into our hands, and we drive all these nations flying before us.

Ath. Nay, my good friend, do not say that; there have been, as there always will be, flyings and pursuings of which no account can be given, and therefore we cannot say that victory or defeat in battle afford more than a doubtful proof of the goodness or badness of institutions. For when the greater states conquer and enslave the lesser, as the Syracusans have done the Locrians, who appear to be the best-governed people in their part of the world, or as the Athenians have done the Ceans (and there are ten thousand other instances of the same sort of thing), all that is not to the point; let us endeavour rather to form a conclusion about the various institutions themselves, and say nothing, at present, of victories and defeats. Let us only say that such a custom is honourable, and the other not. And first permit me to tell you how good and bad are to be estimated in reference to these very matters.

Meg. How do you mean?

Ath. All those who are ready at a moment's notice to praise or censure any practice which is matter of discussion, seem to me to proceed in a wrong way. Let me give you an illustration of what I mean:—You may suppose a person to be praising wheat as a good sort of food, whereupon another person instantly
blames wheat, without ever enquiring into its effect or use, or in what way, or to whom, or with what, or in what state, wheat is to be applied. And that is just what we are doing in this discussion. At the very mention of the word intoxication, one side is ready with their praises and the other with their censures, and this is absurd. For either side adduce their witnesses and approvers, and some of us think that we speak with authority because we have many witnesses; and others because they see those who abstain conquering in battle, and this again is disputed by us. Now I cannot say that I approve of such a method of discussing laws. And about this very point of intoxication I should like to speak in another way, which I hold to be the right one; for if number is to be the criterion, are there not myriads upon myriads of nations ready to dispute the point with you who are only two cities?

Meg. I shall gladly welcome any method of enquiry which is right.

Ath. Let me put the matter thus:—Suppose a person to praise the keeping of goats, and the creatures themselves as capital things to have, and then some one who had seen goats feeding without a goatherd in cultivated spots, and doing mischief, was to censure a goat or any other animal who has no keeper, or a bad keeper, would there be any sense or justice in such censure?

Meg. Certainly not.

Ath. Does a captain require only to have nautical knowledge in order to be a good captain, whether he is or is not sea-sick? What do you say?

Meg. I say that he is not a good captain if he is liable to sickness.

Ath. And what would you say of the commander of an army? Will he be able to command merely because he has military skill if he be a coward, who, when danger comes, is sick and drunk with fear?

Meg. Impossible.

Ath. And what if besides being a coward he have no skill?

Meg. He is a miserable fellow, who is only fit to be a commander of old women.

Ath. And what would you say of some one who blames or
praises any sort of meeting which is intended by nature to have a ruler, and is well enough when under his presidency? The critic, however, has never seen the society meeting together at an orderly feast under the control of a president, but always without a ruler or with a bad one:—when observers of this class praise or blame such meetings is what they say of any value?

Meg. Certainly not, if they have never seen or been present at such a meeting when rightly ordered.

Ath. But think; may not banqueters and banquets be said to constitute a sort of meeting?

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. And did any one ever see this convivial meeting rightly ordered? Of course you two will answer at once that you have never seen them at all, because they are not customary or lawful in your country; but I have come across many of them in many different places, and moreover I have made enquiries about them wherever I went, as I may say, and never did I see or hear of anything of the sort which was carried on altogether rightly; in some few particulars they might be right, but in general they were utterly wrong.

Cle. What do you mean, Stranger, by this remark? Explain. For we, as you say, from our inexperience in such matters, might very likely not know, even if we came in their way, what was right or wrong in such societies.

Ath. Likely enough; then let me try to be your instructor: you would acknowledge, would you not, that in all gatherings of mankind, of whatever sort, there ought to be a leader?

Cle. Certainly I should.

Ath. And we were saying just now, that when men are at war the leader ought to be a brave man?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. The brave man is less likely than the coward to be disturbed by fears?

Cle. That is also true.

Ath. And if there were a possibility of having a general of an army who was absolutely fearless and imperturbable, should we not by all means appoint him?

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. Now, however, we are speaking not of a general who is
to command an army, when foe meets foe in time of war, but of one who is to regulate meetings of another sort, when friend meets friend in time of peace.

*Cle.* True.

*Ath.* And that sort of meeting, if attended with drunkenness, is apt to be unquiet.

*Cle.* Certainly; the reverse of quiet.

*Ath.* In the first place, then, the revellers as well as the soldiers will require a ruler.

*Cle.* To be sure; no men more so.

*Ath.* And we ought, if possible, to provide them such a quiet ruler?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And he should be a man who understands society; for his duty is to preserve the friendly feelings which exist among the company at the time, and to increase them for the future by his use of the occasion.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* Must we not appoint a sober man and a wise to be our master of the revels? For if the ruler of drinkers be himself young and drunken, and not over-wise, only by some special good fortune will he be saved from doing some great evil.

*Cle.* It will be by a singular good fortune that he is saved.

*Ath.* Now suppose such associations to be framed in the best way possible in states, and that some one blames the very fact of their existence—he may very likely be right. But if he blames a practice which he only sees very much mismanaged, he shows clearly that he is not aware of the mismanagement, and also not aware that everything done in this way will turn out to be wrong, because done without the superintendence of a sober ruler. Do you not see that a drunken pilot or a drunken ruler of any sort will ruin ship, chariot, army—anything, in short, of which he has the direction?

*Cle.* The last remark is very true, Stranger; and I see quite clearly the advantage of an army having a good leader—he will give victory in war to his followers, which is a very great advantage, and so of other things. But I do not see any similar advantage which either individuals or states gain from the good management of a feast; and I want you to tell me
what great good will be effected, supposing that this drinking ordinance is duly established.

Ath. If you mean to ask what great good accrues to the state from the right training of a single youth, or of a single chorus,—when the question is put in that form, we cannot deny that the good is not very great in any particular instance. But if you ask what is the good of education in general, the answer is easy—that education makes good men, and that good men act nobly, and conquer their enemies in battle, because they are good. Education certainly gives victory, although victory sometimes produces forgetfulness of education; for many have grown insolent from victory in war, and this insolence has engendered in them innumerable evils; and many a victory has been and will be suicidal to the victors; but education is never suicidal.

Cle. You seem to imply, my friend, that convivial meetings, when rightly ordered, are an important element of education.

Ath. Certainly I do.

Cle. And can you show that what you have been saying is true?

Ath. To be absolutely sure of the truth of matters concerning which there are many opinions, is an attribute of the Gods not given to man, Stranger; but I shall be very happy to tell you what I think, especially as we are now proposing to enter on a discussion concerning laws and constitutions.

Cle. Your opinion, Stranger, about the questions which are now being raised, is precisely what we want to hear.

Ath. Very good; I will try to find a way of explaining my meaning, and you shall try to have the gift of understanding me. But first let me make an apology. The Athenian citizen is reputed among all the Hellenes to be a great talker, whereas Sparta is renowned for brevity, and the Cretans have more wit than words. Now, I am afraid of appearing to elicit a very long discourse out of very small materials. For drinking indeed may appear to be a slight matter, and yet is one which cannot be rightly ordered according to nature, without correct principles of music; these are necessary with a view to any satisfactory treatment of the subject, and music again runs up into education generally, and there will be no end to the discussion. What
would you say then to leaving these matters for the present, and passing on to some other question of law?

Meg. O Athenian Stranger, let me tell you what perhaps you do not know, that our family is your proxenus. I imagine that from their earliest youth all boys, when they are told that they are the proxeni of a particular state, feel kindly towards their second country; and this has certainly been my own feeling. I can well remember from the days of my boyhood, how, when any Lacedaemonians praised or blamed the Athenians, they used to say to me,—‘See, Megillus, how ill or how well, as the case might be, has your state treated us;’ and having always had to fight your battles against detractors when I heard you assailed, I became warmly attached to you. And I always like to hear the Athenian tongue spoken; the common saying is quite true, that a good Athenian is more than ordinarily good, for he is the only man who is freely and genuinely good by the inspiration of nature, and is not manufactured by the law. Therefore be assured that I shall like to hear you say whatever you have to say.

Cle. I can say the same, Stranger; and that you may speak with the greater confidence, let me also remind you of a tie which unites you to Crete. You must have heard the story of the prophet Epimenides, who was of my family, and came to Athens ten years before the Persian war, in accordance with the response of the Oracle, and offered certain sacrifices which the God commanded. The Athenians were at that time in dread of the Persian invasion; and he said that for ten years they would not come, and that when they came, they would go away again without accomplishing any of their objects, and would suffer more evil than they inflicted. At that time my forefathers formed ties of hospitality with you; thus ancient is the friendship which I and my parents have had for you.

Ath. You seem to be quite ready to listen; and I am also ready to perform as much as I can of an almost impossible task, which I will nevertheless attempt. At the outset of the discussion, let me define the nature and power of education; for this is the way by which our argument must travel onwards to the God Dionysus.

Cle. Let us proceed, if you please.
BOOK I.

Ath. Well, then, if I tell you what are my notions of education, will you tell me whether you agree with them?

Cle. Let us hear.

Ath. According to my view, he who would be good at anything must practise that thing from his youth upwards, both in sport and earnest, in the particular manner which the work requires: for example, he who is to be a good builder, should play at building children's houses; and he who is to be a good husbandman, at tilling the ground; those who have the care of their education should provide them when young with mimic tools. And they should learn beforehand the knowledge which they will afterwards require for their art. For example, the future carpenter should learn to measure or apply the line in play; and the future warrior should learn riding, or some other exercise for amusement, and the teacher should endeavour to direct the children's inclinations and pleasures by the help of amusements, to their final aim in life. The most important part of education is right training in the nursery. The soul of the child in his play should be trained to that sort of excellence in which when he grows up to manhood he will have to be perfected. Do you agree with me thus far?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Then let us not leave the meaning of education ambiguous or ill-defined. At present, when we speak in terms of praise or blame about the bringing-up of each person, we call one man educated and another uneducated, although the uneducated man may be sometimes very well educated for the calling of a retail trader, or of a captain of a ship, and the like. For we are not speaking of education in this narrower sense, but of that other education in virtue from youth upwards, which makes a man eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship, and teaches him how rightly to rule and how to obey. This is the only education which, upon our view, deserves the name; that other sort of training, which aims at the acquisition of wealth or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart from intelligence and justice, is mean and illiberal, and is not worthy to be called education at all. But let us not quarrel with one another about a word, provided that the proposition which has just been granted hold good: to wit, that those who are rightly
educated generally become good men. Neither must we cast a slight upon education, which is the first and fairest thing that the best of men can ever have, and which, though liable to take a wrong direction, is capable of reformation. And this work of reformation is the great business of every man while he lives.

Cle. Very true; and we quite agree with you.

Ath. And we agreed before that they are good men who are able to rule themselves, and bad men who are not.

Cle. Most true.

Ath. Let me now proceed, if I can, to clear up the subject a little further by an illustration which I will offer you.

Cle. Proceed.

Ath. Do we not consider each of ourselves as one?

Cle. True.

Ath. And each one of us has in his bosom two counsellors, both foolish and also antagonistic; of which, the one we call pleasure and the other pain.

Cle. True.

Ath. Also there are opinions about the future, which have the general name of expectations; and the specific name of fear, when the expectation is of pain; and of hope, when of pleasure; and further, there is reflection about the good or evil of them, and this, when embodied in a decree by the State, is called Law.

Cle. I am hardly able to follow you; proceed, however, as if I were.

Meg. I am in the like case.

Ath. Let us look at the matter in this way: May we not regard every living being as a puppet of the Gods, either their plaything only, or created with a purpose—which of the two we cannot certainly know? But this we know, that these affections in us are like cords and strings, which pull us different and opposite ways, and to opposite actions; and herein lies the difference between virtue and vice. According to the argument there is one among these cords which every man ought to grasp and never let go, but to pull with it against all the rest; and this is the sacred and golden cord of reason, called by us the common law of the State; there are others which are hard and
of iron, but this is soft because golden; and there are several other kinds. Now we ought always to co-operate with the lead of the best, which is law. For inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle, and not violent, her rule must needs have ministers in order to help the golden principle in vanquishing the other principles. And thus the moral of the tale about our being puppets will not be lost, and the meaning of the expression 'superior or inferior to a man's self' will become clearer; as also that in this matter of pulling the strings of the puppet, cities as well as individuals should live according to reason; which the individual attains in himself, and the city receives from some god or from the legislator, and makes it her law in her dealings with herself and with other states. In this way virtue and vice will be more clearly distinguished by us. And when they have become clearer, education and other institutions will in like manner become clearer; and in particular that question of convivial entertainment, which may seem, perhaps, to have been a very trifling matter, and to have taken a great many more words than were necessary.

Cle. Perhaps, however, the theme may turn out not to be unworthy of the length of discourse.

Ath. Very good; let us proceed with any enquiry which really bears on our present object.

Cle. Proceed.

Ath. Suppose that we give this puppet of ours drink,—what will be the effect on him?

Cle. With what view do you ask that question?

Ath. I will tell you bye and bye. When the puppet is brought to the drink, what sort of result is likely to follow? I will endeavour to explain my meaning more clearly: what I am asking is this—Does the drinking of wine heighten and increase pleasures and pains, and passions and loves?

Cle. Very greatly.

Ath. And are perception and memory, and opinion and prudence, heightened and increased? Do not these qualities entirely desert a man if he becomes saturated with drink?

Cle. Yes, they entirely desert him.

Ath. Does he not return to the state of the soul in which he was when a young child?
Cle. To be sure.

Ath. Then at that time he will have the least control over himself?

Cle. The least.

Ath. And will he not be in a most wretched plight?

Cle. Most wretched.

Ath. Then not only an old man but also a drunkard becomes a second time a child?

Cle. Well said, Stranger.

Ath. Will any argument prove to us that we ought to encourage the taste for drinking instead of doing all we can to avoid it?

Cle. I suppose so; at any rate, you said just now that you were ready to maintain such a doctrine.

Ath. True, I did; and I hold to my word, as you both declared that you were ready to hear me.

Cle. To be sure we will hear you, if only for the strangeness of the paradox, which asserts that a man ought of his own accord to plunge into utter degradation.

Ath. Are you speaking of the soul?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And what would you say about the body, my friend? Are you not surprised at any one of his own accord bringing upon himself deformity, leanness, ugliness, decrepitude?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Yet when a man goes of his own accord to a doctor's shop, and takes medicine, is he not quite aware that soon, and for many days afterwards, he will be in a state of body which he would die rather than accept as the permanent condition of his life? Are not those who train in gymnasia, at first beginning reduced to a state of weakness?

Cle. Yes, all that is well known.

Ath. Also that they go of their own accord for the sake of the subsequent benefit?

Cle. Very good.

Ath. And we may conceive this to be true in the same way of other practices?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And the same view may be taken of the pastime of
drinking wine, if we are right in supposing that the same effect follows?

_Cle._ To be sure.

_Ath._ If such convivialities should turn out to have any like advantage equal in importance to the bodily one, they are in their very nature to be preferred to mere bodily exercise, inasmuch as they have no accompaniment of pain.

_Cle._ True; but I hardly think that we shall be able to discover any such benefits to be derived from them.

_Ath._ That is just what I am about to show. And let me ask you a question:—Do we not distinguish two kinds of fear, which are very different?

_Cle._ What are they?

_Ath._ There is the fear of expected evil.

_Cle._ Yes.

_Ath._ And there is the fear of an evil reputation; we are afraid of being thought evil, because we do or say some dishonourable thing, which fear we and all men term shame.

_Cle._ Certainly.

_Ath._ These are the two fears, as I called them; one of which is the opposite of pain and other fears, and the opposite also of the greatest and most numerous sort of pleasures.

_Cle._ Very true.

_Ath._ And does not the legislator and every one who is good for anything, hold this fear in the greatest honour? This is what he terms reverence, and the confidence which is the reverse of this he terms insolence; and the latter he always deems to be a very great evil both to individuals and to states.

_Cle._ True.

_Ath._ Does not this sort of fear preserve us in many important ways? What is there which so surely gives victory and safety in war? For there are two things which give victory—confidence before enemies, and fear of disgrace before friends.

_Cle._ True.

_Ath._ Then each of us should be fearless and also fearful; and what we fear or ought not to fear has been determined.

_Cle._ Certainly.

_Ath._ And when we want to make any one fearless, we and the law bring him face to face with many fears.
Cle. Clearly.

Ath. And when we want to make him rightly fearful, must we not bring him face to face with disgrace, and exercise him in taking up arms against his own pleasures and overcoming them? Or does this principle apply to courage only, and must he who would be perfect in valour fight against and overcome his own natural character,—since if he be unpractised and inexperienced in such conflicts, he will not be half the man which he might have been—but are we to suppose, that with temperance it is otherwise, and that he who has never fought with the shameless and unrighteous temptations of his pleasures and lusts, and conquered them, in earnest and in play, and in every sort of way, word, or work, will still be perfectly temperate?

Cle. How unlikely!

Ath. Suppose that some God had given a fear potion to men, and that the more a man drank of this the more he regarded himself as a child of misfortune on every occasion of drinking, and that he feared everything happening or to happen to him; and that at last the most courageous of men utterly lost his presence of mind for a time, and only came to himself again when he had slept off the influence of the draught.

Cle. But do you know of any such draught, Stranger, which is really to be found among men?

Ath. I do not; but, if there were, might not such a draught have been of use to the legislator as a test of courage? Might we not go and say to him, 'O legislator, whether you are legislating for the Cretans, or the Spartans, or any other, would you not like to have a touchstone of the courage and cowardice of your citizens'?

Cle. 'I should,' will be the answer of every one.

Ath. 'And you would rather have a touchstone in which there is no risk and no great danger than the reverse?'

Cle. From that proposition, again, no one will dissent.

Ath. 'And, in order to make use of the draught, you would lead them amid such imaginary terrors, and prove them, when the affection of fear was working upon them, and compel them to be fearless, exhorting and admonishing them, and also
honouring them, but dishonouring any one who will not be persuaded by you to be in all respects such as you command him; and if he underwent the trial well and manfully, you would let him go unscathed; but if ill, you would inflict a punishment upon him? Or would you abstain from using the potion altogether, although you have no reason for abstaining?'

Cle. He would be certain, Stranger, to use the potion.

Ath. This would be a mode of testing and training which would be wonderfully easy in comparison with those now in use, and might be applied to a single person, or to a few, or indeed to any number; and he would do well who provided himself with the potion, which alone is of more efficacy than ten thousand other things, whether he preferred to be by himself in the wilderness, and there contend with his fears, because he was ashamed to be seen by the eye of man until he was perfect; or trusting to the force of his own nature and habits, and believing that he had been already disciplined sufficiently, he did not hesitate to train himself in company with any number of others, and display his power in conquering the irresistible influence of the draught—his virtue being such, that he never in any instance fell into any great unseemliness, but was always himself, and left off before he arrived at the last cup, fearing that he, like all other men, might be overcome by the potion.

Cle. Yes, Stranger, in that last case, too, he might equally show his self-control.

Ath. Let us return to the lawgiver, and say to him:—'Well, lawgiver, there is certainly no such fear potion which man has either received from the Gods or himself discovered; for witchcraft has no place at our board. But is there any potion which might serve as a test of overboldness and excessive and indiscreet boasting?'

Cle. I suppose that he will say, Yes,—meaning that wine is such a potion.

Ath. Is not the effect of this quite the opposite of the effect of the other? When a man drinks wine he begins to be better pleased with himself, and the more he drinks the more he is filled full of brave hopes, and the opinion of his power, and at last the string of his tongue is loosened, and fancying himself
wise, he is brimming over with lawlessness, and has no more fear or respect, and is ready to do or say anything.

Cle. I think that every one will admit the truth of your description.

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. Now, let us remember, as we were saying, that there are two things which should be cultivated in the soul: first, the greatest courage; secondly, the greatest fear—

Cle. Which you described as parts of reverence, if I am not mistaken.

Ath. Thank you for reminding me. But now, as the habit of courage and fearlessness is to be trained amid fears, let us consider whether the opposite quality is not also to be trained among opposites.

Cle. I dare say.

Ath. There are times and seasons at which we are by nature more than commonly valiant and bold; now we ought to train ourselves on these occasions to be as free from impudence and shamelessness as possible, and to be afraid to say or suffer or do anything that is base.

Cle. True.

Ath. Are not the moments in which we are apt to be bold and shameless such as these?—when we are under the influence of anger, love, pride, ignorance, avarice, cowardice? or when wealth, beauty, strength, and all the intoxicating workings of pleasure madden us? What is better adapted than the festive use of wine, in the first place to test, and in the second place to train the character of a man, if care be taken in the use of it? What is there cheaper, or more innocent? For do but consider which is the greater risk:—Would you rather test a man of a harsh and uncivil nature, which is the source of ten thousand acts of injustice, by making bargains with him at a risk to yourself, or by having him as a companion at the festival of Dionysus? Or would you, if you wanted to apply a touchstone to a man who is prone to love, entrust your wife, or your sons, or daughters to him, perilling your dearest interests in order to have a view of the condition of his soul? I might add numberless particulars, in which the advantage would be manifest of getting to know a character in sport, and
without paying dearly for experience. And I do not believe that either a Cretan, or any other man, will doubt that such a test is a fair test, and safer, cheaper, and speedier than any other.

*Cle.* That is certainly true.

*Ath.* And this knowledge of the natures and habits of men’s souls will be of the greatest use in that art which has the management of them; and that art, if I am not mistaken, is politics.

*Cle.* Certainly.
BOOK II.

Athenian Stranger. And now we have to consider whether the insight into human nature is the only advantage derived from well-ordered potations, or whether there are not other advantages greater and more to be desired still. The argument seems to imply that there are. But how and in what way these are to be attained, will have to be considered attentively, or we may be entangled in an error.

Cleinias. Proceed.

Ath. Let me once more recall our doctrine of right education; which, if I am not mistaken, depends on the due regulation of convivial intercourse.

Cle. You talk rather grandly.

Ath. Pleasure and pain I maintain to be the first perceptions of children, and I say that they are the forms under which virtue and vice are originally present to them. As to wisdom and true and fixed opinions, happy is the man who acquires them, even when declining in years; and he who possesses them, and the blessings which are contained in them, is a perfect man. Now, I mean by education that training which is given by suitable habits to the first instincts of virtue in children;—when pleasure, and friendship, and pain, and hatred, are rightly implanted in souls not yet capable of understanding the nature of them, and who find them, after they have attained reason, to be in harmony with her. This harmony of the soul, when perfected, is virtue; but the particular training in respect of pleasure and pain, which leads you always to hate what you ought to hate, and love what you ought to love, from the beginning to the end, may be separated off; and, in my view, will be rightly called education.

Cle. I think, Stranger, that you are quite right in all that you have said and are saying about education.
I am glad to hear that you agree with me; for, indeed, the true discipline of pleasure and pain which, when rightly ordered, is a principle of education, has been often relaxed and corrupted in human life. And the Gods, pitying the toils which our race is born to undergo, have appointed holy festivals, in which men alternate rest with labour; and have given them the Muses and Apollo the leader of the Muses, and Dionysus, to be partners in their revels, that they may improve what education they have, at the festivals of the gods and by their aid. I should like to know whether a common saying is true to nature or not. For what men say is that the young of all creatures cannot be quiet in their bodies or in their voices; they are always wanting to move, and cry out; at one time leaping and skipping, and overflowing with sportiveness and delight at something, and then again uttering all sorts of cries. But, whereas other animals have no perception of order or disorder in their movements, that is, of rhythm or harmony, as they are called, to us, the Gods, who, as we say, have been appointed to be our partners in the dance, have given the pleasurable sense of harmony and rhythm; and so they stir us into life, and we follow them and join hands with one another in dances and songs; and these they call choruses, which is a term naturally expressive of cheerfulness. Shall we begin, then, with the acknowledgment that education is first given through Apollo and the Muses? What do you say?

Cle. I assent.

Ath. And the uneducated is he who has not been trained in the chorus, and the educated is he who has been well trained?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And the chorus is made up of two parts, dance and song?

Cle. True.

Ath. Then he who is well educated will be able to sing and dance well?

Cle. I suppose that he will.

Ath. Let us see; what are we saying?

Cle. What?

\[1 \chi'\rho\delta, \text{ erroneously connected with } \chi'\rho\epsilon\nu.\]
Ath. He sings well and dances well; now must we add that he sings what is good and dances what is good?

Cle. Let us make the addition.

Ath. We will suppose that he knows the good to be good, and the bad to be bad, and makes use of them accordingly: which now is the better trained in dancing and music;—he who is able to move his body and to use his voice in what is understood to be the right manner, but has no delight in good or hatred of evil; or he who is incorrect in gesture and voice, but is right in his sense of pleasure and pain, and welcomes what is good, and is offended at what is evil?

Cle. Let us make the addition.

Ath. We will suppose that he knows the good to be good, and the bad to be bad, and makes use of them accordingly: which now is the better trained in dancing and music;—he who is able to move his body and to use his voice in what is understood to be the right manner, but has no delight in good or hatred of evil; or he who is incorrect in gesture and voice, but is right in his sense of pleasure and pain, and welcomes what is good, and is offended at what is evil?

Cle. There is a great difference, Stranger, in the two kinds of education.

Ath. If we know what is good in song and dance, then we know also who is rightly educated and who is uneducated; but if not, then we certainly shall not know wherein lies the safeguard of education, and whether there is any or not.

Cle. True.

Ath. Let us follow the scent like hounds, and go in pursuit of beauty of figure, and melody, and song, and dance; if these escape us, there will be no use in talking about true education, whether Hellenic or barbarian.

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And what is beauty of figure, or beautiful melody? When a manly soul is in trouble, and when a cowardly soul is in similar case, are they likely to use the same figures and gestures, or to give utterance to the same sounds?

Cle. How can they, when the very colours of their faces differ?

Ath. Good, my friend; I may observe, however, in passing, that in music there certainly are figures and there are melodies: and music is concerned with harmony and rhythm, so that you may speak of a melody or figure having rhythm or harmony; the term is correct enough, but you cannot speak correctly, as the masters of choruses have a way of talking metaphorically of the 'colour' of a melody or figure, although you can speak of the melodies or figures of the brave and the coward, praising the one and censuring the other. And not to be tedious, the figures and melodies which are expressive of virtue of soul or
BOOK II.

225

body, or of images of virtue, are without exception good, and
those which are expressive of vice are the reverse of good.

Cle. You are right in calling upon us to make that division.

Ath. But are all of us equally delighted with every sort of
dance?

Cle. Far otherwise.

Ath. And what, then, is the cause of error or division among
us? Are beautiful things not the same to us all, or are they
the same in themselves, but not in our opinion of them? For
no one will admit that forms of vice in the dance are more
beautiful than forms of virtue, or that he himself delights in the
forms of vice, and others in a muse of another character. And
yet most persons say, that the excellence of music is to give
pleasure to our souls. But this is intolerable and blasphemous;
there is, however, a more plausible account of the delusion.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. There is a way of making our likes and dislikes the
criterion of excellence. Choric movements are imitations of
manners occurring in various actions, chances, characters,—each
particular is imitated, and those to whom the words, or songs,
or dances are suited, either by nature or habit or both, cannot
help feeling pleasure in them and applauding them, and calling
them beautiful. But those whose natures, or ways, or habits are
unsuited to them, cannot delight in them or applaud them, and
they call them base. There are others, again, whose natures are
right and their habits wrong, or whose habits are right and their
natures wrong, and they praise one thing, but are pleased at
another. For they say that certain things are pleasant, but not
good. And in the presence of those whom they think wise,
they are ashamed of dancing and singing in the baser manner,
or of deliberately lending their countenance to such proceed-
ings; and yet, they have a secret pleasure in them.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And is any harm done to the lover of vicious dances or
songs, or any good done to the approver of the opposite sort of
pleasure?

Cle. I think that there is.

Ath. 'I think' is not the word, but I would say, rather, 'I am
certain.' For must they not have the same effect as when a

VOL. V.
man is in evil company, whom he likes and approves rather than dislikes, and only censures them playfully as if he had a suspicion of his own badness? In that case, he who takes pleasure in them will surely become like those in whom he takes pleasure, even though he be ashamed to praise them. And what greater good or evil can any destiny ever make us undergo?

Cle. I know of none.

Ath. Then in a city which has or in future ages is to have good laws, and where there is a due regard to the instruction and amusement which the Muses give, can we suppose that the poets are to be allowed to teach in the dance anything which the poet himself likes, in the way of rhythm, or melody, or words, to the children and youth of well-conditioned parents? Is he to train his choruses as he pleases, without reference to virtue or vice?

Cle. That is surely quite unreasonable, and is not to be thought of.

Ath. And yet he may do this in almost any state with the exception of Egypt.

Cle. And what are the laws about music and dancing in Egypt?

Ath. You will wonder when I tell you: Long ago they appear to have recognised the very principle of which we are now speaking—that their young citizens must be habituated to forms and strains of virtue. These they fixed, and exhibited the patterns of them in their temples; and no painter or artist is allowed to innovate upon them, or to leave the traditional forms and invent new ones. To this day, no alteration is allowed either in these arts, or in music at all. And you will find that their works of art are painted or moulded in the same forms which they had ten thousand years ago;—this is literally true and no exaggeration,—their ancient paintings and sculptures are not a whit better or worse than the work of to-day, but are made with just the same skill.

Cle. How extraordinary!

Ath. I should rather say, how wise and worthy of a great legislator! I know that other things in Egypt are not so good. But what I am telling you about music is true and deserving
of consideration, because showing that a lawgiver may institute melodies which have a natural truth and correctness without any fear of failure. To do this, however, must be the work of God, or of a divine person; in Egypt they have a tradition that their ancient chants are the composition of the Goddess Isis. And therefore, as I was saying, if a person can only find in any way the natural melodies, he may confidently embody them in a fixed and legal form. For the love of novelty which arises out of pleasure in the new and weariness of the old, has not strength enough to vitiate the consecrated song and dance, under the plea that they have become antiquated. At any rate, they are far from being antiquated in Egypt.

Cle. Your arguments seem to prove your point.

Ath. May not the true use of music and choral festivities be described as follows: we rejoice when we think that we prosper, and again we think that we prosper when we rejoice?

Cle. Exactly.

Ath. And when rejoicing is our good fortune, we are unable to be still?

Cle. True.

Ath. Our young men break forth into dancing and singing, and we who are their elders deem that we are fulfilling our part in life when we look on at them. Having lost the agility of youth, we delight in their sports and merry-making; because we love to think of our former selves, and gladly institute contests for those who are able to awaken in us the memory of what we once were.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. People say that we ought to regard him as the wisest of men, and the winner of the palm, who gives us the greatest amount of pleasure and mirth. For when mirth is to be the order of the day, he ought to be honoured most, and, as I was saying, bear the palm, who gives most mirth to the greatest number. Now I want to know whether this is a true way of speaking or of acting?

Cle. Possibly.

Ath. But, my dear friend, let us distinguish between different cases, and not be hasty in forming a judgment: One way of considering the question will be to imagine a festival at which
there are entertainments of all sorts, including gymnastic, musical, or equestrian contests: the citizens are assembled, and proclamation is made that any one who likes may enter the lists, and that he is to bear the palm who gives the most pleasure to the spectators—there is to be no regulation about the manner how; but he who is most successful in giving pleasure is to be crowned victor, and is deemed to be the pleasantest of the candidates: What is likely to be the result of such a proclamation?

Cle. In what respect?

Ath. There would be various exhibitions: the Homeric bard would exhibit a rhapsody, another a performance on the lute; one would have a tragedy, and another a comedy. Nor would there be anything astonishing in some one imagining that he could gain the prize by exhibiting a puppet-show. Suppose these competitors to meet, and not these only, but innumerable others as well, can you tell me who ought to be the victor?

Cle. I do not see how I can answer you, unless I myself hear the several competitors; the question is absurd.

Ath. Well, then, if neither of you can answer, shall I answer this question which you deem absurd?

Cle. By all means.

Ath. If very small children are to determine the question, they will decide for the puppet-show?

Cle. Of course.

Ath. The older children will be advocates of comedy; educated women, and young men, and people in general, will favour tragedy.

Cle. Very likely.

Ath. And I believe that we old men would have the greatest pleasure in hearing a rhapsodist recite well the Iliad and Odyssey, or one of the Hesiodic poems, and would award the victory to him? But, who would really be the victor? that is the question.

Cle. Yes.

Ath. Clearly you and I will be compelled to reply that the old men are right; their way of thinking is far better than any other which now prevails in the world.

Cle. Certainly.
BOOK II.

Ath. Thus far I too should agree with the many, that the excellence of music is to be measured by pleasure. But the pleasure must not be that of chance persons; the fairest music is that which delights the best and best educated, and especially that which delights the one man who is pre-eminent in virtue and education. And therefore the judges will require virtue—they must possess wisdom and also courage; for the true judge ought not to learn from the theatre, nor ought he to be panic-stricken at the clamour of the many and his own incapacity; nor again, knowing the truth, ought he through cowardice and unmanliness carelessly to deliver a lying judgment, out of the very same lips which have just appealed to the Gods before he judged. He is sitting not as the disciple of the theatre, but, in his proper place, as their instructor, and he ought to be the enemy of all pandering to the pleasure of the spectators. The ancient and common custom of Hellas, which still prevails in Italy and Sicily, did certainly leave the judgment to the body of spectators, who determined the victor by the show of hands; yet this custom has been the destruction of the poets;—for they are now in the habit of composing with a view to please the bad taste of their judges, and the result is that the spectators instruct themselves, which has been the ruin of the theatre;—when they ought to be having characters put before them better than their own, and so receiving a higher pleasure, they themselves make them inferior. Now what is the inference to be deduced from all this? Shall I tell you?

Cle. What?

Ath. The inference at which we arrive for the third or fourth time is, that education is the constraining and directing of youth towards that right reason, which the law affirms, and which the experience of the best of our elders has agreed to be truly right. In order, then, that the soul of the child may not be habituated to feel joy and sorrow in a manner at variance with the law, and those who obey the law, but may rather follow the law and rejoice and sorrow at the same things as the aged—in order, I say, to produce this effect, songs appear to have been invented, which are really charms, and are designed to implant that harmony of which we speak. And, because the mind of the child is incapable of enduring serious training, they are called
plays or songs, and are performed in play; just as when men are sick and ailing in their bodies, their attendants give them wholesome diet in pleasant meats and drinks, but unwholesome diet in disagreeable things, in order that they may learn, as they ought, to like the one, and to dislike the other. And similarly the true legislator will persuade, and, if he cannot persuade, will compel the poet to express, as he ought, by fair and noble words, in his rhythms, the figures, and in his melodies, the music of temperate and brave and in every way good men.

Cle. But do you really imagine, Stranger, that this is the way in which poets generally compose in States at the present day? As far as I can observe there is nothing of the sort, except among us and among the Lacedaemonians, as you now tell me; in other places novelties are always being introduced in dancing and in music, generally not under the authority of any law, but at the instigation of lawless pleasures; and these pleasures are so far from being the same, as you describe the Egyptian to be, or having the same principles, that they are never the same.

Ath. Most true, Cleinias; and I daresay that I may have expressed myself obscurely, and so led you to imagine that I was speaking of some really existing state of things; whereas I was only saying what regulations I would like to have about music, and hence there occurred a misapprehension on your part. For when evils are far gone and irremediable, the task of censuring them is never pleasant, although at times necessary. But as we do not really differ, will you let me ask you whether you maintain that such institutions are more prevalent among the Cretans and Lacedemonians than among the other Hellenes?

Cle. Certainly they are.

Ath. And if they were extended to the other Hellenes, would that be an improvement?

Cle. There would be a very great improvement, if the customs which prevailed among them were such as prevail among us and the Lacedaemonians, and such as you were just now saying ought to prevail.

Ath. Let us see whether we understand one another:—Are not the principles of education and music which prevail among you as follows: you compel your poets to say that the good
BOOK II.

man, if he be temperate and just, is fortunate and happy; and this whether he be great and strong, or small and weak, and whether he be rich or poor; and, on the other hand, if he have a wealth passing that of Cinyras or Midas, and be unjust, he is miserable and lives in pain. As the poet says, and with truth: I sing not, I care not about him who accomplishes all noble things, not having justice; let him who ‘draws near and smites his enemies be a just man.’ But if he be unjust, I would not have him ‘look calmly upon bloody death,’ nor ‘surpass in swiftness the Thracian Boreas;’ and let no other thing that is called good ever be his. For the goods of which the many speak are not really good: first in the catalogue is placed health, beauty next, wealth third; and then innumerable others, as for example to have a keen eye or a quick ear, and in general to have all the senses perfect; or, again, to be a tyrant and do as you like; and the final consummation of happiness is to have acquired all these things, and as soon as you are possessed of them to be immortal. But you and I say, that while to the just and holy all these things are the best of possessions, to the unjust they are all, including even health, the greatest of evils. For in truth, to have sight, and hearing, and the use of the senses, or to live at all without justice and virtue, even though a man be rich in all the so-called goods of fortune, is the greatest of evils, if life be immortal; but not so great, if the bad man lives a very short time. These are the truths of which you must persuade, or if they will not be persuaded, must compel your poets to sing with suitable accompaniments of harmony and rhythm, and in these they must train up your youth. Am I not right? For I plainly declare that evils as they are termed are goods to the unjust, and only evils to the just, and that goods are truly good to the good, but evil to the evil. Let me ask again, Are you and I agreed about this?

CLE. I think that in some things we agree, in others not.

ATH. When a man has health and wealth and a tyranny which lasts, and is pre-eminent in strength and courage, and has the gift of immortality, and none of the so-called evils which counter-balance these goods, but only the injustice and insolence of his own nature—of such an one you are, I suspect, unwilling to believe that he is miserable rather than happy.
Cle. There is my difficulty.

Ath. Once more: Suppose that he be valiant and strong, and handsome and rich, and does throughout his whole life whatever he likes, still, if he be injurious and insolent, would you not both agree that he will live basely? You will surely grant so much?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And an evil life too?

Cle. I am not equally disposed to grant that.

Ath. Will he not live painfully and to his own disadvantage?

Cle. How can I possibly say so?

Ath. Then may Heaven make us to be of one mind, for now we are of two. To me, dear Cleinias, the truth of what I am saying is plainer than the fact that Crete is an island. And, if I were a lawgiver, I would try to make the poets and all the citizens speak in this strain; and I would inflict the heaviest penalties on any one in all the land who should dare to say that there are bad men who lead pleasant lives, or that the profitable and gainful is one thing, and the just another; and there are many other matters about which I should make my citizens speak in another strain from the Cretans and Lacedaemonians of this age, and I may say, indeed, from the world in general. Why, my good friends, if I were to ask Zeus and Apollo, the Gods who were your legislators,—Is not the most just life also the pleasantest? or are there two lives, one of which is the juster and the other the pleasanter?—and they were to reply that there are two; and thereupon I proceeded to ask (that would be the right way of pursuing the enquiry) Which are the happier—those who lead the justest, or those who lead the pleasantest life? and they replied, Those who lead the pleasantest—that would be a very strange answer, which I should not like to put into the mouth of God. The words will come with more propriety from the lips of fathers and legislators, and therefore I will repeat my former questions to one of them, and suppose him to say again that he who leads the pleasantest life is the happiest. And to that I rejoin:—O my father, did you not wish me to live as happily as possible? And yet you also never ceased telling me that I should live as justly as possible. Now, here the giver of the rule, whether he be
BOOK II.

233

legislator or father will be in a dilemma, and will in vain endeavour to be consistent with himself. But if he were to declare that the justest life is also the happiest, every one hearing him would enquire, if I am not mistaken, what is that good and noble principle in life which the law approves, and which is superior to pleasure and pain? For what good can the just man have which is separated from pleasure? Shall we say that glory and fame, coming from Gods and men, though good and noble, are nevertheless unpleasant, and infamy pleasant? Certainly not, sweet legislator. Or shall we say that the not-doing of wrong and there being no wrong done is good and honourable, although there is no pleasure in it, and that the doing wrong is pleasant, but evil and base?

Cle. Impossible.

Ath. The view which identifies the pleasant and the just and the good and the noble has an excellent moral and religious tendency. And the opposite view is most at variance with the designs of the legislator, and, in his opinion, infamous; for no one, if he can help, will be persuaded to do that which gives him more pain than pleasure. But as distant prospects are apt to be dimly seen, especially in childhood, the legislator will try to purge away the darkness and exhibit the truth; he will persuade the citizens, in some way or other, by customs and praises and words, that just and unjust are opposed to one another as shadow and light, and that, seen from the point of view of a man's own evil and injustice, the unjust appears pleasant and the just unpleasant; but that, seen from the just man's point of view, the very opposite is the appearance which they wear.

Cle. True.

Ath. And which may be supposed to be the truer judgment—that of the inferior or of the better soul?

Cle. Surely, that of the better soul.

Ath. Then the unjust life must not only be more base and depraved, but also more unpleasant than the just and holy life?

Cle. That seems to be implied in the present argument.

Ath. And even supposing this were otherwise, and not as the argument has proven, still the lawgiver, who is worth anything, if he ever ventures to tell a lie to the young for their good, could not invent a more useful lie than this, or one which will have a
better effect in making them do what is right, not on compulsion but voluntarily.

_Cle._ Truth, Stranger, is a noble thing and a lasting, but a thing of which men are hard to be persuaded.

_Ath._ And yet the story of the Sidonian Cadmus, which is so improbable, has been readily believed, and also innumerable other tales.

_Cle._ What is that story?

_Ath._ The story of armed men springing up after the sowing of teeth, which the legislator may take as a proof that he can persuade the minds of the young of anything; so that he has only to reflect and find out what belief will be of the greatest public advantage, and then use all his efforts to make the whole community utter one and the same word in their songs and tales and discourses all their life long. But if you do not agree with me, there is no reason why you should not argue on the other side.

_Cle._ I do not see that any argument can fairly be raised by either of us against what you are now saying.

_Ath._ The next suggestion which I have to offer is, that all our three choruses shall sing to the young and tender souls of children, reciting in their strains all the noble thoughts of which we have already spoken, or are about to speak; and the sum of them shall be, that the life which is by the Gods deemed to be the happiest is the holiest;—we shall affirm this to be a most certain truth; and the minds of our young disciples will be more likely to receive these words of ours than any others which we might address to them.

_Cle._ I assent to what you say.

_Ath._ First will enter in their natural order the sacred choir composed of children, which is to sing lustily the heaven-taught lay to the whole city. Next will follow the choir of young men under the age of thirty, who will call upon the God Paean to testify to the truth of their words, and will pray him to be gracious to the youth and to turn their hearts. Thirdly, the choir of elder men, who are from thirty to sixty years of age, will also sing. There remain those who are too old to sing, and they will tell stories, illustrating the same virtues, as with the voice of an oracle.
BOOK II.

Cle. Who are those who compose the third choir, Stranger; for I do not clearly understand whom you mean?

Ath. And yet almost all that I have been saying has been said with a view to them.

Cle. Will you try to be a little plainer?

Ath. I was speaking at the commencement of our discourse, as you will remember, of the fiery nature of young creatures: I said that they were unable to keep quiet either in limb or voice, and that they called out and jumped about in a disorderly manner; and that no other animal attained to any perception of order, but man only. Now the order of motion is called rhythm, and the order of the voice, in which high and low are duly mingled, is called harmony; and both together are termed choric song. And I said that the Gods had pity on us, and gave us Apollo and the Muses to be our playfellows and leaders in the dance; and Dionysus, as I daresay that you will remember, was the third.

Cle. I quite remember.

Ath. Thus far I have spoken of the chorus of Apollo and the Muses, and I have still to speak of the remaining chorus, which is that of Dionysus.

Cle. How is that arranged? There is something strange, at any rate on first hearing, in a Dionysiac chorus of old men, if you really mean that those who are above thirty, and may be fifty, or from fifty to sixty years of age, are to form a dance in his honour.

Ath. Very true; and I think with you that some reason should be given for the proposal.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Are we agreed thus far?

Cle. About what?

Ath. That every man and boy, slave and free, both sexes, and the whole city, should never cease charming themselves with the strains of which we have spoken; and that there should be every sort of change and variation of them in order to take away the effect of sameness, so that the singers may always receive pleasure from their hymns, and may never weary of them.

Cle. Every one will agree.
LAWS.

Ath. Where, then, will that best part of our city which, by reason of age and intelligence, has the greatest influence, sing these fairest of strains, which are to do so much good? Shall we be so foolish as to let them off who would give us the most beautiful and also the most useful of songs?

Cle. But we cannot let them off; that is already implied.

Ath. Then how can we accomplish our purpose? Let us see.

Cle. How are we to see?

Ath. When a man is advancing in years, he no longer likes to sing;—he has no pleasure in his own performances; and if compulsion is used, he will be more and more ashamed, the older and more discreet he grows;—What do you say?

Cle. Certainly he will.

Ath. Well, and will he not be yet more ashamed if he has to stand up and sing in the theatre to a mixed audience?—and if when he is required to do so, like the other choirs who contend for prizes, and have been trained under a singing master, he is pinched and hungry, he will certainly have a feeling of shame and discomfort which will make him very unwilling to exhibit.

Cle. No doubt.

Ath. How, then, shall we reassure him, and get him to sing? Shall we begin by enacting that boys shall not taste wine at all until they are eighteen years of age; we will tell them that fire must not be poured upon fire, whether in the body or in the soul, until they begin to go to labour (this is a precaution against the excitableness of youth); afterwards they may taste wine in moderation up to the age of thirty, but while a man is young he should abstain altogether from intoxication and excess of wine; when, at length, he has reached forty years, and is feasted at public banquets, he may invite not only the other Gods, but Dionysus above all, to the mystery and festivity of the elder men, making use of the wine which he has given them to be the cure of the sourness of old age; that in age we may renew our youth, and forget our sorrows; and also in order that the nature of the soul, like iron melted in the fire, may become softer and more impressible. In the first place, will not any one whose heart is warm within him, be more ready and less ashamed to sing,—I do not say before a large audience, but before a
moderate number; nor yet among strangers, but among his familiars, and, as we have often said, to chant, and to enchant.

Cle. He will be far more ready.

Ath. There will be no impropriety in using such a method of persuading them to join in song.

Cle. None at all.

Ath. And what strain will they sing, and what muse will they hymn? The strain should clearly be one suitable to them.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And what strain is suitable for heroes? Shall they sing a choric strain?

Cle. Truly, Stranger, we of Crete and Lacedaemon know no strain other than that which we have learnt and been accustomed to sing in our chorus.

Ath. I dare say; for you have never acquired the knowledge of the most beautiful kind of song in your military way of life, which is modelled after the camp, and is not like that of dwellers in cities; and you have your young men herding and feeding together like young colts. No one takes his own individual colt and drags him away from his fellows against his will, raging and foaming, and gives him a groom for him alone, and trains and rubs him down privately, and gives him the qualities in education which will make him not only a good soldier, but also a governor of a state and of cities. Such an one, as we were saying at first, would be a greater warrior than him of whom Tyrtaeus sings; and he would honour courage everywhere, but always as the fourth, and not as the first part of virtue, either in individuals or states.

Cle. Once more, Stranger, I must complain that you depreciate our lawgivers.

Ath. Not intentionally, if at all, my good friend; but whither the argument leads, thither let us follow; for if there be indeed some strain of song more beautiful than that of the choruses or the public theatres, I should like to impart it to those who, as we say, are ashamed of the ordinary strains, and want to have the best.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. When things have an accompanying charm, either the best thing in them is this very charm, or there is some right or
utility possessed by them;—for example, I should say that eating and drinking, and the use of food in general, have an accompanying charm which we call pleasure; but that their rectitude is that which we term the rightness and utility of the things served up to us, or more precisely their healthful quality.

_Cle._ Very true.

_Ath._ Thus, too, I should say that learning has a certain accompanying charm which is the pleasure; and that the right and the profitable, the good and the noble, are qualities given to it by the truth.

_Cle._ Exactly.

_Ath._ And so in the imitative arts,—if they succeed in making likenesses, and are accompanied by pleasure, may not their works be said to have a charm?

_Cle._ Yes.

_Ath._ But equal proportions, whether of quality or quantity, and not pleasure, speaking generally, would give them truth or rightness.

_Cle._ Yes.

_Ath._ Then that only can be rightly judged by the standard of pleasure, which makes or furnishes no utility or truth or likeness, nor on the other hand is productive of any hurtful quality, but exists solely for the sake of the accompanying charm; and the term 'pleasure' is most appropriately used when these other qualities are absent.

_Cle._ You are speaking of harmless pleasure, are you not?

_Ath._ Yes; and this I term amusement, when doing neither harm nor good in any degree worth speaking of.

_Cle._ Very true.

_Ath._ Then, if such be our principles, we must assert that imitation is not to be judged of by pleasure and false opinion; and this is true also of equality, for the equal is not equal or the symmetrical symmetrical, because somebody thinks or likes something, but they are to be judged of by the standard of truth, and by no other whatever.

_Cle._ Quite true.

_Ath._ Do we not regard all music as representative and imitative?

_Cle._ Certainly.
Then, when any one says that music is to be judged of
by pleasure, his doctrine cannot be admitted; and if there be
any music of which pleasure is the criterion, such music is not
to be sought out or deemed to have any real excellence, but only
that other kind of music which is an imitation of the good.

Very true.

And those, who seek for the best kind of song and music
ought not to seek for that which is pleasant, but for that which
is true; and the truth of imitation consists, as we were saying, in
rendering the thing imitated according to quantity and quality.

Certainly.

And every one will admit that musical compositions are
all imitative and representative. Will not poets and spectators
and actors all agree in this?

They will.

Surely then he who would judge correctly must know
what each composition is; for if he does not know what is the
character and meaning of the piece, and what it represents, he
will never discern whether the intention is true or false.

Certainly not.

And will he who does not know what is true be able to
distinguish what is good and bad? My statement is not very
clear; but perhaps you will understand me better if I put the
matter in another way.

How is that?

There are ten thousand likenesses of objects of sight?

Yes.

And can he who does not know what the exact object is
which is imitated, ever know whether the resemblance is truth-
fully executed? I mean, for example, whether a statue has the
proportions of a body, and the true situation of the parts, what
those proportions are, and how the parts fit into one another in
due order; also their colours and conformations, or whether this
is all confused in the execution: do you think that any one can
know about this, who does not know what the animal is which
has been imitated?

Impossible.

But even if we know that the thing pictured or sculp-
tured is a man, who has received at the hand of the artist all
his proper parts and forms and colours, must we not also know whether the work is beautiful or in any respect deficient in beauty?

Cle. If this were not required, Stranger, we should all of us be judges of beauty.

Ath. Very true; and may we not say that in everything imitated, whether in drawing, music, or any other art, he who is to be a competent judge must possess three things;—he must know, in the first place, of what the imitation is; secondly, he must know that it is true; and thirdly, that it has been well executed in words and melodies and rhythms?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Then let us not faint in discussing the peculiar difficulty of music. Music is more celebrated than any other kind of imitation, and therefore requires the greatest care of them all. For if a man makes a mistake here, he may do himself the greatest injury by welcoming evil dispositions, and the mistake may be very difficult to discern, because the poets are artists very inferior in character to the Muses themselves, who would never fall into the monstrous error of assigning to the words of men the gestures and songs of women; nor combine the melodies and gestures of freemen with the rhythms of slaves and men of the baser sort; or, beginning with the rhythms and gestures of freemen, assign to them a melody or words which are of an opposite character; nor would they mix up the voices and sounds of animals and of men and instruments, and every other sort of noise, as if they were all one. But human poets are fond of introducing this sort of inconsistent mixture, and thus make themselves ridiculous in the eyes of those who, as Orpheus says, 'are ripe for pleasure.' The experienced see all this confusion, and yet the poets go on and make still further havoc by separating the rhythm and the figure of the dance from the melody, setting words to metre without music, and also separating the melody and rhythm from the words, using the lyre or the flute alone. For when there are no words, it is very difficult to recognise the meaning of the harmony and rhythm, or to see that any worthy object is imitated by them. And we must acknowledge that all this sort of thing, which aims only at swiftness and smoothness and a brutish noise, and uses
the flute and the lyre not as the mere accompaniments of the dance and song, is exceedingly rude and coarse. The use of either, when unaccompanied by the others, leads to every sort of irregularity and trickery. This is all true enough. But we are considering not how our choristers, who are from thirty to fifty years of age, and may be over fifty, are not to use the Muses, but how they are to use them. And the considerations which we have urged seem to show in what way these fifty years' old choristers who are to sing, may be expected to be better trained. For they need to have a quick perception and knowledge of harmonies and rhythms; otherwise, how will they ever know which melodies would be rightly sung to the Dorian mode, or to the rhythm which the poet has assigned to them?

Cle. Clearly they cannot.

Ath. The common people are ridiculous in imagining that they know what is in proper harmony and rhythm, and what is not, when they can only be made to sing and step in rhythm by sheer force; they never consider that they do not know what they are about. Now every melody is right when suitably accompanied, and wrong when unsuitably.

Cle. That is most certain.

Ath. But can a man who does not know a thing, as we were saying, know that the thing is right?

Cle. Impossible.

Ath. Then now, as would appear, we are making the discovery that our newly-appointed choristers, whom we hereby invite and in a manner compel to sing, but of their own free will, must be educated to such an extent as to be able to follow the steps of the rhythm and the notes of the song, that they may know the harmonies and rhythms, and be able to select what are suitable for men of their age and character to sing; and may sing them, and have innocent pleasure from their own performance, and also lead younger men to receive with dutiful delight good dispositions. Having such training, they will attain a more accurate knowledge than falls to the lot of the common people, or even of the poets themselves. For the poet need not know the third point, viz. whether the imitation is good or not, though he can hardly help knowing the laws of melody and rhythm. But the aged chorus must know all the three, that they may choose the
best, and that which is nearest to the best; for otherwise they will never be able to charm the souls of young men in the way of virtue. And now the original design of the argument which was intended to bring eloquent aid to the Chorus of Dionysus, has been accomplished to the best of our ability, and let us see whether we were right—I should imagine that a drinking assembly is likely to become more and more tumultuous as the drinking goes on: this, as we were saying at first, will certainly be the case.

_Cle._ Certainly.

_Ath._ Every man has a more than natural elevation; his heart is glad within him, and he will say anything and will be restrained by nobody at such a time; he fancies that he is able to rule over himself and all mankind.

_Cle._ Quite true.

_Ath._ Were we not saying that on such occasions the souls of the drinkers become like iron heated in the fire, and grow softer and younger, and are easily fashioned by him who knows how to educate and fashion them, just as when they were young, and that this fashioner of them is the same who prescribed for them in the days of their youth, viz. the good legislator; and that he ought to enact laws of the banquet, which, when a man is confident, bold, and impudent, and unwilling to wait his turn of silence and speech, and drinking and music, will change his character into the opposite—such laws as will infuse into him a just and noble fear, which will take up arms at the approach of insolence, being that divine fear which we have called reverence and shame?

_Cle._ True.

_Ath._ And the calm and sober generals of others who are not sober, are the guardians of these laws and fellow-workers with them; and without their help there is greater difficulty in fighting against drink than in fighting against enemies, when the commander of an army is not himself calm; and he who is unwilling to obey them and the commanders of Dionysiac feasts who are more than sixty years of age, shall suffer a disgrace as great as he who disobeys military leaders, or even greater.

_Cle._ Right.

_Ath._ If, then, drinking and amusement were regulated in
this way, would not the companions of our revels be improved?

they would part better friends than they were, and not as now, enemies. Their whole intercourse would be regulated by law, and the sober would be the leaders of those who are not sober.

*Cle.* I think so too, if drinking were regulated as you propose.

*Ath.* Let us not then simply censure the gift of Dionysus as bad and unfit to be received into the State. For wine has many excellences, and one pre-eminent one, about which there is a difficulty in speaking to the many, from a fear of their misconceiving and misunderstanding what is said.

*Cle.* To what do you refer?

*Ath.* There is a tradition or story, which has somehow gone about the world, that Dionysus was robbed of his wits by his stepmother Here, and that out of revenge he inspires Bacchic furies and dancing madmesses in others; for which reason he gave men wine. Such traditions concerning the Gods I leave to those who think that they may be safely uttered; I only know that no animal at birth is mature or perfect in intelligence; and in the intermediate period, in which he has not yet acquired his own proper sense, he rages and roars without rhyme or reason; and when he has once got on his legs he jumps about without rhyme or reason; and this, as you will remember, has been already said by us to be the origin of music and gymnastic.

*Cle.* To be sure, I remember.

*Ath.* And did we not say that the sense of harmony and rhythm sprang from this beginning among men, and that Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus were the Gods whom we had to thank for them?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* The other story implied that wine was given man out of revenge, and in order to make him mad; but our present doctrine, on the contrary, is, that wine was given him as a balm, and in order to implant modesty in the soul, and health and strength in the body.

*Cle.* That, Stranger, is exactly what was said.

*Ath.* Then half the subject may now be considered to have been discussed; shall we proceed to the consideration of the other half?
LAWS.

Cle: What is the other half, and how do you divide the subject?

Ath. The whole choral art is also in our view the whole of education; and of this art, rhythms and harmonies, having to do with the voice, form a part.

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And the movement of the body and the movement of the voice have a common form which is rhythm, but they differ, in that the one is gesture, and the other song.

Cle. Most true.

Ath. And the sound of the voice which reaches and educates the soul, we have ventured to term music.

Cle. True.

Ath. And the movement of the body, which, when regarded as an amusement, we termed dancing; when pursued with a view to the improvement of the body, according to rules of art, may be called gymnastic.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. Music, which was one half of the choral art, may be said to have been completely discussed. Shall we proceed to the other half or not? What would you like?

Cle. My good friend, when you are talking with a Cretan and Lacedaemonian, and we have discussed music and not gymnastic, what answer are either of us likely to make to you?

Ath. That question is pretty much of an answer; and I understand and accept what you say both as an answer, and also as a command to proceed with gymnastic.

Cle. You quite understand me; do as you say.

Ath. I will; and there will be small difficulty in speaking intelligibly to you about a subject with which both of you are far more familiar than with music.

Cle. That is very true.

Ath. Is not the origin of gymnastics, too, to be sought in the tendency to rapid motion which exists in all animals; man, as we were saying, having attained the sense of rhythm, created and invented dancing; and melody arousing and awakening rhythm, both united formed the choral art?

Cle. Very true.
And one part of this subject has been already discussed by us, and there remains another part to be discussed?

Cle. Exactly.

Ath. I have first to add a crown to my discourse about drink.

Cle. What more would you say?

Ath. I should say that if a city seriously means to adopt the practice of drinking under due regulation and with a view to the enforcement of temperance, and in like manner, and on the same principle, will allow of other pleasures, designing to gain the victory over them—in this way all of them may be used. But if the State makes drinking an amusement only, and whoever likes may drink whenever he likes, and with whom he likes, and add to this any other indulgences, I shall never agree or allow that this city or this man should adopt such a usage of drinking. I would go farther than the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and am disposed rather to the law of the Carthaginians, that no one while he is on a campaign should be allowed to taste wine at all; but I would say that he should drink water during all that time, and that in the city no slave, male or female, should ever drink wine; and that no rulers should drink during their year of office, nor pilots of vessels, nor judges while on duty should taste wine at all; nor any one who is going to hold a consultation about any matter of importance, nor in the day-time at all, unless in consequence of exercise or as medicine; nor again at night, when any one, either man or woman, is minded to get children. There are numberless other cases also in which those who have good sense and good laws ought not to drink wine, so that if what I say is true, no city will need many vineyards. Their husbandry and their way of life in general will follow an appointed order, and their cultivation of the vine will be the most limited and moderate of their employments. And this, Stranger, shall be the crown of my discourse about wine, if you agree.

Cle. Excellent: we agree.
BOOK III.

Athenian Stranger. Enough of this. And what, then, is to be regarded as the origin of government? Will not a man be able to judge best from a point of view in which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to good or evil?

Cleinias. What do you mean?

Ath. I mean that he might watch them from the point of view of time, and observe the changes which take place in them during infinite ages.

Cle. How so?

Ath. Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them?

Cle. Hardly.

Ath. But you are sure that it must be vast and incalculable?

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. And have there not been thousands and thousands of cities which have come into being and perished during this period? And has not every place had endless forms of government, and been sometimes rising and at other times falling, and again improving or waning?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Let us endeavour to ascertain the cause of these changes; for that will probably explain the first origin and succession of states.

Cle. Very good. You shall endeavour to impart your thoughts to us, and we will make an effort to understand you.

Ath. Do you believe that there is any truth in ancient traditions?
What traditions?

Ath. The traditions about the many destructions of mankind which have been occasioned by deluges and diseases, and in many other ways, and of the preservation of a remnant.

Cle. Every one is disposed to believe them.

Ath. Let us imagine one of them: I will take the famous one which was caused by a deluge.

Cle. What is to be remarked in them?

Ath. I mean to say that those who then escaped would only be hill shepherds,—small sparks of the human race preserved on the tops of mountains.

Cle. Clearly.

Ath. Such survivors would necessarily be unacquainted with the arts of those who live in cities, and with the various devices which are suggested to them by interest or ambition, and all the wrongs which they contrive against one another.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Let us suppose, then, that the cities in the plain and on the sea-coast were utterly destroyed at that time.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Would not all implements perish and every other excellent invention of political or any other sort of wisdom utterly fail at that time?

Cle. Why, yes, my friend; and if things had always continued as they are at present ordered, how could any discovery have ever been made even in the least particular? For it is evident that the arts were unknown during thousands and thousands of years. And no more than a thousand or two thousand years have elapsed since the discoveries of Daedalus, Orpheus and Palamedes,—since Marsyas and Olympus invented music, and Amphion the lyre,—not to speak of numberless other inventions which are but of yesterday.

Ath. Have you forgotten, Cleinias, the name of a friend who is really of yesterday?

Cle. I suppose that you mean Epimenides.

Ath. The same, my friend; for his ingenuity does indeed far overlap the heads of all your great men; what Hesiod had preached of old, he carried out in practice, as you declare.

Cle. Yes, according to our tradition.
Ath. After the great destruction, may we not suppose that the state of man was something of this sort:—In the beginning of things there was a fearful illimitable desert and a vast expanse of land; a herd or two of oxen would be the only survivors of the animal world; and there might be a few goats, hardly enough to support the life of those who tended them.

Cle. True.

Ath. And of cities or governments or legislation, about which we are now talking, do you suppose that they could have any recollection at all?

Cle. They could not.

Ath. And out of this state of things has there not sprung all that we now are and have: cities and governments, and arts and laws, and a great deal of vice and a great deal of virtue?

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. Why, my good friend, how can we possibly suppose that those who knew nothing of all the good and evil of cities could have attained their full development, whether of virtue or of vice?

Cle. I understand your meaning, and you are quite right.

Ath. But, as time advanced and the race multiplied, the world came to be what the world is.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Doubtless the change was not made all in a moment, but little by little, during a very long period of time.

Cle. That is to be supposed.

Ath. At first, they would have a natural fear ringing in their ears which would prevent their descending from the heights into the plain.

Cle. Of course.

Ath. The fewness of the survivors would make them desirous of intercourse with one another; but then the means of travelling either by land or sea would have been almost entirely lost, as I may say, with the loss of the arts, and there would be great difficulty in getting at one another; for iron and brass and all metals would have become confused, and would have disappeared; nor would there be any possibility of extracting them; and they would have no means of felling timber. Even if you suppose that some implements might have been preserved
in the mountains, they would quickly have worn out and disappeared, and there would be no more of them until the art of metallurgy had again revived.

Cle. There could not have been.

Ath. In how many generations would this be attained?

Cle. Clearly, not for many generations.

Ath. During this period, and for some time afterwards, all the arts which require iron and brass and the like would disappear.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Faction and war would also have died out in those days, and for many reasons.

Cle. How would that be?

Ath. In the first place, the desolation of these primitive men would create in them a feeling of affection and friendship towards one another; and, in the second place, they would have no occasion to fight for their subsistence, for they would have pasture in abundance, except just at first, and in some particular cases; on this pasture-land they would mostly support life in a primitive age, having plenty of milk and flesh, and procuring other food by the chase, not to be despised either in quantity or quality. They would also have abundance of clothing, and bedding, and dwellings, and utensils either capable of standing on the fire or not; for the plastic and weaving arts do not require any use of iron: God has given these two arts to man in order to provide him with necessaries, that, when reduced to their last extremity, the human race may still grow and increase. Hence in those days mankind were not very poor; nor was poverty a cause of difference among them; and rich they could not be, if they had no gold and silver, and such at that time was their condition. And the community which has neither poverty nor riches will always have the noblest principles; there is no insolence or injustice, nor, again, are there any contentions or envyings among them. And therefore they were good, and also because they were what is called simple-minded; and when they were told about good and evil, they in their simplicity believed what they heard to be very truth and practised it. No one had the wit to suspect another of a falsehood, as men do now; but what they
heard about Gods and men they believed to be true, and lived accordingly; and therefore they were in all respects such as we have described them.

Cle. That quite accords with my views, and with those of my friend here.

Ath. Would not many generations living on in a simple manner, although ruder, perhaps, and more ignorant of the arts generally, and in particular of those of land or naval warfare, and likewise of other arts, termed in cities legal practices and party conflicts, and including all conceivable ways of hurting one another in word and deed;—although inferior to those who lived before the deluge, or to the men of our day in these respects, would they not, I say, be simpler and more manly, and also more temperate and in general more just? The reason has been already explained.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. I should wish you to understand that what has preceded and what is about to follow, has been, and will be said, with the intention of explaining what need the men of that time had of laws, and who was their lawgiver.

Cle. And thus far what you have said has been very well said.

Ath. They could hardly have wanted lawgivers as yet; nothing of that sort was likely to have existed in their days, for they had no letters at this early stage; they lived by habit and the customs of their forefathers, as they are called.

Cle. Probably.

Ath. But there was already existing a form of government which, if I am not mistaken, is generally termed a lordship, and this still remains in many places, both among Hellenes and barbarians, and is the government which is declared by Homer to have prevailed among the Cyclopes:—

'They have neither councils nor judgments, but they dwell in hollow rocks on the tops of high mountains, and every one is the judge of his wife and children, and they do not trouble themselves about one another.'

Cle. That must be a charming poet of yours; I have read some other verses of his, which are very clever; but I do not know much of him, for foreign poets are little read among the Cretans.
Meg. But they are in Lacedaemon, and he appears to be the prince of them all; the manner of life, however, which he describes is not Spartan, but rather Ionian, and he seems quite to confirm what you are saying, tracing up the ancient state of mankind by the help of tradition to barbarism.

Ath. Yes; and we may accept his witness to the fact that there was a time when primitive societies had this form.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And did not such states spring out of single habitations and families who were scattered and thinned in the devastations; and the eldest of them was their ruler, because with them government originated in the authority of a father and a mother, whom, like a flock of birds, they followed, forming one troop under the patriarchal rule and sovereignty of their parents, which of all sovereignties is the most just?

Cle. Very true.

Ath. After this they came together in greater numbers, and increased the size of their cities, and betook themselves to husbandry, first of all at the foot of the mountains, and made enclosures of loose walls and works of defence, in order to keep off wild beasts; thus creating a single large and common habitation.

Cle. Yes; at least we may suppose it.

Ath. There is another thing which would probably happen.

Cle. What?

Ath. When these larger habitations grew up out of the lesser original ones, each of the lesser ones would survive in the larger; every family would be under the rule of the eldest, and, owing to their separation from one another, would have peculiar customs in things divine and human, which they would have received from their several parents who had educated them; and these customs would incline them to order, when the parents had the element of order in them; and to courage, when they had the element of courage in them. And they would naturally stamp upon their children, and upon their children's children, their own institutions; and, as we are saying, they would find their way into the larger society, having already their own peculiar laws.

Cle. Certainly.
LAWS.

Ath. And every man surely likes his own laws best, and the laws of others not so well.

Cle. True.

Ath. Then now we seem to have stumbled upon the beginnings of legislation?

Cle. Exactly.

Ath. The next step will be that these persons who meet together, must choose some arbiters, who will inspect the laws of all of them, and will publicly present such of them as they approve to the chiefs who lead the tribes, and are in a manner their kings, and will give them the choice of them. These will themselves be called legislators, and will appoint the magistrates, framing some sort of aristocracy, or perhaps monarchy, out of the dynasties or lordships, and in this altered state of the government they will live.

Cle. Yes, they would be appointed in the order which you mention.

Ath. Then, now let us speak of a third form of the state in which all other forms and conditions of polities and cities concur.

Cle. And what is that?

Ath. The form pointed out by Homer was the third form, which succeeds the second. In speaking of the foundation of Dardania, he says,

'For not as yet had the holy Ilium been built on the plain to be a city of articulately-speaking men; but they were still dwelling at the foot of many-fountained Ida.'

For indeed, in these verses, and in what he said of the Cyclopes, he speaks the words of God and nature; for the inspiration of poets is divine, and often in their strains, by the aid of the Muses and the Graces, they attain truth.

Cle. Yes.

Ath. Then now let us proceed with the rest of our tale, which will probably be found to illustrate in some degree our proposed design:—Shall we do so?

Cle. By all means.

Ath. Ilium was built when they had descended from the mountain, in a large and fair plain, on a sort of low hill, watered by many rivers descending from Ida.
Cle. Such is the tradition.
Ath. And that we must suppose to have taken place many ages after the deluge?
Cle. Yes; many ages must have elapsed.
Ath. A marvellous forgetfulness of the former destruction would appear to have come over them, when they placed their town right under numerous streams flowing from the heights, and trusting for security to not very high hills, either.
Cle. There must have been a long interval, clearly.
Ath. And, as men increased in number, many other cities would begin to be built on the plain?
Cle. Doubtless.
Ath. Those cities made war against Troy—by sea as well as land—for at that time men were ceasing to be afraid of the sea.
Cle. Clearly.
Ath. The Achaeans remained ten years, and overthrew Troy.
Cle. True.
Ath. And during the ten years in which the Achaeans were besieging Ilium, the homes of the besiegers were falling into an evil plight. Their youth revolted; and when the soldiers returned to their own cities and families, they did not receive them properly, and as they ought to have done, and numerous deaths, murders, exiles, were the consequence. The exiles came again, under a new name, no longer Achaeans, but Dorians,—a name which they derived from Dorieus, who was the assembler of them. The rest of the story is told by you Lacedaemonians as part of the history of Sparta.
Meg. Certainly.
Ath. Thus, after digressing from the original subject of laws into music and drinking-bouts, the argument has, providentially, come back to the same point, and presents to us another handle. For we have come to the settlement of Lacedaemon; which, as you truly say, is in laws and in institutions the sister of Crete. And we are all the better for the digression, because we have gone through various states
and settlements, and have been present at the foundation of a first, second, and third state, succeeding one another in infinite time. And now there appears on the horizon a fourth state or nation which was in process of settlement and has continued to this day. If, out of all these, we are able to discern what is well or ill settled, and what laws are the salvation or destruction of cities, and what changes would make a state happy, O Megillus and Cleinias, we may now begin again, unless we have some reason to find fault with what has preceded.

Meg. If some God, Stranger, would promise us that our new enquiry about legislation would be as good and full as the last, I would go a long way to hear such another, and would think that the longest day—and we are now approaching the summer solstice—was too short for the discussion.

Ath. Then I suppose that we must consider this subject?

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. Let us place ourselves in thought at the moment, when Lacedaemon and Argos and Messene and the other countries were all in complete subjection, Megillus, to your ancestors; for at a later date, as the legend informs us, they divided their army into three portions, and settled three cities, Argos and Messene and Lacedaemon.

Meg. True.

Ath. Temenus was the king of Argos, Cresphontes of Messene, Procles and Eurysthenes of Lacedaemon.

Meg. To be sure.

Ath. To these kings all the men of that day made oath that they would assist them, if any one subverted their kingdom.

Meg. True.

Ath. But can a kingdom be destroyed, or was any other form of government ever destroyed, by any but the rulers themselves? Surely not. Have we forgotten what has just been laid down?

Meg. No.

Ath. And may we not now further confirm what was then said? For we have come upon facts which have brought us
back again to the principle; so that, in resuming the discussion, we shall not be enquiring about an empty theory, but about events which actually happened. The case was as follows:—Three royal heroes made oath to three cities which were under a kingly government, and the cities to the kings, that both rulers and subjects should govern and be governed according to the laws which were common to all of them: the rulers promised that as time and the race went forward they would not make their rule more arbitrary; and the subjects said that, if the rulers observed these conditions, they would never subvert or permit others to subvert those kingdoms; the kings were to assist kings and peoples when injured, and the peoples were to assist peoples and kings in like manner. Is not this true?

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. And these three states to whom laws were given, whether by their kings or by any others, had a further security for the maintenance of their constitutions?

Meg. What security?

Ath. That the other two states were always to come to the rescue against a rebellious third.

Meg. True.

Ath. Many persons say that legislators ought to impose such laws as the mass of the people will be ready to receive; but this is just as if one were to command gymnastic masters or physicians to treat or cure their pupils or patients in an agreeable manner.

Meg. Exactly.

Ath. Whereas the physician may often be too happy if he can restore health, and make the body whole, without any very great infliction of pain.

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. There was also another advantage possessed by the men of that day, which greatly lightened the task of passing laws.

Meg. What advantage?

Ath. The legislators of that day, when they equalized property, escaped the great accusation which generally arises in legislation, if a person attempts to disturb the possession of
land, or to get rid of debts, because he sees that without this reform there can never be any real equality. Now, in general, when the legislator attempts to make a new settlement of such matters, every one meets him with the cry, 'that he is not to disturb vested interests,'—declaring with imprecations that he is introducing agrarian laws and abolition of debts, until a man is at his wits' end; whereas no one could quarrel with the Doriens for distributing the land,—there was nothing to hinder them; and as for debts, they had none which were considerable or of old standing.

Meg. Very true.

Ath. But then, my good friends, why did the settlement and legislation of their country turn out so badly?

Meg. How do you mean; and for what do you blame them?

Ath. There were three kingdoms, and of these, two quickly corrupted their original constitution and laws, and the only one which remained was the Spartan.

Meg. The question which you ask is not easily answered.

Ath. And yet must be answered when we are enquiring about laws, which is our old man's sober game of play, and beguiles the way, as I was saying when we first set out on our journey.

Meg. Certainly; and we must find out why this was.

Ath. What laws are more worthy of our attention than those which have regulated such cities? or what cities or settlements are greater or more famous?

Meg. I know of none.

Ath. Can we doubt that they intended these institutions not only for the protection of Peloponnesus, but of all the Hellenes, in case they were attacked by the barbarian? For the inhabitants of the region about Ilium, when they provoked by their insolence the Trojan war, relied upon the power of the Assyrians and the Empire of Ninus, which still subsisted and had a great prestige; the people of those days fearing the united Assyrian Empire just as we now fear the great king. And the second capture of Troy was a serious offence on their part, because Troy was a portion of the Assyrian Empire. To meet the danger the constitution of the
single army, distributed into three cities, was devised by the royal brothers, sons of Heracles, and far better ordered than the expedition against Troy. For, in the first place, they had, as they thought, in the Heraclidae better leaders than the Pelopidae; in the next place, they considered that their army was superior in valour to that which went against Troy; for, although the latter conquered the Trojans, they were themselves conquered by the Heraclidae—Achaeans by Dorians. May we not suppose that this was the intention with which the men of those days framed the constitutions of their states?

Meg. Quite true.

Ath. And would not men who had shared with one another many dangers, and were governed by a single race of royal brothers, and had taken the advice of oracles, and in particular of the Delphian oracle, be likely to think that such states would be permanent and lasting?

Meg. Of course they would.

Ath. Yet these institutions, of which such great expectations were entertained, seem to have all rapidly vanished away; with the exception, as I was saying, of that small part of them which existed in your land. And this third part has never to this day ceased warring against the two others; whereas, if the original idea had been carried out, and they had agreed to be one, their power would have been invincible in war.

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. Now, what was the ruin of this great confederacy? Here is a subject well worthy of consideration.

Meg. Certainly, no one will ever find more striking instances of laws or governments being the salvation or destruction of great and noble interests, than are here presented to his view.

Ath. Then now we seem to have happily arrived at a real and important question?

Meg. Very true.

Ath. Did you never observe, sage friend, that men in general, and we ourselves, often fancy that they see some beautiful thing which might have effected wonders if they...
had only known how to make a right use of it—in some way or other; and yet this mode of looking at things may turn out after all to be a mistake, and not according to nature, either in our own case or in any other?

Meg. To what are you referring?

Ath. I was thinking of my own admiration of the afore-said Heraclid expedition, which was so noble, and might have had such wonderful results for the Hellenes, if only rightly used; and I was just laughing at myself.

Meg. But were you not right and wise in speaking as you did, and we in assenting to you?

Ath. Perhaps; and yet I cannot help observing that any one who sees anything great or powerful, immediately has the feeling that—'If the owner only knew how to use his great and noble possession, how happy would he be, and what great results would he attain!'

Meg. And would he not be right?

Ath. Reflect; in what point of view does this sort of praise appear just: First, in reference to the question in hand:—If the then commanders had known how to arrange their army properly, how would they have attained success? Would not this have been the way? They would have bound them all firmly together and preserved them for ever, giving them freedom and dominion at pleasure, combined with the power of doing in the whole world, Hellenic and barbarian, whatever they and their descendants desired. What other aim would they have had?

Meg. Very good.

Ath. Suppose any one were in the same way to express his admiration at the sight of great wealth or family honour, or the like, he would praise them under the idea that through them he would attain either all or the greater and chief part of what he desires.

Meg. He would.

Ath. Well, now, and does not the argument show that there is one common desire of all mankind?

Meg. What is it?

Ath. The desire which a man has, that all things may
come to pass in accordance with the will of his soul, things human at any rate, if not things divine.

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. And having this desire always, and at every time of life, he cannot help always praying for the fulfilment of it.

Meg. No doubt.

Ath. And we join in the prayers of our friends, and ask for them what they ask for themselves?

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. Dear is the son to the father—the younger to the elder.

Meg. Of course.

Ath. And yet the son often prays to obtain things which the father prays that he may not obtain.

Meg. When the son is young and foolish, you mean?

Ath. Yes; and when the father, in the dotage of age or the heat of youth, having no sense of right and justice, prays with fervour, under the influence of feelings like those of Theseus when he cursed the unfortunate Hippolytus, do you imagine that the son, having a sense of right and justice, will join in his father's prayers?

Meg. I understand you to mean that a man should not desire or endeavour to have all things according to his wish, for his wish may be at variance with his reason. Every one of us, whether individual or state, ought to pray and endeavour that he may have wisdom.

Ath. Yes; and I remember, and you will remember, what I said at first, that a statesman and legislator ought to ordain laws with a view to wisdom; whereas you were arguing that the good lawgiver ought to order all with a view to war. And to this I replied that there were four virtues, whereas your regards were fixed upon one of the four only; but that you ought to regard all virtue, and especially that which comes first, and is the guide of all the rest—I mean wisdom and mind and opinion united with the affection and desire which waits upon them. And now the argument returns to the same point, and I say once more, in jest if you like, or in earnest if you like, that the prayer of a fool is
full of danger, being likely to end in the opposite of what he desires. And if you would rather receive my words in earnest, I am willing that you should; and you will find, I suspect, as I have said already, that not cowardice was the cause of the ruin of the Dorian kings and of their whole design, nor ignorance of military matters, either on the part of the rulers or of their subjects; but the cause was the corrupting influence of the other vices, and especially their ignorance of the most important human affairs. That was then, and is still, and always will be the case, as I will endeavour, if you will allow me, to make out and demonstrate to you who are my friends, in the course of the argument.

Cle. Pray go on, Stranger;—compliments are troublesome, but we will show, not in word but in deed, how greatly we prize your words, for we will give them our best attention; and that is the way in which a gentleman expresses his approval.

Meg. Excellent, Cleinias; let us do as you say.

Cle. By all means, if Heaven wills. Go on.

Ath. Well, then, proceeding in the same train of thought, I say that the greatest ignorance was the ruin of the Dorian power, and that now, as then, ignorance is ruin. And if this be true, the legislator must endeavour to implant wisdom in states, and banish ignorance to the utmost of his power.

Cle. That is evident.

Ath. Then now consider what is really the greatest ignorance. I should like to know whether you and Megillus would agree with me in what I am about to say; for my opinion is——

Cle. What?

Ath. That the greatest ignorance is when a man hates that which he nevertheless thinks to be good and noble, and loves and embraces that which he knows to be unrighteous and evil. This disagreement between the sense of pleasure and the judgment of reason in the soul is, in my opinion, the worst ignorance; and the greatest too, because affecting the great mass of the human soul; for the principle which feels pleasure and pain in the individual is like the mass or popu-
lace in a state. And when the soul is opposed to knowledge, or opinion, or reason, which are her natural lords, that I call folly, just as in the state, when the multitude refuses to obey their rulers and the laws; or, again, in the individual, when fair reasonings have their habitation in the soul and yet do no good, but rather the reverse of good. All these cases I term the worst ignorance, whether in individuals or in states. I am not speaking, Stranger, as you will understand, of the ignorance of handicraftsmen.

_Cle._ Yes, my friend, we understand and agree.

_Ath._ Let us, then, in the first place declare and affirm that the citizen who does not know these things ought never to have any kind of authority entrusted to him: he must be stigmatized as ignorant, even though he be skilful in calculation and versed in all sorts of accomplishments, and feats of mental dexterity; and the opposite are to be called wise, even although, in the words of the proverb, they know neither how to read nor how to swim; and to them, as to men of sense, authority is to be committed. For, O my friends, how can there be the least shadow of wisdom when there is no harmony? There is none; but the noblest and greatest of harmonies may be truly said to be the greatest wisdom; and of this he is a partaker who lives according to reason; whereas he who is devoid of reason is the destroyer of his house and the opposite of the saviour of the state: he is ignorant of political wisdom. Let this, then, as I was saying, be laid down by us.

_Cle._ Let this be laid down.

_Ath._ I suppose that there must be rulers and subjects in states?

_Cle._ Certainly.

_Ath._ And what are the received principles of rule and obedience in cities, whether great or small; and similarly in families? What are they, and how many in number? Is not one claim of authority which is always just, that of fathers and mothers and in general of progenitors over their offspring?

_Cle._ Certainly.

_Ath._ Next follows the principle that the noble should rule
over the ignoble; and, thirdly, that the elder should rule and the younger obey?

_Cle._ To be sure.

_Ath._ And, fourthly, that slaves should be ruled, and their masters rule?

_Cle._ Of course.

_Ath._ Fifthly, if I am not mistaken, comes the principle that the stronger shall rule, and the weaker be ruled?

_Cle._ That is a rule not to be disobeyed.

_Ath._ Yes, and a rule which prevails very widely among all creatures, and is according to nature, as the Theban poet Pindar once said; and the sixth principle, and the greatest of all, is, that the wise should lead and command, and the ignorant follow and obey; and yet, O thou most wise Pindar, as I should reply to him, it surely is not contrary to nature, but according to nature, being the rule of law over willing subjects, and not a rule of compulsion.

_Cle._ Very true.

_Ath._ There is a seventh kind of rule which is conferred by the arbitrament of the lot, and is dear to the Gods and a token of good fortune: he on whom the lot falls is a ruler, and he who fails in obtaining the lot goes away and is the subject; and this we affirm to be quite just.

_Cle._ Certainly.

_Ath._ Then now, as we say playfully to any of those who lightly undertake the making of laws, You see before you, legislator, the principles of government, and you see the opposition which is naturally inherent in them. There we have discovered a fountain-head of seditions, to which you must attend. And, first, we will ask you to consider with us, how and in what respect the kings of Argos and Messene violated these our maxims, and ruined themselves and the great and famous Hellenic power of the olden time. Was this because they did not know the truly excellent saying of Hesiod, that the half is often greater than the whole? His meaning was, that when the whole was injurious and the half moderate, then the moderate was more and better than the immoderate.

_Cle._ Very true.
**BOOK III.**

*Ath.* And are we to suppose that this ignorance is less fatal among kings than among peoples?

*Cle.* The probability is that ignorance will be a more prevalent disorder among kings, because they lead a proud and luxurious life.

*Ath.* Is it not palpable that the kings of that time were guilty of trying to be above the established laws, and that they did not consistently observe what they had agreed to observe by word and oath? This inconsistency of theirs may have had the appearance of wisdom, but was really, as we assert, the greatest ignorance, and utterly overthrew the whole empire through fatal error and perversity.

*Cle.* Very likely.

*Ath.* Good; and what ought the then legislator to have done in order to avert this calamity? Truly there is no great wisdom in knowing, and no great difficulty in telling, after the evil has happened; but to have foreseen the remedy at the time would have taken a much wiser head than ours.

*Meg.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* Any one who looks at what has occurred with you, Megillus, may easily know and may easily say what ought to have been done at that time.

*Meg.* Speak a little more clearly.

*Ath.* Nothing can be clearer than the observation which I am about to make.

*Meg.* What is it?

*Ath.* That if any one gives too great a power to anything, too large a sail to a vessel, too much food to the body, too much authority to the mind, and is regardless of the mean, everything is overthrown, and, in the wantonness of excess, runs in the one case to disorder, and in the other to injustice, which is the child of excess. I mean to say, my dear friends, that there is no soul of man, young and irresponsible, who will be able to sustain the temptation of arbitrary power—no one who will not, under such circumstances, become filled with folly, that worst of diseases, and be hated by his nearest and dearest friends: when this happens his kingdom is undermined, and all his power vanishes from him.
And great legislators who know the mean should take heed of the danger. As far as we can guess at this distance of time, what happened was as follows:—

Meg. What?

Ath. A God, who watched over Sparta, seeing into the future, gave you two families of kings instead of one; and thus brought you within the limits of moderation. In the next place, some human wisdom mingled with divine power, observing that the constitution of your government was still feverish and excited, tempered your inborn strength and pride of birth with the moderation which comes of age, making the power of your twenty-eight elders equal with that of the kings in your most important matters. But your third saviour, perceiving that your government was still swelling and foaming, imposed as a curb the power of the Ephori, nearly resembling that of officers elected by lot; and by this arrangement the kingly office, being compounded of the right elements and duly moderated, was preserved, and was the means of preserving all the rest. Since, if there had been only the original legislators, Temenus, Cresphontes, and their contemporaries, as far as they were concerned, not even the portion of Aristodemus would have been preserved; for they had no proper experience in legislation, or they would surely not have imagined that oaths would moderate a youthful spirit invested with a power which might be converted into a tyranny. Now that God has instructed us what sort of government would have been or will be lasting, there is no wisdom, as I have already said, in judging after the event; there is no difficulty in learning from an example which has already occurred. But if any one could have foreseen all this at the time, and had been able to moderate the government of the three kingdoms and unite them into one, he might have saved all the excellent institutions which were then conceived; and no Persian or any other armament would have dared to attack us, or would have regarded Hellas as a power to be despised.

Cle. True.

Ath. There was small credit to us, Cleinias, in defeating them; and the discredit was, not that the conquerors did not
win many great battles both by land and sea; but what, in my opinion, brought discredit was, first of all, the circumstance that of the three cities one only fought on behalf of Hellas, and the two others were so utterly good for nothing that the one was waging a mighty war against Lacedaemon, and thus prevented her from coming to the rescue, and the city of Argos, which had the precedence at the time of the distribution, when asked to aid in repelling the barbarian, would not answer to the call, or give aid. Many things might be told about Hellas in connection with that war which are far from honourable; nor, indeed, can we rightly say that Hellas repelled the invader; for the truth is, that unless the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, in concert, had repulsed the advancing host, all the tribes of Hellas would have been fused in a chaos of barbarians mingling with Hellenes, and Hellenes with barbarians; just as nations who are now subject to the Persian power, owing to unnatural separations and combinations of them, are dispersed and scattered, and live miserably. These things, Megillus, we lay at the door of statesmen and legislators, as they are called, past and present, in order that we may analyse the causes of them, and find out what else might have been done. We were saying, for instance, just now, that there ought to be no great and unmixed powers; and this was under the idea that a state ought to be free and wise and harmonious, and that a legislator ought to legislate with a view to this end. Nor is there any reason to be surprised at our continually proposing aims for the legislator which appear not to be always the same; but we should consider when we say that temperance is to be the aim, or wisdom is to be the aim, or friendship is to be the aim, that all these are really the same; and if so a variety in the modes of expression ought not to disturb us.

Cle. Let us resume the argument in that spirit: And now, speaking of friendship and wisdom and freedom, I wish that you would tell me at what, in your opinion, the legislator should aim?

Ath. Hear me, then: there are two mother forms of states from which the rest may be truly said to be derived; and
one of them may be called monarchy and the other democracy: the Persians have the highest form of the one, and we of the other; almost all the rest, as I was saying, are varying mixtures of these. Now, if you are to have liberty and the combination of friendship with wisdom, you must have both these forms of government in a measure; the argument emphatically declares that no city can be well governed which is not made up of both.

Cle. Impossible.

Ath. The state which has become exclusively and excessively attached to monarchy or to freedom, has neither of them in moderation; but your states, the Laconian and Cretan, have a certain moderation; and the Athenians and Persians having had more at first, have now less. Shall I tell you why?

Cle. By all means, if it will tend to the elucidation of our subject.

Ath. Hear, then:—There was a time when the Persians had more of the state which is a mean between slavery and freedom. In the reign of Cyrus they were freemen and also lords of many others: the rulers gave a share of freedom to the subjects, and being treated as equals, the soldiers were on better terms with their generals, and showed themselves more ready in the hour of danger. And if there was any wise councillor among them, he imparted his wisdom to the public; for the king was not jealous, but allowed him full liberty of speech, and gave honour to those who were able to be his counsellors in anything, and allowed all men equally to participate in wisdom. And the nation waxed in all respects, because there was freedom and friendship and communion of soul among them.

Cle. That certainly appears to have been the case.

Ath. How, then, was this advantage lost under Cambyses, and again recovered under Darius? Shall I try to divine?

Cle. That question, certainly, has a bearing on the subject of our enquiry.

Ath. I imagine that Cyrus, though a great and patriotic general, had never given his mind to education, and never attended to the order of his household.
Cle. What makes you say so?

Ath. I think that from his youth upwards he was a soldier, and entrusted the bringing up of his children to the women; and they brought them up from their childhood as the favourites of fortune, who were blessed already, and needed no more blessings. They thought that they were happy enough, and that no one should be allowed to oppose them in any way, and they compelled every one to praise all that they said or did. This was the manner in which they brought them up.

Cle. A splendid education truly!

Ath. Such an education as women were likely to give them, and especially princesses who had recently grown rich, and in the absence of the men, too, who were occupied in wars and dangers, and too busy to look after them.

Cle. What would you expect?

Ath. Their father had possessions of cattle and sheep, and many herds of men and other animals; but he did not consider that those to whom he was about to make them over were not trained in his own calling, which was Persian; for the Persians are shepherds—sons of a rugged land, which was a stern mother, and well fitted to produce a sturdy race able to live in the open air and watch, and to fight also, if fighting was required. He did not observe that his sons were trained differently; through the so-called blessing of being royal they were educated in the corrupt Median fashion by women and eunuchs, which led to their becoming such as people do become when they are brought up unreproved. And so, after the death of Cyrus, his sons, in the fulness of luxury and licence, took the kingdom, and first one slew the other because he could not endure a rival; and, afterwards, the slayer himself, mad with wine and brutality, lost his kingdom through the Medes and the eunuch, as they called him, who despised the folly of Cambyses.

Cle. That is what is said, and is probably the truth.

Ath. Yes; and the tradition says, that the empire came back to the Persians, through Darius and the seven chiefs.

Cle. True.

Ath. Let us note the rest of the story. Observe, that Darius
was not the son of a king, and had not received a luxurious education. When he came to the throne, being one of the seven, he divided the country into seven portions, and of this arrangement there are some shadowy traces still remaining; he made laws upon the principle of introducing universal equality in the order of the state, and he embodied in a law the settlement of the tribute which Cyrus promised,—thus creating a feeling of friendship and community among all the Persians, and attaching the people to him with money and gifts. Hence his armies cheerfully acquired for him countries as large as those which Cyrus had left behind him. Darius was succeeded by his son Xerxes; and he again was brought up in the royal and luxurious fashion. Might we not justly say: 'O Darius, why did you not learn wisdom from the misfortunes of Cyrus, instead of bringing up Xerxes in the same way in which he brought up Cambyses?' For Xerxes being the creation of the same education, met with much the same fortune as Cambyses; and from that time to this there has never been a really great king among the Persians, although they are all called great. And their degeneracy is not to be attributed to chance as I maintain; the reason is rather the evil life which is generally led by the sons of very rich and royal persons; for never will boy or man, young or old, excel in virtue, who has been thus educated. And this, I say, is what the legislator has to consider, and what at this moment has to be considered by us. Justly may you, O Lacedaemonians, be praised for this—that you do not give special honour or maintenance to wealth rather than to poverty in particular, or to a royal rather than to a private station, where the divine and inspired lawgiver has not originally commanded them to be given. For no man ought to have preeminent honour in a state because he surpasses others in wealth, any more than because he is swift or fair or strong, unless he have some virtue in him; nor even if he have virtue, unless he have this particular virtue of temperance.

Meg. What do you mean, Stranger?

Ath. I suppose that courage is a part of virtue?

Meg. To be sure.

Ath. Then, now hear and judge yourself:—Would you like
to have for a fellow-lodger or neighbour a very courageous man, who had no control over himself?

Meg. Heaven forbid!

Ath. Or an artist, who was clever in his profession, but a rogue?

Meg. Certainly not.

Ath. And surely justice does not grow apart from temperance?

Meg. Impossible.

Ath. Any more than our pattern wise man, whom he exhibited as having his pleasures and pains in accordance with and corresponding to true reason, can be without temperance?

Meg. No.

Ath. There is a further consideration pointing to the due and undue award of honours in states.

Meg. What is it?

Ath. I should like to know whether temperance without the other virtues, existing alone in the soul of man, is rightly to be had in honour or dishonour?

Meg. I cannot tell.

Ath. And that is the best answer; for whichever alternative you had chosen, I think that you would have gone wrong.

Meg. I am fortunate.

Ath. Very good; a quality, which is a mere appendage of things honourable and dishonourable, does not deserve an expression of opinion, but is best expressed by silence.

Meg. You are speaking of temperance, when you say this?

Ath. Yes; but of the other virtues, that which having this appendage is also most beneficial, will be most deserving of honour, and next that which is beneficial in the next degree; and so, each of them will be rightly honoured according to a regular order.

Meg. True.

Ath. And ought not the legislator to determine these classes?

Meg. Certainly he should.

Ath. Suppose that we leave to him the arrangement of details. But the general division of laws according to their importance into a first and second and third class, we who are lovers of law may make ourselves.
Meg. Very good.

Ath. We maintain, then, that a State which would be safe and happy, as far as the nature of man allows, must and ought to distribute honour and dishonour in the right way. And the right way is to place the goods of the soul first and highest in the scale, always assuming temperance as a condition of them; and in the second place, the goods of the body; and in the third place, those of money and property. And if any legislator or state departs from this rule by giving money the place of honour, or in any way preferring that which is really last, may we not say, that he or the state is doing an unholy and unpatriotic thing?

Meg. Yes; let that be plainly asserted.

Ath. The consideration of the Persian governments led us thus far to enlarge. We remarked that the Persians grew worse and worse. And we affirm the reason of this to have been, that they too much diminished the freedom of the people, and introduced too much of despotism, and so destroyed friendship and community of feeling. And when there is an end of these, no longer do the governors govern on behalf of their subjects or of the people, but on behalf of themselves; and if they think that they can gain ever so little for themselves, they devastate cities, and send fire and desolation among friendly races. And as they hate ruthlessly and horribly, so are they hated; and when they want the people to fight for them, they find no community of feeling or willingness to risk their lives in fighting for them; their untold myriads are useless to them on the field of battle, and they think that their salvation depends on the employment of mercenaries and strangers whom they hire, just as if they were in want of men. And they cannot help being stupid, since they proclaim by their actions that the ordinary distinctions of right and wrong are a trifle, when compared with gold and silver.

Meg. Quite true.

Ath. And now enough of the Persians, and their present maladministration of their government, which is owing to the prevalence of slavery and despotism among them.

Meg. Good.

Ath. Next, we must pass in review the government of Attica
in like manner, and from this show that entire freedom and the absence of all superior authority, is not by any means so good as a limited government, which was our ancient Athenian constitution at the time when the Persians made their attack on Hellas, or, speakingly more correctly, on the whole continent of Europe. There were four classes, arranged according to a property census, and reverence was our queen and mistress, and made us willing to live in obedience to the laws. Also the vastness of the Persian armament, both by sea and on land, caused a helpless terror, which made us more and more the servants of our rulers and of the laws; and for all these reasons an exceeding harmony prevailed among us. About ten years before the naval engagement at Salamis, Datis came, leading a Persian host by command of Darius, which was expressly sent against the Athenians and Eretrians, having orders to carry them away captive; and these orders he was to execute under pain of death. Now Datis and his myriads soon became complete masters of Eretria, and a fearful report reached Athens that no Eretrian had escaped him; for the soldiers of Datis had joined hands and netted the whole of Eretria. And this report, whether well or ill founded, was terrible to all the Hellenes, and above all to the Athenians, and they sent embassies in all directions, but no one was willing to come to their relief, with the exception of the Lacedaemonians; and they, either because they were detained by the Messenian war, which was then going on, or for some other reason (for the truth of the matter is not accurately known), came a day too late for the battle of Marathon. After this, the news arrived of mighty preparations being made, and innumerable threats came from the king. Then, as time went on, a rumour reached us that Darius had died, and that his son, who was young and hot-headed, had come to the throne and was persisting in his design. The Athenians were under the impression that the whole expedition was directed against them, in consequence of the battle of Marathon; and hearing of the bridge over the Hellespont, and the canal of Athos, and the host of ships, considering that there was no salvation for them either by land or by sea, for there was no one to help them, and remembering that in the first expedition, when the
Persians destroyed Eretria, no one came to their help, or would risk the danger of an alliance with them, they thought that this would happen again, at least on land; nor, when they looked to the sea, could they descry any hope of salvation; for they were attacked by a thousand vessels and more. One chance of safety remained, slight indeed and desperate, but their only one. They saw that on the former occasion they had gained a seemingly impossible victory, and anchored on this hope, they found that their only refuge was in themselves and in the Gods. All these things created in them the spirit of friendship; there was the immediate fear of the occasion, and that other present fear, which sprang out of the habit of obeying their traditional laws, and which I have several times in the preceding discourse called reverence, to which the good man is, as he ought be, a willing servant, and of which the meaner sort of man is apt to be independent and fearless. If they had not been possessed by this fear, they would never have met the enemy, or defended their temples and sepulchres and their country, and everything that was near and dear to them, as they did; but little by little they would have been all scattered and dispersed.

Meg. Your words, Athenian, are quite true, and worthy of yourself and of your country.

Ath. They are true, Megillus; and to you, who have inherited the virtues of your ancestors, I may properly speak of the actions of that day. And I would wish you and Cleinias to consider whether my words have not also a bearing on legislation; for I am not discoursing only for the pleasure of talking, but for the argument's sake. Please to remark that the experience both of ourselves and the Persians was, in a certain sense, the same; for they led their people as we led ours, the one into utter servitude, the other into all freedom. And now, how shall we proceed? for I would like you to observe that our previous arguments have a good deal to say for themselves.

Meg. True; but I wish that you would give us a fuller explanation.

Ath. I will. Under the ancient laws, my friends, the people was not as now the master, but rather the willing servant of the laws.
Meg. What laws do you mean?

Ath. In the first place, let us speak of the laws about music; that is to say, such music as then existed; in order that we may trace the growth of the excess of freedom from the beginning; for music was early divided among us into certain kinds and manners. One sort consisted of prayers to the Gods, which were called hymns; and there was another and opposite sort called lamentations, and another termed paeans, and another called dithyrambs; of which latter the subject, if I am not mistaken, was the birth of Dionysus. And they used the actual word 'laws,' or νόμοι, meaning 'song,' only adding such and such an instrument, of the harp, for example, when they wanted to denote a particular strain. All these and others were duly distinguished, nor were they allowed to intermingle one sort of music with another. And the authority which determined and gave judgment, and punished the disobedient, was not expressed in a hiss, nor in the most unmusical 'sweet voices' of the multitude, as in our days; nor in applause and clappings of the hands. But the directors of public instruction insisted that the spectators should listen in silence to the end; and boys and their tutors, and the multitude in general, were kept quiet by the touch of the wand. Such was the good order which the multitude were willing to observe; they would not have dared to give judgment by noisy cries. And then, as time went on, the poets themselves introduced the reign of ignorance and misrule. They were men of genius, but they had no knowledge of what is just and lawful in music; raging like Bacchanals and possessed with inordinate delights—mingling lamentations with hymns, and paeans with dithyrambs; imitating the sounds of the flute on the lyre, and making one general confusion; ignorantly affirming that music has no truth, and, whether good or bad, can only be judged of rightly by the pleasure of the hearer. And by composing such licentious poems, and adding to them words as licentious, they have inspired the multitude with lawlessness and boldness, and made them fancy that they can judge for themselves about melody and song. And in this way the theatres from being mute have become vocal, as though they had understanding of good and bad in music.
and poetry; and instead of an aristocracy, an evil sort of theatriocracy has grown up. For if the democracy which judged had only consisted of freemen, there would have been no fatal harm done; but in music there first arose the universal conceit of omniscience and general lawlessness;—freedom came following afterwards, and men, fancying that they knew what they did not know, had no longer any fear, and the absence of fear begets shamelessness. For what is shamelessness but the insolent refusal to regard the opinion of the better by reason of an over-daring sort of liberty?

Meg. Very true.

Ath. Consequent upon this freedom comes the other freedom of disobedience to rulers; and then the attempt to escape the control and exhortation of father, mother, elders, and when near the end, the control of the laws also; and at the very end there is the contempt of oaths and pledges, and no regard at all for the Gods,—herein they exhibit and imitate the old Titanic nature; and thus they return again to the old, and lead a life of evils which have no end. Why do I say so? Because I think that the argument ought to be pulled up from time to time, and not be allowed to run away, but held with bit and bridle, and then we shall not, as the proverb says, fall off our ass. Let us then once more ask the question, to what end has all this been said?

Meg. Very good.

Ath. This, then, has been said for the sake—

Meg. Of what?

Ath. We said that the lawgiver ought to have three things in view: first, that the city for which he legislates should be free; and secondly, be at unity with herself; and thirdly, should have understanding; these were our principles, were they not?

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. With a view to this we selected two kinds of government, the one the most despotic, and the other the most free; and now we are considering which of them is the right form: we took a mean in both cases, of despotism in the one, and of liberty in the other, and we saw that in a mean they attained their perfection; but that when they were
carried to the extreme of either, slavery or despotism, neither party were the gainers.

Meg. Very true.

Ath. And that was our reason for considering the settlement of the Dorian army, and of the country at the foot of the Dardanian mountains, and the removal of the city to the plain by the sea, and the first men who were the survivors of the deluge. And all that was said about music and drinking, and what preceded, has been said with the view of seeing how a state might be best administered, and how an individual might best order his own life. And now, Megillus and Cleinias, how can we put to the proof the value of our words?

Cle. Stranger, I think that I see how a proof of their value may be obtained. This discussion of ours appears to me to have been singularly fortunate, and just what I at this moment want; most auspiciously have you and my friend Megillus come in my way. For I will tell you what has happened to me; and I regard the coincidence as a sort of omen. The greater part of Crete is going to send out a colony, and they have entrusted the management of the affair to the Cnosians; and the Cnosians to me and nine others. And they desire us to give them any laws which we please, whether taken from the Cretan model or from any other; and they do not mind about their being foreign if they are better. Grant me then this favour, which will also be a gain to yourselves:—Let us make a selection from what has been said, and then let us imagine a State of which we will suppose ourselves to be the original colonizers. Thus we shall proceed with our enquiry, and at the same time I may have the use of the framework which you are constructing, for the city which is in contemplation.

Ath. Good news, Cleinias; if Megillus has no objection, you may be sure that I will do all in my power to please you.

Cle. I agree.

Meg. And I too.

Cle. Excellent; and now let us begin to frame the State.
BOOK IV.

Athenian Stranger. And now, what will this city be? I do not mean to ask what is or will be the name of the place; that may be determined by the accident of locality or of the original settlement,—a river or fountain, or some local deity may give the sanction of a name to the newly-founded city; but I do want to know what the situation is; whether maritime or inland?

Cleinias. I should imagine, Stranger, that the city of which we are speaking is about eighty stadia distant from the sea.

Ath. And are there harbours on the seaboard?

Cle. Excellent harbours, Stranger; there could not be better.

Ath. You don't say so! And is the surrounding country productive, or in need of importations?

Cle. Hardly in need of anything.

Ath. And is there any neighbouring state?

Cle. None whatever, and that is the reason for selecting the place; in days of old, there was a migration of the inhabitants, and the region has been deserted from time immemorial.

Ath. And has the place a fair proportion of hill, and plain, and wood?

Cle. Like the rest of Crete in that.

Ath. You mean to say that there is more rock than plain?

Cle. Exactly.

Ath. Then there is some hope that your citizens may be virtuous: had you been on the sea, and well provided with harbours, and an importing rather than a producing country, some mighty saviour would have been needed, and lawgivers more than mortal, if you were ever to have a chance of preserving your state from degeneracy and discordance of manners. But there is comfort in the eighty stadia; although the sea is too near, especially if, as you say, the harbours are so
good. Still we must be satisfied. The sea is pleasant enough as a daily companion, but has also a bitter and brackish quality; filling the streets with merchants and shopkeepers, and begetting in the souls of men uncertain and unfaithful ways—making the state unfriendly and unfaithful both to her own citizens, and also to other nations. There is a consolation, therefore, in the country producing all things at home; and yet, owing to the ruggedness of the soil, not providing anything in great abundance. Had there been abundance there might have been a great export trade, and a great return of gold and silver; which, as we may safely affirm, has the most fatal results on a State whose aim is the attainment of just and noble sentiments: this was said by us, if you remember, in the previous discussion.

Cle. I remember, and am of opinion that we both were and are in the right.

Ath. Well, but let me ask, how is the country supplied with timber for ship-building?

Cle. There is no pine of any consequence, or fir, and not much cypress; and you will find very little stone-pine or plane-wood, which shipwrights always require for the interior of ships.

Ath. These are also natural advantages.

Cle. Why so?

Ath. Because no city ought to be easily able to imitate its enemies in what is mischievous.

Cle. How does that bear upon any of the matters of which we have been speaking?

Ath. Remember, my good friend, what I said at first about the Cretan laws, that they looked to one thing only, and this, as you both agreed, was war; and I replied that such laws, in so far as they tended to promote virtue, were good; but in that they regarded a part only, and not the whole of virtue, I disapproved of them. And now I hope that you in your turn will follow and watch me if I legislate with a view to anything but virtue, or with a view to a part of virtue. For I consider that the true lawgiver, like an archer, aims only at that on which some eternal beauty is always attending, and dismisses everything else, whether wealth or any other benefit,
when separated from virtue. I was saying that the imitation of enemies was a bad thing; and I was thinking of a case in which a maritime people are harassed by enemies, as the Athenians were by Minos (I do not speak from any desire to recall past grievances); but he, as we know, was a great naval potentate, who compelled the inhabitants of Attica to pay him a cruel tribute; and in those days they had no ships of war as they now have, nor was the country filled with ship timber, and therefore they could not readily build them. Hence neither could they learn how to imitate their enemy at sea, or become sailors themselves, and in this way directly repel their enemies. Better for them to have lost many times over the seven youths, than that heavy-armed and stationary troops should have been turned into sailors, and accustomed to leap quickly on shore, and again to hurry back to their ships; or should have fancied that there was no disgrace in not awaiting the attack of an enemy and dying boldly; and that there were good reasons, and plenty of them, for a man throwing away his arms, and betaking himself to flight; which is not dishonourable, as people say, at certain times. This is the language of naval warfare, and is anything but worthy of extraordinary praise. For we should not teach bad habits, least of all to the best part of the citizens. You may learn the evil of such a practice from Homer, by whom Odysseus is introduced, rebuking Agamemnon, because he desires to draw down the ships to the sea at a time when the Achaeans are hard pressed by the Trojans,—he gets angry with him, and says:

'Who, at a time when the battle is in full cry, biddest to drag the well-oared ships into the sea, that the prayers of the Trojans may be accomplished yet more, and high ruin fall upon us? For the Achaeans will not maintain the battle, when the ships are drawn into the sea, but they will look behind and will cease from strife; in that the counsel which you give will prove injurious.'

You see that he quite knew triremes on the sea, in the neighbourhood of fighting men, to be an evil;—lions might be trained in that way to fly from a herd of deer. Moreover, naval powers which owe their safety to ships, do not honour that sort of warlike excellence which is most deserving of
honour. For he who owes his safety to the pilot and the captain, and the oarsman, and all sorts of rather good-for-nothing persons, cannot rightly give honour to whom honour is due. But how can a state be in a right condition which cannot duly award honour?

Cle. It is hardly possible, I admit; and yet, Stranger, we Cretans are in the habit of saying that the battle of Salamis was the salvation of Hellas.

Ath. Why, yes; and that is an opinion which is widely spread both among Hellenes and barbarians. But Megillus and I say, rather, that the battle of Marathon was the beginning, and the battle of Plataea the completion of the great deliverance, and that these battles made the Hellenes better; whereas the sea-fights of Salamis and Artemisium—for I may as well put them both together—made them no better, if I may say so without offence about the battles which helped to save us. And in estimating the goodness of a state, we regard both the situation of a country and the order of the laws, considering that the mere preservation and continuance of life is not the most honourable thing for men, as the vulgar think, but the continuance of the best life, while we live; and that again, if I am not mistaken, is a remark which has been made already.

Cle. Yes.

Ath. Then we have only to ask, whether we are taking the course which we acknowledge to be the best for the settlement and legislation of states.

Cle. The best by far.

Ath. And now let me proceed to another question: Who are to be the colonists? May any one come out of all Crete; and is the idea that the population in the several states is too numerous for the means of subsistence? For I suppose that you are not going to send out a general invitation to any Hellene who likes to come. And yet I observe that in your country there are people who have come from Argos and Aegina and other parts of Hellas. Tell me, then, whence do you draw your recruits in the present enterprise?

Cle. They will come from all Crete; and of other Hellenes,
Peloponnesians will be most acceptable. For, as you truly observe, there are Cretans of Argive descent; and the race of Cretans which has the highest character at the present day, is the Gortynian, and this has come from Gortys in the Peloponnesus.

*Ath.* Cities find colonization in some respects easier when the colonists are one race, which like a swarm of bees is sent out from a single country, friends from friends, owing to some pressure of population, or other similar necessity, or because a portion of a state is driven by factions to emigrate. And there have been whole cities which have taken flight when utterly conquered by a superior power in war. This, however, which is in one way an advantage to the colonist or legislator, in another point of view creates a difficulty. There is an element of friendship in the community of race, and language, and laws, and in common sacrifices, and the like; but colonies which are of this homogeneous sort are apt to kick against any laws different from their own; and although the badness of their own laws has undone them, yet because of the force of habit they would fain preserve the very customs which were their ruin; and the leader of the colony, who is their legislator, finds them troublesome and rebellious. On the other hand, the conflux of several populations might be more disposed to listen to new laws; but then, to make them combine and pull together, as they say of horses, is a most difficult task, and the work of years. And yet there is nothing which perfects the virtue of men like legislation and colonization.

*Cle.* No doubt; but I should like to know why you say so.

*Ath.* My good friend, I am afraid that the course of my speculations is leading me to say something depreciatory of legislators; but if the word be to the purpose there can be no harm. And yet, why am I disquieted, for I believe that the same principle applies equally to all human things?

*Cle.* To what are you referring?

*Ath.* I was going to say that man never legislates, but accidents of all sorts, which legislate for us in all sorts of ways. The violence of war and the hard necessity of poverty are constantly overturning governments and changing laws.
And the power of disease has often caused innovations in the state, when there have been pestilences and bad seasons continuing during many years. Any one who sees all this, naturally rushes to the conclusion of which I was speaking, that no mortal legisitates in anything, but that in human affairs chance is almost everything. And this may be said of the arts of the sailor, and the pilot, and the physician, and the general, and may seem to be well said; and yet there is another thing which may be said with equal truth of all of them.

Cle. What is it?

Ath. That God governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with Him in the government of human affairs. There is, however, a third and less extreme view, that art should be there also; for I should say that in a storm there must surely be a great advantage in having a pilot. You would agree?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And might not this be also said of legislation as well as of other things: even supposing all other circumstances favourable, the true legislator is still required, from time to time, to provide for the happiness of the state?

Cle. That I admit.

Ath. In each case the artist would be right in praying for certain favourable conditions, under which he would only require to exercise his art?

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And all other artists, if they had to offer up their prayers, would do likewise?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And the legislator would do so too?

Cle. I believe that he would.

Ath. 'Come, legislator,' we will say to him; 'what conditions do you require of us before you organize your state?' What ought he to answer? Shall I give the answer of the legislator?

Cle. Very good.

Ath. He will say—'Give me a state which is governed by a tyrant, and let the tyrant be young and have a good memory; let him be quick at learning, and of a courageous and noble nature; let him have that which, as I said before, is the
inseparable companion of all the other parts of virtue, if there is to be any good in them.'

Cle. I suppose, Megillus, that this companion virtue of which the Stranger speaks, must be temperance?

Ath. Yes, Cleinias, temperance in the vulgar sense; not that which in the exaggerated language of some philosophers is demonstrated to be prudence, but that which is the natural gift of children and animals, and makes some of them live continently and others incontinently, but when isolated, was, as we said, hardly worth reckoning in the catalogue of goods. I think that you must understand my meaning?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Then our tyrant must have this as well as the other qualities, if the state is to acquire in the best manner and in the shortest time the form of government which is most conducive to happiness; for there neither is nor ever will be a better or speedier way of establishing a polity than by a tyranny.

Cle. By what possible arguments, Stranger, can you prove such a monstrous doctrine?

Ath. There is surely no difficulty in seeing, Cleinias, what is in accordance with the order of nature?

Cle. You would assume, as you say, a tyrant who was young, temperate, quick at learning, having a good memory, courageous, of a noble nature?

Ath. Yes; and you must add fortunate; and his good fortune must be that he is the contemporary of a great legislator, and that some happy chance brings them together. When this has been accomplished, God has done all that He can ever do for a state which he desires to be eminently prosperous; He has done second best for a state in which there are two such rulers, and third best for a state in which there are three. The difficulty increases with the increase of the number, and diminishes with the diminution of the number.

Cle. You mean to say, I suppose, that the best government is produced from a tyranny, and originates in a good lawgiver and an orderly tyrant, and most easily and rapidly passes out of such a tyranny into a perfect form of government; and, in
the second degree, out of an oligarchy; and, in the third degree, out of a democracy: is not that your meaning?

Ath. Not so; I mean rather to say that the change is best made out of a tyranny; and secondly, out of a monarchy; and thirdly, out of some sort of democracy: fourth, in the capacity for improvement, comes oligarchy, which has the greatest difficulty in admitting of such a change, because the government is in the hands of a number of potentates. I am supposing that the legislator is by nature of the true sort, and that his strength is united with that of the chief men of the state; and when he is strongest, and, at the same time, there are the fewest persons concerned, as in a tyranny, there the change is likely to be easiest and most rapid.


Ath. And yet I have repeated what I am saying a good many times; but I suppose that you have never seen a city which is under a tyranny?

Cle. No; I cannot say that I have any great desire to see one.

Ath. And yet, where there is a tyranny, you might certainly see that of which I am now speaking.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. I mean that you might see how, without trouble and in no very long period of time, the tyrant, if he wishes, can change the manners of a state: he has only to go in the direction of virtue or of vice, whichever he prefers, he himself setting an example in his own person, praising and countenancing some actions, and reproving and setting a note of dishonour upon others.

Cle. But how can we imagine that the citizens in general will at once follow the example set to them; or how can he have this power both of persuading and of compelling them?

Ath. Let no one, my friends, persuade us that there is any quicker and easier way in which laws act upon states than when the rulers lead: such changes never have, nor ever will, come to pass in any other way. The real impossibility or difficulty is of another sort, and is rarely surmounted in the course of ages; but when once it is surmounted, ten thousand or rather all blessings follow.
Cle. Of what are you speaking?

Ath. The difficulty is to find the divine love of temperate and just institutions existing in any powerful forms of government, whether in a monarchy or oligarchy of wealth or of birth. You might as well hope to reproduce the character of Nestor, who is said to have excelled all men in the power of speech, and yet more in his temperance. This, however, according to the tradition, was in the times of Troy; in our own days there is nothing of the sort; but if such an one either has or ever shall come into being, or is now among us, blessed is he and blessed are they who hear the wise words that flow from his lips. And this may be said of power in general: When the supreme power in man coincides with the greatest wisdom and temperance, then the best laws and the best constitution come into being; but in no other way. And I would have what I am saying regarded as a sort of divination and declaration that, in one point of view, there may be a difficulty for a city to have good laws, but that there is another point of view in which nothing can be easier or sooner effected, granting our supposition.

Cle. How do you mean?

Ath. Let us try to put into words the laws which are suitable to your state; like children, framing our lips to utter them.

Cle. Let us proceed without delay.

Ath. Then let us invoke God at the settlement of our state; may He hear and be propitious to us, and come and set in order the State and the laws!

Cle. May he come!

Ath. But what form of polity are we going to give the city?

Cle. Tell me what you mean a little more clearly. Do you mean what form of polity, as, for example, democracy or oligarchy, or aristocracy or monarchy? For I suppose that you would not include tyranny.

Ath. Which of you will answer first, to which of these classes your own government is to be referred?

Meg. Ought I to answer first, since I am the elder?

Cle. Perhaps you should.

Meg. And yet, Stranger, I perceive that I cannot say, without more thought, what I should call the government of Lacedaemon, for it seems to me to be like a tyranny; the
power of our Ephors is marvellously tyrannical; and sometimes it appears to me to be of all cities the most democratical; and who can reasonably deny that it is an aristocracy? We have also a monarchy which is held for life, and is said by all mankind, and not by ourselves only, to be the most ancient of all monarchies; and, therefore, when asked on a sudden, I cannot precisely say which form of government the Spartan is.

Cle. I am in the same difficulty, Megillus, for I do not feel confident that the polity of Cnosus is any of these.

Ath. The reason is, my excellent friends, that you really have polities, but the cities of which we were speaking are mere aggregations of citizens who are the subjects and servants of parts of their own state; they are named after their several ruling powers, and are not polities at all. But if states are to be named after their rulers, the true state ought to be called by the name of the God who rules over wise men.

Cle. And who is this God?

Ath. May I still make use of fable to some extent, in the hope that I may be better able to answer your question: shall I?

Cle. By all means.

Ath. In the primeval world, and a long while before the cities came into being whose settlements we have described, there is said to have been in the time of Cronos a blessed state and way of life, of which the best-ordered of existing states is a copy.

Cle. It will be very necessary to hear about that.

Ath. I quite agree with you; and therefore I have introduced the subject.

Cle. Most appropriately; and since the tale is to the point, you will do well in giving us the whole story.

Ath. I will do as you suggest. There is a tradition of the happy life of mankind in days when all things were spontaneous and abundant. And of this the reason is said to have been as follows:—Cronos knew what we ourselves were declaring, that no human nature invested with supreme power is able to order human affairs and not overflow with insolence and wrong. Which reflection led him to appoint not men but demigods, who
are of a higher and more divine race, to be the kings and rulers of our cities; he did as we do with flocks of sheep and other tame animals. For we do not appoint oxen to be the lords of oxen, or goats of goats; but we ourselves are a superior race, and rule over them. In like manner God, in His love of mankind, placed over us the demons, who are a superior race, and they with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us, taking care of us and giving us peace and reverence and order and justice never failing, made the tribes of men happy and peaceful. And this tradition, which is true, declares that cities of which some mortal man and not God is the ruler, have no escape from evils and toils. Still we must do all that we can to imitate the life which is said to have existed in the days of Cronos, and, as far as the principle of immortality dwells in us, to that we must hearken, both in private and public life, and regulate our cities and houses according to law, meaning by the very term 'law,' the distribution of mind. But if either an oligarchy or a democracy has a soul eager after pleasures and desires—wanting to be filled with them, yet retaining none of them, and perpetually afflicted with an endless and insatiable disorder; and this evil soul, having first trampled the laws under foot, becomes the master either of a state or an individual,—then, as I was saying, there is no possibility of salvation. And now, Cleinias, we have to consider whether you will or will not accept my view.

Cle. Certainly we will.

Ath. Do you know that there are often said to be as many forms of laws as there are of governments? And how many there are of these we have already stated. And this you must regard as a matter of very great importance. For what is to be the standard of just and unjust, is once more the point at issue. Men say that the law ought not to regard either peace or war, or virtue in general, but only the interests and power and preservation of the existing form of government; this is thought by them to be the best way of expressing the natural definition of justice.

Cle. How?

1 νόμος = νοῦ διανομή.
Ath. Justice is said by them to be the interest of the stronger.
Cle. Speak plainer.
Ath. I will; they surely assume that the governing power makes whatever laws have authority in any state?
Cle. True.
Ath. Well, they would say, and do you suppose that tyranny or democracy, or any other conquering power, does not make the continuance of the power which is possessed by them the first or principal object of their laws?
Cle. How can they have any other?
Ath. And whoever transgresses these laws is punished as an evil-doer by the legislator, who calls the laws just?
Cle. Naturally.
Ath. This, then, is always the mode and fashion in which justice exists?
Cle. Certainly, if we are correct in our view.
Ath. Why, yes, this is one of the evil forms of government to which we were referring.
Cle. What were they?
Ath. Those which we were examining when we spoke of who ought to govern whom. Did we not arrive at the conclusion that parents ought to govern their children, and the elder the younger, and the noble the ignoble? And there were many other principles, if you remember, and they were not always consistent. One principle was that of Pindar; he spoke of law in the order of nature doing and justifying violence.
Cle. Yes; I remember.
Ath. Consider, then, to whom our state is to be entrusted. For there is a thing which has occurred times without number in states——
Cle. What?
Ath. That when there has been a contest for power, and the conquerors have monopolized the government, and have refused all share to the defeated party and their descendants, they have lived watching one another, in perpetual fear that some one will come into power who has a recollection of former wrongs, and will rise up against them. Now, according to our view, such governments are not polities at all, nor are laws right which are
passed for the good of particular classes and not for the good of the whole state. States which have such laws are not polities but parties, and their notion of justice is simply unmeaning. I say this, because I am going to assert that we must not entrust the government in your state to any one because he is rich, or because he possesses any advantage, such as strength, or stature, or again birth: but he who is most obedient to the laws of the state, he shall win the palm; and to him who is victorious in the first degree shall be given the highest office and chief ministry of the gods; and the second to him who bears the second palm; and in a similar ratio shall all the other offices be assigned to their holders. And when I call the rulers servants or ministers of the law, I give them this name not for the sake of novelty, but because I certainly believe that upon their service or ministry depends the well- or ill-being of the state. For that state in which the law is subject and has no authority, I perceive to be on the highway to ruin; but I see that the state in which the law is above the rulers, and the rulers are the inferiors of the law, has salvation, and every blessing which the Gods can confer.

Cle. Truly, Stranger, you see with the keen vision of age.

Ath. Why, yes; every man when he is young has that sort of vision dullest, and when he is oldest most keen.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And now, what is to be the next step? May we not suppose the colonists to have arrived, and proceed to make our speech to them?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. 'Friends,' we say to them,—'God, as the old tradition declares, holding in His hand the beginning, middle, and end of all that is, moves according to His nature in a straight line towards the accomplishment of His end. Justice always follows Him, and is the punisher of those who fall short of the divine law. To that law, he who would be happy holds fast, and follows it in all humility and order; but he who is lifted up with pride, or money, or honour, or beauty, who has a soul hot with folly, and youth, and insolence, and thinks that he has no need of a guide or ruler, but is able himself to be the guide of others, he, I say, is left deserted of God; and being
thus deserted, he takes to him others who are like himself, and
dances about, throwing all things into confusion, and many think
that he is a great man, but in a short time he pays a penalty
which justice cannot but approve, and is utterly destroyed, and
his family and city with him. Wherefore, seeing that human
things are thus ordered, what should a wise man do or think,
or not do or think?'

CLE. Every man ought to make up his mind that he will be
one of the followers of the God; there can be no doubt of that.

ATH. Then what life is agreeable to God, and becoming in
his followers? One only, according to the old saying that 'like
agrees with like, with measure measure,' but things which have
no measure agree neither with themselves nor with the things
which have measure. Now, God is the measure of all things,
in a sense far higher than any man, as they say, can ever
hope to be. And he who would be dear to God must, as
far as is possible, be like Him and such as He is. Wherefore
the temperate man is the friend of God, for he is like Him;
and the intemperate man is unlike Him, and different from
Him, and unjust. And the same holds of other things, and
this is the conclusion, which is also the noblest and truest of
all sayings:—that for the good man to offer sacrifice to the
Gods, and hold converse with them by means of prayers and
offerings and every kind of service, is the noblest and best of
all things, and also the most conducive to a happy life, and
very fit and meet. But with the bad man, the opposite of this
holds: for the bad man has an impure soul, whereas the good
is pure; and from one who is polluted, neither a good man nor
God is right in receiving gifts. And therefore the unholy waste
their much service upon the Gods, which, when offered by any
holy man, is always accepted of them. Such is the mark at
which we ought to aim. But what weapons shall we use, and
how shall we direct them? In the first place, we affirm that
next after the Olympian Gods, and the Gods of the State,
honour should be given to the Gods below; they should receive
everything in even numbers, and of the second choice, and of
evil omen, while the odd numbers and the first choice, and the
things of lucky omen, are given to the Gods above, by him who
would rightly hit the mark of piety. Next to these Gods,
a wise man will do service to the demons or spirits, and then to the heroes, and after them will follow the sacred places of private and ancestral Gods, having their ritual according to law. Next comes the honour of living parents, to whom, as is meet, we have to pay the first and greatest and oldest of all debts, considering that all which a man has belongs to those who gave him birth and brought him up, and that he must do all that he can to minister to them: first, in his property; secondly, in his person; and thirdly, in his soul; paying the debts due to them for the care and travail which they bestowed upon him of old, in the days of his infancy, and which he is now to pay back to them when they are old and in the extremity of their need. And all his life long he ought never to utter, or to have uttered, an unbecoming word to them; for of all light and winged words he will have to give an account; Nemesis, the messenger of justice, is appointed to watch over them. When they are angry and want to satisfy their feelings in word or deed, he should not resist them; for a father who thinks that he has been wronged by his son may be reasonably expected to be very angry. At their death, the most moderate funeral is best, neither exceeding the customary expense, nor yet falling short of the honour which has been usually shown by the former generation to their parents; and let a man not forget to pay the yearly tribute of respect to the dead, honouring them chiefly by omitting nothing that conduces to a perpetual remembrance of them, and giving a reasonable portion of his fortune to the dead. Doing this, and living after this manner, we shall receive our reward from the Gods and those who are above us; and we shall spend our days for the most part in good hope. And how a man ought to order what relates to his descendants and his kindred and friends and citizens, and the rites of hospitality taught by Heaven, and the intercourse which arises out of them, all with a view to the embellishment and orderly regulation of his own life—these things, I say, the laws, as we proceed with them, will accomplish, partly persuading, and partly when natures do not yield to the persuasion of custom, chastising them by might and right, and will thus render our state, if the Gods co-operate with us, prosperous and happy. But of what has to be said, and must be said by the legislator who is of my way of
BOOK IV.

thinking, and yet, if said in the form of law, would be out of place—of this I think that he may give a sample for the instruction of himself and of those for whom he is legislating; and then when, as far as he is able, he has gone through all the preliminaries, he may proceed to the work of legislation. Now, what will be the form of such prefaces? There may be a difficulty in including or describing them all under a single form, but I think that we may get some notion of them if we can guarantee one thing.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. I should wish the citizens to be as receptive of virtue as possible; this will surely be the aim of the legislator in all his laws.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. What I have been proposing appears to me to have some use; for a person will listen with more gentleness and good-will to the precepts addressed to him by the legislator, when his soul is not altogether unprepared to receive them. Even a little done in the way of conciliation gains his ear, and is always worth having. For there is no great inclination or readiness on the part of mankind to be made as good, or as quickly good, as possible. The case of the many proves the wisdom of Hesiod, who says that the road to wickedness is smooth and very short, and there is no need of perspiring:

19 'But before virtue the immortal Gods have placed the sweat of labour, and long and steep is the way thither, and rugged at first; but when you have reached the top, then, however difficult, it becomes easy.'

Cle. Yes; and he certainly speaks well.

Ath. Very true: and now let me tell you the effect which the preceding discourse has had upon me.

Cle. Proceed.

Ath. Suppose that we have a little conversation with the legislator, and say to him—'O, legislator, speak; if you know what we ought to say and do, you can surely tell.'

Cle. Certainly, he can.

Ath. Did we not hear you just now saying, that the legislator ought not to allow the poets to do what they liked? For that they did not know in which of their words they went against the laws, to the hurt of the state.
Cle. That is true.
Ath. May we not fairly make answer to him on behalf of the poets—
Cle. What answer shall we make to him?
Ath. That the poet, according to the tradition which has ever prevailed among us, and is accepted of all men, when he sits down on the tripod of the muse, is not in his right mind; like a fountain, he allows the stream of thought to flow freely, and his art being imitative, he is often compelled to represent men under opposite circumstances, and thus to say two different things; neither can he tell whether there is any truth in either of them, or in one more than in the other. But this is not the case in a law; the legislator must give not two rules about the same thing, but one only. Take an example from what you have just been saying. Of three kinds of funerals, there is one which is too extravagant, another is too niggardly, the third in a mean; and you choose and approve and order the last without qualification. But if I had an extremely rich wife, and she bade me bury her, and I were to describe her burial in poetry, I should praise the extravagant sort; and a poor miserly man, who had not much money to spend, would approve of the niggardly; and the man of moderate means, who was himself moderate, would praise a moderate funeral. Now you in the capacity of legislator must not barely say 'a moderate funeral,' but you must define what moderation is, and how much; unless you are definite, you must not suppose that you are speaking a language that can become law.
Cle. Very true.
Ath. And is our legislator to have no preface to his laws, but to say at once Do this, avoid that—and then holding the penalty in terrorem, to go on to another law; offering never a word of advice or exhortation to those for whom he is legislating, after the manner of some doctors? For of doctors, as you doubtless know, there are two kinds, a gentler and a ruder, and two modes of cure; and as children ask the doctor to be gentle with them, so we will ask the legislator to cure our disorders with the gentlest remedies. What I mean to say is, that besides doctors there are their assistants, who are also styled doctors.
BOOK IV.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And whether they are slaves or freemen makes no difference; they acquire their knowledge of medicine by obeying and observing their masters; empirically and not rationally, as the manner of freemen is, who have learned scientifically themselves the art which they impart to their pupils. You are aware that there are these two classes of doctors?

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. And did you ever observe that there are two classes of patients in states, slaves and freemen; and the slave doctors run about and cure the slaves, and wait for them in the dispensaries—practitioners of this sort never talk to their patients individually; or let them talk about their own individual complaints? The doctor prescribes what he thinks good, out of the abundance of his experience, as if he had no manner of doubt; and when he has given his orders, like a tyrant, he rushes off with equal assurance to some other servant who is ill; and so he relieves the master of the house of the care of his invalid slaves. But the other doctor, who is a freeman, attends and practises upon freemen; and he carries his enquiries far back, and goes into the nature of the disorder; he enters into discourse with the patient and with his friends, and is at once getting information from the sick man, and also instructing him as far as he is able, and he will not prescribe for him until he has first convinced him; at last, when he has brought the patient more and more under his persuasive influences and set him on the road to health, he attempts to effect a cure. Now, which is the better way of proceeding in a physician and in a trainer? Is he the better who accomplishes his ends in a double way, or he who works in one way, and that the ruder and inferior?

Cle. I should say, Stranger, that the double way is far better.

Ath. Should you like to see an example of the double and single method in legislation?

Cle. Certainly I should.

Ath. What will be our first law? Will not the legislator, observing the order of nature, begin by making regulations for births?

Cle. Certainly.
LAWS.

Ath. And in all states the birth of children goes back to the connection of marriage?

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Then, according to the true order, the laws relating to marriage should be those which are first determined in every state?

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. Then let me first give the law of marriage in a simple form, which may be as follows:—A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, or, if he does not, he shall pay such and such a fine, or shall suffer the loss of such and such privileges. This would be the simple law about marriage. The double law would run as follows:—A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, considering that the human race naturally partakes of immortality, of which all men have the greatest desire implanted in them; for the desire of every man that he may become famous, and not lie in the grave without a name, is only the love of continuance. Now, mankind are coeval with all time, and are ever following, and will ever follow, the course of time; and so they are immortal, inasmuch as they leave children behind them, and partake of immortality in the unity of generation. And for a man voluntarily to deprive himself of this gift, as he deliberately does who will not have a wife or children, is impiety. He who obeys the law shall be free, and shall pay no fine; but he who is disobedient, and does not marry, when he has arrived at the age of thirty-five, shall pay a yearly fine of a certain amount, in order that his celibacy may not be a source of ease and profit to him; and he shall not share in the honours which the young men in the state give to the aged. Comparing now the two forms of the law, you will be able to arrive at a judgment about any other laws—whether they should be double in length even when shortest, because they have to persuade as well as threaten, or whether they shall only threaten and be of half the length.

Meg. The Lacedaemonians, Stranger, would generally prefer the shorter form; although, for my own part, if any one were to ask me which I myself prefer in the state, I should certainly determine in favour of the longer; and I would have every law 72
BOOK IV.

made after the same pattern, if I had to choose. But I think that Cleinias is the person to be consulted, for his is the state which is going to use these laws.

Cle. Thank you, Megillus.

Ath. Whether, in the abstract, words are to be many or few, is a very unmeaning question; the best form, and not the shortest, is to be approved; nor is length at all to be regarded. In the form of law which has been recited, the one kind is not only twice as good in practical usefulness as the other, but the case is like that of the two kinds of doctors, of whom I was just now speaking. And yet legislators never appear to have considered that whereas they have two instruments which they might use in legislation—persuasion and force, in so far as a rude and uneducated multitude are capable of being affected by them, they use one only; for they do not mingle persuasion with antagonism, but employ force pure and simple. There is a third point, sweet friends, which ought to be, and never is, regarded in our existing laws.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. A point arising out of our previous discussion, which comes into my mind I know not how. All this time, from early dawn until noon, have we been talking about laws in this charming retreat: now we are going to promulgate our laws, and what has preceded was only the prelude of them. Why do I mention this? For this reason:—Because all discourses and vocal exercises have preludes and overtures, which are a sort of artistic beginnings intended to help the strain which is to be performed; lyric measures and every other sort of music have preludes framed with wonderful care. But of the truer and higher strain of law and politics, no one has ever yet uttered any prelude, or composed or published any, as though there was no such thing in nature. Whereas our present discussion seems to me to imply that there is—these double laws, of which we were speaking, are not exactly double, but they are in two parts, the law and the prelude of the law. The arbitrary command, which was compared to the commands of the physicians, whom we described as of the meaner sort, was the law pure and simple; and that which preceded, and was described by our friend as hortatory only,
was, in fact, an exhortation, and is analogous to the preamble of a discourse. For I imagine that all this language of con-
ciliation, which the legislator has been uttering in the preface of the law, was intended to create good-will in the person whom he addressed, in order that, by reason of this good-will, he might more intelligently receive his command, that is to say, the law. And therefore, in my way of speaking, this is more rightly described as the preamble than as the matter of the law. And I must further proceed to observe, that the legislator should not make laws which have no preambles; he should remember how great will be the difference between them, accordingly as they have, or have not, preambles, as in the instance already given.

Cle. The lawgiver, if he asks my opinion, will certainly legislate in the form which you advise.

Ath. I think that you are quite right, Cleinias, in affirming that all laws have preambles, and that throughout the whole of this work of legislation every single law should have a suitable preamble at the beginning; for that which is to follow is most important, and whether this is clearly recorded or not is a very serious matter. Yet we should be wrong in requiring that all laws, small and great alike, should have preambles of the same kind, any more than all songs or speeches; although they may be natural to all, they are not always necessary, and whether they are to be employed or not has to be left to the judgment of the speaker or the musician, or, in the present instance, of the lawgiver.

Cle. That I think is most true. And now, Stranger, without delay, let us return to the argument, and, as people say in play, make a second and better beginning, if you please, with the principles which we have been laying down, which we never thought of regarding as a preamble before, but of which we may now make a preamble, and not merely consider them to be chance topics of discourse. Let us acknowledge, then, that we have a preamble. About the honour of the Gods and the respect of parents, enough has been already said; and we may proceed to the topics which follow next in order, until the preamble is deemed by you to be complete: and after that you shall go through the laws themselves.
At. I understand you to mean that we have made a sufficient preamble about the Gods and demons, and about parents living or dead; and now you would have us bring the rest of the subject into the light of day?

Cle. Exactly.

Ath. After this, as is meet and for the general interest, I the speaker, and you the listeners, will try to estimate all that relates to the souls and bodies and properties of the citizens, as regards both their occupations and amusements, and thus arrive, as far as in us lies, at the nature of education—that will follow next in order.

Cle. Very good.
BOOK V.

Athenian Stranger. LISTEN, all ye who have just now heard the laws about Gods, and about our dear forefathers:—Of all the things which a man has, next to the Gods, his soul is the most divine and most truly his own. Now in every man there are two parts: the better and superior part, which rules, and the worse and inferior part, which serves; and the ruler is always to be preferred to the servant. Wherefore I am right in bidding every one next to the Gods, who are our masters, and those who in order follow them, to honour his own soul, which every one seems to honour, but no one honours as he ought; for honour is a divine good, and no evil thing is honourable; and he who thinks that he can honour the soul by word or gift, or any sort of compliance, without making her in any way better, seems to honour her, but honours her not at all. For example, every man, from his very boyhood, fancies that he is able to know everything, and thinks that he honours his soul by praising her, and he is very ready to let her do whatever she may like. But I mean to say that in acting thus he only injures his soul, and does not honour her; whereas, in our opinion, he ought to honour her as second only to the Gods. Again, when a man thinks that others are to be blamed, and not himself, for the errors which he has committed, and the many and great evils which befell him in consequence, and is always fancying himself to be exempt and innocent, he is under the idea that he is honouring his soul; whereas the very reverse is the fact, for he is really injuring her. And when, disregarding the word and approval of the legislator, he indulges in pleasure, then again he is far from honouring her; he only dishonours her, and fills
her full of evil and remorse; or when he does not endure to the end the labours and fears and sorrows and pains which the legislator approves, but gives way before them, then, by yielding, he does not honour the soul, but by all such conduct he makes her to be dishonourable; nor when he thinks that life at any price is a good, does he honour her, but yet once more he dishonours her; for the soul having a notion that the world below is all evil, he yields to her, and does not resist and teach or convince her that, for aught she knows, the world of the Gods below, instead of being evil, may be the greatest of all goods. Again, when any one prefers beauty to virtue, what is this but the real and utter dishonour of the soul? For such a preference implies that the body is more honourable than the soul; and this is false, for there is nothing of earthly birth which is more honourable than the heavenly, and he who thinks otherwise of the soul has no idea how greatly he under-values this wonderful possession; nor, again, when a person is willing, or not unwilling, to acquire dishonest gains, does he then honour his soul with gifts?—far otherwise; he sells her glory and honour for a small piece of gold; but all the gold which is under or upon the earth is not enough to give in exchange for virtue. In a word, I may say that he who does not estimate the base and evil, the good and noble, according to the standard of the legislator, and abstain in every possible way from the one and practise the other with all his might, does not know that he is most fouly and disgracefully abusing his soul, which is the divinest part of man; for no one, as I may say, ever considers that which is declared to be the greatest penalty of evil-doing—namely, to grow into the likeness of bad men, and growing like them to fly from the conversation of the good, and be cut off from them, and cleave to and follow after the company of the bad. And he who is joined to them must do and suffer what such men by nature do and say to one another, a suffering which is not justice but retribution; for justice and the just are noble, whereas retribution is the suffering which waits upon injustice; and whether a man escape or endure this, he is miserable,—in the former case, because he is not cured; while in the latter, he perishes in order that the rest of mankind may be saved.
Speaking generally, our glory is to follow the better and improve the inferior, which is susceptible of improvement, in the best manner possible. And of all the possessions which a man has, the soul is by nature most inclined to avoid the evil, and search out and find the chief good; and having found, to dwell with the good during the remainder of life. Wherefore the soul also is second in honour; and third, as every one will perceive, comes the honour of the body in natural order. Having determined this, we have next to consider that there is a genuine honour of the body, and that of honours some are and some are not genuine. The legislator, as I suspect, ranks them in the following order:—Honour is not to be given to the fair, or the strong, or the swift, or the tall, or the healthy body (although many may think otherwise), any more than to their opposites; but the mean states of all these habits are by far the safest and most moderate; for the one extreme makes the soul braggart and insolent, and the other, illiberal and mean; and money, and property, and distinction all go to the same tune. The excess of any of these things is apt to be a source of hatred and divisions among states and individuals; and the defect of them is commonly a cause of slavery. And, therefore, I would not have any one fond of heaping up riches for the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them as rich as possible. For the possession of great wealth is of no use, either to them or to the state. The condition of youth which is free from flattery, and at the same time not in need of the necessaries of life, is the best and most harmonious of all, being in accord and agreement with our nature, and making life to be most entirely free from sorrow. Let parents, then, bequeath to their children not riches, but the spirit of reverence. We, indeed, fancy that they will inherit reverence from us, if we rebuke them when they show a want of reverence. But this quality is not really imparted to them by the present style of admonition, which only tells them that the young ought always to be reverential. A sensible legislator will rather exhort the elders to reverence the younger, and above all to take heed that no young man sees or hears him doing or saying anything base; for where old men have no shame, there young men will most certainly be devoid of reverence. The best way
of training the young, is to train yourself at the same time; not to admonish them, but to be always carrying out your own principles in practice. He who honours his kindred, and reveres those who share in the same Gods, and are of the same blood and family, may fairly expect that the Gods who preside over generation will be propitious to him, and will quicken his seed. And he who deems the services which his friends and acquaintances do to him, greater and more important than they themselves deem them, and his own favours to them less than theirs to him, will have their good-will in the intercourse of life. And surely in his relations to the state and his fellow-citizens, he is by far the best, who rather than the Olympic or any other victory of peace or war, desires to win the palm of obedience to the laws of his country; and who, of all mankind, is the person reputed to have obeyed them best during his whole life. In his relations to strangers, a man should consider that a contract is a most holy thing, and that all concerns and wrongs of strangers are more directly dependent on the protection of God, than the wrongs done to citizens; for the stranger having no kindred and friends, is more to be pitied by Gods and men. Wherefore, also, he who is most able to assist him is most zealous in his cause; and he who is most able is the divinity and god of the stranger, who follows in the train of Zeus, the god of strangers. And for this reason, he who has a spark of caution in him, will do his best to pass through life without sinning against the stranger. And of offences committed, whether against strangers or fellow-countrymen, that against suppliants is the greatest. For the God who witnessed to the agreement made with the suppliant, becomes in a special manner the guardian of the sufferer; and he will certainly not suffer unavenged.

Thus we have fairly described the manner in which a man is to act about his parents, and himself, and his own affairs; and in relation to the state, and his friends, and kindred, both in what concerns his own countrymen, and in what concerns the stranger. I will now describe what manner of man he must be who would best pass through life in respect of those other things which are not matters of law, but of praise and blame only; in which praise and blame educate a man, and
make him more tractable and amenable to the laws which are about to be imposed.

Truth is the beginning of every good thing, both in heaven and on earth; and he who would be blessed and happy, should be from the first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long as possible, for then he can be trusted; but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. Neither condition is to be desired, for the untrustworthy and ignorant has no friend, and as time advances he becomes known, and lays up in store for himself isolation in crabbed age when life is on the wane: so that, whether his children or friends are alive or not, he is equally solitary. Worthy of honour, too, is he who does no injustice, and of more than twofold honour if he not only does no injustice himself, but hinders others from doing any; the first may count as one man, the second is worth many men, because he informs the rulers of the injustice of others. And yet more highly to be esteemed is he who co-operates with the rulers in correcting the citizens as far as he can—he shall be proclaimed the great and perfect citizen, and bear away the palm of virtue. The same praise may be given about temperance and wisdom, and all other goods which may be imparted to others, as well as acquired by a man for himself; he who imparts them shall be honoured as the man of men, and he who is willing, yet is not able, may be allowed the second place; but he who is jealous and will not, if he can help, allow others to partake in a friendly way of any good, is deserving of blame: the good, however, which he has, is not to be undervalued because possessed by him, but to be acquired by us to the utmost of our power. Let every man, then, freely strive for the prize of virtue, and let there be no envy. For the unenvious nature increases the greatness of states—he himself contends in the race and defames no man; but the envious, who thinks that he ought to get the better by defaming others, is less energetic himself in the pursuit of true virtue, and reduces his rivals to despair by his unjust slanders of them. And thus he deprives the whole city of the proper training for the contest of virtue, and diminishes
her glory as far as in him lies. Now every man should be valiant, but he should also be gentle. From the cruel, or hardly curable, or altogether incurable acts of injustice done by others, a man can only escape by fighting and defending himself and conquering, and by never ceasing to punish them; and no man who is not of a noble spirit is able to accomplish this. As to the actions of those who do evil, but whose evil is curable, in the first place, let us remember that the unjust man is not unjust of his own free will. For no man of his own free will would choose to possess the greatest of evils, and least of all in the most honourable part of himself. And the soul, as we said, is of a truth deemed by all men the most honourable. In the soul, then, which is the most honourable part of him, no one, if he could help, would admit, or allow to continue the greatest of evils. The unjust and the unfortunate are always to be pitied in any case; and one can afford to forgive as well as pity him who is curable, and refrain and calm one's anger, not giving way to passion, and continuing wrathful like a woman who has been piqued. But upon him who is incapable of reformation and wholly evil, the vials of our wrath should be poured out; wherefore, I say, that good men ought, when occasion arises, to be both gentle and passionate. The greatest evil to men, generally, is one which is innate in their souls, and which a man is always excusing in himself and never correcting; I mean, what is expressed in the saying, 'that every man by nature is and ought to be his own friend.' Whereas the excessive love of self is in reality the source to each man of all offences; for the lover is blinded about the beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the just, the good, and the honourable, and thinks that he ought always to prefer his own interest to the truth. But he who would be a great man, ought to regard what is just, and not himself or his interests, whether in his own actions, or those of others. Through a similar error, men are induced to fancy that their own ignorance is wisdom, and thus we who may be truly said to know nothing, think that we know all things; and because we will not let others act for us in what we do not know, we are compelled to act amiss ourselves. Wherefore, let every man
avoid excess of self-love, and condescend to follow a better
man than himself, not allowing any false shame to stand in
the way. There are also lesser matters than these which are
often repeated, and with good reason; a man should recollect
them and remind himself of them. For when a stream is
flowing out, there should be water flowing in too; and recol-
lection is the flowing in of failing knowledge. Therefore I
say that a man should refrain from excess either of laughter
or tears, and should exhort his neighbour to do the same; he
should veil his immoderate sorrow or joy, and seek to behave
with propriety, whether the genius of his good fortune remains
with him, or whether at the crisis of his fate, when he seems
to be mounting high and steep places, the Gods oppose him
in some of his enterprises. Still he may hope, that when
calamities supervene upon the blessings which the God gives
him, he will lighten them and change existing evils for the
better; and as to the goods which are the opposite of these
evils, he will not doubt that they will be ever present with
him, and that he will be fortunate. Such should be men's
hopes, and such should be the exhortations with which they
admonish one another, never losing an opportunity, but on
every occasion distinctly reminding themselves and others, of
all these things both in jest and earnest.

Enough has now been said of divine matters, both as
touching the practices which men ought to follow, and the
several characters which they ought to cultivate. But of
human things we have not as yet spoken, and we must; for
to men we are discoursing and not to Gods. Pleasures and
pains and desires are a part of human nature, and on them
every mortal being must of necessity hang and depend with
the most eager interest. And therefore we must praise the
noblest life, not only as the fairest in appearance, but if a
man will only taste, and not as in the days of youth run
away to another, he will find that this nobler life surpasses
also in the very thing which we all of us desire.—I mean in 73:
having the greatest pleasure and the least pain during the
whole of life. And this will be plain, and will be quickly
and clearly seen, if a man has a true taste of them. But
what is a true taste? That we have to learn from the argu-
ment,—the point being what is according to nature, and what is not according to nature. One life must be compared with another; the more pleasurable with the more painful, after this manner:—We desire to have pleasure, but we neither desire nor choose pain; and the neutral state we are ready to take in exchange, not for pleasure but for pain; and we also choose less pain and greater pleasure, but less pleasure and greater pain we do not choose; and an equal balance of either we cannot venture to assert that we should desire. And all these differ or do not differ severally in number and magnitude and intensity and equality, and in the opposites of these when regarded as objects of choice, in relation to the will. And such being the necessary order of things, we choose that life in which there are many great and intense elements of pleasure and pain, and in which the pleasures are in excess, and do not choose that in which the opposites exceed; nor, again, do we choose that in which the elements of either are small and few and feeble, and the pains exceed. And when, as I said before, there is a balance of pleasure and pain in life, this is to be regarded by us as the balanced life; while other lives are preferred by us because they exceed in what we like, or are rejected by us because they exceed in what we dislike. All the lives of men may be regarded by us as bound up in these, and we must also consider what sort of lives we by nature choose. And if we wish for any others, I say that we choose them only through some ignorance and inexperience of the lives which actually exist.

Now, what lives are they, and how many in which, having searched out and beheld the objects of will and desire and their opposites, and making of them a law, choosing, I say, the dear and the pleasant and the best and noblest, a man may live in the happiest way possible? Let us say that the temperate life is one kind of life, and the rational another, and the courageous another, and the healthful another; and to these four let us oppose four other lives,—the foolish, the cowardly, the intemperate, the diseased. He who knows the temperate life will describe it as in all things gentle, having gentle pains and gentle pleasures, and placid desires and loves not insane; whereas the intemperate life is impetuous
in all things, and has violent pains and pleasures, and vehement and stinging desires, and loves utterly insane; and in the temperate life the pleasures exceed the pains, but in the intemperate life the pains exceed the pleasures in greatness and number and intensity. Hence one of the two lives is naturally and necessarily more pleasant and the other more painful, and he who would live pleasantly cannot possibly choose to live intemperately. And if this is true, the inference clearly is that no man is voluntarily intemperate; but that the whole multitude of men lack temperance in their lives, either from ignorance or from want of self-control or both. And the same holds of the diseased and healthy life; they both have pleasures and pains, but in health the pleasure exceeds the pain, and in sickness the pain exceeds the pleasure. Now, our intention in choosing the lives is not that the painful should exceed, but the life in which pain is exceeded by pleasure we determine to be the more pleasant life. And we should say that the temperate life has the elements both of pleasure and pain fewer and minuter and less concentrated than the intemperate, and the wise life than the foolish life, and the life of courage than the life of cowardice; the one class exceeding in pleasure and the other in pain, the courageous surpassing the coward, and the wise exceeding the fool. And so in all lives the one class exceed the other class in pleasure; the temperate and courageous and wise and healthy exceed the cowardly and foolish and intemperate and diseased lives; and generally speaking, that which has any virtue, whether of body or soul, is pleasanter than the vicious life, and far superior in beauty and rectitude and excellence and goodness and reputation, and causes him who lives accordingly to be infinitely happier than the opposite.

Enough of the preamble; and now the laws should follow; or, to speak more correctly, an outline of them. As, then, in the case of a web or any other tissue, the warp and the woof cannot be made of the same materials, but the warp is necessarily superior as being stronger, and having a certain character of firmness, whereas the woof is softer and has a proper degree of elasticity;—in a similar manner those who are to hold great offices in states, should be distinguished truly in each
case from those who have been but slenderly proven by education. I say, therefore, that there are two parts in the constitution of a state—one the appointment of officers, the other the rules which are prescribed for them.

But, before all this, comes the following consideration:—The shepherd or herdsman, or breeder of horses or the like, when he has received his animals will not begin to train them until he has first purified them in a manner which befits a community of animals; he will divide the healthy and unhealthy, and the good breed and the bad breed, and will send away the unhealthy and badly bred to other herds, and tend the rest, reflecting that his labours will be vain and without effect, either on the souls or bodies of those whom nature and ill nurture have corrupted, and that they will involve in destruction the pure and healthy nature and being of every other animal, if he neglect to purge them away. Now, the case of other animals is not so important;—they are only worth mentioning for the sake of illustration, but what relates to man is of the highest importance; and the legislator should make inquiries, and indicate what is proper for each in the way of purification and of any other procedure. Take, for example, the purification of a city—there are many kinds of purification, some easier and others more difficult; and some of them, and the best and most difficult of them, the legislator, if he be also a despot, may be able to effect; but he who without a despotism sets up a new government and laws, even if he attempt the mildest of purgations, may think himself happy if he can complete his work. The best kind of purification is painful, like similar cures in medicine, involving righteous punishment and inflicting death or exile in the last resort. For in this way we commonly dispose of great sinners who are incurable, and are the greatest injury of the whole state. But the milder form of purification is as follows:—when men who have nothing, and are in want of food, show a disposition to follow their leaders in an attack on the property of the rich—these, who are the natural plague of the state, are sent away by the legislator in a friendly spirit as far as he is able; and this dismissal of them is euphemistically termed a colony. And every legislator should contrive to
do this at once. Our present case, however, is peculiar. For there is no need to devise any colony or purifying separation under the circumstances in which we are placed. But, as when many streams flow together from springs and mountain torrents into a single lake, we ought to attend and take care that the confluent waters should be perfectly clear, and in order to effect this, should pump and draw off and divert impurities, so in every political arrangement there may be trouble and danger. But, seeing that we are discoursing and not acting, let our selection be supposed to be completed, and the desired purity attained. Touching evil men, who want to join and be citizens of our state, we will not allow them to come until we have tested them by persuasion and time; but the good we will to the utmost of our ability receive as friends with open arms.

Another piece of good fortune must not be forgotten, which, as we were saying, the Heraclid colony had, and which is also ours,—that we have escaped division of land and the abolition of debts; for these are always a source of dangerous contention, and a city which is driven to legislation upon such matters can neither allow the old ways to continue, nor yet venture to alter them. We must have recourse to prayers, as men say, and hope that a slight change may be cautiously effected in a length of time. And such a change can be accomplished\(^1\) by those who have abundance of land, and having also many debtors, are willing, in a kindly spirit, to share with those who are in want, sometimes remitting and sometimes giving, holding fast in a path of moderation, and deeming poverty to be the increase of a man's desires and not the diminution of his property. For this is the chiefest foundation of a state, and upon this lasting basis may be erected afterwards whatever political order is suitable under the circumstances; but if the change be based upon an unsound principle, the political superstructure which is added will hardly succeed. That is a danger which, as I am saying, is escaped by us, and yet we had better say how, if we had not escaped, we might have escaped; and we may venture now to assert that no other way of escape, whether narrow or broad, can be devised but a just contentment—upon

\(^1\) Reading ἐπάρχει.
this rock our city shall be built; for there ought to be no disputes among citizens about property. If there are quarrels of long standing among them, no legislator of any degree of sense will proceed a step in the arrangement of the state until they are settled. But that they to whom God has given, as He has to us, to be the founders of a new state free from enmity—that they should create themselves enmities by reason of their mode of dividing lands and houses, would be super-
human folly and wickedness.

How can we rightly order our citizens? In the first place, their number has to be determined, and also the number and size of the portions which are to be assigned to them; and the land and the houses will then have to be apportioned by us as fairly as we can. The number of citizens can only be estimated satisfactorily in relation to the territory and the neighbouring states. The territory must be sufficient to maintain a certain number of inhabitants in a moderate way of life—more than this is not required; and the number of citizens should be sufficient to defend themselves against the injustice of their neighbours, and also to give them the power of aiding their neighbours when they are wronged. Upon this basis we will define the limits of theirs and their neighbours' territory both in theory and fact. And now, let us proceed to legislate with a view to perfecting the form and outline of our state. The number of our citizens shall be 5040—this will be a convenient number; and these shall be owners of the land and protectors of the ownership. The houses and the land will be divided in the same way, so that every man may correspond to a lot. Let the whole number be first divided into two parts, and then into three; and the number is further capable of being divided into four or five parts, or any number of parts up to ten. Every legislator ought to know so much arithmetic as to be able to tell what number is most likely to be useful to all cities; and we are going to take that number which contains the greatest and most regular and unbroken series of divisions. The whole of number has every possible division, and the number 5040 can be divided by exactly fifty-nine divisors, and ten of these proceed without interval from one to ten: this will furnish numbers for war and peace,
and for all contracts and dealings, including taxes and divisions. These properties of number should be ascertained at leisure by those who are bound by law to know them; for they are true, and should be proclaimed at the foundation of the city, with a view to use. Whether the legislator is establishing a new state or restoring an old and decayed one, in respect of Gods and temples,—the temples which are to be built in each city, and the Gods or demi-gods after whom they are to be called,—if he be a man of sense, he will make no change in anything which the oracle of Delphi, or Dodona, or Ammon, or any ancient tradition has sanctioned in whatever manner, whether by apparitions or religious inspiration of Heaven in obedience to which mankind have established sacrifices in connection with mystic rites, either originating on the spot, or derived from Tyrrhenia or Cyprus or some other place, and on the strength of these traditions have consecrated oracles and images, and altars and temples, and made sacred groves for each of them. The least part of all these ought not to be disturbed by the legislator; but he should assign to the several districts some God, or demi-god, or hero, and, in the distribution of the soil, should give to these first their separate domain and all things fitting, that the inhabitants of the district may meet at fixed times, and that they may readily supply their several wants, and entertain one another with sacrifices, and become friends and acquainted; for there is no greater good in a state than that the citizens should be known to one another. When darkness and not light reigns in the daily intercourse of life, no man will receive the honour of which he is deserving, or the power or the justice to which he is fairly entitled: wherefore, in every state, above all other things, every man ought to take heed of this,—that he have no deceit in him, but that he be always true and simple, and that no other deceitful person take any advantage of him.

And now comes the movement of the pieces from the sacred line as in the game of draughts. The form of constitution being unusual, may excite wonder when mentioned for the first time; but, upon reflection and trial, will appear to us, if not the best, to be the second best. And yet a person may not approve this form, because he thinks that the sort of legislation is ill adapted
to a legislator who has not despotic power. The truth is, that there are three forms of government, the best, the second and third best, which we may just mention, and then leave the selection to the ruler of the settlement. Following this method in the present instance, let us speak of that state which is first and second and third in excellence, and then leave to Cleinias, or to some one else, the selection of that form of polity which he approves in his own country.

The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying, that 'Friends have all things in common.' Whether there is now, or ever will be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all men express praise and blame, and feel joy and sorrow, on the same occasions, and the laws unite the city to the utmost,—whether all this is possible or not, I say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a state more exalted in virtue, or truer or better than this. Such a state, whether inhabited by Gods or sons of Gods, will make them blessed who dwell therein; and therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the state, and to cling to this, and, as far as possible, to seek for one which is like this. The state which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest to immortality and unity in the next degree; and after that, by the grace of God, we will complete the third one. And we will begin by speaking of the nature and origin of the second.

Let them at once distribute their land and houses, and not till the land in common, since a community of goods goes beyond their proposed origin, and nurture, and education. But in making the distribution, let the several possessors feel that their particular lots also belong to the whole city; and seeing that the earth is their parent, let them tend her more carefully than children do their mother. For she is a goddess and their queen, and they are her mortal subjects. Such also are the feelings which they ought to entertain to the Gods and demi-
LAWS.

gods of the country. And in order that the distribution may always remain, they ought to consider further that the present number of families should be always retained, and neither increased nor diminished. This may be secured for the whole city in the following manner:—Let the possessor of a lot leave the one of his children who is his best beloved, and one only, to be the heir of his dwelling, and his successor in the duty of ministering to the Gods, the family and the state, as well the living as those who are departed; but of his other children, if he have more than one, he shall give the females in marriage according to the law to be hereafter enacted, and the males he shall distribute as sons to such of the citizens as have no children, and are likely to be thankful; or if there are none, and particular individuals have too many children, male or female, or too few, as in the case of barrenness—in all these cases let the highest and most honourable magistracy created by us, judge and determine what is to be done with the redundant or deficient, and devise a means that the number of 5040 houses shall always remain the same. There are many ways of regulating numbers; for they in whom generation is affluent may be made to refrain, and, on the other hand, special care may be taken to increase the number of births by rewards and stigmas, and by the instruction and admonition of the younger by their elders—in this way the object may be attained. And if after all there be very great difficulty about the preservation of the 5040 houses, and there be an excess of citizens, owing to the too great love of those who live together, and we are at our wit's end, there is still the old device often mentioned by us of sending out a colony, which will part friends with us, and be composed of suitable persons. If, on the other hand, there come a wave bearing a deluge of disease, or a plague of war, and the inhabitants become much fewer than the appointed number by reason of mortality, you ought not to introduce citizens of spurious birth and education, if this can be avoided; but even God is said not to be able to fight against necessity.

Wherefore let us suppose this 'high argument' of ours to address us in the following terms:—Best of men, cease not to honour in their natural order similarity and equality and
sameness and agreement, as manifested in number and in every quality of goodness and greatness. And, above all, observe the aforesaid number 5040 throughout life; in the second place, do not disparage the small and modest proportions of the inheritances which you received in the distribution, by buying and selling them to one another. For then neither will the God who gave you the lot be your friend, nor will the legislator; and indeed the law declares to the disobedient the terms upon which he may or may not take the lot. In the first place, the earth as he is informed is sacred to the Gods; and in the next place, priests and priestesses will offer up prayers over the sacrifices, once, twice, and thrice, that he who buys or sells the houses or lands which he has received, may suffer the punishment which he deserves; and these their prayers they shall write down in the temples, on tablets of cypress-wood, for the instruction of posterity. Moreover they will set a watch over all these things, that they may be observed—the magistracy which has the sharpest eyes shall keep watch that any infringements of their commands may be discovered and punished as offences both against the law and the God. How great is the benefit of such an ordinance to all those cities, which obey and are administered accordingly, no bad man can ever know, as the old proverb says; but only a man of experience and good habits. For in such an order of things, there will not be much opportunity for making money; no man either ought, or indeed will be, allowed to exercise any ignoble occupation, of which the vulgarity deters a freeman, and disinclines him to acquire riches by any such means.

Further, the law enjoins that no private man shall be allowed to possess gold and silver, but only coin for daily use, which is almost necessary in dealing with artisans, and for payment of all those hirelings whose labour he may require, whether slaves or immigrants. Wherefore our citizens, as we say, should have a coin passing current among themselves, but not accepted among the rest of mankind; with a view, however, to expeditions and journeys to other lands,—for embassies, or for any other occasion which may arise of sending out a herald, the state must also possess a common
Hellenic currency. If a private person is ever obliged to go abroad, let him have the consent of the archons and go; and if when he returns he has any foreign money remaining, let him give the surplus back to the treasury, and receive a corresponding sum in the local currency. And if he is discovered to appropriate it, let it be confiscated, and let him who knows and does not inform be subject to curse and dishonour equally with him who brought the money, and also to a fine not less in amount than the foreign money which has been brought back. In marrying and giving in marriage, no one shall give or receive any dowry at all; and no one shall deposit money with another whom he does not trust as a friend, nor shall he lend money upon interest; and the borrower should be under no obligation to repay either capital or interest. That these principles are best, any one may see who compares them with the first principle and intention of a state. The intention, as we affirm, of a reasonable statesman, is not what the many declare to be the object of a good legislator; namely, that the state for which he is advising should be as great and as rich as possible, and should possess gold and silver, and have the greatest empire by sea and land;—this they imagine to be the true object of legislation, at the same time adding, inconsistently, that the true legislator desires to have the city the best and happiest possible. But they do not see that some of these things are possible, and some of them are impossible; and he who orders the state will desire what is possible, and will not indulge in vain wishes or attempts to accomplish that which is impossible. The citizen must indeed be happy and good, and the legislator will seek to make him so; but very rich and very good at the same time he cannot be, not, at least, in the sense in which the many speak of riches. For they describe by the term 'rich' the few who have the most valuable possessions, although the owner of them be a rogue. And if this is true, I can never assent to the doctrine that the rich man will be happy—he must be good as well as rich. And good in a high degree, and rich in a high degree at the same time, he cannot be. Some one will ask, why not? And we shall answer,—because acquisitons which come from sources which
are just and unjust indifferently, are more than double those which come from just sources only; and the sums which are expended neither honourably nor disgracefully, are only half as great as those which are expended honourably and on honourable purposes. Thus, if one acquires double and spends half, the other who is in the opposite case and is a good man cannot possibly be wealthier than he. The first—I am speaking of the saver and not of the spender—is not always bad; he may indeed in some cases be utterly bad, but, as I was saying, a good man he never is. For he who receives money unjustly as well as justly, and spends neither justly nor unjustly, will be a rich man if he be also thrifty. On the other hand, the utterly bad is in general profligate, and therefore poor; while he who spends on noble objects, and acquires wealth by just means only, can hardly be remarkable for riches, any more than he can be very poor. The argument then is right, in declaring that the very rich are not good, and, if they are not good, they are not happy. But the intention of our laws was, that the citizens should be as happy as possible, and as friendly as possible to one another. And men who are always at law with one another, and amongst whom there are many wrongs done, can never be friends to one another, but only those among whom crimes and lawsuits are few and slight. Therefore, we say that gold and silver ought not to be allowed in the city, nor much of the vulgar sort of trade which is carried on by lending money, or rearing the meaner kinds of live stock; but only the produce of agriculture, and only so much of this as will not compel us in pursuing it to neglect that for the sake of which riches exist,—I mean, soul and body, which without gymnastics, and without education, will never be worth anything; and therefore, as we have said not once but many times, the care of riches should have the last place in our thoughts. For there are in all three things about which every man has an interest; and the interest about money, when rightly regarded, is the third and lowest of them: midway comes the interest of the body; and, first of all, that of the soul; and the state which we are describing will have been rightly constituted if it ordains
honours according to this scale. But if, in any of the laws which have been ordained, health be preferred to temperance, or wealth to health and temperate habits, that law must clearly be wrong. Wherefore, also, the legislator ought often to impress upon himself the question—'What do I want?' and 'Do I attain my aim, or do I miss the mark?' In this way, and in this way only, he may acquit himself and free others from the work of legislation. Let the allottee then hold his lot upon the conditions which we have mentioned.

It would be well that every man should come to the colony having all things equal; but seeing that this is not possible, and one man will have greater possessions than another, for many reasons and in particular for the sake of equality in the various occasions of the state, qualifications of property must be unequal, in order that officers and contributions and distributions may be proportioned to the value of each person's wealth, and not solely to the virtue of his ancestors or himself, nor yet to the strength and beauty of his person, but also to the measure of his wealth or poverty; and so by a law of inequality, which will be in proportion to his wealth, he will receive honours and offices as equally as possible, and there will be no quarrels and disputes. To which end there should be four different standards appointed: there should be a first and a second and a third and a fourth class, in which the citizens will be placed, and they will be called by these and similar names: they may continue in the same rank, or pass into another in any individual case, on becoming richer from being poorer, or poorer from being richer. The form of law which I should propose would be as follows:—In a state which is desirous of being saved from the greatest of all plagues—not faction, but rather distraction—there should exist among the citizens neither extreme poverty, nor, again, excessive wealth, for both are productive of both these evils. Now the legislator should determine what is to be the limit of poverty or wealth. Let the limit of poverty be the value of the lot; this ought to be preserved, and no ruler, nor any one else who aspires after a reputation for virtue, will allow the lot to be impaired in any case. This the legislator gives as a measure, and he will permit a man to acquire double or triple,
or as much as four times the amount of this. But if a person have yet greater riches, whether he has found them, or they have been given to him, or he has made them in business, or has acquired by any stroke of fortune that which is in excess of the measure, if he give them back to the state, and to the Gods who are the patrons of the state, he shall suffer no penalty or loss of reputation; but if he disobeys this our law, any one who likes may inform against him and receive half the value of the excess, and the delinquent shall pay a sum equal to the excess out of his own property, and the other half of the excess shall belong to the Gods. And let every possession of every man, with the exception of the lot, be publicly registered with the archons whom the law appoints, in order that all suits relating to money may be easy and quite simple.

The next thing to be noted is, that the city should be placed as nearly as possible in the centre of the country; we should choose a place which possesses what is suitable for a city, and this may easily be imagined and described. Then we will divide the city into twelve portions, first founding a temple to Hestia and Zeus and Athene, to be termed the Acropolis, which we surround with a circular enclosure, and make the division of the entire city and country radiate from this point. The twelve portions shall be equalized in the following manner:—The smaller portions shall be of good land and the larger of inferior land; and the lots shall be 5040 in number. Further, each of them shall be divided into two, and the two sections shall form one allotment, having a share of the land which is near the city and of the land which is at a distance: let the portion which is close to the city be added to that which is farthest, and form one lot, and the portion which is nearest be added to the portion which is next farthest, and so on of the rest. Moreover, in the two sections of the lots the same principle of equalization of the soil ought to be maintained; the badness and goodness shall be compensated by more and less. And the legislator shall divide the citizens into twelve parts, and arrange the rest of their property, as far as possible, so as to form twelve equal parts; and there shall be a description of all. After this they shall
assign twelve lots to twelve Gods, and call them by their names, and dedicate to each God their several portions, and call the tribes after them. And they shall distribute the twelve divisions of the city in the same way in which they divided the country; and every man shall have two habitations, one near the centre of the country, and the other at the extremity. Enough, then, of the manner of settlement.

Now we ought to consider always that there can never be such a happy concurrence of circumstances as we have described; neither can all things coincide as they are wanted. Men who will not take offence at such a mode of living together, and will endure all their life long to have their property fixed at a moderate limit, and to beget children in accordance with our ordinances, and will allow themselves to be deprived of gold and other things which the legislator, as is evident from these enactments, will certainly forbid them; and will endure, further, the two dwellings, the one centralized in the city and the other round about;—all this is like the legislator telling his dreams, or making a city and citizens out of wax. There is truth in these objections, and therefore every one should take to heart what I am going to say. Once more, then, the legislator shall appear and address us:—'O, my friends,' he will say to us, 'do not suppose me ignorant that there is a certain degree of truth in these words; but I am of opinion that, in matters which are not present but future, he who exhibits a pattern of that at which he aims, should in nothing fall short of the fairest and truest; and that he who finds any part of his work impossible of execution should avoid and not execute that part, but he should contrive to carry out that which is nearest and most akin to it; and he should let the legislator perfect his design, and when it is perfected, he should join with him in considering what part of his legislation is expedient and what will arouse opposition; for surely the artist who is to be deemed worthy of any regard at all, ought always to make his work self-consistent.'

Having determined that there is to be a distribution into twelve parts, let us now see in what way this is to be accomplished. There is no difficulty in perceiving that the twelve parts admit of the greatest number of divisions of that which is
included under them, consisting of other parts which agree with
them, and are produced out of them up to 5040; and hence the
law ought to order phratries and demes and villages, and also
military ranks and movements, as well as coins and measures,
dry and liquid, and weights, so as to be commensurable and
agreeable to one another. Nor should we fear the appearance
of minuteness, if the law commands that all the vessels which
a man possesses should have a common measure, when we
consider that the divisions and variations of numbers have a use
in respect of all the variations of which they are susceptible,
both in themselves and as measures of height and depth, and in
all sounds and motions, as well those which proceed in a straight
direction, upwards or downwards, as in those which go round
and round. The legislator is to consider all these things, and to
bid the citizens, as far as possible, not to lose sight of numerical
order; for no single instrument of youthful education has such
mighty power, both as regards domestic economy and politics,
and in the arts, as the study of arithmetic. Above all, arith-
metic stirs up him who is by nature sleepy and dull, and makes
him quick to learn, retentive, shrewd, and aided by art divine
he makes progress quite beyond his natural powers. All these,
if only the legislator, by laws and institutions, can banish mean-
ness and covetousness from the souls of the disciples, and enable
them to profit by them, will be excellent and suitable instru-
ments of education. But if he cannot, he will unintentionally
create in them, instead of wisdom, the habit of craft, which evil
tendency may be observed in the Egyptians and Phoenicians,
and many other races, through the general illiberality of their
pursuits and possessions, whether some unworthy legislator of
theirs has been the cause, or some impediment of chance or
nature. For we must not fail to observe, O Megillus and Clei-
nias, that there is a difference in places, and that some beget
better men and others worse; and we must legislate accordingly.
Some places are subject to strange and fatal influences by
reason of diverse winds and violent heats, some by reason of
waters; or, again, from the character of that subsistence which
the earth supplies them, which not only affects the bodies of
men for good or evil, but produces similar results in their souls.
And in all such qualities those spots excel in which there is
a divine inspiration, and in which the Gods have their appointed lots, and are propitious to the dwellers in them. To all these matters the legislator, if he have any sense in him, must attend as far as man can, and frame his laws accordingly. And this is what you, Cleinias, must do, and to matters of this kind you must turn your mind since you are going to colonize a new country.

Cleinias. Your words, Athenian Stranger, are excellent, and I will do as you say.
Athenian Stranger. And now having made an end of the preliminaries we will proceed to the appointment of the magistrates.

Cleinias. Very good.

Ath. In the government of a state there are two parts: first, the number of the magistrates, and the mode of appointing them; and, secondly, when they have been appointed, laws will have to be provided for each of them, in nature and number suitable to them. But before electing the magistrates let us stop a little and say a word in season.

Cle. What have you got to say?

Ath. This is what I have to say;—every one can see, that although the work of legislation is a most important matter, yet if a well-ordered city superadd to good laws unsuitable officers, there will be no use in having the good laws; not only are they ridiculous and useless, but the greatest political injury and evil accrues from them.

Cle. Of course.

Ath. Then now, my friend, let us observe what will happen in the constitution of our intended state. In the first place, you will acknowledge that those who are duly appointed to magisterial power, and their families, should severally give satisfactory proof of what they are, from their youth upward until the time of their election; in the next place, those who are to elect—should be trained in habits of law, and be well educated, that they may have a right judgment, and may be able to select or reject men whom they approve or disapprove, as they are worthy of either. But how can we imagine that those who are brought together for the first time, and are
strangers to one another, and also uneducated, will avoid making mistakes in the choice of magistrates?

Cle. Impossible.

Ath. The matter is serious, and excuses will not serve the turn. I will tell you, then, what you and I will have to do, since you, as you tell me, with nine others, have offered to settle the state on behalf of the people of Crete, and I am to help you, which is my reason for inventing this romance. I certainly should not like to leave the tale wandering all over the world without a head;—a headless monster is such a hideous thing.

Cle. Excellent, Stranger.

Ath. Yes; and I will be as good as my word.

Cle. Let us by all means do as you propose.

Ath. That we will, by the grace of God, if old age will only permit us.

Cle. But God will be gracious.

Ath. Yes; and under His guidance let us consider a further point.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. Let us remember what a courageously mad and daring creation this our city is.

Cle. What had you in your mind when you said that?

Ath. I had in my mind the free and easy manner in which we are ordaining that the inexperienced colonists shall receive our laws. Now a man need not be very wise, Cleinias, in order to see that no one can easily receive laws at their first imposition. But if we could anyhow wait until those who have been imbued with them from childhood, and have been nurtured in them, and become habituated to them, take their part in the public elections; I say, if this could be accomplished, and rightly accomplished by any way or contrivance,—then, I think that there would be very little danger, at the end of the time, of a state thus trained not being permanent.

Cle. That may be believed.

Ath. Then let us consider if we can find any way of doing as you say; for I maintain, Cleinias, that the Cnosians, above all the other Cretans, should not be satisfied with barely discharging their duty to the colony, but they ought to take
the utmost pains to establish the principal offices of the state in the best and surest manner. Above all, this applies to the selection of the guardians of the law, who must be chosen first of all, and with the greatest care; the others are of less importance.

Cle. What method can we devise of electing them?

Ath. This will be the method:—Sons of the Cretans, I shall say to them, inasmuch as the Cnosians have precedence over the other states, they should, in common with those who join this settlement, choose of themselves a body of thirty-seven in all, nineteen of them being taken from the settlers, and the remainder from the citizens of Cnosus. Of these latter the Cnosians shall make a present to your colony, and you yourself shall be one of the eighteen, and shall become a citizen of the new state; and if you and the others will not agree, they may fairly use a little violence in order to accomplish their end.

Cle. But why, Stranger, do not you and Megillus take a part in our new city?

Ath. O, Cleinias, Athens is proud, and Sparta too; and they are both a long way off. But you and the other colonists are conveniently situated as you describe. I have been speaking of the way in which the new citizens may be best managed under present circumstances; but in after ages, and when the city is permanently established, let the election be on this wise. All who are horse or foot soldiers, or have taken part in war during the age for military service, shall share in the election of magistrates; and the election shall be held in whatever temple the state deems most venerable, and every one shall carry his vote to the altar of the God, writing down on a tablet the name of his father, and tribe, and ward; and at the side he shall write his own name in like manner. Any one who is dissatisfied with that which he has written may, if he pleases, take away his tablet, and, within a period of not less than thirty days, replace it in the agora. The tablets which are judged to be first, to the number of 300, shall be exhibited by the archons to the whole city, and the city shall in like manner select from these the candidates whom they prefer; and this second selection, to the number of 100, shall be again exhibited to
the citizens; in the third, let any one who pleases select out of the 100, walking through the parts of victims, and let them choose for magistrates and proclaim the seven-and-thirty who have the greatest number of votes. But who, Cleinias and Megillus, will order for us in the colony all this matter of the magistrates, and the scrutinies of them? If we reflect, we shall see that the cities which are thus constituted must originally have some such persons, who cannot possibly be elected before there are any magistrates⁴; and yet they must be elected in some way, and they are not to be inferior men, but the best possible. For as the proverb says, 'a good beginning is half the business;' and 'to have begun well' is praised by all, and in my opinion is a great deal more than half the business, and has never been praised by any one enough.

Cle. That is very true.

Ath. Then let us recognise the difficulty, and make clear to our own minds how the beginning is to be accomplished. There is only one proposal which I have to offer, and that is one which, under our circumstances, is both necessary and expedient.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. I maintain that this colony of ours has a father and mother, which is no other than the colonizing state. Well, I know that many colonies have been, and will be, at enmity with their parents. But in early days the child, as in a family, loves and is beloved; even if there come a time later when the tie is broken, still, while he is in want of education, he naturally loves his parents and is beloved by them, and flies to them for protection, and finds in them his natural defence in time of need; and this parental feeling already exists in the Cnosians, as is shown by their care of the new city; and there is a similar feeling on the part of the young city towards Cnosus. And I repeat what I was saying—for there is no harm in repeating what is good—that the Cnosians should take a public interest in all these matters, and choose, as far as they can, the eldest and best of the colonists, to the number of not less than a hundred; and let there be another hundred of the Cnosians themselves. These, I say, on their arrival, should have a joint

¹ Reading πρὸ πατῶν.
BOOK VI.

care that the magistrates should be appointed according to law, and that when they are appointed they should undergo a scrutiny. When this has been effected, the Cnosians shall return home, and the new city do the best she can for her own preservation and happiness. I would have the seven-and-thirty now, and in all future time, chosen to fulfil the following duties: Let them, in the first place, be the guardians of the law; and, secondly, of the registers in which each one registers before the magistrate the amount of his property, excepting four minae which are allowed to citizens of the first class, three to the second, two to the third, and a single mina to the fourth. And if any one, despising the laws, for the sake of gain be found to possess anything more which has not been registered, let all that he has in excess be confiscated, and let him suffer a punishment which shall be the reverse of honourable or fortunate. And let any one who will, indict him on the charge of loving base gains, and proceed against him before the guardians of the law. And if he be cast, let him lose his share of the public possessions, and when there is any public distribution, let him have nothing but the original lot; and let him be written down a criminal as long as he lives, in some place in which any one who pleases can read about his crimes. The guardian of the law shall not hold office longer than twenty years, and shall not be less than fifty years of age when he is elected; or if he is elected when he is sixty years of age, he shall hold office for ten years only; and upon the same principle, he must not imagine that he will continue to hold such an important office as that of guardian of the laws, after he is seventy years of age, if he live so long.

These are the three first ordinances about the guardians of the law; as the work of legislation progresses, there will be laws for each of them, which will assign to them their further duties. And now we may proceed in order to speak of the election of other officers; for generals have to be elected, and these again must have their ministers, generals, and colonels of horse, and commanders of brigades of foot, who would be more rightly called by their popular name of brigadiers. The guardians of the law shall propose generals, who are natives of the city, and a selection from the candidates proposed shall be made by those who are or have been of the age of military
service. And if one who is not proposed is thought by somebody to be better than one who is, let him name him whom he prefers in the place of the other, and make oath that he is better, and propose him; and whichever of them is approved by vote shall be taken; and the three who have the greatest number of votes shall be appointed generals, and superintendents of military affairs, after previously undergoing a scrutiny, like the guardians of the law. And let the generals thus elected propose twelve brigadiers, one for each tribe; and there shall be a right of counter-proposal as in the case of the generals, and the voting and decision shall take place in the same way. Until the prytanes and council are elected, the guardians of the law shall convene the assembly in some holy spot which is suitable to the purpose, placing the hoplites by themselves, and the cavalry by themselves, and in a third division all the rest of the army. All are to vote for the general officers of foot [and horse], but the brigadiers are to be voted for only by those who carry shields. Let the body of cavalry choose phylarchs for the generals; but captains of light troops, or archers, or any other division of the army, shall be appointed by the generals for themselves. There only remains the appointment of officers of cavalry: these shall be proposed by the same persons who proposed the generals, and the election and proposal of other candidates shall be carried out in the same way as in the case of the generals, and let the cavalry vote and the infantry look on at the election; the two who have the greatest number of votes shall be the leaders of all the horse. Disputes about the voting may be raised once or twice; but if the dispute be raised a third time, the presiding officers in each case shall decide.

The council shall consist of 360 members,—this will be a convenient number for sub-division. If we divide the whole number into four parts of ninety each, we get ninety counsellors for each class. First, all the citizens shall vote for members of the council taken from the first class; they shall be compelled to vote, and, if they do not, shall be duly fined. When the candidates have been elected, some one shall mark them down; this shall be the business of the first day. And on the following day, the election shall be made from the second class in the same manner and under the same conditions as on the previous
BOOK VI.

day; and on the third day an election shall be made from the third class, at which every one may if he likes vote, and the three first classes shall be compelled to vote; but the fourth and lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of this class who does not vote shall not be punished. On the fourth day members of the council shall be elected from the fourth and smallest class; they shall be elected by all, but he who is of the fourth class shall suffer no penalty, nor he who is of the third, if he be not willing to vote; but he who is of the first or second class, if he does not vote shall be punished;—he who is of the second class shall pay a fine triple the fine which was exacted at first, and he who is of the first class quadruple. On the fifth day the rulers shall bring out the names noted down, in the presence of all the citizens, and every man shall choose out of them, under pain, if he do not, of suffering the first penalty; and when they have chosen 180 out of each of the classes, they shall choose one-half of them by lot, who shall undergo a scrutiny:—These are to form the council for the year.

The mode of election which has been described, is in a mean between monarchy and democracy, and such a mean the state ought always to observe; for servants and masters never can be friends, nor good and bad, merely because they are said to have equal privileges. For to unequals equals become unequal, if they are not harmonised by measure; and both by reason of equality, and by reason of inequality, cities are filled with seditions. The old saying, that 'equality makes friendship,' is witty and also true; but there is obscurity and confusion as to what sort of equality is meant. For there are two equalities which are called by the same name, but are in reality in many ways almost the opposite of one another; one of them may be introduced without difficulty, by any state or any legislator in the distribution of honours; this is the rule of measure, weight, and number, which regulates and apportions them. But there is another equality, of a better and higher kind, which is not at once recognised. This is the judgment of Zeus, which has little place in human things; that little, however, is the source of the greatest good to individuals and states. For it gives to the greater more, and to the inferior less always and
in proportion to the nature of each; and, above all, greater honour to the greater virtue, and to the less less; and to either in proportion to their respective measure of virtue and education. And this is justice, and is ever the true principle of politics, at which we ought to aim, and according to this rule order the new city which we are founding, and any other city which may be hereafter founded. To this the legislator should look,— not to the interests of tyrants one or more, or to the power of the people, but to justice always; which, as I was saying, is the distribution of natural equality among unequals. But there are times at which every state is compelled to use the words, 'just' 'equal,' in a secondary sense, in the hope of escaping in some degree from factions. For equity and indulgence are infractions of the perfect and strict rule of justice. And this is the reason why we are obliged to use the equality of the lot, in order to avoid the discontent of the people; and we invoke God and fortune in our prayers, and beg that they themselves will direct the lot with a view to supreme justice. And therefore, although we are compelled to use both equalities, we should use that into which the element of chance enters as seldom as possible.

Thus, O my friends, and for the reasons given, should a state act which would endure and be saved. But as a ship sailing on the sea has to be watched night and day, in like manner a city also is sailing on a sea of politics, and is liable to all sorts of insidious assaults; and therefore from morning to night, and from night to morning, rulers must join hands with rulers, and watchers succeed watchers, receiving and giving up their trust in a perpetual order. A multitude can never fulfil a duty of this sort with anything like energy; moreover, the greater number of the senators will have to be left during the greater part of the year to order their concerns at their own homes. They must be arranged in twelve portions, answering to twelve months, and serve as guardians each portion for a single month. Their business is to be at hand and receive any foreigner or citizen who comes to them, whether to give information, or to put questions of which other states are to receive the answers; or when the city desires to ask a question and receive an answer; or again, when there is a likelihood of internal com-
motions, which are always liable to happen in some form or other, they will, if they can, prevent their occurring; or if they have already occurred, will lose no time in making them known to the city, and healing the evil. Wherefore, also, this which is the presiding body of the state ought always to have the control of their assemblies, and the dissolutions of them, regular as well as occasional. All this is to be ordered by the twelfth part of the council, which is always to keep watch together with the other officers of the state during one portion of the year, and to rest during the remaining eleven portions.

Thus will the city be fairly ordered. And now, who is to have the superintendence of the country, and what shall be the arrangement? Seeing that the whole city and the entire country have been both of them divided into twelve portions, ought there not to be appointed superintendents of the ways of the city, and of the houses, and buildings, and harbours, and the agora, and fountains, and groves, and temples, and the like?

Cle. To be sure there ought.

Ath. Let us assume, then, that there ought to be servants of the temples, and priests and priestesses, and three kinds of officers who shall preside over roads and buildings, and the order of them; and over men that they may keep them from crime, and over beasts who are within the enclosure and suburb of the city, according to the requirements of the city. Those who have the care of the city shall be called wardens of the city; and those who have the care of the agora shall be called wardens of the agora; and those who have the care of the temples shall be called priests. Those who hold the hereditary office of priest or priestess, shall not be disturbed; but if there be few or none such, as is probable at the foundation of a new city, priests and priestesses shall be appointed to be servants of the Gods who have no servants. Some of them shall be elected, and others appointed by lot, and they shall mingle in a friendly manner those who are of the people and those who are not of the people in every place and city, that the state may be as far as possible of one mind. The officers of the temple shall be appointed by lot; in this way their election will be committed to God, who will do what is agree-
able to Him. And he who obtains a lot shall undergo a scrutiny, first, as to whether he is sound of body and of legitimate birth; and in the second place, in order to show that he is of a perfectly pure family, not stained with homicide or any similar impiety in his own person, and also that his father and mother have led a similar unstained life. Now the laws about all divine things should be brought from Delphi, and they should use them under the direction of the interpreters of them. The tenure of the priesthood should always be for a year and no longer; and he who will duly execute the sacred office, according to the laws of religion, must be not less than sixty years of age,—the laws shall be the same about priestesses; and let the twelve tribes taken by fours appoint interpreters, one out of each tribe, and let this be done thrice; and let the three who have the greatest number of votes undergo a scrutiny, and the remaining nine go to Delphi, in order that the God may return one out of each triad; their age shall be the same as that of the priests, and the scrutiny of them shall be conducted in the same manner; let them be interpreters for life, and when any one dies let the tribes, taken as before by fours, select another from the tribe of the deceased: moreover, they shall choose treasurers of the property of the several temples, and of the sacred groves, who shall have authority over the produce and the letting of them; and three of them shall be chosen from the highest classes for the greater temples, and two for the lesser, and one for the least of all; the manner of their election and the scrutiny of them shall be the same as that of the generals. This shall be the order of the temples.

Let everything have a guard as far as possible; and let the defence of the city be committed to the generals, and taxiarchs, and hipparchs, and phylarchs, and prytanes, and the wardens of the city, and of the agora, when the election of them has been completed. The defence of the country shall be provided for as follows:—The entire land has been already distributed into twelve as nearly as possible equal parts, and let one tribe, taken by lot, provide annually for each division five wardens of the country and commanders of the watch; and let each of the five have the power of selecting twelve others out of
BOOK VI.

the youth of their own tribe,—these shall be not less than twenty-five years of age, and not more than thirty. And let there be allotted to them severally every month one of the twelve portions of the land, in order that they may all acquire knowledge and experience of the whole country. This duty and service of commanders and of watchers shall continue during two years. At first, they will have their stations allotted to them, and will afterwards go from place to place in regular order, making their round from left to right as their commanders direct them; (when I speak of going to the right, I mean that they are to go to the east). And at the commencement of the second year, in order that as many as possible of the guards may not only get a knowledge of the country at any one season of the year, but may also have experience of the manner in which different places are affected at different seasons of the year, their then commanders shall lead them again towards the left, from place to place in succession, until they have completed the second year. In the third year they shall choose other wardens of the country, and commanders of the watch, five in number, who are to be the superintendents of the bands of twelve. While on service at each station, their attention shall be directed to the following points:—In the first place, they shall see that the country is well protected against enemies; they shall trench and dig wherever this is required, and, as far as they can, they shall confine in fastnesses the evil-disposed, in order to prevent them from doing any harm to the country or the property; they shall use the beasts of burden and the labourers whom they find on the spot: these will be their instruments whom they will superintend, taking them, as far as possible, at the times when they are not engaged in their regular business. They shall make every part of the country inaccessible to enemies, and as accessible as possible to friends; there shall be ways for man and beast, and they shall take care to have them always as smooth as they can; and shall provide against the rains doing harm instead of good to the land, when they come down from the mountains into the hollows; and shall keep them back by the help of works and ditches, in order that they may receive and drink up the rain from heaven, and making fountains
and streams in the fields and places which are underneath, may furnish even to the dry places plenty of good water. The fountains of waters, whether of rivers or of springs, shall be ornamented with plantations and buildings for beauty; and let them bring together the streams in subterraneous channels, and make water plentiful by irrigation at all seasons of the year; and if there be a sacred grove or dedicated precinct in their neighbourhood, they shall let the stream have a way to the actual temples of the Gods. Everywhere in such places the youth shall make gymnasia for themselves, and warm baths for the aged, placing by them abundance of dry wood, for the benefit of those labouring under disease—there the weary frame of the rustic, worn with toil, will be kindly received, and experience far better treatment than at the hands of a not over-wise doctor.

The building of these and the like works will be useful and ornamental; they will provide a pleasing amusement, but they will be a serious employment too; for the companies of sixty will have to guard their own positions, not only with a view to enemies, but also with an eye to professing friends. When a quarrel arises among neighbours or citizens, and any one whether slave or freeman wrongs another, let the five rulers decide small matters on their own authority; but where the charge against another relates to greater matters, the seventeen composed of the five and the twelve, shall determine any charges which one man brings against another, not involving more than three minae. Every judge and ruler shall be liable to give an account of his conduct in office, except those who, like kings, have the final decision. Moreover, as regards the aforesaid wardens of the country, if they do any wrong to those of whom they have the care, whether by imposing upon them unequal tasks, or by taking the produce of the soil or implements of husbandry without their consent; also if they receive anything in the way of a bribe, or decide suits unjustly, or if they yield to the influences of flattery, let them be publicly dishonoured; and in regard to any other wrong which they do to the inhabitants of the country, if the question be of a mina, let them submit to the decision of the villagers in the neighbourhood; but in suits of greater amount, or in case of the lesser if they
refuse to submit, trusting that their monthly removal into
another part of the country will enable them to escape—in
such cases the injured party may bring his suit in the com-
mon court, and if he obtain a verdict he may exact from the
defendant who refused to submit a double penalty.

The rulers and the wardens of the country, while on their two
years' service, shall have common meals at their several stations,
and shall all live together; and he who is absent from the daily
meal, or sleeps out at night, unless by order of the rulers, or by
reason of absolute necessity, if the five denounce him and in-
scribe his name in the agora as not having kept his guard, let
him be deemed to have betrayed the city, and let him be dis-
graced and beaten with impunity by any one who meets him
and is willing to punish him. If any of the rulers is guilty of
such an irregularity, the whole company of sixty shall see to it,
and he who is cognisant of the offence, and does not bring the
offender to trial, shall be amenable to the same laws as the
younger offender himself, and shall pay a heavier fine, and be
incapable of ever commanding the young. The guardians of
the law are to be careful inspectors of these matters, and shall
either prevent or punish offenders. Every man should re-
member the universal rule, that he who is not a good servant
will not be a good master; a man should pride himself more
upon serving well than upon commanding well: first upon
serving the laws, which is also the service of the Gods; in the
second place, upon having served ancient and honourable men
in the days of his youth. Moreover, during the two years in
which he is a warden of the country, his daily food ought to
be of a simple and humble kind. When the twelve are gathered
together, let them take counsel with the five, and determine
that they will serve themselves, and will not have other slaves
and servants for their own use, neither will they use those of
the villagers and husbandmen for their private advantage, but
for the public service only; and in general let them make up
their minds to live independently by themselves, servants of the
state and their own. Further, at all seasons of the year, summer
and winter alike, let them survey minutely the whole
country, bearing arms and keeping guard,—at the same time
acquiring a perfect knowledge of every locality. There can be
no more important kind of information than the exact knowledge of a man's own country; and for this as well as for more general reasons of pleasure and advantage, hunting with dogs and other kinds of sports should be pursued by the young. The service to whom this is committed may be called the secret police or wardens of the country; the name does not much signify, but every one who has the safety of the state at heart will use his utmost diligence in this service.

After the wardens of the country, we have to speak of the election of wardens of the agora and of the city. The wardens of the country were sixty in number, and the wardens of the city will be three, and will divide the twelve parts of the city into three; like the former, they shall have care of the ways, and of the different high roads which lead out of the country into the city, and of the buildings, that they may be all made according to law;—also of the waters, which those who superintend and preserve the waters convey to them, care being taken that they may reach the fountains pure and abundant, and be both an ornament and a benefit to the city. These also shall be men of ability, and at leisure to take care of the public interest. Let every man propose as warden of the city any one whom he likes out of the highest class, and when the vote has been given on them, and the number is reduced to the six who have the greatest number of votes, let the electing officers choose by lot three out of the six, and when they have undergone a scrutiny let them hold office according to the law appointed for them. Next, let the wardens of the agora be elected in like manner, out of the first and second class, five in number: ten are to be first elected, and out of the ten five are to be chosen by lot, as in the election of the wardens of the city; and when they have undergone a scrutiny, they shall be proclaimed wardens of the agora. Every one shall vote for all the ten, and he who will not vote, if he be informed against before the archons, shall be fined fifty drachmae, and shall also be deemed a bad citizen. Let any one who likes go to the assembly and to the general council; this shall be compulsory on citizens of the first and second class, and they shall pay a fine of ten drachmae if they be found not answering to their names at the assembly. But the
third and fourth class shall be under no compulsion, and shall be let off without a fine, unless the rulers have commanded all to be present, in consequence of some urgent necessity. The wardens of the agora shall observe the order appointed by law for the agora, and shall have the charge of the temples and fountains which are in the agora; and they shall see that no one injures them, and punish him who does so, with stripes and bonds, if he be a slave or stranger; but if he be a citizen who misbehaves in this way, they shall have the power themselves of inflicting a fine upon him to the amount of a hundred drachmae, or with the consent of the wardens of the city up to double that amount. And let the wardens of the city have a similar power of imposing punishments and fines in their own department; and let them impose fines by their own authority, up to a mina, or up to two minae with the consent of the wardens of the agora.

In the next place, it will be proper to appoint ministers of music and gymnastic, two of each kind—one whose business will be education, and the other for the superintendence of contests. In speaking of education, the law means to speak of those who have the care of order and instruction in gymnasia and schools, and of the going to school and lodging of boys and girls; and in speaking of contests, the law refers to the judges of gymnastics and of music; these again are divided into two classes, the one having to do with music, the other with gymnastic; and the same who judge of the gymnastic contests of men, shall judge of horses; but in music there shall be one set of judges of solo singing, and of imitation—I mean of rhapsodists, players on the harp, the flute and the like, and another who shall judge of choruses. First of all, we must choose leaders for the choruses of boys, and men, and maidens, whom they shall follow in the amusement of the dance, and in our other musical arrangements;—one leader will be enough for them, and he should be not less than forty years of age. One leader of the solo singers will also be enough to introduce them, and to give judgment on the competitors, and he ought not to be less than thirty years of age. The leader and regulator of the choruses shall be elected after the following manner:—Let any persons who commonly take an interest in
such matters go to the meeting, and be fined if they do not go (the guardians of the law shall judge of their fault), but those who have no interest shall not be compelled. The elector shall propose as leader some one who understands music, and in the scrutiny he may be challenged on the one part by those who say he has no skill, and defended on the other hand by those who say that he has. Ten are to be elected by vote, and he of the ten who is chosen by lot shall undergo a scrutiny, and lead the choruses for a year according to law. And in like manner the competitor who wins the lot shall be leader of the solo and concert music for that year; and he [who is elected] shall refer the judgment of them to the judges. In the next place, we have to choose judges in the contests of horses and of men; these shall be selected from the third and also from the second class of citizens, and the three first classes shall be compelled to go to the election, but the lowest class shall not be compelled; and let there be three elected by lot out of the twenty who have been chosen previously, and they must also have the vote and approval of the examiners. But if any one is rejected in the scrutiny at any ballot or decision, others shall be chosen in the same manner, and undergo a similar scrutiny.

There remains the minister of the education of youth, male and female; he too will rule according to law, being a single magistrate of fifty years old at least;—the father of children lawfully begotten, of both sexes, or of one at any rate. He who is elected, and he who is the elector, should consider that of all the great offices of state this is the greatest; for the first shoot of any plant rightly tending to the perfection of its own nature, has the greatest effect on its maturity; and this is not only true of plants, but of animals wild and tame, and also of men. Man, as we say, is a tame or civilized animal; nevertheless, he requires proper instruction and a fortunate nature, and then of all animals he becomes the most divine and most civilized; but if he be insufficiently or ill educated he is the most savage of earthly creatures. Wherefore the legislator ought not to allow the education of children to become a secondary or accidental matter. In the first place, he who would be rightly provident about them, should begin by taking
BOOK VI.

337
care that he is elected, who of all the citizens is in every re-
spect the best; him they shall do their best to appoint as
guardian and superintendent. To this end all the magistrates,
with the exception of the council and prytanes, shall go to the
temple of Apollo, and elect by ballot him of the guardians of
the law whom they severally think will be the best super-
intendent of education. And he who has the greatest number
of votes, after he has undergone a scrutiny at the hands of all the
magistrates who have been his electors, with the exception
of the guardians of the law,—shall hold office for five years;
and in the sixth year let another be chosen in like manner
to fill his office.

If any one dies while he is holding a public office, and more
than thirty days before his term of office expires, let those
who are concerned with the matter elect another to the office
in the same manner as before. And if any one who is entrusted
with orphans dies, let the relations both on the father's and
mother's side, who are residing at home, including cousins, ap-
point another guardian within ten days, and be fined a drachma
a day for neglect.

A city which has no regular courts of law ceases to be a
city; and again, if a judge is silent and says no more than the
litigants in preliminary trials and in private arbitrations, he
will never be able to decide justly; wherefore a multitude of
judges will not easily judge well, nor a few if they are not
good judges. The point in dispute should be made clear by
both parties; and time, and deliberation, and repeated exami-
nation, greatly tend to clear up doubts. For this reason, he
who goes to law with another, should go first of all to his
neighbours and friends who know best the questions at issue.

And if he be unable to obtain from them a satisfactory de-
cision, let him have recourse to another court; and if the two
courts cannot settle the matter, let the third put an end to
the suit.

Now the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded
as a choice of magistrates, for every magistrate must also be
a judge of some things; and the judge, though he be not a
magistrate, yet in certain respects is a very important magis-
trate on the day on which he is determining a suit. Regarding

VOL. V. Z
then the judges also as magistrates, let us say who are fit to be judges, and of what they are to be judges, and how many of them are to judge in each suit. Let that be the supreme tribunal which the litigants agree to appoint in common for themselves. And let there be two other tribunals: one for private individuals, who desire to have causes of action decided against one another; the other for public causes, in which some citizen is of opinion that the public has been wronged by an individual, and is willing to vindicate the common interests. And we must not forget to mention how the judges are to be qualified, and who they are to be. In the first place, let there be a tribunal open to all private persons who are trying causes one against another for the third time, and let this be composed as follows: All the officers of state, as well annual as those holding office for a longer period, at the beginning of the new year, in the month which follows the summer solstice, shall meet on the evening before the expiration of the year in some temple, and calling God to witness, shall dedicate one judge of every court to be their first-fruits, choosing the one in each office who seems to them to be the best, and whom they deem likely to decide the causes of his fellow-citizens during the ensuing year in the best and holiest manner. And when the election is completed, a scrutiny shall be held in the presence of the electors themselves, and if any one be rejected another shall be chosen in the same manner. Those who have undergone the scrutiny shall judge the causes of those who have declined the inferior courts, and shall give their vote openly. The counsellors and other magistrates who have elected them shall be required to be hearers and spectators of the causes; and any one else may be present who pleases. If one man charges another with having intentionally decided wrong, let him go to the guardians of the law and lay his accusation before them, and he who is found guilty in such a case shall pay damages to the injured party equal to half the injury; but if he shall appear to deserve a greater penalty, the judges shall determine what additional punishment he shall suffer, and what he ought to pay to the public treasury, or to the party who brought the original suit.

In the judgment of offences against the state, the people 70
ought to participate, for when any one wrongs the state they are all wronged, and may reasonably complain if they are not allowed to share in the decision. Such causes ought to originate with the people, and they ought also to have the final decision of them, and the trial of them shall take place before three of the highest magistrates, upon whom the plaintiff and the defendant shall agree; and if they are not able to come to an agreement themselves, the council shall choose one of the two proposed. And in private suits, too, as far as is possible, all should have a share; for he who has no share in the administration of justice, is apt to imagine that he has no share in the state at all. And for this reason there shall be a court of law in every ward, and the judges shall be chosen by lot;—they shall give their decisions at once, and shall be inaccessible to entreaties. The final judgment shall rest with that court which, as we maintain, has been established in the most incorruptible form of which human things admit: this shall be the court established for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in the courts of the neighbours or of the tribes.

Thus much of the courts of law, which, as I was saying, cannot be defined either as being or not being offices; a superficial sketch has been given of them, and some things have been told and others omitted. For the right place of an exact statement of the laws respecting suits, under their several heads, will be at the end of the body of legislation;—let us then expect them at the end. Hitherto our legislation has been chiefly occupied with the appointment of offices. Perfect unity and exactness, extending to the whole and every particular of political administration, cannot be attained to the full, until the discussion shall have a beginning, middle, and end, and is complete in every part. At present we have reached the election of rulers, and this may be regarded as a sufficient termination of what has preceded. And now there need no longer be any delay or hesitation in making laws.

Cle. I like your way, Stranger, both in what you have said, and still more in what you are going to say. I particularly approve of your manner of joining the beginning to the end.
Thus far, then, the old man's game of play has gone off well.

Cle. I suppose you mean to say rather their serious and noble pursuit?

Ath. Perhaps; but I should like to know whether you and I are agreed about a certain thing?

Cle. What is that?

Atk. You know the endless labour which painters expend upon their pictures—they and their apprentices are always putting in or taking out colours, or performing some operation of this sort; they seem as if they would never cease touching up their works, which are always being made brighter and more beautiful.

Cle. I know something of them from report, although I have never had much acquaintance with their art.

Ath. No matter; we may make use of the illustration notwithstanding:—Suppose that some one had a mind to paint a figure in the most beautiful manner, in the hope that his work instead of losing would always improve as time went on—do you not see that being a mortal, unless he leaves some one to succeed him who will correct the flaws which time has introduced, and be able to add what is left imperfect through the defect of the artist, and who will brighten up and improve the picture, all his great labour will last but a short time?

Cle. True.

Ath. And is not the aim of the legislator similar? First, he desires that his laws should be written down with the requisite exactness; in the second place, as time goes on and he has made an actual trial of his decrees, will he not find omissions? Do you imagine that there ever was a legislator so foolish as not to know that many things are necessarily omitted, which some one coming after him must observe and correct, if the constitution and the order of government is not to deteriorate, but to improve in the state which he is establishing?

Cle. Certainly, that is the sort of thing which every one would desire.

Ath. And if any one possesses any means of accomplishing this by word or deed, or has any way great or small by which he can teach a person to understand how he can maintain and
amend the laws, he should finish what he has to say, and not leave the work incomplete.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And is not this what you and I have to do at the present moment?

Cle. What have we to do?

Ath. As we are about to legislate and have chosen our guardians of the law, and are ourselves in the evening of life, and they as compared with us are young men, we ought not only to legislate for them, but to endeavour to make them both lawgivers and guardians of the law themselves as far as this is possible.

Cle. Certainly; if we can.

Ath. At any rate, we must do our best.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. We will say to them,—O friends and saviours of our laws, in laying down any law, there are many particulars which we shall omit, and this cannot be helped; at the same time, we will do our utmost to describe what is important, and will give an outline which you shall fill up. And I will explain to what principle you are to look in accomplishing this work. Megillus, and I, and Cleinias, have often spoken to one another touching these matters, and we are of opinion that we have spoken well. And we hope that you will be of the same mind with us, and become our disciples, and keep in view the things which in our united opinion the legislator and guardian of the law ought to keep in view. There was one principle in particular about which we were agreed—that a man's whole energies throughout life should be devoted to the acquisition of the virtue proper to a man, whether this was to be gained by study, or habit, or some kind of possession, or desire, or opinion, or knowledge—and this applies equally to men and women, old and young—the aim of all should always be such as I have described; anything which may be an impediment, the good man ought to show that he utterly disregards. And if at last necessity plainly compels him to be an outlaw from his native land, rather than bow his neck to the yoke and be ruled by inferiors, and he has to fly, he must be an exile and endure all these things rather than accept another form of government,
which is likely to make men worse. These are our original principles; and do you now, fixing your eyes upon the standard of what a man and a citizen ought to be, praise and blame the laws—blame those which have not this power of making the citizen better, but embrace those which have; and with gladness receive and live in them; bidding a long farewell to other institutions which aim at goods, as they are termed, of a different kind.

Let us proceed to another class of laws, beginning with their foundation in religion. And we must first return to the number 5040—the entire number had, or rather has, a great many convenient divisions, and the number of the tribe which was a twelfth part of the whole, being correctly formed by $21 \times 20$, also has them. And not only is the whole number divisible by twelve, but also the number of each tribe is divisible by twelve. Now every portion should be regarded by us as a sacred gift of Heaven, corresponding to the months and to the movement of the universe. Every city has a guiding or sacred principle given by nature, but in some the division or distribution has been more right than in others, and has been more sacred and fortunate. In our opinion, nothing can be more right than the selection of the number 5040, which may be divided by all numbers from one to twelve with the single exception of eleven, and that admits of a very easy correction; for if two families be deducted from 5040, the division by eleven is restored. And the truth of this may be easily proved when we have leisure. But for the present, trusting to the mere assertion of this principle, let us divide the state; and assigning to each portion some God or son of a God, let us give them altars and sacred rites, and at the altars let us hold assemblies for sacrifice twice in the month—twelve assemblies for the tribes, and twelve for the city, according to their divisions; the first in honour of the Gods and divine things, and the second to promote friendship and 'better acquaintance,' as the phrase is, and every sort of good fellowship with one another. For people must be acquainted with those into whose families they marry and to whom they are given in marriage; in such matters, as far as possible to avoid mistakes is all important, and with this serious purpose let games be instituted in which youths and
maidens shall dance together, seeing and being seen naked, at
a proper age, and on a suitable occasion, not transgressing the
rules of modesty. The masters of choruses will be the
superintendents and regulators of these games, and they,
together with the guardians of the law, will legislate in any
matters which we have omitted; for, as we were saying, where
there are numerous and minute details, the legislator cannot
but fail. And the annual officers who have experience, and
know what is wanted, must make arrangements and improve-
ments year by year, until such enactments and provisions are
sufficiently determined. A ten years' experience of sacrifices
and dances, if extending to all particulars, will be quite
sufficient; and if the legislator be alive they shall communicate
with him, but if he be dead then the several officers shall
bring the omissions which come under their notice before the
guardians of the law, until all is perfect; and from that time
there shall be no more change, and they shall establish and
use the new laws with the others which the legislator originally
gave them, and of which they are never, if they can help, to
change aught; or, if some necessity overtakes them, the
magistrates must be called into counsel, and the whole people,
and they must go to all the oracles of the Gods; and if they
are all agreed, in that case they may make the change, but in
any other case he who objects according to law shall prevail.

Whenever any one of twenty-five years of age, seeing and
being seen, believes himself to have found a marriage connection
which is to his mind, and suitable for the procreation of children,
let him marry if he be under the age of five-and-thirty years;
but let him first hear how he ought to seek after what is suitable
and appropriate. For, as Cleinias says, every law like a strain
of music should have a suitable prelude.

Cle. You recollect at the right moment, Stranger, and do not
miss the opportunity of saying a word in season.

Ath. I thank you. We will say to him:—O my son, he who
is born of good parents ought to make such a marriage as wise
men would approve. Now they would advise you neither to
avoid a poor marriage, nor specially to desire a rich one; but
if other things are equal, always to honour inferiors, and with
them to form connections;—this will be for the benefit of the
city and of the families which are united; for the equable and symmetrical tends infinitely more to virtue than the unmixed. And he who is conscious of being too headstrong, and carried away more than is fitting in all his actions, ought to desire to become the relation of orderly parents; and he who is of the opposite temper ought to seek the opposite alliance. Let there be one word concerning all marriages:—Every man shall follow, not after the marriage which is most pleasing to himself, but after that which is most beneficial to the state. For somehow every one is by nature prone to that which is likest to himself, and in this way the whole city becomes unequal in property and in disposition; and hence there arise in most states results which we least desire to happen. Now, to add to the law an express provision, not only that the rich man shall not marry into the rich family, nor the powerful into the family of the powerful, but that the slower natures shall be compelled to enter into marriage with the quicker, and the quicker with the slower, may awaken anger as well as laughter in the minds of many; for there is a difficulty in perceiving that the city ought to be well mingled like a cup, in which the maddening wine is hot and fiery; but when chastened by a soberer God, receives a fair admixture and becomes an excellent and temperate drink. Yet in marriage no one is able to see the necessity of this. Wherefore also the law must leave such matters, and try to charm the spirits of men into believing the equability of their children's disposition to be of more importance than equality in excessive fortune when they marry; and him who is too desirous of forming a rich marriage they should endeavour to turn aside by reproaches, not, however, by any compulsion of written law. Let this then be our exhortation concerning marriage, not forgetting what was said before—that man should cling to immortality—and leave behind him posterity who shall be servants of the God in his place. All this and yet more may truly be said about the duty of marrying in the way of prelude. But if a man will not listen, and remains unsocial and alien among his fellow-citizens, and is still unmarried at thirty-five years of age, let him pay a yearly fine;—he who is of the highest class shall pay a fine of a hundred drachmae, and he who is of the second class a fine of seventy drachmae; the third class
shall pay sixty drachmae, and the fourth thirty drachmae, and let the money be sacred to Herè; he who does not pay the fine in the year shall owe ten times the sum, which the treasurer of the goddess shall exact; and if he fails in doing so, let him be answerable and give an account of the money at his audit. He who refuses to marry shall be thus punished in money, and also be deprived of all honour which the younger show to the elder; let no young man voluntarily obey him, and, if he attempt to punish any one, let every one come to the rescue and defend the injured person, and he who is present and does not come to the rescue, shall be pronounced by the law to be a coward and a villain. Of the marriage portion I have already spoken; and again I say for the benefit of poor men that he who neither gives nor receives a dowry on account of poverty, has a compensation; for the citizens of our state have the necessaries of life, and their wives will be less likely to be insolent, and husbands to be mean and subservient to them on account of property. And he who obeys this law will do a noble action; but he who will not obey, and gives or receives more than fifty drachmae as the price of the marriage garments if he be of the lowest, or more than a mina, or a mina-and-a-half, if he be of the third or second classes, or two minae if he be of the highest class, shall owe to the public treasury a similar sum, and that which is given or received shall be sacred to Herè and Zeus; and let the treasurers of these Gods exact the money, as was said before about the unmarried—that the treasurers of Herè were to exact the money, or pay the fine themselves.

The betrothal by a father shall be valid in the first degree, that by a grandfather in the second degree, and in the third degree, betrothal by brothers who have the same father; but if there are none of these alive, the betrothal by a mother shall be valid in like manner; in cases of unexampled fatality, the next of kin and the guardians shall have authority. What are to be the rites before marriages, or any other sacred acts, relating either to the future, or the present, or the past, shall be referred to the interpreters; and he who follows their advice may be satisfied. Touching the marriage festival, they shall assemble not more than five male and five female friends of both families,
and a like number of members of the family of either sex, and no man shall spend more than his means will allow; he who is of the richest class may spend a mina,—he who is of the second, half a mina, and in the same proportion as the census of each decreases: all men shall praise him who is obedient to the law; but he who is disobedient shall be punished by the guardians of the law as a man wanting in true taste, and uninstructed in the hymeneal strains of the Muses. Drunkenness is always improper, except at the festivals of the God who gave wine; and peculiarly dangerous, when a man is engaged in the business of marriage; for at such a crisis of their lives a bride and bridegroom ought to have all their wits about them, and they ought to take care that their offspring may be born of reasonable beings; and who can tell on what day or night Heaven will give them increase? Moreover, they ought not to be begetting children when their bodies are dissipated by intoxication, but their offspring should be compact and solid, quiet and compounded properly; whereas the drunkard is all abroad in all his actions, and is beside himself both in body and soul. Wherefore, also, the drunken man is bad and unsteady in sowing the seed of increase, and is likely to beget offspring who will be unstable and untrustworthy, and cannot be expected to walk straight either in body or mind. Hence during the whole year and all his life long, and especially while he is begetting children, he ought to take care and not intentionally to do what is injurious to health, or what involves insolence and wrong; for it needs must be that the souls and bodies of the children receive the impress which is stamped upon them at birth, and he begets children in every way inferior. And especially on the day and night of marriage should a man abstain from such things. For there is an original indwelling divinity in man which preserves all things, if used with proper respect by each individual. He who marries is to consider, that one of the two houses in the lot is the nest and nursery of his young, and there he is to marry and make the home of himself and his children, going away from his father and mother. For in friendships there must be some degree of desire, in order to cement and bind together diversities of character; but excessive intercourse not having the desire
which is created by time, insensibly dilutes friendships from a feeling of satiety; wherefore a man and his wife shall leave to his and her father and mother their own dwelling-places, and themselves go as to a colony and dwell there, and visit and be visited by their parents; and they shall beget and bring up children, handing on the torch of life from one generation to another, and worshipping the Gods according to law for ever.

In the next place, we have to consider what sort of property will be most convenient. There is no difficulty either in understanding or acquiring most kinds of property, but there is great difficulty in what relates to slaves. And the reason is, that we speak about them in a way which is right and which is not right; for what we say about our slaves is consistent and also inconsistent with our practice about them.

Meg. I do not understand, Stranger, what you mean.

Ath. I am not surprised, Megillus, for the state of Helots among the Lacedaemonians is of all Hellenic forms of slavery the most controverted and disputed about, some approving and some condemning it; there is less dispute about the slavery which exists among the Heracleots, who have subjugated the Mariandynians, and about the Thessalian Penestae. Looking at these and the like examples, what ought we to do concerning property in slaves? I made a remark, in passing, which naturally elicited a question about my meaning from you. I said that we should all agree as to the necessity of having the best and most attached slaves whom we can get. For many a man has found his slaves better in every way than brethren or sons, and many times they have saved the lives and property of their masters and their whole house—such tales are well known.

Meg. To be sure.

Ath. But may we not also say that the soul of the slave is utterly corrupt, and that no man of sense ought to trust them as a class? And the wisest of our poets, speaking of Zeus, says:

'Far-seeing Zeus takes away half the understanding of men whom the day of slavery subdues.'

Different persons have got these two different notions of slaves
in their minds—some of them utterly distrust their servants as a class, and, as if they were wild beasts, chastise them with goads and whips, and make their lives three times, or rather many times, as slavish as they were before;—and others do just the opposite.

Meg. True.

Cle. Then what are we to do, Stranger, when, in our own country, there are such differences in the treatment of slaves by their owners?

Ath. Well, Cleinias, there can be no doubt that man is a troublesome animal, and therefore is not, and is not likely to become very manageable when you attempt to introduce the necessary division of slave, and freeman, and master.

Cle. That is obvious.

Ath. He is a troublesome piece of goods, as has been often shown in the frequent revolts of the Messenians, and the great mischiefs which happen in states having many slaves who speak the same language; and the numerous robberies and lawless life of the Italian banditti, as they are called. A man who considers all this is fairly at a loss. Two alternatives are open to us,—not to have the slaves of the same country, or if possible, speaking the same language; in this way they will more easily be held in subjection: secondly, we should tend them carefully, not only out of regard to them, but yet more out of respect to ourselves. And the right treatment of slaves is to behave properly to them, and to do to them, if possible, even more justice than to those who are our equals; for he who really and naturally reverences justice, and hates injustice, is discovered in his dealings with any class of men to whom he can easily be unjust. And he who in regard to the natures and actions of his slaves is undefiled by impiety and injustice, will best sow the seeds of virtue in them; and this may be truly said of every master, and tyrant, and of every other having authority in relation to his inferiors. Slaves ought to be punished as they deserve, and not admonished as if they were freemen, which will only make them conceited. The language used to a servant ought always to be that of a command, and we ought not to jest with them, whether they are males or females—this is a foolish way which many people have of setting up their slaves, and making the life of
servitude more disagreeable both for them and for those who command them.

Cle. True.

Ath. Now that each of the citizens is provided, as far as possible, with a sufficient number of suitable slaves who can help him in what he has to do, we may next proceed to describe their dwellings.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. The city being new and hitherto uninhabited, care ought to be taken of all the buildings, and the manner of building each of them, and also of the temples and walls. These, Cleinias, were matters which properly came before the marriages;—but, as we are only talking, there is no objection to changing the order. If, however, our plan of legislation is ever carried out, then the house shall precede the marriage if God so will, and afterwards we will come to the regulations about marriage; but at present we are only describing these matters in a general outline.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. The temples are to be placed all round the agora, and the whole city built in a circle on the heights, for the sake of defence and for the sake of purity. Near the temples are to be placed the houses of the magistrates and the courts of law; in these plaintiff and defendant will receive their rights, and the places will be regarded as most holy, partly because they have to do with holy things, and partly because they are the dwelling-places of holy Gods: and in them will be the courts in which cases of homicide and other trials of capital offences may fitly take place. As to the walls, Megillus, I agree with Sparta in thinking that they should be allowed to sleep in the earth, and that we should not attempt to disinter them; there is a poetical saying, which is finely expressed, that 'walls ought to be of steel and iron, and not of earth;' besides, how ridiculous of us to be sending out our young men annually into the country to dig and to trench, and to keep off the enemy by fortifications, under the idea that they are not to be allowed to set foot in our territory, and then, that we should surround ourselves with a wall, which, in the first place, is by no means conducive to the health of cities, and is also apt to produce a certain effeminacy
in the minds of the inhabitants, inviting men to run thither instead of repelling their enemies, and leading them to imagine that their safety is due not to their keeping guard day and night, but that when they are protected by walls and gates, then they may sleep in safety; as if they were meant not to labour, and did not know that true repose comes from labour, and that disgraceful indolence and a careless temper of mind is only the renewal of trouble. If men must have walls, the private houses ought to be so arranged from the first that the whole city may be one wall, having all the houses capable of defence by reason of their uniformity and equality towards the streets. The form of the city being that of a single dwelling will have an agreeable aspect, and being easily guarded will have great advantages of security. At the first building of the city these should be principal objects of the inhabitants; and the wardens of the city should see to them, and should further impose a fine on him who neglects them; and in all that relates to the city they should have a care of cleanliness, and no citizen should encroach upon any public property either by buildings or diggings. Further, they ought to take care that the rains from heaven flow off easily, and of any other matters which may have to be administered either within or without the city. The guardians of the law shall pass any further enactments which their experience may show to be necessary, and supply any other points in which the law may be deficient. And now that these matters, and the buildings about the agora, and the gymnasia, and places of instruction, and theatres, are all ready and waiting for scholars and spectators, let us proceed to the subjects which follow marriage in the order of legislation.

Cle. By all means.

Ath. Assuming that marriages exist already, Cleinias, the mode of life during the year after marriage, before children are born, will follow next in order. In what way bride and bridegroom ought to live in a city which is to be superior to other cities, is a matter not at all easy for us to determine. There have been many difficulties already, but this will be the greatest of them, and the most disagreeable to the many. Still I cannot but say what appears to me to be right and true, Cleinias.

Cle. Certainly.
BOOK VI.

Ath. He who imagines that he can give laws for the public conduct of states, while he leaves the private life of citizens wholly to take care of itself; who thinks that individuals may pass the day as they please, and that there is no necessity of order in all things; he, I say, who gives up the control of their private lives, and supposes that they will conform to law in their common and public life, is making a great mistake. Why have I made this remark? Why, because I am going to enact that the bridegrooms should live at the common tables, just as they did before marriage. This was a singularity when first enacted by the legislator in your parts of the world, Megillus and Cleinias, as I should suppose, on the occasion of some war or other similar danger, which caused the passing of the law, and which would be likely to occur in thinly-peopled places, and in times of pressure. But when men had once tried and been accustomed to a common table, experience showed that the institution greatly conduced to security; and in some such manner the custom of having common tables arose.

Cle. Likely enough.

Ath. I said that there may have been singularity and danger in imposing such a custom at first, but that now there is not the same difficulty. There is, however, another institution which is the natural sequel to this, and would be excellent, but nowhere exists at present. The institution of which I am about to speak is not easily described or executed; and would be like the legislator setting the river on fire¹, as people say, or performing any other impossible feat.

Cle. What is the cause, Stranger, of this extreme hesitation?

Ath. You shall hear without any further loss of time. That which has law and order in a state is the cause of every good, but that which is disordered or ill-ordered is often the ruin of that which is well-ordered; and at this point the argument is now waiting. For in your country, Cleinias and Megillus, the common tables of men are a heaven-born and admirable institution, but you are mistaken in leaving the women unregulated by law. They have no similar institution of public tables in the light of day, and just that part of the human race which is by nature prone to secrecy and stealth on account of their weak-

¹ Literally, carding the fire.
ness—I mean the female sex—has been left without regulation by the legislator, which is a great mistake. And, in consequence of this neglect, many things have grown lax among you, which might have been far better, if they had been only regulated by law; for the neglect of regulations about women may not only be regarded as a neglect of half the entire matter, but in proportion as woman’s nature is inferior to that of men in capacity of virtue, in that proportion is she more important than the two halves put together. The careful consideration of this matter, and the arranging and ordering on a common principle all our institutions relating both to men and women, greatly conduces to the happiness of the state. But at present, such is the unfortunate condition of mankind, that no man of sense will even venture to speak of common tables in places and cities in which they have never been established at all; and how can any one avoid being utterly ridiculous, who attempts to compel women to show how much they eat and drink in public? There is nothing at which the sex is more likely to take offence. For women are accustomed to creep into dark places, and when dragged out into the light they will exert their utmost powers of resistance, and be far too much for the legislator. And therefore, as I said before, in most places they will not endure to have the truth spoken without raising an outcry, but in this state perhaps they may. And if we may assume that our whole discussion about the state has not been mere idle talk, I should like to prove to you, if you will consent to listen, that this institution is good and proper; but if you had rather not, I will refrain.

Cle. There is nothing which we should both of us like better, Stranger, than to hear what you have to say.

Ath. Very good: And you must not be surprised if I go back a little, for we have plenty of leisure, and there is nothing to prevent us from considering in every point of view the subject of law.

Cle. True.

Ath. Then let us return once more to what we were saying at first. Every man should understand that the human race, either had no beginning at all, and will never have an end, but always will be and has been; or had a beginning an immense time ago.
Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Well, and have there not been constitutions and
destruictions of states, and all sorts of pursuits both orderly
and disorderly, and diverse desires of meats and drinks always,
and in all the world, and all sorts of changes of the seasons
in which animals may be expected to have undergone in-
numerable transformations?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And may we not suppose that vines appeared, which
had previously no existence, and also olives, and the gifts of
Demeter and her daughter, of which one Triptolemus was the
minister, and that, before they existed, animals took to devour-
ing each other as they do still?

Cle. True.

Ath. And the practice of men sacrificing one another still exists
among many nations; and, on the other hand, we hear of other
human beings who did not even venture to taste the flesh
of a cow and had no animal sacrifices, but only cakes and fruits
swimming in honey, and similar pure offerings, but no flesh
or animals; from these they abstained under the idea that they
ought not to eat them, and might not stain the altars of the
Gods with blood. In former days men are said to have lived
a sort of Orphic life, having the use of all lifeless things, but
abstaining from all living things.

Cle. Such has been the constant tradition, and is very likely
true.

Ath. Some one might say to me, what is the drift of all this?

Cle. A very pertinent question, Stranger.

Ath. And therefore I will endeavour, Cleinias, if I can, to
draw the natural inference.

Cle. Proceed.

Ath. I see that among men all things depend upon three
wants and desires, of which the end is virtue, if they are rightly
led by them, or the opposite if wrongly. Now these are eating
and drinking, which begin at birth; every animal has a natural
desire for them, and is violently excited, and rebels against him
who says that he must not satisfy all his pleasures and appetites,
and get rid of the corresponding pains. And the third and

1 Reading ὅτι and ἔτολμον.
greatest and sharpest want and desire breaks out last, and is the fire of sexual lust, which kindles in men every species of wantonness and madness. And these three disorders we must endeavour to master by the three great principles of fear and law and right reason; turning them away from that which is called pleasantest to the best, using the Muses and the Gods who preside over contests to extinguish their increase and influx.

But to return: After marriage let us speak of the birth of children, and after their birth of their nurture and education. In the course of discussion the several laws will be perfected, and we shall at last arrive at the common tables. Whether such associations are to be confined to men, or extended to women also, we shall see better when we approach and take a nearer view of them; and we may then determine what previous institutions are required and will have to precede them. As I said before, we shall see them more in detail, and shall be better able to lay down the laws which are proper or suited to them.

Cle. Very true.
Ath. Let us keep in mind the words which have now been spoken; for hereafter there may be need of them.
Cle. What do you bid us keep in mind?
Ath. That which we comprehended under the three words—first, eating; secondly, drinking; thirdly, the excitation of love.
Cle. I shall be sure to remember, Stranger.
Ath. Very good. Then let us now proceed to marriage, and teach persons in what way they shall beget children, threatening them, if they disobey, with the terrors of the law.
Cle. What do you mean?
Ath. The bride and bridegroom should consider that they are to produce for the state the best and fairest specimens of children which they can. Now all men who are associated in any action always succeed when they attend and give their mind to what they are doing, but when they do not give their mind or have no mind, they fail; wherefore let the bridegroom give his mind to the bride and to the begetting of children, and the bride in like manner give her mind to the bridegroom, and
particularly at the time when their children are not yet born. And let the women whom we have chosen to be the overseers of these matters, whether many or few, in whatever number and at whatever time the magistrates may command, assemble every day in the temple of Eileithyia during a third part of a day, and being there assembled, let them inform one another of any one whom they see, whether man or woman, of those who are begetting children without due regard to the provisions of the law concerning nuptial rites and sacrifices; and let the begetting of children and the supervision of those who are begetting them continue ten years and no longer, during the time when marriage is fruitful. But if any continue without children up to this time, let them take counsel with their kindred and with the women holding office, and be divorced for their mutual benefit. If, however, any dispute arises about what is proper and for the interest of either party, they shall choose ten of the guardians of the law and abide by their permission and appointment. The women who preside over these matters shall enter into the houses of the young, and partly by admonitions and partly by threats make them give over their ignorance and error; and if they rebel, let them go and tell the guardians of the law, and they shall prevent them; and if they cannot prevent them, they shall declare the matter to the public assembly; and let them write up their names and make oath that they cannot reform such and such an one; and let him who is thus written up, if he cannot in a court of law convict those who have inscribed his name, be deprived of the privileges of a citizen in the following respects:—let him not go to weddings nor to the birthday solemnities of children; and if he go, let any one who pleases strike him with impunity; and let the same regulations hold about women: let not a woman be allowed to appear abroad, or receive honour, or go to nuptial and birthday festivals, if she in like manner be written up as acting disorderly and cannot obtain a verdict. And if, when they themselves have done begetting children according to the law, a man or woman have connection with another man or woman who are still begetting children, let the same penalties be inflicted upon them as upon those who are still having a family; and when the time for procreation has passed let the man or woman who refrain in such
matters be held in esteem, and let those who do not refrain be held in the contrary of esteem—that is to say, disesteem. Now, if the greater part of mankind behave modestly, the enactments of law may be left to slumber; but, if they are disorderly, the enactments having been passed, let them be carried into execution. To every man the first year is the beginning of life, and the time of birth ought to be written down in the temples of their fathers as the beginning of existence to every child, whether boy or girl. Let every phratria have inscribed on a whited wall the names of the successive archons by whom the years are reckoned. And near to them let the living members of the phratria be inscribed, and when they depart life let them be erased. The limit of marriageable ages for a woman shall be from sixteen to twenty years at the longest,—for a man, from thirty to thirty-five years; and let a woman hold office at forty, and a man at thirty years. Let a man go out to war from twenty to sixty years, and for a woman, if there appear any need to make use of her in military service, let the time of service be after she shall have brought forth children up to fifty years of age; and let regard be had to what is possible and suitable to each.
AND now, assuming that children of both sexes have been born, their nurture and education will properly follow next in order; this cannot be left altogether unnoticed, and yet may be thought rather a subject for precept and admonition than for law. In private life there are many little things, not always apparent, arising out of the pleasures and desires and pains of individuals, which are contrary to the intention of the legislator—these minutiae alter and discompose the characters of the citizens, and cause great evil in states; for they are so small and of such frequent occurrence, that there would be an unseemliness and want of propriety in making them penal by law; and if made penal, they are the destruction of the written law, because mankind get the habit of frequently transgressing in small matters. The result is that you cannot legislate about them, and still less can you say nothing. I speak somewhat darkly, but I shall endeavour also to bring my wares into the light of day, for I acknowledge that at present there is a want of clearness in what I am saying.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Am I not right in maintaining that a good education is that which tends most to the improvement of mind and body?

Cle. Undoubtedly.

Ath. And nothing can be plainer than that the fairest bodies ought to grow up from infancy in the best and straightest manner?

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And do we not further observe that the first shoot of
every living thing is by far the greatest and fullest? Many will even contend that a man at twenty-five does not grow to twice the height which he attained at five.

Cle. True.

Ath. Well, and is not rapid growth without proper and abundant exercise the source of endless evils in the body?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And the body should have the most exercise when growing most?

Cle. But, Stranger, are we to impose this great amount of exercise upon newly-born infants?

Ath. Nay, rather on the bodies of infants still unborn.

Cle. What do you mean, my good sir? In the process of gestation?

Ath. Exactly. I am not at all surprised that you have never heard of this very peculiar sort of gymnastic applied to such little creatures, which, although strange, I will endeavour to explain to you.

Cle. By all means.

Ath. The practice is more easy for us to understand than for you, by reason of certain amusements which are carried to excess at Athens. Not only boys, but often older persons, are in the habit of keeping quails and cocks, which they train to fight one another. And they are far from thinking that the contests in which they stir them up to fight with one another are sufficient exercise; for, in addition to this, they carry them about—each having a big bird tucked in under his arms, and the smaller in his hands, and go for a walk of a great many miles for the sake of health, that is to say, not their own health but the health of the birds; and this proves to any one who is capable of understanding, that all bodies are benefited by shakings and movements, when they are moved without weariness, whether the motion proceeds from themselves, or from a swing, or at sea, or on horseback, or is caused by other bodies in whatever way moving, and thus gaining the mastery over food and drink, and being able to impart beauty and health and strength:—admitting all this, what follows? Shall we make a ridiculous law that the pregnant woman shall walk about and fashion the embryo within as we fashion wax before it hardens, and after birth
swathe it for two years. Suppose that we compel nurses, under penalty of a legal fine, to be always carrying the children somewhere or other, either into the country, or to the temples, or to their relations' houses until they are well able to stand, and to take care that their limbs are not distorted by leaning on them when they are too young—they should continue to carry them until the infant has completed its third year; the nurses should be strong, and there should be more than one of them. Shall these be our rules, and shall we impose a penalty for the neglect of them? No, no; penalty more than enough will fall upon our own heads.

Cle. What penalty?
Ath. Ridicule, and the difficulty of getting the feminine servant-like dispositions of the nurses to comply.

Cle. Then why was there any need to speak of the matter at all?
Ath. The reason is, that masters and freemen in states when they hear of it are very likely to arrive at a true conviction that without due regulation of private life in cities, stability in the laying down of laws is hardly to be expected; and he who makes this reflection may himself adopt the laws just now mentioned, and, adopting them, may order his house and state well and be happy.

Cle. Likely enough.
Ath. And therefore let us proceed with our legislation until we have determined the exercises which are suited to the souls of young children, in the same manner as we have begun to go through the rules which relate to their bodies.

Cle. By all means.
Ath. Let us assume, then, as a first principle in relation both to the body and soul of very young creatures, that nursing and moving about by day and night is good for them all, and that the younger they are, the more they will need it; infants should live, if that were possible, as if they were always rocking at sea. This is the lesson which nurses have learned from experience, and which we may also learn from the use of the remedy of motion in the rites of the Corybantes; for when mothers want their restless children to go to sleep they do not employ rest, but, on the contrary, motion—rocking them in their arms; nor
do they give them silence, but they sing to them and lap them in sweet strains; and the Bacchic women are cured of their frenzy in the same manner by the use of the dance and of music.

Cle. Well, Stranger, and what is the reason of this?
Ath. The reason is obvious.
Cle. What?
Ath. The affection both of the Corybantes and of the children is an emotion of fear; and fear springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And when some one applies external agitation to affections of this sort, the motion coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent internal one, and produces a peace and calm in the soul, and quiets the restless palpitation of the heart, which is a thing much to be desired, sending some to sleep, and making others who are awake to dance to the pipe with the help of the Gods to whom they offer acceptable sacrifices, and producing in them a sound mind, which takes the place of their former agitations. And in this, as I would shortly say, there is a considerable amount of sense.
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. But if fear has such a power we ought to consider further, that every soul which from youth upward has been familiar with fears, will be made more liable to fear, and every one will admit that this is the way to form a habit of cowardice and not of courage.
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. And, on the other hand, the habit of overcoming, from our youth upwards, the fears and terrors which beset us, may be said to be an exercise of courage?
Cle. True.
Ath. And we may say that the use of exercise and motion in the earliest years of life has a great tendency to create a part of virtue in the soul?
Cle. Quite true.
Ath. Further, a cheerful temper, or the reverse, may be regarded as having much to do with high spirit on the one hand, or with cowardice on the other?
Cle. To be sure.
Ath. Then now we must endeavour to show how and to what
extent we may, if we please, implant either character in the young.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. There is a common opinion, that luxury makes the disposition of youth morose and irascible and vehemently excited by trifles; that on the other hand excessive and savage servitude makes men mean and abject, and haters of their kind, and therefore makes them undesirable associates.

Cle. But how can the state educate those who do not as yet understand the language of the country, and are therefore incapable of appreciating any sort of instruction?

Ath. I will tell you how: Every animal that is born is wont to utter some cry, and this is especially the case with man, and he is also affected with the inclination to weep more than any other animal.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. Do not nurses, when they want to know what an infant desires, judge by these signs?—when anything is brought to the infant and he is silent, then he is supposed to be pleased, but, when he weeps and cries out, then he is not pleased. For tears and cries are the inauspicious signs by which children show what they love and hate. Now the time which is thus spent is no less than three years, and is a very considerable portion of life to be passed ill or well.

Cle. True.

Ath. Does not the morose and ill-natured man appear to you to be full of lamentations and sorrows more than a good man ought to be?

Cle. Certainly he does.

Ath. Well, but if during these three years every possible care were taken that our nursling should have as little of sorrow and fear, and in general of pain as was possible, might we not expect in early childhood to make his soul more gentle and cheerful?

Cle. To be sure, Stranger,—more especially if we could procure him a variety of pleasures.

Ath. There I cannot agree with you, sweet Cleinias: to begin educating him in that way would be his utter ruin. Let us see whether I am right.
Cle. Proceed.

Ath. The point about which you and I differ is of great importance, and I hope that you, Megillus, will help to decide between us. For I maintain that the true life should neither seek for pleasures, nor, on the other hand, entirely avoid pains, but should embrace the middle state, which I just spoke of as gentle or propitious, and is a state which we by some divine presage and inspiration rightly ascribe to God: Now, I say, he among us who would be divine ought to pursue after this mean habit—he should not rush headlong into pleasures, for he will not be free from pains; nor should we allow any one, young or old, male or female, to be thus given any more than ourselves, and least of all the newly-born infant, for in infancy more than at any other time the character is engrained by habit. Nay, more, if I were not afraid of appearing to be ridiculous, I would say that a woman during her year of pregnancy should of all women be most carefully tended, and kept from violent or excessive pleasures and pains; and at that time she should cultivate gentleness and benevolence and kindness.

Cle. You need not ask Megillus, Stranger, which of us has most truly spoken; for I agree that all men ought to avoid the life of unmingled pain or pleasure, and pursue always a middle course. And having spoken well, may I add that you have been well answered?

Ath. Very good, Cleinias; and now let us all three consider a further point.

Cle. What is it?

Ath. That all the matters which we are now describing are commonly called by the general name of unwritten customs, and what are termed the laws of our ancestors are all of similar nature. And then arises in our minds the further reflection that we ought not to call these things laws, nor yet to leave them unmentioned; for they are the bonds of the whole state, and come in the intervals of the written laws which are or are hereafter to be laid down; they are just ancient hereditary customs, which, if they are rightly ordered and made habitual, envelope and entirely preserve the previously existing written law; but if they depart from right and fall into disorder, then they are like the props of builders which give way in the
centre and produce a common ruin in which one part drags another down, and the fair superstructure falls because the old foundations are undermined. Reflecting upon this, Cleinias, you ought to bind together the new state in every possible way, omitting nothing, whether great or small, of what are called laws or manners or pursuits, for by these means a city is bound together, and all these things are only lasting when they depend upon one another; and, therefore, we must not wonder if we find that many apparently trifling customs or usages come pouring in and lengthening out our laws.

Cle. Very true: we are disposed to agree with you.

Ath. Up to the age of three years, whether of boy or girl, if a person strictly carries out our previous regulations and makes them a principal aim, he will do much for the advantage of the young creatures. But at three, four, five, and six years the childish nature will require sports; now is the time to get rid of self-will in him, punishing him, not so as to disgrace him. As we were saying about slaves, that we ought neither to punish them in hot blood or so as to anger them, nor yet to leave them unpunished lest they become self-willed, a like rule is to be observed in the case of the free-born. Children at that age have certain natural modes of amusement which they find out for themselves when they meet. And all the children who are between the ages of three and six ought to meet at the temples of the villages, the several families of a village uniting on one spot, and the nurses seeing that the children behave properly and orderly,—they themselves and their whole company being under the care of one of the twelve women aforesaid annually appointed out of their number by the guardians of the law to inspect and order each company. Let the twelve be appointed by the women who have authority over marriage, one out of each tribe and all of the same age; and when appointed, let them hold office and go to the temples every day, punishing all offenders, male or female, who are slaves or strangers, by the help of some of the public servants; but if any citizen disputes the punishment, let her bring him before the wardens of the city; or, if there be no dispute, let her punish him herself. After the age of six years the time has arrived for the separation of the sexes,—
let boys live with boys, and girls in like manner with girls. Now they must begin to learn—the boys going to teachers of horsemanship and the use of the bow, the javelin, and sling; and if they do not object, let women also go to learn if not to practise; above all, they ought to know the use of arms; for I may note, that the practice which now almost universally prevails is due to ignorance.

Cle. In what respect?

Ath. In this respect, that the right and left hand are supposed to differ by nature when we use them; whereas no difference is found in the use of the feet and the lower limbs; but in the use of the hands we are in a manner lame, by reason of the folly of nurses and mothers; for although our several limbs are by nature balanced, we create a difference in them by bad habit. In some cases this is of no consequence, as, for example, when we hold the lyre in the left hand, and the plectrum in the right, but it is downright folly to make the same distinction in other cases. The custom of the Scythians proves our error; for they not only hold the bow from them with the left hand and draw the arrow to them with their right, but use either hand for both purposes. And there are many similar examples in charioteering and other things, from which we may learn that those who make the left side weaker than the right act contrary to nature. In the case of the plectrum, which is of horn only, and similar instruments, as I was saying, it is of no consequence, but makes a great difference, and may be of very great importance to the warrior who has to use iron weapons, bows and javelins, and the like; above all, when in heavy armour, he has to fight against heavy armour. And there is a very great difference between one who has learnt and one who has not, and between one who has been trained in gymnastic exercises and one who has not been. For as he who is perfectly skilled in the Pancratium or boxing or wrestling, is not unable to fight from his left side, and does not limp and draggle in confusion when his opponent makes him change his position, so in heavy-armed fighting, and in all other things, if I am not mistaken, the like holds—he who has these double powers of attack and defence ought not in any case to leave them either unused or untrained; and if a person had the
nature of Geryon or Briareus he ought to be able with his hun-
dred hands to throw a hundred darts. Now, the rulers, male and
female, should see to all these things; the women superintend-
ing the nursing and amusements of the children, and the men
superintending their education, that all of them, boys and girls
alike, may be sound hand and foot, and may not, if they can
help, spoil the gifts of nature by bad habits.

Education has two branches,—one of gymnastic, which is
concerned with the body, and the other of music, which is
designed for the improvement of the soul. And gymnastic has
also two parts—dancing and wrestling; and one sort of dancing
imitates musical recitation, and aims at preserving dignity and
freedom; the other aims at producing health, agility, and
beauty in the limbs and parts of the body, giving the proper
flexion and extension to each of them, diffusing and accom-
panying the harmonious motion of the dance everywhere. As
regards wrestling, the tricks which Antaeus and Cercyon de-
vised in their systems out of a vain spirit of competition, or
the tricks of boxing which Epeius or Amycus invented, are
useless for war, and do not deserve to have much said about
them; but the art of wrestling erect and keeping free the neck
and hands and sides, working with energy and constancy,
with a composed strength, and for the sake of health—these
are always useful, and are not to be neglected, but to be
enjoined alike on masters and scholars, when we reach that
part of legislation; and we will desire the one to give their
instructions freely, and the others to receive them thankfully.
Nor, again, must we omit suitable imitations of war in our
dances; in Crete there are the armed sports of the Curetes,
and in Lacedaemon of the Dioscori. And our virgin lady,
delighting in the sports of the dance, thought it not fit to
dance with empty hands; she must be clothed in a complete
suit of armour, and in this attire go through the dance; and
youths and maidens should in every respect imitate her ex-
ample, honouring the Goddess both with a view to the actual
necessities of war, and to festive amusements: it will be right
also for the boys until such time as they go out to war to
make processions and supplications to the Gods in goodly
array, armed and on horseback, in dances and marches,
fast or slow, offering up prayers to the Gods and to the sons of Gods; and also engaging in contests and preludes of contests, if at all, with these objects. For these sort of exercises, and no others, are useful both in peace and war, and are beneficial both to states and to private houses. But other labours and sports and excessive training of the body are unworthy of freemen, O Megillus and Cleinias.

I have now completely described the kind of gymnastic which I said at first ought to be described; if you know of any better, will you communicate your thoughts?

Cle. It is not easy, Stranger, to put these principles of gymnastic aside and to enunciate better ones.

Ath. Next in order follow the gifts of the Muses and of Apollo: before, we fancied that we had said all, and that gymnastic alone remained to be discussed; but now we see clearly what points have been omitted, and should be first proclaimed; of these, then, let us proceed to speak.

Cle. By all means.

Ath. Hear me once more, although you have heard me say the same before—that caution must be always exercised, both by the speaker and by the hearer, about anything that is singular and unusual. For my tale is one which many a man would be afraid to tell, and yet I have a confidence which makes me go on.

Cle. What have you to say, Stranger?

Ath. I say that in states generally no one has observed that the plays of childhood have a great deal to do with the permanence or want of permanence in legislation. For when plays are ordered with a view to children having the same plays and amusing themselves after the same manner, and finding delight in the same playthings, the more solemn institutions of the state are allowed to remain undisturbed. Whereas if sports are disturbed and innovations are made in them, and they constantly change, and the young never speak of their having the same likings, or the same established notions of good and bad taste, either in the bearing of their bodies or in their dress, but he who devises something new and out of the way in figures and colours and the like is held in special honour, we may truly say that no greater evil can happen in
a state; for he who changes the sports is secretly changing the
manners of the young, and making the old to be dishonoured
among them and the new to be honoured. And I affirm that
there is nothing which is a greater injury to all states than
saying or thinking thus. Will you hear me tell how great I
deem it to be?

_Cle._ You mean the evil of blaming antiquity in states?

_Ath._ Exactly.

_Cle._ If you are speaking of that, you will find in us hearers
who are disposed to receive what you say not unfavourably but
most favourably.

_Ath._ I should expect so.

_Cle._ Proceed.

_Ath._ Well, then, let us give all the greater heed to one
another's words. The argument says that to change from
anything except the bad is the most dangerous of all things;
this is true in the case of the seasons and of the winds, in the
management of our bodies and the habits of our minds—true
of all things except, as I said before, of the bad. He who looks
at the constitution of individuals accustomed to eat any sort
of meat or drink any drink or do any work which they could
get, may see that they are at first disordered, but afterwards,
as time goes on, their bodies grow adapted to them, and they
learn to know and like variety, and have good health and enjoy-
ment of life; and if ever afterwards they are confined again to
a superior diet, at first they are troubled with disorders, and
with difficulty become habituated to their new food. A similar
principle we may imagine to hold good about the minds of men
and the nature of their souls. For when they have been brought
up in certain laws, which by some Divine Providence have re-
mained unchanged during long ages, so that no one has any
memory or tradition of their ever having been otherwise than
they are, then every one is afraid and ashamed to change that
which is established. The legislator must somehow find a way
of implanting this reverence for antiquity, and I would propose
the following way:—People are apt to fancy, as I was saying
before, that when the plays of children are altered they are
merely plays, not seeing that the most serious and detrimental
consequences arise out of the change; and they readily comply
with the child’s wishes instead of deterring him, not considering that these children who make innovations in their games, when they grow up to be men will be different from the last generation of children, and, being different, will desire a different sort of life, and under the influence of this desire will want other institutions and laws; and no one ever apprehends that there will follow what I just now called the greatest of evils to states. Changes in bodily fashions are no such serious evils, but frequent changes in the praise and censure of manners are the greatest of evils, and require the utmost prevision.

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. And now do we still hold to our former assertion, that rhythms and music in general are imitations of good and evil characters in men? What say you?

Cle. That is the only doctrine which I can admit.

Ath. Must we not, then, try in every possible way to prevent our youth desiring imitations and novelties either in dance or song? nor must any one be allowed to offer them varieties of pleasures.

Cle. Most true.

Ath. Can any better mode of effecting this object be imagined by any of us than that of the Egyptians?

Cle. What is their method?

Ath. They consecrate every sort of dance or melody, first ordaining festivals,—calculating for the year what they ought to be, and at what time, and in honour of what Gods, sons of Gods, and heroes they ought to be celebrated; and, in the next place, what hymns ought to be sung at the several sacrifices, and with what dances the particular festival is to be honoured. This is to be arranged at first by certain persons, and, when arranged, the whole assembly of the citizens are to offer sacrifices and libations to the Fates and all the other Gods, and to consecrate the several odes to Gods and heroes: and if any one offers any other hymns or dances to any one of the Gods, the priests and priestesses, with the consent of the guardians of the law, shall religiously and lawfully exclude him, and he who is excluded, if he do not submit, shall be liable all his life long to have a suit of impiety brought against him by any one who likes.
Cle. Very good.

Ath. In the consideration of this subject, let us remember what is due to ourselves.

Cle. To what are you referring?

Ath. I mean that any young man, and much more any old one, when he sees or hears anything strange or unaccustomed, does not at once run to embrace the paradox, but he stands considering, like a person who is at a place where three ways meet, and does not very well know his way—he may be alone or he may be walking with others, and he will say to himself and them, 'Which is the way?' and will not move forward until he is satisfied that he is going right. And this is our case, for a strange discussion on the subject of law has arisen, which requires the utmost consideration, and we should not at our age be too ready to speak about such great matters, or be confident that we can say anything certain all in a moment.

Cle. Most true.

Ath. Then we will allow time for reflection, and decide when we have given the subject sufficient consideration. But that we may not be hindered from completing the natural arrangement of our laws, let us proceed to the conclusion of them in due order; for very possibly, if God will, the exposition of them, when completed, may throw light on our present perplexity.

Cle. Excellent, Stranger; let us do as you propose.

Ath. Let us then affirm the paradox that strains of music are our laws (vómuoi), and this latter being the name which the ancients gave to lyric songs, they probably would not have very much objected to our proposed application of the word. Some one, either asleep or awake, must have had a dreamy suspicion of their nature. And let our decree be as follows:—No one in singing or dancing shall offend against public and consecrated models, and the general fashion among the youth, any more than he would offend against any other law. And he who observes this law shall be blameless; but he who is disobedient, as I was saying, shall be punished by the guardians of the laws, and by priests and priestesses: suppose that we imagine this to be our law.

Cle. Very good.
Ath. Can any one who makes such laws escape ridicule? Let us see. I think that our only safety will be in first framing certain models for them. One of these models shall be as follows:—If when a sacrifice is going on, and the victims are being burnt according to law,—if, I say, any one who may be a son or brother, standing by another at the altar and over the victims, horribly blasphemes, will he not inspire despondency and evil omens and forebodings in the mind of his father and of his other kinsmen?

Cle. Of course.

Ath. And this is just what takes place in almost all our cities. A magistrate offers a public sacrifice, and there come in not one but many choruses, who stand by themselves a little way from the altar, and from time to time pour forth all sorts of horrible blasphemies on the sacred rites, exciting the souls of the audience with words and rhythms, and melodies most sorrowful to hear; and he who can at the instant the city is sacrificing make the citizens weep most, carries away the palm of victory. Now, ought we not to forbid such strains as these? And if ever our citizens must hear such lamentations, then on some unblest and inauspicious day let there be choruses of foreign and hired minstrels, like those who accompany the departed at funerals with barbarous Carian chants. That is the sort of thing which will be appropriate if we have such strains at all; and let the apparel of the singers be not circlets and ornaments of gold, but the reverse. Enough of the description. And now I will ask once more whether we shall lay down as one of our principles of song——

Cle. What?

Ath. That we should avoid every evil word. I need hardly ask again, but shall assume that you agree with me.

Cle. By all means; that law is approved by the suffrage of all of us.

Ath. But what shall be our next musical law or type? Ought not prayers to be offered up to the Gods when we sacrifice?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And our third law, if I am not mistaken, will be to the effect, that our poets understanding prayers to be requests which we make to the Gods, will take especial heed that they do not
by mistake ask for evil instead of good. To make such a prayer would surely be too ridiculous.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Were we not a little while ago quite determined that no silver or golden Plutus should dwell in our state?

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. And what did this illustration mean? Did we not imply that the poets are not always quite capable of knowing what is good or evil? And if one of them utters a mistaken prayer in song or words, he will make our citizens pray for the opposite of what is good in matters of the highest import; than which, as I was saying, there can be few greater mistakes. Shall we then propose as one of our laws and models relating to the Muses——

Cle. What?—will you explain the law more precisely?

Ath. Shall we make a law that the poet shall compose nothing contrary to the ideas of the lawful, or just, or beautiful, or good, which are allowed in the state? nor shall he be permitted to communicate his compositions to any private individuals, until he shall have shown them to the appointed judges, and the guardians of the law, and they are satisfied with them. As to the persons whom we appoint to be our legislators about music and directors of education, they have been already indicated. Once more then, as I have asked more than once, shall this be our third law, and type, and model—What do you say?

Cle. Yes, by all means.

Ath. Next it will be proper to have hymns and praises of the Gods, intermingled with prayers; and after the Gods prayers and praises should be offered in like manner to demigods and heroes, suitable to their several characters.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. In the third place there will be no objection to a law, that citizens who are departed and have done good and energetic deeds, either with their souls or with their bodies, and have been obedient to the laws, should receive eulogies; this will be very fitting.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. But to honour with hymns and panegyrics those who
are still alive is not safe; a man should run his course, and make a fair ending, and then we will praise him; and let praise be given equally to women as well as men who have been distinguished in virtue. The order of songs and dances shall be as follows:—There are many ancient musical compositions and dances which are excellent, and from these the government may freely select what is proper and suitable; and they shall choose judges of not less than fifty years of age, who shall make the selection, and any of the old poems which they deem sufficient they shall include; any that is deficient or altogether unsuitable, they shall either utterly throw aside, or examine and amend, taking into their counsel poets and musicians, and making use of their poetical genius; but explaining to them the wishes of the legislator in order that they may regulate dancing, music, and all choral strains, according to his mind; and not allowing them to indulge, except in some minor matters, their individual pleasures and fancies. Now, the irregular strain of music is always made ten thousand times better by attaining to law and order, and rejecting the honied Muse—not however that we mean wholly to exclude pleasure, which is the characteristic of all music. And if a man be brought up from childhood to the age of discretion and maturity in the use of the orderly and severe music, when he hears the opposite he detests it, and calls it illiberal; but if trained in the sweet and vulgar music, he deems the opposite cold and displeasing. So that, as I was saying before, while he who hears them gains no more pleasure from the one than from the other, the one has the advantage of making those who are trained in it better men, whereas the other makes them worse.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Again, we must distinguish and determine on some general principle what songs are suitable to women, and what to men, and must assign to them their proper melodies and rhythms. It is shocking for a whole harmony to be inharmonical, or for a rhythm to be unrhythmical, and this will happen when the melody is inappropriate to them. And, therefore, the legislator must assign to them also their forms. Now, both sexes have melodies and rhythms which of necessity
belong to them; and those of women are clearly enough indicated by their natural difference. The grand, and that which tends to courage, may be fairly called manly; but that which inclines to moderation and temperance, may be declared both in law and in ordinary speech to be the more womanly quality:

This, then, will be the general order of them.

Let us now speak of the manner of teaching and imparting them, and the persons to whom, and the time when, they are severally to be imparted. As the shipwright first lays down the lines of the keel, and draws the design in outline, so do I seek to distinguish the patterns of life, and lay down their keels according to the nature of different men's souls; seeking truly to consider by what means, and in what ways, we may go through the voyage of life best. Now, human affairs are hardly worth considering in earnest, and yet we must be in earnest about them,—a sad necessity constrains us. And having got thus far, there will be a fitness in our completing the matter, if we can only find some suitable means of doing so. But what am I saying? and yet very probably there may be a meaning latent in these very words.

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. I say that about serious matters a man should be serious, and about a matter which is not serious he should not be serious; and that God is the natural and worthy object of a man's most serious and blessed endeavours; who, as I said before, is made to be the plaything of God, and that this, truly considered, is the best of him; wherefore every man and woman should walk seriously, and pass life in the noblest of pastimes, and be of another mind from what they now are.

Cle. In what respect?

Ath. Now they think that their serious pursuits should be for the sake of their sports, for they deem war a serious pursuit, which must be managed well for the sake of peace; but the truth is, that there neither is, nor has been, nor ever will be, either amusement or instruction in any degree worth speaking of in war, which is nevertheless deemed by us to be the most serious of our pursuits. And therefore, as we say, every one of us should live the life of peace as long and as well as he can. And what is the right way of living? Are we to live in sports
always? If so, in what kind of sports? We ought to live sacrificing, and singing, and dancing, and then a man will be able to propitiate the Gods, and to defend himself against his enemies and conquer them in battle. The type of song or dance by which he will propitiate them has been described, and the paths along which he is to proceed have been cut for him. He will go forward in the spirit of the poet:

'Telemachus, some things thou wilt thyself find in thy heart, but other things God will suggest; for I deem that thou wast not born or brought up without the will of the Gods.'

And this ought to be the view of our alumni; they ought to think that what has been said is enough for them, and that any other things some God or a demi-God will suggest to them—he will tell them to whom, and when, and to what Gods severally they are to sacrifice and perform dances, and how they may propitiate the deities, and live according to the appointment of nature; being for the most part puppets, but having some little share of reality.

Meg. You have a low opinion of mankind, Stranger.

Ath. Nay, Megillus, I was only comparing them with the Gods; and under that feeling I spoke. Let us grant, if you wish, that the human race is not to be despised, but is worthy of some consideration.

Next follow the buildings for gymnasia and schools open to all; these are to be in three places in the midst of the city; and outside the city and in the surrounding country there shall be schools for horse exercise, and open spaces also in three places, arranged with a view to archery and the throwing of missiles, at which young men may learn and practise. Of these mention has already been made; and if the mention be not sufficiently explicit, let us speak further of them and embody them in laws. In these several schools let there be dwellings for teachers, who shall be brought from foreign parts by pay, and let them teach the frequenters of the school the art of war and the art of music, and the children shall come not only if their parents please, but if they do not please; and if their education is neglected, there shall be compulsory education, as the saying is, of all and sundry, as far as this is possible; and the pupils shall be regarded as belonging to the state rather than to their
parents. My law would apply to females as well as males; they shall both go through the same exercises. I assert without fear of contradiction that gymnastic and horsemanship are as suitable to women as to men. Of the truth of this I am persuaded from ancient tradition, and at the present day there are said to be myriads of women in the neighbourhood of the Black Sea, called Sauromatides, who not only ride on horseback like men, but have enjoined upon them the use of bows and other weapons equally with the men. And I further affirm, that if these things are possible, nothing can be more absurd than the practice which prevails in our own country of men and women not following the same pursuits with all their strength and with one mind, for thus the state, instead of being a whole, is reduced to a half, and yet has the same imposts to pay and the same toils to undergo; and what can be a greater mistake for any legislator to make?

Cle. Very true; and much of what has been asserted by us, Stranger, is contrary to the custom of states; still, in saying that the discourse should be allowed to proceed, and that when the discussion is completed, we should choose what seems best, you have spoken very properly, and have made me feel compunction for what I said. Tell me, then, what you would next wish to say.

Ath. I should wish to say, Cleinias, as I said before, that if the possibility of these things were not sufficiently proven in fact, then there might be an objection to the argument, but the fact being as I have said, he who rejects the law must find some other ground of objection; and, failing this, our exhortation will still hold good, nor will any one deny that women ought to share as far as possible in education and in other ways with men, for consider;—if women do not share in their whole life with men, then they must have some other order of life.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And what arrangement of life to be found anywhere is preferable to this community which we are now assigning to them? Shall we prefer that which is adopted by the Thracians and many other races who use their women to till the ground and to be shepherds of their herds and flocks, and to minister
to them like slaves? Or shall we do as we and people in our part of the world do? getting together, as the phrase is, all our goods and chattels into one dwelling—these we entrust to our women, who are the stewards of them; and who also preside over the shuttles and the whole art of spinning. Or shall we take a middle course, as in Lacedaemon, Megillus, letting the girls share in gymnastic and music, while the grown-up women, no longer employed in spinning wool, are actively engaged in weaving the web of life, which will be no cheap or mean employment, and in the duty of serving and taking care of the household and bringing up children in which they will observe a sort of mean, not participating in the toils of war; and if there were any necessity that they should fight for their city and families, unlike the Amazons, they would be unable to take part in archery or any other skilled use of missiles, nor could they, after the example of the Goddess, carry shield or spear, or stand up nobly for their country when it was being destroyed, and strike terror into their enemies, if only because they were seen in regular order? Living as they do, they would never dare at all to imitate the Sauromatides, whose women, when compared with ordinary women, would appear to be like men. Let him who will, praise your legislators, but I must say what I think. The legislator ought to be whole and perfect, and not half a man only; he ought not to let the female sex live softly and waste money and have no order of life, while he takes the utmost care of the male sex, and leaves half of life only blest with happiness, when he might have made the whole state happy.

Meg. What shall we do, Cleinias? Shall we allow a stranger to run down Sparta in this fashion?

Cle. Yes; for as we have given him liberty of speech we must let him go on until we have perfected the work of legislation.

Meg. Very true.

Ath. Then now I may proceed?

Cle. By all means.

Ath. What will be the manner of life among men who may be supposed to have their food and clothing provided for them in moderation, and who have entrusted the practice of the arts
BOOK VII.

to others, and whose husbandry committed to slaves paying a part of the produce, brings them a return sufficient for men living temperately; who, moreover, have common tables in which the men are placed apart, and near them are the common tables of their families, of their daughters and mothers, which day by day, the rulers, male and female, are to inspect and look to their mode of life and so dismiss them; after which the magistrate and his attendants shall honour with libations those Gods to whom that day and night are dedicated, and then go home? To men whose lives are thus ordered, is there no work to be done which is necessary and fitting, but shall each one of them live fattening like a beast? Such a life is neither just nor honourable, nor can he who lives it fail of meeting his due; and the due reward of the idle fatted beast is that he should be torn in pieces by some other valiant beast whose fatness is worn down by labours and toils. These regulations, if we duly consider them, will never perfectly take effect under present circumstances, nor as long as women and children and houses and all other things are the private property of individuals; but if we can attain the second-best form of polity, with that we may be satisfied. And to men living under this second polity there remains a work to be accomplished which is far from being small or insignificant, but is the greatest of all works, and ordained by the appointment of righteous law. For the life which is wholly concerned with the virtue of body and soul may truly be said to be twice, or more than twice, as full of toil and trouble as the pursuit after Pythian and Olympic victories, which debar a man from every employment of life. For there ought to be no bye-work interfering with the greater work of providing the necessary exercise and nourishment for the body, and instruction and education for the soul. Night and day are not long enough for the accomplishment of their perfection and consummation; and therefore to this end all freemen ought to arrange the time of their employments during the whole course of the twenty-four hours, from morning to evening and from evening to the morning of the next sunrise. There may seem to be some impropriety in the legislator determining minutely the little details of the management of the house, including such particulars as the
duty of wakefulness in those who are to be perpetual watchmen of the whole city; for that any citizen should continue during the whole night in sleep, instead of being seen by all his servants, always the first to awake and the first to rise—this, whether the regulation is to be called a law or only a practice, should be deemed base and unworthy of a freeman; also that the mistress of the house should be awakened by her handmaids instead of herself first awakening them, is what her slaves, male and female, and her children, and, if that were possible, everything in the house should regard as base. If they rise early, they may all of them do much of their public and of their household business, as magistrates in the city, and masters and mistresses in their private houses, before the sun is up. Much sleep is not required by nature, either for our souls or bodies, or for the actions in which they are concerned. For no one who is asleep is good for anything, any more than if he were dead; but he of us who has the most regard for life and reason keeps awake as long as he can, reserving only so much time for sleep as is expedient for health; and much sleep is not required, if the habit of not sleeping be once formed. Magistrates in states who keep awake at night are terrible to the bad, whether enemies or citizens, and are honoured and reverenced by the just and temperate, and are useful to themselves and to the whole state.

A night which is short and devoted to work, in addition to all the above-mentioned advantages, infuses a sort of courage into the minds of the citizens. When the day breaks, the time has arrived for youth to go to their schoolmasters. Now, neither sheep nor any other animals can live without a shepherd, nor can children be left without tutors, or slaves without masters. And of all animals the boy is the most unmanageable, inasmuch as he has the fountain of reason in him not yet regulated; he is the most insidious, sharp-witted, and insubordinate of animals. Wherefore he must be bound with many bridles; in the first place, when he gets away from mothers and nurses, he must be under the control of tutors on account of his childishness and foolishness; then, again, being a freeman, he must have teachers and be educated by them in anything which they teach, and must learn what he has to learn; but
he is also a slave, and in that regard any freeman who comes
in his way may punish him and his tutor and his instructor,
if any of them does anything wrong; and he who comes across
him and does not inflict upon him the punishment which he
deserves, shall incur the greatest disgrace; and let the guardian
of the law, who is the director of education, see to him who
coming in the way of the offences which we have mentioned,
does not chastise them when he ought, or chastises them in a
way which he ought not; let him keep a sharp look-out, and
take especial care of the training of our children, directing
their natures, and always turning them to good according to
the law.

And how can our law sufficiently train the director of edu-
cation himself; for as yet all has been imperfect, and nothing
has been said either clear or satisfactory? Now, as far as
possible, the law ought to leave nothing to him, but to explain
everything, that he may be the interpreter and tutor of others.
About dances and music and choral strains, I have already
spoken both as to the character of the selection of them, and
the manner in which they are to be improved and consecrated.
But we have not yet spoken, O illustrious guardian of education,
of the manner in which your pupils are to use those strains
which are written in prose, although you have been informed
what martial strains they are to learn and practise; what relates
in the first place to the learning of letters, and secondly, to
the lyre, and also to calculation, which, as we were saying, is
needful for them all to learn, and any other things which are
required with a view to war and the management of house
and city, and, looking to the same object, what is useful in
the revolutions of the heavenly bodies—the stars and sun and
moon, and the various regulations about these matters which
are necessary for the whole state—I am speaking of the
arrangements of days in periods of months, and of months in
years, which are to be observed, in order that times and sacri-
fices and festivals may proceed in regular and natural order,
and keep the city alive and awake, the Gods receiving the
honours due to them, and men having a better understanding
about them: all these things, O my friend, have not yet been
sufficiently declared by the legislator. Attend, then, to what
I am now going to say: We were telling you, in the first place, that you were not sufficiently informed about letters, and the objection made was to this effect,—'That you were never told whether he who was meant to be a respectable citizen should apply himself in detail to that sort of learning, or not apply himself at all;' and the same remark was made about the lyre. But now we say that he ought to attend to them. A fair time for a boy of ten years old to spend in letters is three years; at thirteen years he should begin to handle the lyre, and he may continue at this for another three years, neither more nor less, and whether his father or himself like or dislike the study, he is not to be allowed to spend more or less time in learning music than the law allows. And let him who disobeys the law be deprived of those youthful honours of which we shall hereafter speak. Hear, however, first of all, what the young ought to learn in the early years of life, and what their instructors ought to teach them. They ought to be occupied with their letters until they are able to read and write; but the acquisition of perfect beauty or quickness in writing, if nature has not stimulated them to acquire these accomplishments in the given number of years, they should let alone. And as to the learning of compositions committed to writing which are unaccompanied by song, whether metrical or without rhythmical divisions, compositions in prose, as they are termed, having no rhythm or harmony—seeing how dangerous are the writings handed down to us by many writers of this class—what will you do with them, O most excellent guardians of the law? or how can the lawgiver rightly direct you about them? I believe that he will be in great difficulty.

Cle. What troubles you, Stranger? and why are you so perplexed in your mind?

Ath. You naturally ask, Cleinias, and to you, who are my partners in the work of education, I must state the difficulties of the case.

Cle. To what do you refer in this instance?

Ath. I will tell you. There is a difficulty in opposing many myriads of mouths.

Cle. Well, and have we not already opposed the popular voice in many important enactments?
Ath. That is quite true; and you mean to imply that the road which we are taking may be disagreeable to some but is agreeable to as many others, or if not to as many, at any rate to persons not inferior to the others, and in company with them you bid me, at whatever risk, proceed along the path of legislation which has opened out of our present discourse, and to be of good cheer, and not to faint.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And I do not faint; I say, indeed, that we have a great many poets writing in hexameter, trimeter, and all sorts of measures—some who are serious, others who aim only at raising a laugh—and all mankind declare that the youth who are rightly educated should be brought up and saturated with them; they should be constantly hearing them read at recitations, and some would have them learn by heart entire poets; while others select choice passages and long speeches, and make compendiums of them, saying that these shall be committed to memory, and that in this way only can a man be made good and wise by experience and learning. And you want me to say plainly in what they are right and in what they are wrong.

Cle. Yes, I do.

Ath. But how can I in one word rightly comprehend all of them? I am of opinion, and, if I am not mistaken, there is a general agreement, that every one of these poets has said many things well and many things the reverse of well; and if this be true, then I do affirm that much learning brings danger to youth.

Cle. Then how would you advise the guardian of the law to act?

Ath. In what respect?

Cle. I mean to what pattern should he look as his guide in permitting the young to learn some things and forbidding them to learn others. Do not shrink from answering.

Ath. My good Cleinias, I rather think that I am fortunate.

Cle. In what?

Ath. I think that I am not wholly in want of a pattern, for when I consider the words which we have spoken from early dawn until now, and which, as I believe, have been inspired by
Heaven, they appear to me to be quite like a poem. When I reflected upon all these words of ours, I naturally felt pleasure, for of all the discourses which I have ever learnt or heard, either in poetry or prose, this seemed to me to be the justest, and most suitable for young men to hear; I cannot imagine any better pattern than this which the guardian of the law and the educator can have. They cannot do better than advise the teachers to teach the young these and the like words, and if they should happen to find writings, either in poetry or prose, or even unwritten discourses like these of ours, and of the same family, they should certainly preserve them, and commit them to writing. And, first of all, they shall constrain the teachers themselves to learn and approve them, and any of them who will not, shall not be employed by them, but those whom they find agreeing in their judgment, they shall make use of and shall commit to them the instruction and education of youth. And here and on this wise let my fanciful tale about letters and teachers of letters come to an end.

Cle. I do not think, Stranger, that we have wandered out of the proposed limits of the argument; but whether we are right or not in the whole design I cannot be very certain.

Ath. The truth, Cleinias, may be expected to become clearer when, as we have often said, we arrive at the end of the whole discussion about laws.

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And now that we have done with the teacher of letters, the teacher of the lyre has to receive orders from us.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. I think that we have only to recollect our previous discussions, and we shall be able to give suitable regulations touching all this part of instruction and education to the teachers of the lyre.

Cle. To what do you refer?

Ath. We were saying, if I remember rightly, that the sixty years' old choristers of Dionysus were to be specially quick in their perceptions of rhythm and musical composition, that they might be able to distinguish good and bad imitation, or in other words, the imitation of the good or bad soul when under the influence of passion, rejecting the one and displaying the other
in hymns and songs, charming the souls of youth, and inviting them to follow and attain virtue by the way of imitation.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And with this view the teacher and the learner ought to use the sounds of the lyre because its notes are pure, the player who teaches and his pupil giving note for note in unison; but complexity, and variation of notes, when the strings give one sound and the poet or composer of the melody gives another; also when they make concords and harmonies in which lesser and greater intervals, slow and quick, or high and low notes, are combined; or, again, when they make complex variations of rhythms, which they adapt to the notes of the lyre,—all that sort of thing is not suited to those who have to acquire a speedy and useful knowledge of music in three years; for opposite principles are confusing, and create a difficulty in learning, and our young men should learn quickly, and their mere necessary acquirements are not few or trifling, as will be shown in due course. Let our educator attend to the principles concerning music which we are laying down. As to the songs and words themselves which the masters of choruses are to teach and the character of them, they have been already described by us, and are the same which we said were to be consecrated as may suit the several feasts, and so furnish an innocent and useful amusement to cities.

Cle. That, again, is true.

Ath. Then let the musical president who has been elected receive these rules from us as the very truth; and may he prosper in his office! Let us now proceed to lay down other rules about dancing and gymnastic exercise in general. Having said what remained to be said about the teaching of music, let us speak in like manner about gymnastic. For boys and girls ought to learn to dance and practise gymnastic exercises—ought they not?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. Then the boys ought to have dancing masters, and the girls dancing mistresses to exercise them.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Then once more let us call him who will have the chief trouble, the superintendent of youth; he will have plenty to do, if he is to have the charge of music and gymnastic.
Cle. But how will an old man be able to attend to such great charges?

Ath. O, my friend, there will be no difficulty, for the law has already given and will give him permission to select as his assistants in this charge any citizens, male or female, whom he desires; and he will know whom he ought to choose, and will be anxious not to make a mistake, from a sense of responsibility, and from a consciousness of the importance of his office, and also because he will consider that if young men have been and are well brought up, then all things go swimmingly, but if not, it is not meet to say, nor do we say, what will follow, lest the regarders of omens should take alarm about our infant state. Many things have been said by us about dancing and about gymnastic movements in general; for we include under gymnastics all military exercises, such as archery, and all hurling of weapons, and the use of the light shield, and all fighting with heavy arms, and military evolutions, and movements of armies, and encampments, and all that relates to horsemanship. Of all these things there ought to be public teachers, receiving pay from the state, and their pupils should be the men and boys in the state, and also the girls and women, who are to know all these things. While they are yet girls they should have practised dancing in arms and the whole art of fighting—when they are grown-up women, applying themselves to evolutions and tactics, and the mode of grounding and taking up arms; if for no other reason, yet in case the whole people should have to leave the city and carry on operations of war outside, that the young who are left to guard and the rest of the city may be equal to the task; and, on the other hand (what is far from being an impossibility), when enemies, whether barbarian or Hellenic, come from without with mighty force and make a violent assault upon them, and thus compel them to fight for the possession of the city, great would be the disgrace to the state, if the women had been so miserably trained that they could not fight for their young, as birds will, against any creature however strong, and die or undergo any danger, but must instantly rush to the temples and crowd at the altars and shrines, and bring upon human nature the reproach, that of all animals man is the most cowardly.
Cle. Such a want of education, Stranger, is certainly an unseemly thing to happen in a state, and also a great misfortune.

Ath. Suppose that we carry our law to the extent of saying that women ought not to neglect military matters, but that all citizens, male and female alike, shall attend to them?

Cle. I quite agree.

Ath. Of wrestling we have spoken in part, but of what I should call the most important part we have not spoken, and cannot easily speak without showing at the same time by gesture as well as in word what we mean; when word and action combine, and not till then, we shall explain clearly what has been said, pointing out that of all movements wrestling is most akin to the military art, and is to be pursued for the sake of this, and not this for the sake of wrestling;

Cle. Excellent.

Ath. Thus far we have spoken of the palestra, and we will now proceed to speak of other movements of the body. Such motion may be in general called dancing, and is of two kinds: one of nobler figures, imitating the honourable, the other of the more ignoble figures, imitating the mean; and of both these there are two further sub-divisions. Of the serious, one kind is of those engaged in war and vehement action, and is the exercise of a noble person and a manly heart; the other exhibits a temperate soul in the enjoyment of prosperity and modest pleasures, and may be truly called and is the dance of peace. The warrior dance is different from the peaceful one, and may be rightly termed Pyrrhic; this imitates the modes of avoiding blows and darts, by dropping or giving way, or springing aside, or rising up or falling down; also the opposite postures which are those of action, as, for example, the imitation of archery and the hurling of javelins, and of all sorts of blows. And when the imitation is of brave bodies and souls, and the action is direct and muscular, giving for the most part a straight movement to the limbs of the body—that, I say, is the true sort; but the opposite is not right. In the dance of peace the consideration is whether a man bears himself naturally and gracefully, and after the manner of well-conditioned men. But before proceeding I must distinguish the dancing about which
there is any doubt, from that about which there is no doubt. How shall we distinguish them? There are dances of the Bacchic sort, in which they imitate, as they say, the Nymphs, and Pan, and drunken Silenuses, and Satyrs, after whom they name them, making purifications and celebrating mysteries,—all this sort of dancing cannot be distinguished as having either a peaceful or a warlike character, or indeed as having any meaning whatever, and may, I think, be most truly described as distinct from the warlike dance, and distinct from the peaceful, and not suited for a city at all. Having left this behind us, we will now proceed to the dances of war and peace, about which there can be no doubt in our state. Now the unwarlike muse, which honours in dance the Gods and the sons of the Gods, is associated with the consciousness of prosperity; and this may be sub-divided into classes, of which one is expressive of an escape from some labour or danger into good, and has greater pleasures; the other expressive of preservation and increase of former good, in which the pleasure is less exciting;—in all these cases, every man when the pleasure is greater, moves his body more, and less when the pleasure is less; and, again, if he be more orderly and disciplined he moves less; but if he be a coward, and has no training or self-control, he makes greater and more violent movements, and in general when he is speaking or singing he is not altogether able to control his body; and so out of the imitation of words in gestures the art of dancing has originated. And in these various kinds of imitation one man moves in an orderly, another in a disorderly manner; and as the ancients may be observed to have given many names which are according to nature and deserving of praise, so there is an excellent one which they have given to those dances of men in their times of prosperity, who are moderate in their pleasures—whomever he was gave them a very true, and poetical, and rational name, when he called them Emmeleiai, or dances of order; thus establishing two kinds of dances of the nobler sort, the dance of war which he called the Pyrrhic, and the dance of peace which he called Emmeleia, or the dance of order; giving to each their appropriate and becoming name. These things the legislator should indicate in general outline, and the guardian of the law should enquire into them and search them out, combining
dancing with music, and assigning to the several sacrificial feasts that which is suitable to them; and when he has consecrated them all in due order, he shall for the future change nothing, whether of dance or song. Thenceforward the city and the citizens shall continue to have the same pleasures, themselves being as far as possible alike, and shall live well and happily.

I have described the dances which are appropriate to noble bodies and generous souls. But it is necessary also to consider and know uncomely persons and thoughts, and those which are intended to produce laughter in comedy, and have a comic character both in respect to style, and song, and dance, whether real or imitated. For serious things cannot be understood without laughable things, nor opposites at all without opposites, if a man is really to have intelligence of either; but he cannot carry out both in action, if he is to have any degree of virtue. And for this very reason he should learn them both, in order that he may not in ignorance do or say anything which is ridiculous and out of place—he should command slaves and hired strangers to imitate such things, but he should never take any serious interest in them himself, nor should any freeman or freewoman be discovered learning them; and there should always be some element of novelty in the imitation. Let these then be laid down, both in law and in our narrative, as the regulations of laughable amusements which are generally called comedy. And, if any of the serious or tragic poets, as they are termed, come to us and say—'O strangers, may we go to your city and country or may we not, and shall we bring with us our poetry—what is your will about these matters?' How shall we answer the divine men? I think that our answer should be as follows:—Best of strangers, we will say to them, we also according to our ability are tragic poets, and our tragedy the best and noblest; for our whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which we affirm to be indeed the very truth of tragedy. You are poets and we are poets, your rivals and antagonists in the noblest of dramas, which true law will carry out in act, as our hope is. Do not then suppose that we shall all in a moment allow you to erect your stage in the agora, or introduce the fair voice of your actors, speaking above our own, and permit you to harangue our women and children, and the
mass of mankind, about our institutions, in language other than our own, and very often the opposite of our own. For a state would be mad which gave you this licence, until the magistrates had determined whether your poetry might be recited, and was fit for publication or not. Wherefore, O ye sons and scions of the softer Muses, first of all show your songs to the magistrates, and let them compare them with our own, and if they are the same or better we will give you a chorus; but if not, then, my friends, we cannot. Let these, then, be the customs ordained by law about all dances and the teaching of them, and let matters relating to slaves be separated from those relating to masters, if you do not object.

Cle. We can have no hesitation in assenting when you put the matter thus.

Ath. There still remain three studies suitable for freemen. Arithmetic is one of them; the measurement of length, surface, and depth is the second; and the third has to do with the revolutions of the stars in relation to one another. Not every one has need to toil through all these things in a strictly scientific manner, but only a few, and who they are to be, we will hereafter indicate in the proper place; not to know what is necessary for mankind in general, and what is the truth, is disgraceful to every one: and yet to enter into these matters minutely is neither easy, nor at all possible for every one; but there is something in them which is necessary and cannot be set aside, and probably he who made the proverb about God originally had this in view when he said, 'that not even God himself can fight against necessity';—he meant, if I am not mistaken, divine necessity; for as to the human necessities of which men often speak when they talk in this manner, nothing can be more ridiculous than such an application of the words.

Cle. And what necessities of knowledge are there, Stranger, which are divine and not human?

Ath. I conceive them to be those of which he who has no use nor any knowledge at all cannot be a God, or demi-god, or hero to mankind, or able to take any serious thought or charge of them. And very unlike a divine man would he be, who is unable to count one, two, three, or to distinguish odd and even numbers; or is unable to count at all, or reckon night and day,
and who is totally unacquainted with the revolution of the sun and moon, and the other stars. There would be great folly in supposing that all these are not necessary parts of knowledge to him who intends to know anything about the highest kinds of knowledge; but which these are, and how many there are of them, and when they are to be learned, and what is to be learned together and what apart, and the whole correlation of them, must be rightly apprehended first; and these leading the way we may proceed to the other parts of knowledge. For so necessity grounded in nature constrains us, against which we say that no God contends, or ever will contend.

Cle. I think, Stranger, that what you have now said is very true and agreeable to nature.

Ath. Yes, Cleinias, I quite agree with you. But it is difficult for the legislator to begin with these studies; at a more convenient time we will make regulations for them.

Cle. You seem, Stranger, to be afraid of our habitual ignorance of the subject: there is no reason why that should prevent you from speaking out.

Ath. I certainly am afraid of the difficulties to which you allude, but I am still more afraid of those who apply themselves to this sort of knowledge, and apply themselves badly. For entire ignorance is not so terrible or extreme an evil, and is far from being the greatest of all; too much cleverness and too much learning, accompanied with ill bringing up, are far more fatal.

Cle. True.

Ath. All freemen, I conceive, should learn as much of these branches of knowledge as every child in Egypt is taught when he learns his alphabet. In that country arithmetical games have been actually invented for the use of children, which they learn as a pleasure and amusement. They have to distribute apples and garlands, using the same number sometimes for a larger and sometimes for a lesser number of persons; and they arrange pugilists and wrestlers as they pair together by lot or remain over, and show the order in which they follow. Another mode of amusing them is by distributing vessels, some in which gold, brass, silver, and the like are mixed, others in which they are unmixed; as I was saying, they adapt to their amusement
the numbers in common use, and in this way make more intelligible to their pupils the arrangements and movements of armies and expeditions, and in the management of a household they make people more useful to themselves, and more wide awake; and again in measurements of things which have length, and breadth, and depth, they free us from that natural ignorance of all these things which is so ludicrous and disgraceful.

Cle. What kind of ignorance do you mean?

Ath. O my dear Cleinias, I, like yourself, have late in life heard with amazement of our ignorance in these matters; to me we appear to be more like pigs than men, and I am quite ashamed, not only of myself, but of all Hellenes.


Ath. I will; or rather I will show you my meaning by a question, and do you please to answer me: You know, I suppose, what length is?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And what breadth is?

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. And you know that these are two distinct things, and that there is a third thing called depth?

Cle. Of course.

Ath. And do not all these seem to you to be commensurable with one another?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. That is to say, length is naturally commensurable with length, and breadth with breadth, and depth in like manner with depth?

Cle. Undoubtedly.

Ath. But if some things are commensurable and others wholly incommensurable, and you think that all things are commensurable, what is your position in regard to them?

Cle. Clearly, far from good.

Ath. Concerning length and breadth when compared with depth, or breadth and length when compared with one another, are not all the Hellenes agreed that these are commensurable with one another in some way?

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. But if they are absolutely incommensurable, and yet
all of us regard them as commensurable, have we not reason to be ashamed of our compatriots; and might we not say to them:—O ye best of Hellenes, is not this one of the things of which we were saying that not to know them is disgraceful, and of which to know only what is necessary is no great distinction?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And there are other things akin to these, in which there spring up other errors of the same family.

*Cle.* What are they?

*Ath.* The natures of commensurable and incommensurable quantities in their relation to one another. A man who is good for anything ought to be able, when he thinks, to distinguish them; and different persons should compete with one another in asking questions, which will be a far better and more graceful way of passing their time than the old man's game of draughts.

*Cle.* I dare say; and these pastimes are not so very unlike a game of draughts.

*Ath.* And these, as I maintain, Cleinias, are the studies which our youth ought to learn, for they are innocent and not difficult; the learning of them will be an amusement, and they will benefit the state. If any one is of another mind, let him say what he has to say.

*Cle.* Of course you are right.

*Ath.* Then if these studies are such as we say, we will include them; if not, they shall be excluded.

*Cle.* Assuredly: but may we not now, Stranger, prescribe these studies as necessary, and so fill up the lacunae of our laws?

*Ath.* They shall be regarded as pledges which may be refused hereafter by the state, if they do not please either us who impose them, or you upon whom they are imposed.

*Cle.* A fair condition.

*Ath.* Next let us see whether we are willing that the study of astronomy shall or shall not be proposed for our youth.

*Cle.* Proceed.

*Ath.* Here occurs a strange phenomenon, which certainly cannot in any point of view be tolerated.
Cle. To what are you referring?

Ath. Men say that we ought not to enquire into the supreme God and the nature of the universe, nor busy ourselves in searching out the causes of things, and that such enquiries are impious; whereas the very opposite is the truth.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. Perhaps what I am saying may seem paradoxical, and at variance with the usual language of age. But when any one has any good and true notion which is for the advantage of the state and in every way acceptable to God, he cannot abstain from expressing it.

Cle. Your words are reasonable enough; but shall we find any good or true notion about the stars?

Ath. My good friends, at this day all of us Hellenes speak falsely, if I may use such an expression, of those great Gods, the Sun and the Moon.

Cle. What is the falsehood?

Ath. We say that they and divers other stars do not keep the same path, and we call them planets or wanderers.

Cle. Very true, Stranger; and in the course of my life I have often myself seen the morning star and the evening star and divers others not proceeding in their own path, but wandering out of their path in all manner of ways, and I have seen the sun and moon doing what we all know that they do.

Ath. Just so, Megillus and Cleinias, and I maintain that our citizens and our youth ought to learn about the nature of the Gods in heaven, so far as to be able to offer sacrifices and pray to them in pious language, and not to blaspheme about them.

Cle. There you are right, if such a knowledge be only attainable; and if we are wrong in our mode of speaking now, and can be better instructed and learn to use better language, then I quite agree with you that such a degree of knowledge as will enable us to speak rightly should, if attainable, be acquired by us. And now do you try to explain to us your whole meaning, and we, on our part, will endeavour to understand you.

Ath. There is some difficulty in understanding my meaning, but not a very great one, nor will any great length of time be required; and of this I am myself a proof; for I did not know
these things long ago, nor in the days of my youth; and yet I can explain them to you in a brief space of time, whereas if they had been difficult I could certainly never have explained them all, old as I am, to old men like yourselves.

_Cle._ True; but what is this study which you describe as wonderful and fitting for youth to learn, but of which we are ignorant? Try and explain the nature of it to us as clearly as you can.

_Ath._ I will. For, O my good friends, that other doctrine about the wandering of the sun and the moon and the other stars is not the truth, but the very reverse of the truth. Each of them moves in the same path—not in many paths, but in one only, which is circular, and the varieties are only apparent. Nor are we right in supposing that the swiftest of them is the slowest, nor conversely, that the slowest is the quickest. And if what I say is true, only just imagine that we had a similar notion about horses running at Olympia, or about men who ran in the long course, and that we addressed the swiftest as the slowest and the slowest as the swiftest, and sang the praises of the vanquished as though he were the victor,—in that case our praises would not be true, nor very agreeable to the runners, though they be but men; and now, to commit the same error about the Gods which would have been ludicrous and erroneous in the case of men,—is not that ludicrous and erroneous?

_Cle._ Worse than ludicrous, I should say.

_Ath._ At all events, the Gods cannot like us to be spreading a false report of them.

_Cle._ Most true, if such is the fact.

_Ath._ And if we can show that such is really the fact, then all these matters ought to be learned so far as is necessary for the avoidance of impiety; but if we cannot, they may be let alone, and let this be our decision.

_Cle._ Very good.

_Ath._ Enough of laws relating to education and learning. But hunting and similar pursuits in like manner claim our attention. For the legislator appears to have a duty imposed upon him which goes beyond mere legislation. There is something over and above law which lies in a region between admonition and law, and has several times occurred to us in the course of dis-
cussion; for example, in the education of very young children there were things, as we maintain, which are not to be defined, and to regard them as matters of positive law is a great absurdity. Now, our laws and the whole constitution of our state having been thus delineated, the praise of the virtuous citizen is not complete when he is described as the person who serves the laws best and obeys them most, but the highest form of praise is that which describes him as the good citizen who goes through life undefiled and is obedient to the words of the legislator, both when he is giving laws and when he assigns praise and blame. This is the truest word than can be spoken in praise of a citizen; and the true legislator ought not only to write his laws, but also to interweave with them all such things as seem to him honourable and dishonourable. And the perfect citizen ought to seek to strengthen these no less than the principles of law which are sanctioned by punishments. I will adduce an example which will clear up my meaning. Hunting is of wide extent, and has a name under which many things are included, for there is a hunting of creatures in the water, and of creatures in the air; and there is a great deal of hunting of land animals of all sorts, and not of wild beasts only; the hunting after man is also worthy of consideration; there is the hunting after him in war, and there is often a hunting after him in the way of friendship, which is praised and also blamed; and there is thieving, and the hunting which is practised by robbers, and that of armies against armies. Now the legislator, in laying down laws about hunting, can neither abstain from noting these things, nor can he make threatening ordinances which will assign, rules and penalties about all of them. What is he to do? He will have to praise and blame hunting with a view to the discipline and exercise of youth. And, on the other hand, the young man must listen obediently; neither pleasure nor pain should hinder him, and he should regard as his standard of action the praises and injunctions of the legislator rather than the punishments which he imposes by law. This being premised, there will follow next in order moderate praise and censure of hunting; the praise being assigned to that which will make the souls of young men better, and the censure to that which has the opposite effect. And now let us address young
men in the form of a pious wish for their welfare: O, my friends, we will say to them, may no desire or love of hunting in the sea, or of angling or of catching the creatures in the sea, ever take possession of you, either when you are awake or when you are asleep, by hook or with weels, which latter is a very lazy contrivance; and let not any desire of catching men and of piracy by sea enter into your souls and make you cruel and lawless hunters. And as to the desire of thieving in town or country, may it never enter into your most passing thoughts; nor let the insidious fancy of catching birds, which is hardly worthy of freemen, come into the head of any youth. There remains therefore for our athletes only the hunting and catching of land animals, of which the one sort is called hunting by night, in which the hunters sleep in turn and are lazy; this is not to be commended any more than that which has intervals of rest, in which the wild strength of beasts is subdued by nets and snares, and not by the victory of a laborious spirit. Thus, only the best kind of hunting is allowed at all—that of quadrupeds, which is carried on with horses and dogs and men's own persons, and they get the victory over the animals by running them down and striking them and hurling at them, those who have a care of godlike manhood taking them with their own hands. The praise and blame which is assigned to all these things has now been declared; and let the law be as follows: Let no one hinder our sacred hunters from following the chase wherever and whithersoever they will; but the nightly hunter, who trusts to his nets and springs, shall not be allowed to hunt anywhere. The fowler in the mountains and waste places shall be permitted, but on cultivated ground and on consecrated wilds he shall not be permitted; and any one who meets him may stop him. As to the hunter in waters, he may hunt anywhere except in harbours or sacred streams or marshes or pools, provided only that he do not trouble the water with poisonous mixtures. And now we may say that all our enactments about education are complete.

Cle. Very good.
Book VIII.

Athenian Stranger. Next, with the help of the Delphian oracle, we have to institute festivals and make laws about them; and to determine what sacrifices will be for the good of the city, and to what Gods they shall be offered; but when they shall be offered, and how often, may be partly regulated by us.

Cleinias. The number—yes.

Ath. Then we will first determine the number; and let the whole number be 365—one for every day,—so that one magistrate at least will sacrifice daily to some God or demi-god on behalf of the city, and the citizens, and their possessions. And the interpreters, and priests, and priestesses, and prophets shall meet, and, in company with the guardians of the law, ordain those things which the legislator of necessity omits; and I may remark that they are the very persons who ought to take note of what is omitted. The law will say that there are twelve feasts dedicated to the twelve Gods, after whom the several tribes are named; and that to each of them they shall sacrifice every month, and appoint choruses, and musical and gymnastic contests, corresponding to the several Gods and seasons of the year. And they shall have festivals of women, distinguishing those which ought to be separated from the men's festivals, and those which ought not. Further, they shall not confuse the infernal deities and their rites with the Gods who are termed heavenly and their rites, but shall separate them, giving to Pluto his own in the twelfth month, which is sacred to him, according to the law. To such a city warlike men should entertain no
aversion, but they should honour him as being always the best friend of man. For the connection of soul and body is no way better than the dissolution of them, as I am ready to maintain quite seriously. Moreover, those who would regulate these matters rightly, should consider, that our city among existing cities has indeed no fellow, either in respect of leisure or command of the necessaries of life, but also like an individual ought to live happily. And those who would live happily should in the first place do no wrong to one another, and ought not themselves to be wronged by others; to attain the first is not difficult, but there is great difficulty in acquiring the power of not being wronged. No man can be perfectly secure against wrong, unless he has become perfectly good; and cities are like individuals in this, for a city if good has a life of peace, but if evil, a life of war within and without. Wherefore the citizens ought to practise war—not in time of war, but rather while they are at peace. And every city which has any sense, should go on military expeditions at least for one day in every month, and for more if the magistrates think fit, taking no thought about winter cold or summer heat; and they should go out in one body, including their wives and their children, when the magistrates determine to lead forth the whole people, or in such portions as are summoned by them; and they should always provide that there should be games and sacrificial feasts, and they should have tournaments, imitating in as lively a manner as they can real battles. And they should distribute prizes of victory and valour to the competitors, passing censures and encomiums on one another according to the characters which they bear in the contests and in their whole life; honouring him who seems to be the best, and blaming him who is the opposite. And let poets celebrate the victors,—not however every poet, but only one who in the first place is not less than fifty years of age; nor should he be one who, although he may have musical and poetical gifts, has never in his life done any noble or illustrious action; but those who are good and honourable in the state, poets of noble actions—let their poems be sung, even though they be not very musical. And let the judgment of them rest with the instructor of youth and the other guardians of the laws, who shall give them this privilege, and they alone
shall be free to sing; but the rest of the world shall not have this liberty. Nor shall any one dare to sing a song which has not been approved by the judgment of the guardians of the laws, not even if his strain be sweeter than the songs of Thamyras and Orpheus; but only such poems as have been judged sacred and dedicated to the Gods, and such as are the works of good men, works of praise or blame which have been deemed to fulfil their design fairly.

The regulations about war, and about liberty of speech in poetry, ought to apply equally to men and women. The legislator may be supposed to argue the question in his own mind:—Who are my citizens for whom I have set in order the city? Are they not competitors in the greatest of all contests, and have they not innumerable rivals? To be sure, is the natural reply. Well, but if we were training boxers, or pancratiasts, or any other sort of athletes, would they never meet until the hour of contest arrived; and should we do nothing to prepare ourselves previously? Surely, if we were boxers, we should have been learning to fight for many days before, and exercising ourselves in imitating all those blows and wards which we were intending to execute in the hour of conflict; and in order that we might come as near to reality as possible, instead of cestuses we should put on boxing-gloves, that the blows and the wards might be practised by us to the utmost of our power. And if there were a lack of competitors, the fear of ridicule would not deter us from hanging up a lifeless image and practising at that. Or if we had no adversary at all, animate or inanimate, should we not venture in the dearth of antagonists to spar by ourselves? In what other manner could we ever study the art of self-defence?

Cle. The way which you mention, Stranger, would be the only way.

Ath. And shall the warriors of our city, who are destined when occasion calls to enter the greatest of all contests, and to fight for their lives, and their children, and their property, and the whole city, be worse prepared than boxers? And will the legislator, because he is afraid that their practising with one another may appear ridiculous, abstain from commanding them to go out and fight; will he not ordain that soldiers shall
perform lesser exercises without arms every day, making dancing
and all gymnastic tend to this end; and also will he not require
that they shall practise some gymnastic exercises, greater as
well as lesser, as often as every month; and that they shall
have contests one with another in every part of the country,
seizing upon posts and lying in ambush, and imitating in every
respect the reality of war; fighting with boxing-gloves and
hurling javelins, and using weapons somewhat dangerous, and
as nearly as possible like the true ones, in order that the sport
may not be altogether without fear, but may have terrors and
to a certain degree show the man who has and who has not
courage; and that the honour and dishonour which are assigned
to them respectively, may prepare the whole city for the true
conflict of life? If any one dies in these mimic contests, the
homicide is involuntary, and we will make the slayer, when he
has been purified according to law, to be pure of blood, con-
sidering that if a few men should die, others as good as they
will be born; but that if fear is dead, then the citizens will never
find a test of superior and inferior in desert, which is a far
greater evil to the state than the loss of a few.

Cle. We are quite agreed, Stranger, that we should legislate
about such things, and that the whole state should practise
them.

Ath. And what is the reason that dances and contests of this
sort hardly ever exist in states, at least not to any extent worth
speaking of? Is this due to the ignorance of mankind and
their legislators?

Cle. Perhaps.

Ath. Certainly not, sweet Cleinias; there are two causes,
which are quite enough to account for the deficiency.

Cle. What are they?

Ath. One cause is the love of wealth, which wholly absorbs
men, and never for a moment allows them to think of anything
but their own private possessions; on this the soul of every
citizen hangs suspended, and can attend to nothing but his
daily gain; mankind are ready to learn any branch of know-
ledge, and to follow any pursuit which tends to this end, and
they laugh at every other:—that is one reason why a city will
not be in earnest about war or any other good and honourable
pursuit. From an insatiable love of gold and silver, every man is willing to endure the practice of any art or contrivance, seemly or unseemly, in the hope of becoming rich; and will make no objection to performing any action, holy, or unholy and utterly base, if only like a beast he have the power of eating and drinking all sorts of things, and procuring for himself in every sort of way the gratification of his lusts.

Cle. True.

Ath. Let this, then, be deemed one of the causes which prevent states from pursuing in an efficient manner the art of war, or any other noble aim, but makes the orderly and temperate part of mankind into merchants, and captains of ships, and servants, and converts the valiant sort into thieves and burglars, and robbers of temples, and violent, tyrannical persons; many of whom are not without ability, but they are unfortunate.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. Must not they be truly unfortunate whose souls are compelled to pass through life always hungering?

Cle. Then that is one cause, Stranger; but you spoke of another.

Ath. Thank you for reminding me.

Cle. The insatiable lifelong love of wealth, as you were saying, is one cause which absorbs mankind, and prevents them from rightly practising the arts of war:—Granted; and now tell me, what is the other?

Ath. Do you imagine that I delay because I am in a perplexity?

Cle. No; but we think that you are too severe upon the money-loving temper, of which you seem in the present discussion to have a peculiar dislike.

Ath. That is a very fair rebuke, Stranger; and I will now proceed to the second cause.

Cle. Proceed.

Ath. I say that governments are a cause—democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, concerning which I have often spoken in the previous discourse; or rather governments they are not, for none of them exercises a voluntary rule over voluntary subjects; but they may be truly called states of discord, in which while the government is voluntary, the subjects always obey against their
will, and have to be coerced; and the ruler fears the subject, and will not, if he can help, allow him to become either noble, or rich, or strong; or valiant, or warlike at all. These two are the causes of almost all evils, and of the evils of which I have been speaking they are the special causes. But our state has escaped both of them; for her citizens have the greatest leisure, and they are not subject to one another, and will, I think, be made by these laws the reverse of lovers of money. Such a constitution may be reasonably supposed to be the only one existing which will accept the education which we have described, and the martial pastimes which have been perfected according to our idea.

Cle. Good.

Ath. Then next we must remember, about all gymnastic contests, that only the warlike sort of them are to be practised and to have prizes of victory; and those which are not military are to be given up. The military sort had better be completely described and established by law; and first, let us speak of running and swiftness.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Certainly the most military of all qualities is general activity of body, whether of foot or hand. For escaping or for capturing an enemy, quickness of foot is required; but hand-to-hand conflict and combat need vigour and strength.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Neither of them can attain their greatest efficiency without arms.

Cle. How can they?

Ath. Then our herald, in accordance with the prevailing practice, will first summon the runner;—he will appear armed, for to an unarmed competitor we will not give a prize. And he shall enter first who is to run the single course bearing arms; next, he who is to run the double course; third, he who is to run the horse-course; and fourthly, he who is to run the long course; the fifth class whom we start, shall be the first who goes forth in heavy armour,—and he shall run a course of sixty stadia to some temple of Ares—him we will call the heavy-armed runner; he shall run over smooth ground, and his competitor shall be an archer, and carry the equipments of an
archer, and he shall run a distance of 100 stadia over the mountains, and across every sort of country, to the temple of Apollo and Artemis; this shall be the order of the contest, and we will wait for them until they return, and will give a prize to the conqueror in each.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Let us suppose that there are three sorts of contests,—one of boys, another of beardless youths, and a third of men. For the youths we will fix the length of the contest at two-thirds, and for the boys at half of the entire course, whether they contend as archers or as heavy-armed. Touching the women: let the girls who are not grown up compete naked in the stadium and the double course, and the horse-course and the long course, and let them run on the race-ground itself; those who are thirteen years of age and upwards until their marriage shall continue to share in contests if they are not more than twenty, and shall be compelled to run up to eighteen; and they shall descend into the arena in suitable dresses. Let these be the regulations about contests in running both for men and women.

Respecting contests of strength, instead of wrestling and similar contests of the heavier sort, we will institute conflicts in armour of one against one, and two against two, and so on up to ten against ten. As to what a man ought not to suffer or do, and to what extent, in order to gain the victory—as in wrestling, the masters of the art have laid down what is fair and what is not fair, so in fighting in armour—we ought to call in skilful persons, who shall judge for us and be our assessors in the work of legislation; they shall say who deserves to be victor in combats of this sort, and what he is not to do or suffer, and in like manner what rule determines who is defeated; and let the same ordinances apply to women until they are married as well as to men. The pancration shall have a counterpart in a combat of the light-armed; they shall contend with bows and with light shields and with javelins and with slings and throwing of stones by hand; and laws shall be made about it, and rewards and prizes given to him who best fulfils the ordinances of the law.

Next in order we shall have to legislate about the horse
BOOK VIII.

403

countests. Now, we do not need many horses, for they cannot
be of much use in a country like Crete, and hence we naturally
do not take much pains about the rearing of them or about
horse races. There is no one who keeps a chariot among us,
and any rivalry in such matters would be altogether out of
place; there would be no sense nor any shadow of sense in
instituting contests which are not after the manner of our
country. And, therefore, we give our prizes for single horses
and for colts who have not cast their teeth, and for those who
are intermediate between the full-grown horses themselves; and
thus our equestrian games will accord with the nature of the
country. Let them have conflict and rivalry in these matters
in accordance with the law, and let the colonels and generals
of horse decide together about all courses and about the armed
competitors in them. But we have nothing to say to the
unarmed either in gymnastic exercises or in these contests.
On the other hand, the Cretan Bowman or javelin-man who
fights in armour on horseback is useful, and therefore we may
as well place a competition of this sort among our amusements.
Women are not to be forced to compete by laws and ordinances;
but if they have acquired the habit and are strong enough and
like to share in the contest, let them be allowed, girls as well
as boys, and no blame to them.

Thus the competition and the mode of learning gymnastic
have been described; and we have spoken also of the toils of
the contest, and of daily exercise in the house of the teacher.
Likewise, what relates to music has been, for the most part,
completed. But as to rhapsodes and their vocation, and the
contests of choruses which are to perform at feasts, these shall
be arranged when the months and days and years have been
appointed for Gods and demi-gods, whether every third year,
or again every fifth year, or in whatever way or manner the
 Gods may put into men's minds the distribution and order of
them. At the same time, we may expect that the musical
contests will be celebrated in turn by the command of the
judges and the instructor of youth and the guardians of the
law meeting together for this purpose, and themselves becoming
legislators of the times and nature and conditions of the choral
contests and of dancing in general. What they ought severally
to be in language and song, and in the admixture of harmony with rhythm and the dance, has been often declared by the original legislator; and his successors ought to follow him, making the games and sacrifices duly to correspond at fitting times, and appointing public festivals. It is not difficult to determine how these and the like matters may have a regular order; nor, again, is the alteration of them of any serious importance to the state. There is, however, another matter of great importance and difficulty, concerning which God should legislate, if there were any possibility of obtaining from him an ordinance about it. But seeing that divine aid is not to be had, there appears to be a need of some bold man who specially honours plainness of speech, and will say outright what is best for the city and citizens,—ordaining what is good and convenient for the whole state amid the corruptions of human souls, opposing the mightiest lusts, and having no man his helper but himself, standing alone and following reason only.

_Cle._ What is this, Stranger, that you are saying? For thus far we do not understand your meaning.

_Ath._ Very likely; I will endeavour to explain myself more clearly. When I came to the subject of education, I beheld young men and maidens holding friendly intercourse with one another. And there naturally arose in my mind a sort of apprehension—I could not help thinking how one is to deal with a city in which youths and maidens are well nurtured, and have nothing to do, and are not undergoing the excessive and servile toils which extinguish wantonness, and whose only cares during their whole life are sacrifices and festivals and dances. How, in such a state as this, will they abstain from desires which thrust many a man and woman into perdition; and from which reason, assuming the functions of law, commands them to abstain? The ordinances already made may possibly get the better of most of these desires; the prohibition of excessive wealth is a very considerable gain in the direction of temperance, and the whole education of our youth imposes a law of moderation on them; moreover, the eye of the rulers is required always to watch over the young, and never to lose sight of them; and these provisions do, as far as human means can effect anything, exercise a regulating influence upon the desires
in general. But how can we take precautions against the unnatural loves of either sex, from which innumerable evils have come upon individuals and cities? How shall we devise a remedy and way of escape out of so great a danger? Truly, Cleinias, here is a difficulty. In many ways the island of Crete and Lacedaemon furnish a great help to those who make peculiar laws; but in the matter of love, as we are alone, I must confess that they are quite against us. For if any one following nature should lay down the law which existed before the days of Laius, and denounce these lusts as contrary to nature, adducing the animals as a proof that such unions were monstrous, he might prove his point, but he would be wholly at variance with the custom of your states. Further, they are repugnant to a principle which we say that a legislator should always observe, for we are always enquiring which of our enactments tends to virtue and which not. And suppose we grant that these loves are accounted by law to be honourable, or at least not disgraceful, how about virtue? Will such passions implant in the soul of him who is seduced the habit of courage, or in the soul of the seducer the principle of temperance? Who will ever believe this?—or rather, who will not blame the effeminacy of him who yields to pleasures and is unable to hold out against them? Will not all men censure as womanly him who imitates the woman? And who would ever think of establishing such a practice by law? Certainly no one who had in his mind the image of true law. How can we prove that what I am saying is true? He who would rightly consider these matters must see the nature of friendship and desire, and of these so-called loves, for they are of two kinds, and out of the two arises a third kind, having the same name; and this similarity of name causes all the difficulty and obscurity.

Cle. How is that?

Ath. Dear is the like in virtue to the like, and the equal to the equal; dear also, though after another fashion, is he who has abundance to him who is in want. And when either of these friendships becomes excessive, we term the excess love.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. The friendship which arises from contraries is horrible and coarse, and has often no tie of communion; but that which
arises from likeness is gentle, and has a tie of communion, which lasts through life. As to the mixed sort which is made up of them both, there is, first of all, a difficulty in determining what he who is possessed by this third love desires; moreover, he is drawn different ways, and is in doubt between the two principles; the one exhorting him to enjoy the beauty of youth, and the other forbidding him. For the one is a lover of the body, and hungers after beauty, like ripe fruit, and would feign satisfy himself without any regard to the character of the beloved; the other holds the desire of the body to be a secondary matter, and looking rather than loving with his soul, and desiring the soul of the other in a becoming manner, regards the satisfaction of the bodily love as wantonness; he reverences and respects temperance and courage and magnanimity and wisdom, and wishes to live chastely with the chaste object of his affection. Now the sort of love which is made up of the other two is that which we have described as the third. Seeing then that there are these three sorts of love, ought the law to prohibit and forbid them all to exist among us? Is it not rather clear that we should wish to have in the state the love which is of virtue and which desires the beloved youth to be the best possible; and the other two, if possible, we should hinder? What do you say, friend Megillus?

Meg. I think, Stranger, that you are perfectly right in what you have been now saying.

Ath. I knew well, my friend, that I should obtain your assent, which I accept and therefore have no need to analyse your custom any further. Cleinias shall be prevailed upon to give me his assent at some other time. Enough of this; and now let us proceed to the laws.

Meg. Very good.

Ath. Upon reflection I see a way of imposing the law, which, in one respect, is easy, but in another is of the utmost difficulty.

Meg. What do you mean?

Ath. We are all aware that most men, in spite of their lawless natures, are very strictly and precisely restrained from intercourse with the fair, and this not at all against their will, but entirely with their will.
Meg. What do you mean?

Atk. When any one has a brother or sister who is fair; and about a son or daughter the same unwritten law holds, and is a most perfect safeguard, so that no open or secret connection ever takes place between them. Nor does the thought of such a thing ever enter at all into the minds of most of them.

Meg. Very true.

Atk. Does not a little word extinguish all pleasures of that sort?

Meg. What word?

Atk. The declaration that they are unholy, hated of God, and most infamous; and is not the reason of this that no one has ever said the opposite, but every one from his earliest days has heard men saying the same about them always and everywhere, whether in comedy or in the graver language of tragedy? When the poet introduces on the stage a Thyestes or an Oedipus, or a Macareus having secret intercourse with his sister, he represents him, when found out, ready to kill himself as the penalty of his sin.

Meg. You are very right in saying that tradition, if no breath of opposition ever assails it, has a marvellous power.

Atk. Am I not also right in saying that the legislator who wants to master any of the passions which master man may easily know how to subdue them? He will consecrate the tradition of their evil character among all, slaves and freemen, women and children, throughout the city:—that will be the surest foundation of the law which he can make.

Meg. Yes; but will he ever succeed in making all mankind use the same language about them?

Atk. A good objection; but was I not just now saying that I had a way to make men use natural love and abstain from unnatural, not intentionally destroying the seeds of human increase, or sowing them in stony places, in which they will take no root; and that I would command them to abstain too from any female field of increase in which that which is sown is not likely to grow? Now, if a law to this effect could only be made perpetual, and gain an authority such as already prevents intercourse of parents and children—such a law extending to other sensual desires, and conquering them, would be the source of
ten thousand blessings. For, in the first place, moderation is
the appointment of nature, and deters men from all frenzy and
madness of love, and from all adulteries and immoderate use
of meats and drinks, and makes them good friends to their own
wives. And innumerable other benefits would result if such a
law could only be enforced. I can imagine some lusty youth
who is standing by, and who, on hearing this enactment, declares
in scurrilous terms, that we are making foolish and impossible
laws, and fills the world with his outcry. And therefore I said
that I knew a way of enacting and perpetuating such a law,
which was very easy in one respect, but in another most difficult.
There is no difficulty in seeing that such a law is possible, and
in what way; for, as I was saying, the ordinance once conse-
crated would master the soul of every man, and terrify him into
obedience. But matters have now come to such a pass that
the enactment of the law seems to be impossible, and never
likely to take place, just as the continuance of an entire state
in the practice of common meals is also deemed impossible.
And although this latter is partly disproven by the fact of
their existence among you, still even in your cities the common
meals of women would be regarded as unnatural and impossible.
I was thinking of the rebelliousness of the human heart when
I said that the permanent establishment of these things is very
difficult.

_Meg._ Very true.

_Ath._ Shall I try and find some sort of persuasive argument
which will prove to you that such enactments are possible, and
not beyond human nature?

_Cle._ By all means.

_Ath._ Is a man more likely to abstain from the pleasures of
love and to do what he is bidden about them, when his body is
in a good condition, or when he is in an ill condition, and out of
training?

_Cle._ He will be far more temperate when he is in training.

_Ath._ And have we not heard of Iccus of Tarentum, who, with
a view to the Olympic and other contests, in his zeal for his art,
and also because he was of a manly and temperate constitution,
ever had any connection with a woman or a youth during the
whole time of his training? And the same is said of Crison and
Astylus and Diopompus and many others; and yet, Cleinias, they were far worse educated in their minds than your and my fellow citizens, and in their bodies far more lusty.

Cle. No doubt this fact has been often affirmed positively by the ancients of these athletes.

Ath. And shall they be willing to abstain from what is ordinarily deemed a pleasure for the sake of a victory in wrestling, running, and the like; and our young men be incapable of a similar endurance for the sake of a much nobler victory, which is the noblest of all, as from their youth upwards we will tell them, charming them, as we hope, into the belief of this by tales in prose and verse?

Cle. Of what victory are you speaking?

Ath. Of the victory over pleasure, which if they win, they will live happily, or if conquered the reverse of happily. And, further, will not the fear of impiety enable them to master that which other inferior people have mastered?

Cle. I dare say.

Ath. And since we have reached this point in our legislation, and have fallen into a difficulty by reason of the vices of mankind, I affirm that our ordinance should simply run in the following terms: Our citizens ought not to fall below the nature of birds and beasts in general, who are born in great multitudes, and yet remain until the age for procreation virgin and unmarried, and when they have reached the proper time of life are coupled, male and female, and lovingly pair together, and live the rest of their lives in holiness and innocence, abiding firmly in their original compact:—surely, we will say to them, you should be better than the animals. But if they are corrupted by the other Hellenes and the common practice of barbarians, and they see with their eyes and hear with their ears of the so-called illicit love everywhere prevailing among them, and they themselves are not able to get the better of the temptation, the guardians of the law, exercising the functions of lawgivers, shall devise a second law against them.

Cle. And what law would you advise them to pass if this one failed?

Ath. Clearly, Cleinias, the one which would naturally follow.

Cle. What is that?
Our citizens should not allow pleasures to strengthen with indulgence, but should by toil divert the aliment and exuberance of them into other parts of the body; and this will happen if no immodesty be allowed in the practice of love. Then they will be ashamed of frequent intercourse, and they will find pleasure, if seldom enjoyed, to be a less imperious mistress. They should not be found out doing anything of the sort. Concealment shall be honourable, and sanctioned both by custom and unwritten law; on the other hand, to be detected shall be esteemed dishonourable, but not, to abstain wholly. In this way there will be a second legal standard of honourable and dishonourable, having a second notion of right. Three principles will comprehend all those corrupt natures whom we call inferior to themselves, which is their common class, and will compel them not to transgress.

Cle. What are they?

Ath. The principle of piety, the love of honour, and the desire of beauty, not in the body but in the soul. These are, perhaps, romantic aspirations; but they are the noblest of aspirations, if they could only be realized in any state, and, God willing, in the matter of love we may be able to enforce one of two things—either that no one shall venture to touch any person of the freeborn or noble class except his wedded wife, or sow the unconsecrated and bastard seed among harlots, or in barren and unnatural lusts; or at least we may abolish altogether the connection of men with men; and as to women, if any man has to do with any but those who come into his house duly married by sacred rites, whether they be bought or acquired in any other way, and he offends publicly in the face of all mankind, we shall be right in enacting that he be deprived of civic honours and privileges, and be deemed to be, as he truly is, a stranger. Let this law, then, whether it is one, or ought rather to be called two, be laid down respecting love in general, and the intercourse of the sexes which arises out of the desires, whether rightly or wrongly indulged.

Meg. I, for my part, Stranger, would gladly receive this law. Cleinias shall speak for himself, and tell you what is his opinion.

Cle. I will, Megillus, when an opportunity offers; at present,
I think that we had better allow the Stranger to proceed with his laws.

Meg. Very good.

Ath. We had got about as far as the establishment of the common tables, which in most places would be difficult, but in Crete no one would think of introducing any other custom. There might arise a question about the manner of them—whether they shall be such as they are here in Crete, or such as they are in Lacedaemon,—or is there a third kind which may be better than either of them? The answer to this question might be easily discovered, but the discovery would do no good, for at present they are very well ordered.

Leaving the common tables, we may therefore proceed to the means of providing life. Now, in cities the means of life are gained in many ways and from divers sources, and in general from two sources, whereas our city has only one. For most of the Hellenes obtain their food from sea and land, but our citizens from land only. And this makes the task of the legislator less difficult—half as many laws will be enough, and much less than half; and they will be of a kind better suited to free men. For he has nothing to do with laws about shipowners and merchants and retailers and innkeepers and tax-collectors and mines and money-lending and compound interest and innumerable other things—bidding good-bye to these, he gives laws to husbandmen and shepherds and bee-keepers, and the guardians and superintendents of their implements; and he has already legislated for greater matters, as, for example, what relates to marriage and the procreation and nurture of children, and education, and the establishment of offices—and now he must direct his enactments to those who labour in providing food.

Let us first of all, then, have a class of laws which shall be called the laws of husbandmen. And let the first of them be the law of Zeus, the god of boundaries. Let no one shift the boundary line either of a fellow-citizen who is a neighbour, or, if he dwells at the extremity of the land, of any stranger who is contiguous to him, considering that this is truly 'to move the immovable,' and every one should be more willing to move the largest rock, which is not a landmark, than the least stone which
is the sworn arbiter of friendship and hatred between neighbours; for Zeus, the god of kindred, is the witness of the citizen, and Zeus, the god of strangers, of the stranger, and when aroused, terrible is their wrath. He who obeys the law will never know the fatal consequences of disobedience, but he who despises the law shall be liable to a double penalty, the first coming from the Gods, and the second from the law. For let no one voluntarily remove the boundaries of his neighbour's land, and if any one does, let him who will, inform the landowners, and let them bring him into court, and if he be convicted of re-dividing the land by stealth or by force, let the court determine what he ought to suffer or pay. In the next place, many small injuries done by neighbours to one another through their multiplication, may cause a weight of enmity, and make neighbourhood a very disagreeable and bitter thing. Wherefore a man ought to be very careful of committing any offence against his neighbour, and especially of encroaching on his neighbour's land; for any man may easily do harm, but not every man can do good to another. He who encroaches on his neighbour's land, and transgresses his boundaries, shall make good the damage, and, to cure him of his impudence and also of his meanness, he shall pay a double penalty to the injured party. Of these and the like matters the wardens of the country shall take cognizance, and be the judges of them and assessors of the damage; in the more important cases, as has been already said, the whole military force belonging to any one of the twelve divisions shall decide, and in the lesser cases the officers: or, again, if any one pastures his cattle on his neighbour's land, they shall see the injury, and adjudge the penalty. And if any one, by decoying the bees, gets possession of another's swarms and draws them to himself by making noises, he shall pay the damage; or if any one sets fire to his own wood and takes no care of his neighbour's property, he shall be fined at the discretion of the magistrates. And if in planting he does not leave a fair distance between his own and his neighbour's land, he shall be punished, in accordance with the enactments of many lawgivers, which we may use, not deeming it necessary that the great legislator of our state should determine all the trifles which might be decided by any
BOOK VIII.

body; for example, husbandmen have of old had excellent laws about waters, and there is no reason why we should let the stream of our discourse diverge from them: he who likes may draw water from the fountain-head of the common stream on to his own land, if he do not cut off the spring which clearly belongs to some other owner; and he may take the water in any direction which he pleases, except through a house or temple or sepulchre, but he must be careful to do no harm beyond the channel. And if there be in any place a natural dryness of the earth, which absorbs the rain from heaven, and there is a deficiency in the supply of water, let him dig down on his own land as far as the brick clay, and if at this depth he finds no water, let him carry water from his neighbours, as much as is required for his servants' drinking, and if his neighbours, too, are limited in their supply, let him have a fixed measure, which shall be determined by the wardens of the country. This he shall receive each day, and on these terms have a share of his neighbour's water. If there be heavy rain, and one of those on the lower ground injures some tiller of the upper ground, or some one who has a common wall refuses to give his neighbour an outlet for water; or, again, if some one living on the higher ground recklessly lets off the water on his lower neighbour, and they cannot come to terms with one another, let him, if he will, summon the offender, if he be in the city, before the warden of the city, or if he be in the country before the warden of the country, and let him obtain a decision determining what each of them is to do. And he who will not abide by the decision shall suffer for his malignant and morose temper, and pay a fine equivalent to double the value of the injury, because he was unwilling to submit to the magistrates.

Now, the participation of fruits shall be ordered on this wise. The goddess of Autumn has two gracious gifts: one, the joy\(^1\) of Dionysus which is not treasured up; the other, which nature intends to be stored. Let this be the law, then, concerning the fruits of autumn: he who tastes the common or storing fruits of autumn, whether grapes or figs, before the season of vintage which coincides with Arcturus, either on his own land or on that

\(^1\) Reading πανδιαν.
of others,—let him pay fifty drachmae, which shall be sacred to Dionysus, if he pluck them from his own land; and if from his neighbour’s land a mina, and if from any others two-thirds of a mina. And he who would gather the fresh grapes or the fresh figs, as they are now termed, if he take them off his own land let him pluck them how and when he likes; but if he takes them from the ground of others without their leave, let him in that case be always punished in accordance with the law which ordains that he should not move what he has not laid down. And if a slave touches any fruit of this sort, without the consent of the owner of the land, he shall be beaten with as many blows as there are grapes on the bunch, or figs on the fig-tree. Let a metic purchase the fresh autumnal fruit, and then, if he pleases, he may gather it; but if a stranger is passing along the road, and desires to eat, let him take of the fresh grape for himself and a single follower without price, as a tribute of hospitality. The law however forbids strangers from sharing in the sort which is not used for eating; and if any one, whether he be master or slave, takes of them in ignorance, let the slave be beaten, and the master be dismissed with admonitions, and instructed to take of the other autumnal fruits which are unfit for making raisins and wine, or for laying by as dried figs. As to pears, and apples, and pomegranates, and similar fruits, there shall be no disgrace in taking them secretly; but he who is found out, if he be of less than thirty years of age, shall be struck and beaten off, but not wounded; and no freeman shall have any right of satisfaction for such blows. Of these fruits the stranger may partake just as he may of the fruits of autumn. And if an elder who is more than thirty years of age, eat of them on the spot, let him, like the stranger, be allowed to partake of all such fruits, but he must carry away nothing. If, however, he will not obey the law, let him run the risk of failing in the competition of virtue, in case any one takes notice of his actions before the judges.

Water is the greatest element of nutrition in gardens, but is easily polluted. You cannot poison the soil, or the sun, or the air, which are the other elements of nutrition in plants, or divert them, or steal them; but all these things may very likely happen in regard to water, which must therefore be protected by law:
and let this be the law—If any one intentionally pollutes the water of another, whether the water of a spring, or collected in reservoirs, either by poisonous substances, or by digging, or by theft, let the injured party bring the cause before the wardens of the city, and claim in writing the value of the loss; and if he be found guilty of injuring the water by deleterious substances, let him not only pay damages, but purify the stream or the vessel which contains the water, in such manner as the laws of the interpreters order the purification to be made by the parties in each case.

With respect to the gathering in of the fruits of the soil, let a man, if he pleases, carry his own fruits through any place in which he either does no harm to any one, or himself gains three times as much as his neighbour loses. Now of these things the archons should be made cognisant, as of all other things in which a man intentionally does injury to another or to the property of another, by fraud or force, in the use which he makes of his own property. All these matters a man should lay before the magistrates, and receive damages, supposing the injury to be under three minae; or if he have a charge against another which involves a larger amount, let him bring the suits into the public courts and have the evil-doer punished. But if any of the magistrates appears to give unjust punishments in the penalties which he imposes, let him be adjudged to pay double to the injured party. Any one may bring the offences of magistrates, in any particular case, before the public courts. There are innumerable little matters relating to the modes of punishment, and applications for suits, and the summonses and witnesses to summonses; for example, whether two witnesses should be required for a summons, or how many, and all such details, which cannot be omitted in legislation and are beneath the wisdom of an aged legislator. These lesser matters, as they indeed are, in comparison with the greater ones, let a younger generation regulate by law, after the patterns which have preceded, and according to their own experience of the usefulness and necessity of them; and when they are duly regulated let there be no alteration, but let the citizens live in the observance of them.

Now of artizans, let the regulations be as follows:—In the
first place, let no native or servant of a native be occupied in handicraft arts; for a citizen who is to make and preserve the public order of the state, has an art which requires much study and many kinds of knowledge, since it does not admit of being made a secondary occupation; and hardly any human being is capable of pursuing two professions or two arts rightly, or of practising one art himself, and superintending some one else who is practising another. Let this, then, be our first principle in the state: No one who is a smith shall also be a carpenter, and if he be a carpenter he shall not superintend the smith's art rather than his own, under the pretext that in superintending many servants who are working for him, he is likely to superintend them better, because more revenue will accrue to him from them than from his own art; but let every man in the state have one art, and get his living by that. Let the wardens of the city labour to maintain this law, and if any citizen inclines to any other art rather than the study of virtue, let them punish him with disgrace and infamy, until they bring him back into his own right course; and if any stranger profess two arts, let them chastise him with bonds and money penalties, and expulsion from the state, until they compel him to be one only and not many.

But as touching payments for hire, and contracts of work, or in case any one does wrong to any of the citizens, or they do wrong to any other, up to fifty drachmae, let the wardens of the city decide the case; but if a greater amount is involved, then let the public courts decide according to law. Let no one pay any duty either on the importation or exportation of goods; and as to frankincense and similar perfumes, used in the service of the Gods, which come from foreign parts, and purple and other dyes which are not produced in the country, or the materials of any art which have to be imported, and which are not necessary—no one should import them; nor, again, should any one export anything which is wanted in the country. Of all these things let there be inspectors and superintendents, taken from the guardians of the law; and they shall be the twelve next in order to the five seniors. Concerning arms, and all military implements, if there be need of introducing any art, or plant, or metal, either for the purpose of making chains, or
bridles and reins for animals, let the commanders of the horse and the generals have authority over their importation and exportation; the city shall give them out and receive them again, and the guardians of the law shall make fit and proper laws about them. But let there be no retail trade for the sake of moneymaking, either in this or any other article, in the city or country at all.

With respect to food and the distribution of the produce of the country, the right and proper way seems to be nearly that which is the custom of Crete; for there all are required to distribute the fruits of the soil into twelve parts, and in this way consume them. Let the twelfth portion of each (as for instance of wheat and barley, which the rest of the fruits of the earth shall follow, as well as the animals which are sold in each of the twelve divisions) be further divided into three parts; one part for freemen, another for their servants, and a third part for craftsmen, and in general for the strangers, and any sojourners who may be dwelling in the city, and like other men must live; and there may be those who come on some business which they have with the state, or with some individual. Let only a third part of all necessaries be required to be sold; out of the other two-thirds no one shall be compelled to sell. And how will they be best distributed? In the first place, we see clearly that the distribution will be of equals in one point of view, and in another point of view of unequals.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. I mean that the earth of necessity produces and nourishes the various articles of food, sometimes better and sometimes worse.

Cle. Of course.

Ath. Such being the case, let no one of the three portions be greater than either of the other two;—neither that which is assigned to masters and slaves, nor again that of the stranger; but let the distribution to all be alike, and let every one of the citizens who gets his two portions have power to determine how much, and of what quality, he will distribute to slaves and freemen. And what remains he shall distribute by measure and number among the animals who have to be sustained from the earth, taking the whole number of them.
In the second place, our citizens should have separate houses duly ordered; and this shall be the order of them. There shall be twelve hamlets, one in the middle of each twelfth lot, and in each hamlet they shall first separate off a market-place, and the temples of the Gods, and of their attendant demi-gods, and if there be any local deities of the Magnetes, or holy seats of other ancient deities, whose memory has been preserved—to these let them pay their ancient honours. But Hestia, and Zeus, and Athene, and whatever other God may preside in each of the twelve portions, shall have temples everywhere. And the first erection of houses shall be around these temples, where the ground is highest, in order to provide the safest and most defensible place of retreat for the guards. All the rest of the country they shall settle in the following manner:—They shall make thirteen divisions of the craftsmen; one of them shall dwell in the city, and this, again, they shall subordinate into twelve lesser divisions, among the twelve districts of the city, distributed in the outskirts all around; and in each village they shall settle various classes of craftsmen, with a view to the convenience of the husbandmen. And the chief officers of the wardens of the country shall watch over all these matters, and see how many of them, and which class of them, each place requires; and fix them where they are likely to give the least inconvenience, and to be most useful to the husbandmen. And the officers of the wardens of the city shall see to similar matters in the city.

Now the wardens of the agora ought to see to the details of the agora. Their first care, after the temples have been cared for, should be to prevent any one from doing any wrong in dealings between man and man; in the second place, as being inspectors of temperance and violence, they should chastise him who requires chastisement. Touching articles of sale, they should first see whether the articles which the citizens are under regulations to sell to strangers are sold to them, as the law ordains. And let the law be as follows:—On the first day of the month, the persons in charge, whoever they are, whether strangers or slaves, who have the charge, shall produce to the strangers the portion which falls to them, in the first place, a twelfth portion of the corn;—the stranger shall purchase corn
BOOK VIII.

for the whole month, and other food, on the first market day; and on the tenth day of the month the one party shall sell, and the other buy, liquids sufficient to last during the whole month; and on the twenty-third day there shall be a sale of animals and of utensils, and of other things which husbandmen require, such as skins and all kinds of clothing, either woven or made of felt, and other goods of the same sort; and strangers shall be compelled to buy and purchase them from others. As to the retail trade in these things, whether of barley or wheat made into flour, or any other kind of food, no one shall sell them to citizens or their slaves, nor shall any citizen buy them; but let the stranger sell them in the market of strangers, to artizans and their slaves, making an exchange of wine and food, which is commonly called retail trade. And butchers shall likewise offer for sale dismembered animals to the strangers, and artizans, and their servants. Let any stranger who likes buy fuel from day to day wholesale, from those who have the care of it in the country, and let him sell to the strangers as much as he pleases and when he pleases. As to other goods and implements which are likely to be wanted, they shall sell them in the common market, at any place which the guardians of the law and the wardens of the market and city, choosing according to their judgments, shall determine; at such places they shall exchange money for goods, and goods for money, neither party giving credit to the other; and he who gives credit, whether he obtain his money or not, must be satisfied, for in such exchanges he will not be protected by law. But whenever property has been bought or sold, greater in quantity or value than is allowed by the law, which has determined within what limits a man may increase and diminish his possessions, let the excess be registered in the books of the guardians of the law; or in case of diminution, let there be an erasure made. And let the same rule be observed about the registration of the property of the metics. Any one who likes may come and be a metic on certain conditions; a foreigner, if he likes, and is able to settle, may dwell in the land, but he must practise an art, and not abide more than twenty years from the time at which he has registered himself; and he shall pay no sojourner's tax, however small, except good conduct, nor any other tax for buying and selling.
But when the twenty years have expired, he shall take his property with him and depart. And if in the course of these years he should chance to distinguish himself by any considerable benefit which he confers on the state, and he thinks that he can persuade the council and assembly, either to grant him delay in leaving the country, or to allow him to remain for the whole of his life, let him go and persuade the city, and whatever they assent to at his instance shall take effect. For the children of the metics being artisans, and of fifteen years of age, let the time of their sojourn commence after their fifteenth year; and let them remain for twenty years, and then go where they like; but any of them who wishes to remain, may remain, if he can persuade the council and assembly. And if he do not remain, let him erase all the entries which have been made by him in the registry kept by the archons.
Next to the matters which have preceded in the natural order of legislation, will come suits of law. Of suits those which relate to agriculture have been already described, but the more important have not been described. Having mentioned them severally under their usual names, we will proceed to say what punishments are to be inflicted for each offence, and who are to be the judges of them.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. There is a sense of disgrace in legislating, as we are about to do, for all the details of crime in a state which, as we say, is to be well regulated and will be perfectly adapted to the practice of virtue. To assume that in such a state there will arise some accomplice in crimes as great as any which are ever perpetrated in other states, and that we must legislate for him by anticipation, and threaten and make laws against him if he should arise; in order to deter him, and punish his acts, under the idea that he will arise—this, as I was saying, is in a manner disgraceful. But seeing that we are not like the ancient legislators, who gave laws to demi-gods and sons of Gods, being themselves, according to the popular belief, the offsprings of the Gods, and legislating for others, who were also the children of divine parents, whereas we are only men who are legislating for the sons of men, there is no uncharitableness in apprehending that some one of our citizens may be like a seed which has touched the ox's horn, and have a heart which cannot be softened any more than those seeds can be softened by fire. Among our citizens there may be those who cannot be subdued by all the strength of the laws; and for their sake, though an ungracious task, I will proclaim my first law about
the robbing of temples, in case such a crime should ever be committed. I do not expect or imagine that any well-brought-up citizen will ever take the infection, but their servants, and strangers, and strangers' servants may be guilty of many impieties. And with a view to them especially, and yet not without a provident eye to the weakness of human nature generally, I will proclaim the law about robbers of temples and similar incurable, or almost incurable, criminals. Having already agreed that such enactments ought always to have a short prelude, we may speak to the criminal whom some tormenting desire by night and by day tempts to go and rob a temple, in words of admonition and exhortation:—O sir, we will say to him, the impulse which moves you to rob temples is not an ordinary human malady, nor yet a visitation of heaven, but a madness which is begotten in a man from ancient and unexpiated crimes of his race, destroying him when his time is come;—against this you must guard as well as you can, and how you are to guard I will explain to you. When any such thought comes into your mind, go and perform expiations, go as a suppliant to the temples of the Gods who avert evils, go to the society of those who are called good men among you; hear them tell and yourself try to repeat after them, that every man should honour the noble and the just. Fly from the company of the wicked—fly and turn not back; and if your disorder is lightened by these remedies, well and good, but if not, then acknowledge death to be nobler than life, and depart hence.

Such are the preludes which we sing to all who have thoughts of unholy and treasonable actions, and to him who hearkens to them the law has nothing more to say. But to him who is disobedient when the prelude is over, cry with a loud voice—He who is taken in the act of robbing temples, if he be a slave or stranger, shall have his evil deed engraven on his face and hands, and shall be beaten with as many stripes as may seem good to the judges, and be cast naked beyond the borders of the land. And if he suffers this punishment he will probably be corrected and improved; for no penalty which the law inflicts is designed for evil, but always makes him who suffers either better or not so bad. But if any citizen be found guilty of any great or unmentionable wrong, either in relation to the
Gods, or his parents, or the state, let the judge deem him to be incurable, remembering what an education and training he has had from youth upward, and yet has not abstained from the greatest of crimes. The penalty of death is to him the least of evils; and others will be benefited by his example, if he be put away out of the land with infamy. But let his children and family, if they avoid the ways of their father, have glory, and let honourable mention be made of them, as having nobly and manfully escaped out of evil into good. None of them should have their goods confiscated to the state, for the lots of the citizens ought always to continue the same and equal.

Touching the exaction of penalties, when a man appears to have done anything which deserves a fine, he shall pay the fine, if he have anything in excess of the lot which is assigned to him; but more than that he shall not pay. And to secure exactness, let the guardians of the law refer to the registers, and inform the judges of the precise truth, in order that none of the lots may go uncultivated for want of money. But if any one seems to deserve a greater penalty, let him be imprisoned for a time and otherwise dishonoured, unless some of his friends are willing to be surety for him, and liberate him by becoming partners in the fine. And let no one be outlawed for any offence whatever, nor be banished beyond the frontier, but let him receive punishment—death, or bonds, or blows, or degrading posts or positions, or removed to some temple on the borders of the land, or let him pay money penalties, as we said before. In cases of death, let the judges be the guardians of the law, and a court selected by merit from last year’s magistrates. But how the causes are to be brought into court, and the summonses, and manner of proceeding and the like, may be left to the younger generation of legislators to determine; the manner of voting we must determine ourselves.

Let the vote be given openly; but before they come to the vote let the judges sit in order of seniority over against plaintiff and defendant, and let all the citizens who can spare time hear and take a serious interest in listening to such causes. First of all the plaintiff shall make one speech, and then the defendant shall make another; and after the speeches have been made the
eldest judge shall begin to examine the parties, and proceed to make a satisfactory enquiry into what has been said; and after the oldest has spoken, every one shall proceed in order to examine either party as to what he may have said or omitted to say; and he who has nothing more to ask shall pass over the examination to another. And on so much of what has been said as is to the purpose, they shall put the seals of all the judges with their signatures in writing, and place the writings on the altar of Hestia. On the next day they shall meet again, and in like manner put their questions and go through the cause, and again set their seals upon the evidence; and when they have three times done this, and have had witnesses and evidence enough, they shall each of them give a holy vote, after promising by Hestia that they will decide justly and truly to the utmost of their power; and so they shall put an end to the suit.

Next, after what relates to the Gods, follows what relates to the dissolution of the state:—Whoever by promoting a man to power enslaves the laws, and subjects the city to factions, using violence and stirring up sedition contrary to law, him we will deem the greatest enemy of the whole state. But he who takes no part in such proceedings, and yet being the chief magistrate of the state, knowing of them or not knowing of them, by reason of cowardice does not interfere on behalf of his country, such an one we must consider nearly as bad. Every man who is worth anything will inform the magistrates, and bring the conspirator to trial for making a violent and illegal attempt to change the government. The judges of the traitor shall be the same as of the robbers of temples; and let the whole proceeding be carried on in the same way, and the vote of the majority condemn to death. But let there be a general rule, that the disgrace and punishment of the father is not to be visited on the children, except in the case of some one whose father, grandfather, and great-grandfather have successively undergone the penalty of death. Such persons the city shall send away with all their possessions, reserving only and wholly their appointed lot to their original city and country. And out of the citizens who have more than one son of not less than ten years of age, they shall select ten whom
BOOK IX.

their father or grandfather by the mother's or father's side shall appoint, and let them send to Delphi the names of those who are selected, and him whom the God appoints they shall establish as heir of the house which has failed; and may he have better fortune than his predecessors!

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Once more let there be a third general law respecting the judges who are to give judgment, and the manner of conducting suits against those who are tried on an accusation of treason; and as concerning the remaining or departure of their descendants,—there shall be one law for all three, for the traitor, and the robber of temples, and the subverter by violence of the laws of the state. For a thief, whether he steal much or little, let there be one law, and one punishment for all alike; in the first place, let him pay double the amount of the theft if he be convicted, and if he have so much over and above the allotment. If he have not, he shall be bound until he pay the penalty, or persuade him who has obtained the sentence against him to forgive him. But if a person is convicted of a theft against the state, then if he can persuade the city, or if he will pay back twice the amount of the theft, he shall be set free from his bonds.

Cle. What makes you say, Stranger, that a theft is all one; whether the thief may have taken much or little and either from sacred or secular places—and these are not the only differences in thefts:—seeing, then, that they are of many kinds, ought not the legislator to adapt himself to them, and impose upon them entirely different penalties?

Ath. Excellent. I was running on too fast, Cleinias, and you impinged upon me, and brought me to my senses, reminding me of what, indeed, had occurred to my mind already, that legislation was never yet rightly worked out, as I may say in passing:—Do you remember the image in which I likened the men for whom laws are now made to slaves who are doctored by slaves? For of this you may be very sure, that if one of those empirical physicians, who practise medicine without science, were to come upon the gentleman physician talking to his gentle patient, and using the language almost of philosophy—beginning at the beginning of the disease and dis-
coursing about the whole nature of the body, he would burst into a hearty laugh—he would say what most of those who are called doctors always have at their tongue's end:—Foolish fellow, he would say, you are not healing the sick man, but you are educating him; and he does not want to be made a doctor, but to get well.

_Cle._ And would he not be right?

_Ath._ Perhaps he would; and he might remark upon us, that he who discourses about laws, as we are now doing, is giving the citizens education and not laws; that would be rather a telling observation.

_Cle._ Very true.

_Ath._ But we are fortunate.

_Cle._ In what way?

_Ath._ Inasmuch as we are not compelled to give laws, but we may take into consideration every form of government, and ascertain what is best and what is most needful, and how they may both be carried into execution; and we may also, if we please, at this very moment choose what is best, or, if we prefer, what is most necessary—which shall we do?

_Cle._ There is something ridiculous, Stranger, in our proposing such an alternative, as if we were legislators, simply bound under some great necessity which cannot be deferred to the morrow. But we, as I may by the grace of Heaven affirm, like gatherers of stones or beginners of some composite work, may collect a heap of materials, and afterwards, at our leisure, select what is suitable for our intended construction. Let us then suppose ourselves to be at leisure, not of necessity building, but rather like men who are partly providing materials, and partly putting them together. And we may truly say that some of our laws, like stones, are already fixed in their places, and others lie about.

_Ath._ Certainly, in that case, Cleinias, our view of law will be more in accordance with nature. For there is another matter affecting legislators, which I must earnestly entreat you to consider.

_Cle._ What is that?

_Ath._ Divers other persons, and not legislators only, have composed writings and speeches.
Cle. To be sure.

Ath. Shall we give heed rather to the writings of those others,—poets and the like, who either in metre or out of metre have recorded their own notes of life, and not to the writings of legislators, or shall we give heed to them above all?

Cle. Yes; to them above all others.

Ath. And ought not the legislator to have an opinion concerning those who write about the beautiful, the good, and the just, and to teach what they are, and how they are to be pursued by those who intend to be happy?

Cle. Certainly he should.

Ath. And is it disgraceful for Homer and Tyrtaeus and other poets to lay down evil precepts in their writings respecting life and the pursuits of men, but not disgraceful for Lycurgus and Solon and others who were legislators as well as writers? Of all the writings which there are in cities, are not those which relate to laws, when you unfold and read them, found to be by far the noblest and the best, and do not other writings either agree with them, or if they disagree, are they not ridiculous? We should consider whether the laws of states ought to have the character of loving and wise parents, or of tyrants and masters, who command and threaten, and, after writing their decrees on walls, go their ways; and whether, in discoursing of laws, we shall take the gentler view of them which may or may not be attainable, but to which we, at any rate, will show our readiness to give effect, and be prepared to undergo whatever may be the result. And may the result be good, and by the favour of Heaven it shall be good!

Cle. Excellent; let us do as you say.

Ath. Then we will now consider accurately, as we proposed, what relates to robbers of temples, and all kinds of thefts and offences in general; and we must not be annoyed if, in the course of legislation, we have enacted some things, and have not made up our minds about some others; for as yet we are not legislators, but we may be some day. Let us, then, if you please, consider these matters.

Cle. By all means.

Ath. Concerning all principles of honour and justice, let us endeavour to ascertain how far we are consistent with ourselves,
and how far we are inconsistent, acknowledging indeed that our aim is to contradict the majority—and we may note how far the many are inconsistent with one another.

_Cle._ What are the inconsistencies which you observe in us?

_Ath._ I will endeavour to explain. If I am not mistaken, we are agreed that justice and just men and things and actions are all fair, and, if a person were to maintain that just men, even when they are deformed in body, are still perfectly beautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds, no one would say that there was any inconsistency in this.

_Cle._ They would be quite right.

_Ath._ Perhaps; but let us consider further, that even if all things which are just are fair and honourable, there are always passive states deemed by us to be equivalent to the active ones.

_Cle._ And what is the inference?

_Ath._ The inference is, that a just action in partaking of the just partakes also in the same degree of the fair and honourable?

_Cle._ Certainly.

_Ath._ And must not a suffering which partakes of the just principle be admitted to be in the same degree fair and honourable, if the argument is consistently carried out?

_Cle._ True.

_Ath._ But then if we admit suffering to be just and yet dishonourable, and the term 'dishonourable' is applied to justice, will not the just and the honourable disagree?

_Cle._ What do you mean?

_Ath._ A thing not difficult to understand; the laws which have been already enacted would seem to announce principles directly opposed to what we are saying.

_Cle._ To what?

_Ath._ We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that the robber of temples, and he who was the enemy of law and order, might justly be put to death, and we were proceeding to make divers other enactments of a similar nature. But we refrained, because we saw that these inflictions of sufferings are infinite in number and degree, and are, at once, the most just and also the most dishonourable of all sufferings. And if this is true, are not
the just and the honourable at one time all the same, and at another time in the most diametrical opposition?

Cle. Such appears to be the case.

Ath. In this discordant and inconsistent fashion does the language of the many rend asunder the honourable and just.

Cle. Very true, Stranger.

Ath. Then now, Cleinias, let us see how far we are consistent about these matters.

Cle. Consistent in what?

Ath. I think that I have clearly stated in the former part of the discussion, but if I did not, let me now state—

Cle. What?

Ath. That all bad men are always involuntarily bad; and from this I must proceed to draw a further inference.

Cle. What is it?

Ath. That the unjust man may be bad, but that he is bad against his will. Now that an action which is done involuntarily should be voluntary is a contradiction; wherefore he who maintains that injustice is involuntary will deem that the evil-doer does evil involuntarily. I admit therefore that all men do evil involuntarily, and if any contentious or disputatious person says that men are evil-doers against their will, and yet that many do evil willingly, I certainly cannot agree with him. But, then, how can I avoid being inconsistent with myself, if you, Cleinias, and you, Megillus, say to me,—Well, Stranger, and how about legislating for the city of the Magnetes—shall we legislate or not—what do you advise? Certainly we will, I should reply. Then will you determine for them what are voluntary and what are involuntary crimes, and shall we make the punishments greater of voluntary errors and crimes and less for the involuntary; or shall we make the punishment of all to be alike, under the idea that there is no such thing as voluntary crime?

Cle. Very good, Stranger; and what shall we say in answer to these objections?

Ath. That is a very fair question. In the first place, let us—

Cle. Do what?

Ath. Let us remember what has been well said by us already, that our ideas of justice are in the highest degree confused
and inconsistent. Bearing this in mind, let us proceed to ask ourselves once more whether we have discovered a way out of the difficulty. Have we ever determined in what respect these two classes of actions differ from one another? For in all states and by all legislators whatsoever, two kinds of actions have been distinguished—the one, voluntary, the other, involuntary; and they have legislated about them accordingly. But shall this new word of ours, like an oracle of God, be only spoken, and have no explanation or verification? How can a word not understood be the basis of legislation? Impossible. Before proceeding to legislate, then, we must prove that they are two, and what is the difference between them, that when we impose the penalty upon either, every one may understand our proposal, and be able in some way to judge whether the penalty is fitly or unfitly enacted.

Cle. I agree with you, Stranger; for one of two things is certain: either we must not say that all unjust acts are involuntary, or we must show the meaning and truth of this statement.

Ath. Of these two alternatives, the one is quite intolerable—not to speak what I know to be the truth would be to me unlawful and unholy. But if acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary and involuntary, I must endeavour to find some other distinction in them.

Cle. Very true, Stranger; there cannot be two opinions among us upon that point.

Ath. Reflect, then; there are hurts of various kinds done by the citizens to one another in the intercourse of life, affording plentiful examples both of the voluntary and involuntary.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. I would not have any one suppose that all these hurts are injuries, and that injuries are of two kinds,—one, voluntary, and the other, involuntary; for the involuntary hurts are quite as many and as great as the voluntary. And please to consider whether I am right or not in what I am going to say; for I deny, Cleinias and Megillus, that he who harms another involuntarily does him an injury involuntarily, nor should I legislate about such an act under the idea that I am legislating for an involuntary injury. But I should rather say that such a hurt, whether great or small, is not an injury at all; and, on the
other hand, if I am right, when a benefit is wrongly conferred, the author of the benefit may often be said to injure. For I maintain, O my friends, that the mere giving or taking away of anything is not to be described either as just or unjust; but the legislator has to consider whether any one does good or harm to another out of a just principle and intention. On the distinction between injustice and hurt he must fix his eye; and when there is hurt, he must, as far as he can, make the hurt good by law, and save that which is ruined, and raise up that which is fallen, and make that which is dead or wounded whole. And when compensation is given, the law must always seek to win over the doers and sufferers of the several hurts from feelings of enmity to those of friendship.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Then as to unjust hurts (and gains also, supposing the injustice to bring gain), of these we may heal as many as are capable of being healed, regarding them as diseases of the soul, and the cure of injustice will take the following direction——

Cle. What direction?

Ath. When any one commits any injustice, small or great, the law will admonish and compel him either never at all to do the like again, or never voluntarily, or at any rate in a far less degree; and he must in addition pay for the hurt. Whether the end is to be attained by word or action, with pleasure or pain, by giving or taking away privileges, by means of penalties or gifts, or in whatsoever way the law shall proceed to make a man hate injustice, and love or not hate the nature of the just,—this is quite the noblest work of law. But if the legislator sees any one who is incurable, for him he will appoint a law and a penalty. He knows quite well that to such men themselves there is no profit in the continuance of their lives, and that they would do a double good to the rest of mankind if they would take their departure, inasmuch as they would be an example to other men not to offend, and they would relieve the city of bad citizens. In such cases, and in such cases only, the legislator ought to inflict death as the punishment of offences.

Cle. What you have said appears to me to be very reasonable, but will you favour me by stating a little more clearly the difference between hurt and injustice, and the various
complications of the involuntary and voluntary which arise in these cases?

_Ath._ I will endeavour to comply with your request: Concerning the soul, thus much would be generally said and allowed, that one element in her nature is passion; which may be described either as a state or a part of the soul, and is hard to be striven against and contended with, and by irrational force over-turns many things.

_Cle._ Very true.

_Ath._ And pleasure is not the same with passion, but has an opposite power, working by persuasion and by the force of deceit in all things.

_Cle._ Quite true.

_Ath._ A man may truly say that ignorance is a third cause of crimes. Ignorance, however, may be conveniently divided by the legislator into two sorts: there is simple ignorance, which is the source of lighter offences, and double ignorance, which is accompanied by conceit of wisdom; and he who is under the influence of the latter, fancies that he knows all about matters of which he knows nothing. This second kind of ignorance, when possessed of power and strength, will be held by the legislator to be the source of great and monstrous crimes, but when attended with weakness will only result in the errors of children and old men; and these he will treat as errors, and will make laws accordingly for those who commit them, which will be the mildest and most merciful of all laws.

_Cle._ Quite right.

_Ath._ We all of us remark of one man that he is superior to pleasure and passion, and of another that he is inferior to them; and this is true.

_Cle._ Certainly.

_Ath._ But no one was ever yet heard to say that one of us is superior and the other inferior to ignorance.

_Cle._ Very true.

_Ath._ We are speaking of motives which incite men to the fulfilment of their will; although they may often draw an individual in opposite directions at the same time.

_Cle._ Yes, often.

_Ath._ And now I can define to you clearly, and without
ambiguity, what I mean by the just and unjust, according to my notion of them: When anger and fear, and pleasure and pain, and jealousies and desires, tyrannize over the soul, whether they do any harm or not—I call them all injustice. But when the opinion of the best, whatever states or individuals may suppose that to be, has dominion in the soul and orders the life of every man, even if it be sometimes mistaken, yet what is done in accordance therewith, and the principle in individuals which obeys this rule, and is best for the whole life of man, is to be called just; although the action, done in error, is thought by the multitude to be involuntary injustice. Leaving the question of names, about which we are not going to quarrel, and having already delineated three sorts of errors, we may begin by recalling them somewhat more vividly to our memory: One kind was of the painful sort, which we denominate anger and fear?

_Cle._ Quite right.
_Ath._ There was a second class of pleasures and desires, and a third class of hopes, which aimed at true opinion about the best. This latter being further subdivided into three, there arise five kinds of actions, and for these five kinds we will make laws of two kinds.

_Cle._ What are the two kinds?
_Ath._ There is one kind of actions done by violence and in the light of day, and another kind of actions which are done in darkness and with secret deceit, or sometimes both with violence and deceit; the laws concerning these last ought to have a character of severity.

_Cle._ Naturally.
_Ath._ And now let us return from this digression and complete the work of legislation. Laws have been already enacted by us concerning the robbers of the Gods, and concerning traitors; and also concerning those who corrupt the laws for the purpose of subverting the government. A man may very likely commit some of these crimes, either in a state of madness or when affected by disease, or under the influence of extreme old age, or in a fit of childish wantonness, himself no better than a child. And if this be made evident to one of the judges elected to try the cause, on the appeal of the criminal or his advocate, and
he be judged to have been in this state when he committed the offence, he shall simply pay for the hurt which he may have done to another; but he shall be exempt from other penalties, unless he have slain some one, and have on his hands the stain of blood. And in that case he shall go to another land and country, and there dwell for a year; and if he return before the expiration of the time which the law appoints, or even set his foot at all on his native land, he shall be bound by the guardians of the law and shall be the bondsman of the state for two years, and then go free.

Having begun to speak of homicide, let us endeavour to lay down laws concerning every different kind of homicide; and, first of all, concerning violent and involuntary homicides. If any one in an athletic contest, and at the public games, involuntarily kills a friend, and he dies either at the time or afterwards of the blows which he has received; or if the like misfortune happen to any one in war or military exercises, or mimic contests of which the rulers enjoin the practice, whether with or without arms, when he has been purified according to the law brought from Delphi relating to these matters, he shall be innocent. And so in the case of physicians, if their patient die against their will, they shall be held guiltless by the law. And if one slay another with his own hand, but unintentionally, whether he be unarmed or have some instrument or dart in his hand; or if he kill him by giving him food and drink, or by the application of fire or cold, or by suffocating him, whether he do the deed by his own hand, or by the agency of others, he shall be regarded as the agent, and shall suffer the following penalties:—If he kill the slave of another in the belief that he is his own, he shall bear the master of the dead man harmless from loss, or shall pay a penalty of twice the value of the dead man, which the judges shall assess; but they must use purifications greater and more than in the case of those who committed homicide at the games;—what they are to be, the interpreters whom the God appoints shall be authorized to declare. And if a man kills his own slave, when he has been purified according to law, he shall be quit of the homicide. And if a man kills a freeman unintentionally, he shall undergo the same purification as he did who killed the slave. But let him not
BOOK IX.

forget also a tale of olden time, which is to this effect: He who has suffered a violent end, when newly dead, if he has had the soul of a freeman in life, is angry with the author of his death; and being himself full of fear and panic by reason of his violent death, when he sees his murderer walking about in his own accustomed haunts, he is said to become disordered, which disorder of his, aided by the guilty recollection of the other, is communicated by him with overwhelming force to the murderer and his deeds. Wherefore also the doer must avoid the sufferer for the entire period of a year, and must not be found in any of the places that belong to him in the whole country. And if the dead man be a stranger, he shall abstain from the whole country of the stranger during a like period. If any one voluntarily obey this law, the next of kin to the deceased seeing all that has happened shall take pity on him, and make peace with him, and deal with him as he ought. But if any one is disobedient, and either ventures to go to any of the temples and sacrifice unpurified, or will not continue in exile during the appointed time, the next of kin to the deceased shall proceed against him for murder; and if he be convicted every part of his punishment shall be doubled. And if the next of kin do not proceed against the perpetrator of the crime, then the pollution shall be deemed to fall upon his own head;—the sufferer shall call for vengeance upon his kinsman, and he who has a mind to proceed against him may compel him to be absent from his country during five years, according to law. If a stranger involuntarily kill a stranger who is dwelling in the city, he who likes shall prosecute the cause according to the same rules. If he be a metic, let him be absent for a year, or if he be an entire stranger, in addition to the purifica-
tion, whether he slay a stranger, or a metic, or a citizen, he shall be banished for life from the country which is under the dominion of our laws. And if he return contrary to law, let the guardians of the law punish him with death; and let them hand over his property, if he have any, to him who is next of kin to the sufferer. And if he be wrecked, and driven on the coast against his will, he shall take up his abode on the sea-shore, wetting his feet in the sea, and watching for an opportunity of sailing; but if he be brought by land, and
is not his own master, let the magistrate whom he first comes across in the city, release him and send him unharmed over the border.

If any one slays a freeman with his own hand, and the deed be done in passion, in the case of such actions we must begin by making a distinction. For a deed is done from passion either when men suddenly, and without intention to kill, cause the death of another by blows and the like on a momentary impulse, and are sorry for the deed immediately afterwards; or again, when after having been insulted in deed or word, men pursue revenge, and kill a person intentionally, and are not sorry for their deed. And, therefore, we must assume that there are two kinds of homicide, both of them arising from passion, which may be justly said to be in a mean between the voluntary and involuntary; at the same time, they are neither of them anything more than a likeness or shadow of either. He who treasures up his anger, and avenges himself, not immediately and at the moment, but with insidious design, and after an interval, is like the voluntary; but he who does not treasure up his anger, and takes vengeance on the instant, and without malice prepense, approaches to the involuntary; and yet even he is not altogether involuntary, but is only the image or shadow of the involuntary; wherefore about homicides committed in hot blood, there is a difficulty in determining whether in legislating we shall reckon them as voluntary or as partly involuntary. The best and truest view is to regard either, as a likeness only of the voluntary or involuntary. We may, however, divide them accordingly as they are done with or without premeditation. And we make the penalties heavier for those who commit homicide with angry premeditation, and lighter for those who do not premeditate, but smite upon the instant; for that which is like a greater evil should be punished more severely, and that which is like a less evil should be punished less severely: this shall be the rule of our laws.

_Cle._ Certainly.

_Ath._ Let us proceed: If any one slays a freeman with his own hand, and the deed be done in a moment of anger, and without premeditation, let the offender suffer in other respects
as the involuntary homicide would have suffered, undergoing an exile of two years, that he may learn to school his passions. But he who slays another from passion, yet with premeditation, shall undergo the same penalty as the former; and to this shall be added an exile of three instead of two years,—his punishment is to be longer because his passion is greater. The manner of their return shall be on this wise: (and here the law has difficulty in determining exactly; for in some cases the murder which is judged by the law to be worse may really be the less cruel, and he who is judged the less cruel may be really the worse, and may have executed the murder in a more savage manner, whereas the other may have been gentler. But in general the degrees of guilt will be such as we have described them. Of all these things the guardians of the law must take cognizance):—When either of them has completed his term of exile, they shall send twelve judges to the borders of the land; these during the interval shall have been informed of the actions of the criminals, and they shall judge respecting their pardon and reception; and the homicides shall abide by their judgment. But if after they have returned home, either of them in a moment of anger repeats the deed, let him be an exile, and return no more; or if he return, let him suffer as the stranger was to suffer in a similar case. He who kills his own slave shall undergo a purification, but if he kills the slave of another in anger, he shall pay twice the amount of the loss to his owner. And if a homicide is disobedient to the law, and without purification pollutes the agora, or the games, or the temples, he who pleases may bring to trial the next of kin to the dead man for permitting him, and the murderer with him, and may compel the one to exact and the other to suffer a double amount of fines and purifications; and the accuser may himself receive the fine which is imposed by law. If a slave in a fit of passion kills his master, the kindred of the deceased man may do with the murderer (provided only they do not spare his life) whatever they please, and they will be pure; or if he kills a freeman, who is not his master, the owners shall give up the slave to the relatives of the deceased, and they shall be under an obligation to put him to death, but this may be done in any manner which they please. And if (which is a rare occurrence, but does some-
times happen) a father or a mother in a moment of passion slay a son or daughter by blows, or some other violence, they shall undergo the same purification as in other cases, and be exiled during three years; but when they return from exile the wife shall separate from the husband, and the husband from the wife, and they shall never afterwards beget children together, or live under the same roof, or partake of the same sacred rights with those whom they have deprived of a child or of a brother. And he who is impious and disobedient in such a case shall be brought to trial for impiety by any one who pleases. If in a fit of anger a husband kills his wife, or the wife her husband, they shall undergo the same purification, and their term of exile shall be three years. And when he who has committed any such crime returns, let him have no communion in sacred rites with his children, neither let him sit at the same table with them, and the father or son who disobeys shall be liable to be brought to trial for impiety by any one who pleases. If a brother or a sister in a fit of passion kills a brother or a sister, they shall undergo a purification and a year's exile, as was the case with parents who kill their offspring: they shall not come under the same roof, or share in the sacred rites of those whom they have deprived of their brethren, or of their children. And he who is disobedient shall be justly liable to the law concerning impiety, which relates to these matters. If any one is so violent in his passion against his parents, that in the madness of his anger he dares to kill one of them, if the dead man, when dying, of his own accord acquires the murderer, let him undergo the purification which is assigned to those who have been guilty of involuntary homicide, and do as they do, and he shall be pure. But if he be not acquitted, the perpetrator of such a deed shall be amenable to many laws, for he shall be amenable to the extreme punishments for assault, and impiety, and robbing of temples, for he has robbed his parent of life; and if a man could be slain more than once, most justly would he who in a fit of passion has slain father or mother, undergo many deaths. How can he, whom, even in defence of his life, and when about to suffer death at the hands of his parents, no law will allow to kill his father or his mother who are the authors of his being, and whom the legislator will
command to endure any extremity rather than this—how can he, I say, lawfully receive any other punishment? Let death then be the appointed punishment of him who in a fit of passion slays his father or his mother. But if brother kill brother in a civil broil, or under other like circumstances, if the other have begun, and he only defend himself, let him be free from guilt, as he would be if he had slain an enemy. And if a citizen kill a citizen, or a stranger a stranger; or if a stranger kill a citizen, or a citizen a stranger, let him be free from guilt in like manner; and so in the case of a slave who has killed a slave; but if a slave have killed a freeman in self-defence, let him be subject to the same law as he who has killed a father; and let the law about the remission of penalties in the case of parricide apply equally to every other remission. Whenever any sufferer of his own accord remits the guilt of homicide to another, and declares his act to have been involuntary, let the perpetrator of the deed undergo a purification and remain in exile for a year, according to law.

Enough has been said of murders violent and involuntary and committed in passion: we have now to speak of voluntary crimes done with injustice of whatever kind and premeditation, through the influence of pleasures, and desires, and jealousies.

Cle. Very good.

Aith. Let us first speak, as far as we are able, of their number and nature. The greatest cause of them is lust, which gets the mastery of the soul maddened by desire; and this is most commonly found to exist where the passion reigns which is strongest and most prevalent among the mass of mankind: I mean where the power of wealth breeds endless desires of never-to-be-satisfied acquisition, originating in natural disposition, and a miserable want of education. Of this want of education, the false admiration of wealth which is bruited about among Hellenes and barbarians is the cause; they deem that to be the first of goods which in reality is only the third. And in this way they wrong both posterity and themselves, for nothing can be nobler and better than that the truth about wealth should be spoken in all states—namely, that riches are for the sake of the body as the body is for the sake of the soul. They are good, and wealth is intended by nature to be for the
sake of them, and is therefore inferior to them both, and third in order of excellence. This argument teaches us that he who would be happy ought not to seek to be rich, or rather he should seek to be rich justly and temperately, and then there would be no murders in states, which require to be purged away by other murders. But now, as I said at first, avarice is the chiefest cause and source of voluntary homicide, and hence the worst trials arise. A second cause is ambition: this creates jealousies, which are troublesome companions, above all to the jealous man himself, and in a less degree to the chiefs of the state. And a third cause is cowardly and unjust fear, which has been the occasion of many murders. When a man is doing or has done something which he desires that no one should know him to be doing or to have done, he will take the life of those who are likely to inform of such things, if he have no other means of getting rid of them. Let this be said as a prelude concerning crimes in general; and I must not omit to mention a tradition which is firmly believed by many, and has been received from those who are learned in the mysteries; they say that the crime will be punished in the world below, and also that when the perpetrators return to this world they will suffer what they did by a compensation of nature, and end their lives in like manner by the hand of another. If he who is about to commit a crime believes this, and is induced by the prelude to fear such a penalty, there is no need to proceed with the proclamation of the law. But if he will not listen, let the following law be declared and registered against him:—Whoever shall wrongfully and of design slay with his own hand any of his kinsmen, shall in the first place be deprived of legal privileges; and he shall not pollute the temples, or the agora, or the harbours, or any other place of meeting, whether he is forbidden of men or not; for the law, which represents the whole state, forbids him, and always is and will be in the attitude of forbidding him. And he who, being of the kindred of the deceased, whether on the male or female side, does not prosecute the homicide when he ought, and proclaim him an outlaw, shall in the first place be involved in the pollution, and incur the hatred of the Gods, even as the curse of the law stirs up the voices of
men against him; and in the second place he shall be in the power of any one who is willing to inflict retribution on behalf of the dead. And he who wishes to punish him shall observe all the precautionary ceremonies of lavation, and any others which the Gods command in cases of this kind. Let him make proclamation, and then go forth and compel the perpetrator to suffer the execution of justice according to the law. Now the legislator may easily show that these things must be accomplished by prayers and sacrifices to certain Gods, who are concerned with the prevention of murders in states. But who these Gods are, and what should be the true manner of bringing such trials before the God, the guardians of the law, aided by the interpreters, and the prophets, and the God, shall determine, and when they have determined let them carry on the prosecution at law. The cause shall have the same judges who are appointed to decide finally in the case of those who plunder temples. Let him who is convicted be punished with death, and let him not be buried in the country of the murdered man, for this would be shameless as well as impious. But if he fly and will not stand his trial, let him fly for ever; or, if he set foot anywhere on any part of the murdered man's country, let any relation of the deceased, or any other citizen who may first happen to meet with him, kill him with impunity, or bind and deliver him to the archons who determined the suit, that they may put him to death; and let the prosecutor demand surety of him whom he prosecutes; three sureties sufficient in the opinion of the magistrates who try the cause shall be provided by him, and they shall undertake to produce him at the trial. But if he is unwilling or unable to provide sureties, then the magistrates shall take him and keep him in bonds, and produce him at the day of trial. If a man do not commit the murder with his own hand, but has contrived the death of another, and is the author of the deed in intention and design, having his soul not pure of the guilt of murder, and he is dwelling in the city, let him be tried in the same way, except in what relates to the sureties; and also, if he be found guilty, he shall have burial in his native land, but in all other respects this case shall be as the former; and whether a stranger shall kill a citizen, or a citizen a stranger, or a slave a slave, there
shall be no difference as touching the mere intention and the actual performance, except in the matter of sureties; and these, as has been said, shall be required of the actual murderer only, and he who brings the accusation shall bind them over at the time. If a slave be convicted of killing a freeman voluntarily, or of plotting to kill him, let the public executioner take him either to the sepulchre, or to a place at which he can see the sepulchre of the dead, and inflict upon him as many stripes as the person who took him orders, and if he survives, let him put him to death. And if any one kills a slave who has done no wrong, because he is afraid that he may inform of some base and evil deeds of his own, or for some similar reason, in such a case let him pay the penalty of murder, as he would have done if he had slain a citizen. There are things about which it is terrible and unpleasant to legislate, but impossible not to legislate. If, for example, there should be murders of kinsmen, either perpetrated by the hands of kinsmen, or by their contrivance, and out of malice prepense, which may often happen in ill-regulated states, and perhaps even in a country where a man would not expect to find them, we must repeat once more the tale, which we narrated a little while ago, in the hope that he who hears us will be the more disposed to abstain voluntarily on these grounds from murders, which are utterly abominable. For the tale of tradition, whether under this or some other name, has been plainly set forth by priests of old; they have pronounced that the justice which inspects and avenges the blood of kindred, follows the law of retaliation, and ordains that he who has done any murderous act should of necessity suffer that which he has done. He who has slain a father shall himself be slain at some time or other by his children, and if he have slain his mother he shall of necessity take a woman's nature, and lose his life at the hands of his offspring in after ages; for where a family is polluted with blood there is no other purification, nor can the pollution be washed out until the homicidal soul which did the deed has given life for life, and has propitiated and laid to sleep the wrath of the whole family. These are the retributions of Heaven, and by such punishments men should be deterred. But if they are not deterred, and any one should be incited by some fatality to
deprive his father, or mother, or brethren, or children, of life voluntarily and of purpose, for him the earthly lawgiver legis-lates as follows:—There shall be the same proclamations about outlawry, and there shall be the same sureties which have been enacted in the former cases. But in his case, if he be convicted, the servants of the judges and the magistrates shall slay him at an appointed place where three ways meet, and cast him naked out of the city, and all the magistrates on behalf of the whole city shall carry stones, and each of them shall cast a stone upon the head of the dead man, and deliver the city from pollution; and after that, they shall bear him to the borders of the land, and throw him out unburied, according to law. And what shall he suffer who slays him who of all men, as they say, is his own best friend? I mean the suicide, who deprives himself by violence of his appointed share of life, not because the law of the state requires him, nor yet under the compulsion of some painful and inevitable fortune which has come upon him, nor because he has had to suffer from irre- mediable and intolerable shame, but from sloth or want of manliness, imposes upon himself an unjust penalty. For him, what ceremonies there are to be of purification and burial God knows, and about these the next of kin should enquire of the interpreters and of the laws, and do according to their injunc- tions. They who meet their death in this way shall be buried alone, and none shall be laid by their side; they shall be buried ingloriously in the borders of the twelve portions of the land, in such places as are uncultivated and nameless, and no column or name shall mark the place of their interment. And if a beast of burden or other animal cause the death of any one, except in the case of anything of that kind happening in the public contests, the kinsmen of the deceased shall prosecute the slayer for murder, and the wardens of the country, such, and so many as the kinsmen appoint, shall try the cause, and let the beast when condemned be slain by them, and cast beyond the borders. And if any lifeless thing deprive a man of life, except in the case of a thunderbolt or other fatal dart sent from the Gods,— whether a man is killed by lifeless objects falling upon him, or by his falling upon them, the nearest of kin shall appoint the nearest neighbour to be a judge, and thereby acquit himself.
and the whole family of guilt. And he shall cast forth the guilty thing beyond the border, as has been said about the animals.

If a man is found dead, and his murderer be unknown, and after a diligent search cannot be detected, there shall be the same proclamation as in the previous cases, and the same interdict on the murderer; and they shall proceed against him, and announce in the agora, that he who has slain such and such a person, and has been convicted of murder, shall not set his foot in the temples, nor at all in the country of the murdered man, and if he appears and is discovered he shall die, and be cast forth unburied beyond the border. Let us enact this, which shall be one of our laws about murder.

Enough of murder: and now let the cases in and for which the murderer may rightly be deemed pure be recited:—If a man catch a thief coming into his house by night to steal, and he take him and kill him, or if he slay a footpad in self-defence, he shall be guiltless. And any one who does violence to a free woman or a youth, shall be slain with impunity by the injured person, or by his or her father or brothers or sons. If a man find his wife suffering violence, he may kill the violator, and be guiltless in the eye of the law; or if a person kill another in warding off death from his father or mother or children or brethren or wife who are doing no wrong, he shall assuredly be guiltless.

Thus much as to the nurture and education of the living soul of man, having which, he can, and without which, if he unfortunately be without them, he cannot live; and also concerning the punishments which are to be inflicted for violent deaths, let thus much be enacted. Of the nurture and education of the body we have spoken before, and now we have to speak of deeds of violence, voluntary and involuntary, which men do to one another; these we will now distinguish according to their nature and number, and determine what will be the suitable penalties of each; assigning them their proper place in the series of our enactments. The poorest legislator will have no difficulty in determining that wounds and mutilations arising out of wounds should follow next in order after deaths. Let wounds be divided as homicides were divided—into those which
are involuntary, and which are given in passion or from fear, and those which are voluntary and premeditated acts. Concerning all this, we must make some such proclamation as the following:—Mankind must have laws, and conform to them, or their life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast. And the reason of this is that no man's nature is able to know what is best for the social state of man; or knowing, always able to do what is best. In the first place, there is a difficulty in apprehending that the true art of politics is concerned, not with private but with public good;—for public good binds together states, but private only distracts them,—nor do men always see that the gain is greater both to the individual and the state, when the state and not the individual is first considered. In the second place, even if a person know as a matter of science that this is the truth, but is possessed of absolute and irresponsible power, he will never be able to abide in this principle or to persist in regarding the public good as primary in the state, and the private good as secondary. Human nature will be always drawing him into avarice and selfishness, avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and will bring these to the front, obscurring the juster and better; and so working darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him and the whole city. For if a man were born so divinely gifted that he could naturally apprehend the truth, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no law or order which is above knowledge, nor can mind, without impiety, be deemed the subject or slave of any man, but rather the lord of all. I speak of mind, true and free, and in harmony with nature. But then there is no such mind anywhere, or at least not much; and therefore we must choose law and order, which are second best. Yet these look at things as they exist for the most part only, and are unable to survey the whole of them. And therefore we make laws.

And now we will determine what penalty he ought to pay or suffer who has hurt or wounded another. Any one may easily imagine the questions which have to be asked:—What did he wound, or whom, or how, or when? for there are innumerable particulars of this sort which greatly vary from one another. And to allow courts of law to determine all
these things, or not to determine any of them, is alike impossible. There is one particular which they must determine in all cases—the question of fact. And then, again, that the legislator should not permit them to determine what punishment is to be inflicted in any of these cases, but should himself decide about all of them, small or great, is next to impossible.

Cle. Then what is to be the inference?

Ath. The inference is, that some things should be left to courts of law; others the legislator must decide for himself.

Cle. And what ought the legislator to decide, and what ought he to leave to the courts of law?

Ath. I may reply, that in a state in which the courts are bad and mute, and decide causes secretly and clandestinely; or what is worse, when they are disorderly and noisy, as in a theatre, clapping or hooting in turn this or that orator—I say that then there is a very serious evil, which affects the whole state. Unfortunate is the necessity of having to legislate for such courts, but where the necessity exists, the legislator should only allow them to ordain the penalties for the smallest offences; if the state for which he is legislating be of this character, he must take most matters into his own hands and speak distinctly. But when a state has good courts, and the judges are well trained and scrupulously tested, the determination of the penalties or punishments which shall be inflicted on the guilty may fairly and with advantage be left to them. And we are not to be blamed for not legislating concerning all that large class of matters which judges far worse educated than our's would be able to determine, assigning to each offence the due proportion of wrong done and suffered. They are best able to judge, and therefore to them the greater part may be left. At the same time, as I have often said, we should exhibit to the judges, as we have done, the outline and form of the punishments to be inflicted, and then they will not transgress the just rule. That was an excellent practice, which we observed before, and now that we are resuming the work of legislation, may with advantage be repeated by us.

Let the enactment about wounding be in the following terms: If any one has a purpose and intention to slay another who is not his enemy, and whom the law does not permit him to slay,
and he wounds him, but is unable to kill him, he who had the intent and has wounded him is not to be pitied—he should be regarded as a murderer and be tried for murder. Still having respect to the fortune which has in a manner favoured him, and to the providence who in pity to him and to the wounded man saved the one from a fatal blow, and the other from an accursed fate and calamity—as a thank-offering to this deity, and in order not to oppose his will—in such a case the law will remit the punishment of death, and only compel the offender to emigrate to a neighbouring city during his life; where he shall remain in the enjoyment of all his possessions. But if he have injured the wounded man, he shall make such compensation for the injury as the court deciding the cause shall assess, and the same judges shall decide who would have decided if the man had died of his wounds. And if a child intentionally wound his parents, or a servant his master, death shall be the penalty. And if a brother or a sister intentionally wound a brother or a sister, and is found guilty, death shall be the penalty. And if a husband wound a wife, or a wife a husband, with intent to kill, let him or her undergo perpetual exile; if they have sons or daughters who are still young, the guardians shall take care of their property, and have charge of the children as orphans. If their sons are grown up, they shall be under no obligation to support the exiled parent, but they shall possess the property themselves. And if he who meets with such a misfortune has no children, his kindred to the degree of sons of cousins of the exiled man, both on the male and female side, shall meet together, and after consulting with the guardians and the priests, shall appoint a 5040th citizen to be the heir of the house, considering and reasoning that no house of all the 5040 belongs to the inhabitant or to the whole family, but is the public and private property of the state. Now, the state should seek to have its houses as holy and happy as possible. And if any one of the houses be unfortunate, and stained with impiety, and the heir leave no posterity, and dies unmarried, or married and childless, having suffered death as the penalty of murder or some other crime committed against the Gods or against his fellow-citizens, of which death is the penalty distinctly laid down in the law;
or if any of the citizens be in perpetual exile, and also childless, that house shall first of all be purified and undergo expiation according to law; and then let the kinsmen of the house, as we were just now saying, and the guardians of the law, meet and consider what family there is in the state which is of the highest repute for virtue and also for good fortune, in which there are a number of sons; and let them adopt one of them, and introduce him to the father and forefathers of the dead man, and call him their son, for the sake of the omen, that he may be the continuer of their family, the keeper of their hearth, and the minister of their sacred rites with better fortune than his father had; and when they have made this supplication, they shall make him heir according to law, and the offending person they shall leave nameless and childless and portionless when calamities such as these overtake him.

Now, there is not in all things a limit which touches limit; many things have a common boundary which is betwixt and between them; and we were saying that what is done from passion is of this nature, and is in a mean between the voluntary and involuntary. If a person be convicted of having inflicted wounds in a passion, in the first place he shall pay twice the amount of the injury, if the wound be curable, or, if incurable, four times the amount of the injury; or if the wound be curable, and at the same time cause great and notable disgrace to the wounded person, he shall pay fourfold. And whenever any one in wounding another injures not only the sufferer, but also the city, and makes him incapable of defending his country against the enemy, he, besides the other penalties, shall pay a penalty for the loss which the state has incurred. And the penalty shall be, that in addition to his own times of service, he shall serve on behalf of the disabled person, and shall take his place in war; or, if he refuse, he shall be liable to be convicted by law of refusal to serve. The amount of the injury, whether to be paid twofold or threefold or fourfold, shall be fixed by the judges who convict him. And if, in like manner, a brother wounds a brother, the parents and kindred of either sex, including the children of cousins, whether on the male or female side, shall meet, and when they have judged the cause, they shall entrust the assessment of damages to the parents, as is
BOOK

IX.

449

natural; and if the estimate be disputed, then the arbitrators
on the male side shall make the estimate, or if they cannot,

they shall commit the matter to the guardians of the law. And
similar charges of wounding are brought by children
against their parents, those who are more than sixty years of
age, having children of their own, not adopted, shall be required

when

to decide
and if any one is convicted, they shall determine
whether he ought to die, or suffer some other punishment either
kinsman
79 greater than death, or, at any rate, not much less.
of the offender shall not be allowed to judge the cause, not even
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if

he be of the age which

is

permitted by the law.

If a slave in

of anger wound a freeman, the
up to the wounded man, who

owner of the slave shall give
him
may do as he pleases with
him
if
and
he
do
not
him,
give
up he shall make good the
if
one
that
the slave and the wounded
And
injury.
any
says
man are conspiring together, let him argue the point, and if he
is cast, he shall pay the injury three times over, but if he convict
a

fit

the other two, the freeman who conspired with the slave shall
be liable to be made a slave. And if any one unintentionally
wounds another he shall simply pay for the harm, for no
legislator

shall

In such a case the judges
in the case of

able to control chance.

is

be the same as those who are appointed

children and their parents and they shall estimate the amount
of the injury.
All the preceding injuries and every kind of assault are deeds
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and every man, woman, or

ought to consider
that the elder has the precedence of the younger in honour, both
among the Gods and also among men who would live happily.
of violence

Wherefore
an elder

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it

man

is

child

a foul thing and hateful to the Gods to see
by a younger in the city and it is

assaulted

reasonable that a young

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man when

struck

by an elder should

himself a like
lightly endure his anger, laying up in store for
law
be
the
Let
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honour when he is old.
Every one shall
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reverence his elder in word and deed he shall respect any one
who is twenty years older than himself, whether male or female,
him or her as his father or mother; and he shall
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regarding
abstain from laying hands on any one who is of an age to have
been his father or his mother out of reverence to the Gods who
preside over birth

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from


a stranger, whether he be an old inhabitant or newly arrived; he shall not venture to correct such an one by blows, either as the aggressor or in self-defence. If he thinks that some stranger has struck him out of wantonness or insolence, and ought to be punished, he shall take him to the wardens of the city, but let him not strike him, that he may be kept far away from the possibility of lifting up his hand against a citizen, and let the wardens of the city take the offender and examine him, not forgetting their duty to the God of Strangers, and in case the stranger appear to have struck the citizen unjustly, let them inflict upon him as many blows as he has himself inflicted, and quell his insolence. But if he have done no wrong, then they shall threaten and rebuke the accuser, and let them both go. If a person strike another of the same age or somewhat older than himself, who has no children, whether he be an old man who strikes an old man or a young man who strikes a young man, let him defend himself in the natural way without a weapon and with his hands only. He who, being more than forty years of age, dares to fight with another, whether he be the aggressor or in self-defence, shall be regarded as rude and ill-mannered and slavish;—this will be a disgraceful punishment, and therefore suitable to him. The obedient nature will readily yield to such exhortations, but the disobedient, who heeds not the prelude, shall have the law ready for him. If any man smites another who is older than himself, either by twenty or by more years, in the first place, he who meets him, not being younger than the combatants, or their equal in age, shall separate them, or be disgraced according to law; but if he be the equal in age of the person who is struck or younger, he shall defend the person injured as he would a brother or father or still older relative. Further, let him who dares to smite an elder be tried for assault, as I have said, and if he be found guilty, let him be imprisoned for a period of not less than a year, or for a longer period at the pleasure of the judges. But if a stranger or metic smite one who is older by twenty years or more, the same law shall hold about the bystanders assisting, and he who is found guilty in such a suit, if he be a stranger and not a sojourner, shall be imprisoned during a period of two years; and let him who is a metic and disobeys
the laws be imprisoned for three years, unless the court assign him a longer time of punishment. And let him who was present in any of these cases and did not assist according to law be punished, if he be of the highest class, by paying a fine of a mina; or if he be of the second class, of fifty drachmas; or if of the third class, by a fine of thirty drachmas; or if he be the fourth class, by a fine of twenty drachmas; and the generals and taxiarchs and phylarchs and hipparchs shall form the court in such cases.

Laws are partly framed for the sake of good men, in order to instruct them how they may live on friendly terms with one another, and partly for the sake of those who refuse to be instructed, whose spirit cannot be subdued, or softened, or hindered from plunging into evil. These are the persons who cause the word to be spoken which I am about to utter; for them the legislator legislates of necessity, and in the hope that there may be no need of his laws. He who shall dare to lay violent hands upon his father or mother, or any still older relative, having no fear either of the wrath of the Gods above, or of the punishments that are spoken of in the world below, but transgresses in contempt of ancient and universal traditions as though he were too wise to believe in them, requires some extreme measure of prevention. Now death is not the worst that can happen to men; far worse are the punishments which are said to pursue them in the world below. But although they are most true tales, they work on such souls no prevention; for if they had any effect there would be no slayers of mothers, or impious hands lifted up against parents, and therefore the punishments of this world which are inflicted during life ought not in such cases to fall short, if possible, of the terrors of the world below. Let our enactment then be as follows:—If a man dare to strike his father or his mother, or their fathers or mothers, he being at the time of sound mind, then let any who may be near come to the rescue as has been already said, and the metic or stranger who comes to the rescue shall be called to the first place in the games; but if he do not come he shall suffer the punishment of perpetual exile. He who is not a metic, if he comes to the rescue shall have praise, and if he do not come blame. And if a slave come to the rescue
let him be made free, but if he do not come to the rescue let him receive 100 strokes of the whip, by order of the wardens of the agora, if the occurrence take place in the agora, or if in any place in the city the wardens of the city who are within reach shall punish him; or if in the country then the chief officers of the wardens of the country. But if he who is near at the time be an inhabitant of the land, whether he be a youth, or man, or woman, let him come to the rescue and call upon the impious offender by name; and he who does not come to the rescue shall fall under the curse of Zeus, the God of kindred and of ancestry, according to law. And if any one is found guilty of assaulting a parent, let him in the first place be for ever banished from the city into the country, and let him abstain from all sacred rites; and if he do not abstain, the wardens of the country shall punish him with blows, or in any way which they please, and if he return he shall be put to death. And if any freeman eat or drink, or have any other sort of intercourse with him, or only meeting him has voluntarily touched him, he shall not enter into any temple, nor into the agora, nor into the city, until he be purified; for he should consider that he has become a partaker of a fatal crime. And if he disobey the law, and pollute the city and the temples contrary to law, the magistrate who sees him and does not indict him, shall have to answer for an offence of the worst kind.

If a slave strike a freeman, whether a stranger or a citizen, let any one who is present come to the rescue, or pay the penalty already mentioned; and let the companions of the wounded man bind him, and deliver him up to the injured person, and he receiving him shall put him in chains, and inflict on him as many stripes as he pleases; but having punished him he must surrender him to his master according to law, and not deprive him of his property. Let the law be as follows:—The slave who strikes a freeman, not at the command of the magistrates, his owner shall receive bound from the man whom he has stricken, and not release him until the slave has persuaded the man whom he has stricken that he ought to be released and live. And let there be the same laws about women in relation to women, and about men and women in relation to one another.
And now having spoken of assaults, let us sum up all acts of violence under a single law, which shall be as follows:—No one shall take or carry away any of his neighbour's goods, neither shall he use anything which is his neighbour's without the consent of the owner; for these are the offences which are and have been, and will ever be, the source of all the aforesaid evils. The greatest of them are excesses and insolences of youth, and are offences against the greatest when they are done against religion; and especially great when in violation of public and holy rites, or of those in which tribes and phratries partake; and in the second degree great when they are committed against private rites and sepulchres, and in the third degree (not to repeat the acts formerly mentioned), when insults are offered to parents; the fourth kind of violence is when any one regardless of the authority of the rulers, takes or carries away or makes use of anything which belongs to them, not having their consent; and the fifth kind is when the violation of the civil rights of individual citizens invites retaliation: There should be a common law embracing all these cases. For we have already said in general terms what shall be the punishment of sacrilege, whether fraudulent or violent, and now we have to determine what is to be the punishment of those who speak or act insolently toward the Gods. But first we must give them an admonition which may be in the following terms:—No one ever intentionally did any unholy act, or uttered any unlawful word, retaining a belief in the existence of the Gods, but he must have supposed one of three things,—either that they did not exist,—which is the first possibility, or secondly, that, if they did, they took no care of man, or thirdly, that
they were easily appeased by sacrifices, or turned from their course by prayers.

_Cle._ What shall we say or do to these persons?

_Ath._ My good friend, let us first hear the jests which I suspect that they in their superiority will utter against us.

_Cle._ What jests?

_Ath._ They will make some irreverent speech of this sort: O inhabitants of Athens, and Sparta, and Cnosus, they will reply, in that you speak truly; for some of us deny the very existence of the Gods, while others, as you say, are of opinion that they do not care about us; and others that they are turned from their course by gifts. Now we have a right to claim, as you yourself allowed, in the matter of the laws, that before you are hard upon us and threaten us, you should argue with us and convince us—you should first attempt to teach and persuade us that there are Gods by reasonable evidences, and also that they are too good to be unrighteous, or to be propitiated, or turned from their course by gifts. For when we hear these and the like things said of them by those who are esteemed to be the best of poets, and orators, and prophets, and priests, and innumerable others, the thoughts of most of us are not set upon abstaining from unrighteous acts, but upon doing them and making atonement for them. When lawgivers profess that they are gentle and not stern, we think that they should first of all use persuasion to us, and show us the existence of Gods, if not in a better manner than other men, at any rate in a truer; and who knows but that we shall hearken to them? If then our request is a fair one, please to accept our challenge.

_Cle._ But is there any difficulty in proving the existence of the Gods?

_Ath._ How would you prove their existence?

_Cle._ How? In the first place, the earth and the sun, and the stars and the universe, and the fair order of the seasons, and the division of them into years and months, furnish proofs of their existence; and also there is the fact that all Hellenes and barbarians believe in them.

_Ath._ I am afraid, my sweet friend, though I will not say I am ashamed, of the contempt with which the profane will be likely to assail us. For you do not understand the nature of
their complaint, and fancy that their minds rush into impiety only from a love of sensual pleasure.

*Cle.* Why, Stranger, what other reason is there?

*Ath.* One which you who live in another part of the world would never guess.

*Cle.* What is it?

*Ath.* A very grievous sort of ignorance which is imagined to be the greatest wisdom.

*Cle.* What do you mean?

*Ath.* At Athens there are tales preserved in writing which the virtue of your state, as I am informed, refuses to admit. They speak of the Gods in prose as well as verse, and the oldest of them tell of the origin of the heavens and of the world, and not far from the beginning of their story they proceed to narrate the birth of the Gods, and how after they were born they behaved to one another. Whether these stories have a good or a bad influence, I should not like to be severe upon them, because they are ancient; but I must say that, looking at them with reference to the duties of children to their parents, I cannot praise them, or think that they are useful, or at all true. Of the words of the ancients I have nothing more to say; and I should wish to say of them only what is pleasing to the God. But as to our younger generation and their wisdom, I cannot let them off when they do mischief. For do but mark the effect of their words: when you and I argue for the existence of the Gods, and produce the sun, moon, and stars, claiming for them a divine being, if we would listen to the aforesaid philosophers we should say that they are earth and stones only, which can have no care at all of human affairs, and that all religion is a cooking up of words and a make-believe.

*Cle.* One such teacher, O Stranger, would be bad enough, and you imply that there are many of them, which is worse.

*Ath.* Well, then; what shall we say or do?—shall we assume that some one is accusing us among unholy men, and that they, and not we, are the real defendants in the matter of legislation; they will say of us—How dreadful that we should legislate on the supposition that there are Gods! shall we make a defence? or shall we leave them and return to our laws, lest the preamble

1 Reading λέγομεν.
should become longer than the law? For the discourse will certainly extend to great length, if we are to treat the impiously disposed as they desire, partly arguing with them, as they demand, partly frightening them, or inspiring aversion in them, and then proceed to the requisite enactments.

*Cle.* Yes, Stranger; but then how often have we repeated already that there is no reason why brevity should be preferred to length; for there is nobody to hurry us, and it would be paltry and ridiculous to prefer the shorter to the better. It is a matter of no small consequence, in some way or other to prove that there are Gods, and that they are good, and regard justice more than men. The demonstration of this would be the best and noblest preamble of all our laws. And therefore, without impatience, and without hurry, let us unreservedly consider the whole matter; summoning up all the power of persuasion which we possess.

*Ath.* When I see you thus earnest, I feel impelled to offer up a prayer, and can no longer refrain. Who can be calm when he is called upon to prove the existence of the Gods? Who can avoid hating and abhorring the men who are and have been the cause of this argument; I speak of those who will not believe the words which they have heard as babes and sucklings from their mothers and nurses, repeated by them both in jest and earnest, like charms, who have also heard and seen their parents offering up sacrifices and prayers—sights and sounds delightful to children—sacrificing, I say, in the most earnest manner on behalf of them and of themselves, and with eager interest talking to the Gods, and beseeching them, as though they were firmly convinced of their existence; who likewise see and hear the genuflexions and prostrations which are made by Hellenes and barbarians to the rising and setting sun and moon, in all the various turns of good and evil fortune, not as if they thought that there were no Gods, but as if there could be no doubt of their existence, and no suspicion of their non-existence; when men, knowing all these things, despise them on no real grounds, as would be admitted by all who have any particle of intellig-

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1 The text in this sentence is corrupt; we may read λεγομένοις, or suppose the genitive in construction with ἀκούοντες suggested by the sound of the preceding genitive.
gence, and when they force us to say what we are now saying, how can any one in gentle terms remonstrate with the like of them, when he has to begin by proving to them the very existence of the Gods? Yet the attempt must be made; for it would be unseemly that one-half of mankind should go mad in their lust of pleasure, and the other half in righteous indignation at them. Our address to these lost and perverted natures should not be spoken in passion; let us suppose ourselves to select some one of them, and gently reason with him, smothering our anger:—O my son, we say to him, you are young, and the advance of time will make you reverse many of the opinions which you now hold. Wait, therefore, until the time comes, and do not attempt to judge of high matters at present; and that is the highest of which you think nothing—to know the Gods rightly and to live accordingly. And in the first place let me indicate to you one point which is of great importance, and of the truth of which I am quite certain:—You and your friends are not the first who have held this opinion about the Gods. There have always been persons more or less numerous who have had the same disorder. I have known many of them, and can tell you, that no one who had taken up in youth this opinion, that the Gods do not exist, ever continued in the same until he was old; the two other notions certainly do continue in some cases, but not in many; the notion, I mean, that the Gods exist, but take no heed of human things, and also the notion that they do take heed of them, but are easily propitiated with sacrifices and prayers. What may be the true doctrine, if you are patient, and take my advice, you will hereafter discover, by the help of the legislator and of others. In the meantime take heed lest you offend about the Gods. For the duty of the legislator is and always will be to teach you the truth of these matters.

Cle. Your address, Stranger, thus far, is excellent.

Ath. Most true, Megillus and Cleinias, but I am afraid that we have unconsciously lighted on a strange doctrine.

Cle. What doctrine do you mean?

Ath. The wisest of all doctrines, in the opinion of many.

Cle. I wish that you would speak plainer.

Ath. The doctrine that all things which are or have been or
will be, exist, some by nature, some by art, and some by chance.

Cle. Is not that true?

Ath. Well, philosophers are probably right; at any rate we may as well follow in their track, and examine what is the meaning of them and their disciples.

Cle. By all means.

Ath. They say that the greatest and fairest things are done by nature and chance, and the lesser by art, which receives from nature all the greater and primeval creations, and fashions them in detail; and these lesser works are generally termed artificial.

Cle. What do you and they mean?

Ath. You will understand their meaning better if I take the elements as an example; they mean to say that fire and water, and earth and air, all exist by nature and chance, and not by art, and that as to the bodies which come next in order,—earth, and sun, and moon, and stars,—they are created by the help of these absolutely inanimate existences, and that they are severally moved by chance and some inherent influence according to certain affinities of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, or of soft with hard, and other chance admixtures of opposites which have united of necessity, and that on this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is in the heaven, including animals and all plants, and that all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only; and that art sprang up after these and out of them, mortal and of mortal birth, and produced in play certain images and very partial imitations of the truth, having an affinity to one another, such as music and painting create and their companion arts. And there are other arts which have a serious purpose, and these co-operate with nature, such, for example, as medicine, and husbandry, and gymnastic. And they say that politics co-operate with nature, but in a less degree, and have more of art; also that legislation is entirely a work of art, and is based on assumptions which are not true.

Cle. How do you mean?

Ath. In the first place, my dear friend, they would say that the Gods exist neither by nature nor by art, but only by the
laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made: these, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might, and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine them; and hence arise contentions—the philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others, and not in legal subjection to them.

Cle. What a dreadful picture, Stranger, have you given of young men, and how great is the injury which they inflict on states and families!

Ath. True, Cleinias; but then what should the lawgiver do when this evil is of long standing? should he only rise up in the state and threaten all mankind, declaring that if they will not say and think that the Gods are such as the law ordains (and this may be extended generally to the honourable, the just, and all other important principles which have to do with virtue and vice), he will insist on their actions conforming to the copy which the law gives them; and that he who will not submit to the established religion shall die, or suffer stripes and bonds, or privation of citizenship, or in some cases be punished by loss of property and exile? Should he not rather, when he is making laws for men, at the same time infuse the spirit of persuasion into his words, and mitigate the severity of them as far as he can?

Cle. Why, Stranger, if such persuasion be at all possible, then a legislator who has anything in him ought never to weary of persuading men; he ought to leave nothing unsaid in support of the ancient opinion that there are Gods, and of all those other truths which you were just now mentioning; he ought to support the law and also art, and acknowledge that both alike
exist by nature, or by that which is not inferior to nature, if they are the creations of mind in accordance with right reason, as you appear to me to maintain, and I am disposed to agree with you in thinking.

*Ath.* Yes, my enthusiastic Cleinias; but are not these things when spoken to a multitude hard to be understood, not to mention that they take up a dismal length of time?

*Cle.* Why, Stranger, shall we, whose patience failed not when drinking or music were the themes of discourse, we weary now of discoursing about the Gods, and about divine things? And the greatest help to rational legislation is that the laws when once written down are always at rest; they can be put to the test at any future time, and therefore, if on first hearing they seem difficult, there is no reason for apprehension about them, because any man however dull can understand them, if he go over them often; nor if they are tedious but useful, is there any reason or religion in any man refusing to maintain the principles of them to the utmost of his power.

*Meg.* Stranger, I like what Cleinias is saying.

*Ath.* Yes, Megillus, and we should do as he proposes; for if impious discourses were not scattered, as I may say, throughout the world, there would have been no need of the argument in support of the existence of the Gods—but seeing that they are spread far and wide, such arguments are needed; and who should come to the rescue of the greatest laws, when they are being undermined by bad men, but the legislator himself?

*Meg.* There is no more proper champion of them.

*Ath.* Well, then, tell me, Cleinias, for I must ask you to be my partner,—does not he who talks in this way conceive fire and water and earth and air to be the first elements of all things? these he calls nature, and out of these he supposes the soul to be formed afterwards; and this is not a vague suspicion of his, but he really means and confidently asserts such to be the case.

*Cle.* Very true.

*Ath.* Then, by Heaven, we have discovered the source of this vain opinion of all those physical investigators; and I would have you examine them with the utmost care, for their impiety is a very serious matter; they not only make a bad
BOOK X.

and mistaken use of dialectic, but they lead away the minds of others: that is my opinion of them.

Cle. Very true; but I should like to know how this happens.

Ath. I am afraid that the argument might seem singular.

Cle. Do not hesitate, Stranger; I see that you are afraid of such a discussion carrying you beyond the limits of legislation. But if there be no other way of showing our agreement in the belief of the Gods whom the law is now said to approve, let us take this way, my good sir.

Ath. Then I suppose that I must repeat the singular argument of those who manufacture the soul according to their own impious notions; they affirm that which is the first cause of the generation and destruction of all things, to be not first but last, and that which was last to be first, and hence they have fallen into error about the true nature of the Gods.

Cle. Still I do not understand you.

Ath. Nearly all of them, my friends, seem to be ignorant of the nature and power of the soul, especially in what relates to her origin: they do not know that she is among the first of bodies, and before them all, and is the chief author of their changes and transpositions. And if this is true, and if the soul is older than the body, must not the things which are of the soul's kindred be of necessity before those which appertain to the body?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Then thought and attention and mind and art and law will be prior to that which is hard and soft and heavy and light; and the great and primitive works and actions will be works of art; they will be the first, and after them will come nature and works of nature, which however is a wrong term to apply to them; these will follow, and will be under the government of art and mind.

Cle. But why is the word 'nature' wrong?

Ath. Because those who use the term mean to say that nature is the first creative power; but if the soul turn out to be the primeval element and not fire or air, then in the truest sense and beyond other things the soul may be said to have a natural or creative power: and this would be true if you proved that the soul is older than the body, but not otherwise.
'Cle. You are quite right.

Ath. Shall we, then, take this as the next point to which our attention should be directed?

'Cle. By all means.

Ath. I fear that we may be quite deceived, and that the greenness with which we let the argument escape us, may ludicrously contrast with the ripeness of our ages. Who knows but we may be aiming at the greater, and fail of attaining the lesser? Suppose that we three have to pass a rapid river, and I, being the youngest of the three and experienced in rivers, have the duty thrown upon me of making the attempt first by myself; leaving you in safety on the bank, I am to examine whether the river is passable by older men like yourselves, and if such appears to be the case then I will invite you to follow, and help you across by my knowledge; but if the river is impassable by you, then I shall have had all the danger myself,—does not that seem to be a very fair proposal? I mean to say that the argument in prospect is likely to be too much for you, and out of your depth, and I should be afraid that the stream of my dialectics, giddiness and confusion of mind, and hence a feeling of unpleasantness and unsuitableness might arise. I think therefore that I had better first ask and answer the questions myself while you listen in safety; in that way I can carry on the argument until I have completed the proof that the soul is prior to the body.

'Cle. Excellent, Stranger, and I hope that you will do as you propose.

Ath. Come, then, and if ever we are to call upon the Gods, let us call upon them now in all seriousness to come to the demonstration of their own existence. And so holding fast to the rope we will venture upon the depths of the argument. When questions of this sort are asked of me, my safest answer would appear to be as follows: Some one says to me, 'O Stranger, are all things in rest and nothing in motion, or is the exact opposite of this true, or are some things in motion and others at rest?'—To this I shall reply that some are in motion and others at rest. 'And do not things which move move in a place, and are not the things which are at rest at rest in
'A place?' Certainly. 'And some move or rest in one place and some in more places than one?' You mean to say, we shall rejoin, that those things which rest at the centre move in the same place as when the circumference goes round and the circle is said to be at rest? 'Yes.' And we observe that, in the revolution, the motion which carries round the larger and the lesser circle at the same time is proportionally distributed to greater and smaller, and is greater and smaller in a certain proportion. Here is a wonder which might be thought an impossibility, that the same motion should impart swiftness and slowness in due proportion to larger and lesser circles. Very true. 'And when you speak of bodies moving in many places, you seem to me to mean those which move from one place to another, and sometimes have one centre of motion and sometimes several in the course of their revolutions; and sometimes impinging upon each other they come against bodies which are at rest, and are divided by them, or meeting other bodies which are coming violently from an opposite direction unite with them and interpenetrate them.' I admit the truth of this. Also when they unite they grow, and when they are divided they waste away,—that is, supposing the constitution of each to remain, or if that fails, then there is a second reason of their dissolution. 'And when are all things created and how?' Clearly, they are created when the principle of motion receives increase and attains the second dimension, and from this arrives at the one which is neighbour to this, and after reaching the third becomes perceptible to sense. Everything which is thus changing and moving is in process of generation, and has real existence only when at rest, but when passing into another state is destroyed utterly. Have we not mentioned all the kinds of motion, and by the help of number comprehended them under their kinds with the exception, my friends, of two?

Cle. Which are they?

Ath. Just the two, with which our present enquiry is concerned.

Cle. Speak plainer.

Ath. I suppose that our enquiry has reference to the soul?

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Let us assume that there is a motion able to move other
things, but not to move itself;—that is one kind; and there is another kind which can move itself as well as other things, working in composition and decomposition, by increase and diminution, and generation and destruction,—that is also one of the many kinds of motion?

Cle. Granted.

Ath. And we will assume that which moves other, and is changed by other, to be the ninth, and that which changes itself and others, and has a place in every action and in every passion, and is the true principle of change in all that truly is,—that we shall be inclined to call the tenth.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And which of these ten motions ought we to prefer as being the mightiest and most efficient?

Cle. I must say that the motion which is able to move itself is ten thousand times superior to all the others.

Ath. Very good; but may I make one or two corrections in what I have been saying?

Cle. What are they?

Ath. When I spoke of the tenth sort of motion, that was not quite correct.

Cle. What was the error?

Ath. According to the true order, the tenth was really the first in generation and power; then follows the second, which was improperly termed the ninth by us.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. I mean this: when one thing moves another, and that another, will there be any primary changing element? Can there be, considering that what changes first will always have been changed by another? There cannot. And when the self-moving changes other, and that again other, and thus, thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the self-moving principle?

Cle. Very true, and I quite agree.

Ath. Or, to put the question in another way: If, as most of these philosophers have the audacity to affirm, all things were at rest in one mass, which of the above-mentioned principles of motion would first spring up among them?
Cle. Clearly the self-moving; for there could be no change in them arising out of any external cause, if there had been no previous change in themselves.

Ath. Then we must say that self-motion being the origin and beginning of motion, as well among things at rest as among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. At this stage of the argument let us put a question.

Cle. What question?

Ath. If I were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, or fiery substance, simple or compound—how should we describe it?

Cle. You mean to ask whether we should call the self-moving power life?

Ath. I do.

Cle. Certainly we should.

Ath. And when we see soul in anything, must we not do the same—must we not admit that this is life?

Cle. We must.

Ath. And now, I beseech you, reflect;—you would admit that we have a threefold knowledge of things?

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. I mean that we know the essence, and that we know the definition of the essence, and the name,—these are the three; and there are two more questions which may be raised about anything.

Cle. How two?

Ath. Sometimes a person may give the name and ask the definition; or he may give the definition and ask the name. I may illustrate what I mean in this way——

Cle. How?

Ath. Number like other things is capable of being divided into equal parts; when thus divided, number is termed 'even,' and the definition of the term 'even' is 'number divisible into two equal parts'?

Cle. True.

Ath. I mean to say, that when we are asked about the
definition and give the name, or when we are asked about the name and give the definition—in either case we are dividing number into two equal parts, and the name and definition of 'even' have the same import.

_Cle._ Quite true.

_Ath._ And what is the definition of that which is named 'soul'? Can we conceive of any other than that which has been already given—the motion which is self-moving?

_Cle._ You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-moving is identical with that which we call soul?

_Ath._ Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and moving power of all that is, or has been, or will be, and their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change and motion in all things?

_Cle._ Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things.

_Ath._ And is not that motion which takes place in another, or by reason of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being in truth the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned in the second degree, or in any lower degree which you may prefer?

_Cle._ Very true.

_Ath._ Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, which is the ruler?

_Cle._ Nothing can be more true.

_Ath._ Do you remember our old admission, that if the soul was prior to the body the things of the soul were also prior to those of the body?

_Cle._ Certainly.

_Ath._ Then characters and manners, and wishes and reasonings, and true opinions, and reflections, and recollections are prior to length and breadth and depth and strength of bodies, if the soul is prior to the body.

_Cle._ Of course.

_Ath._ In the next place, must we not of necessity admit that
the soul is the cause of good and evil, base and honourable, just and unjust, and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be the cause of all things?

_Cle._ Certainly.

_Ath._ And as the soul orders and inhabits all things moving every way, must we not say that she orders also the heavens?

_Cle._ Of course.

_Ath._ One soul or more? More than one—I will answer for you; at any rate, we must not suppose that there are less than two—one the author of good, and the other of evil.

_Cle._ Very true.

_Ath._ Yes, very true; the soul then directs all things in heaven, and earth, and sea by her movements, and these are described by the terms—will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion true and false, joy and sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, contentment, and other primary motions akin to these; which again receive the secondary motions of corporate substances, and guide all things to growth and decay, to composition and decomposition, and to the qualities which accompany them, such as heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness, blackness and whiteness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those other qualities which the soul uses, herself a goddess, when truly receiving the divine mind and disciplining all things rightly to their happiness; but when the companion of folly, doing the very contrary of all this. Shall we assume so much, or do we still entertain doubts?

_Cle._ There is no room at all for doubt.

_Ath._ Shall we say then that soul is the nature which controls heaven and earth, and the whole world? Is it the principle of wisdom and virtue, or a principle which has neither wisdom nor virtue? Suppose that we make answer as follows:—

_Cle._ How would you answer?

_Ath._ If, my friend, we say that the whole path of heaven, and the movement of all that is therein, is by nature akin to the movement and revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws, then, as is plain, we must say that the best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good path.

_Cle._ True.
Ath. But when the world moves wildly and irregularly, then the evil soul guides it?

Cle. True again.

Ath. Of what nature is the movement of mind?—Here we are met by a difficulty, and therefore I ought to assist you in framing the answer.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Then let us not answer as if we would look right at the sun, making ourselves darkness from excess of light,—I mean as if we were under the impression that we could see with mortal eyes, or know adequately the nature of mind;—it will be safer to look at the image only.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. Let us select of the ten motions the one which mind chiefly resembles; this I will bring to your recollection, and will then request you to assist me in giving the answer.

Cle. That will be excellent.

Ath. You will surely remember our saying that all things were either at rest or in motion?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And that of things in motion some were moving in one place, and others in more than one?

Cle. That is true.

Ath. Of these two kinds of motion, that which moves in one place must move about a centre after the manner of a top, and is most entirely akin and similar to the circular movement of mind.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. In saying that both mind and the motion which is in one place move in the same and like manner, in and about the same, and in relation to the same, and according to one law and order, and are like the motion of a top, we invented a fair image, which did no discredit to our ingenuity.

Cle. It did us credit.

Ath. And the motion of the other sort which is not after the same manner, nor in the same, nor about the same, nor in relation to the same, nor in one place, nor in order, nor according to any rule or proportion, may be said to be akin to senselessness and folly.
Cle. That is most true.

Ath. Then, after what has been said, there is no difficulty in distinctly stating, that since soul carries all things round, either the best soul or the contrary must of necessity carry round and order and arrange the revolution of the heaven.

Cle. And judging from what has been said, Stranger, there would be impiety in asserting that any but the most perfect soul or souls carries round the heavens.

Ath. You have understood my meaning right well, Cleinias, and now let me ask you another question.

Cle. What are you going to ask?

Ath. If the soul carries round the sun and moon, and the other stars, does she not carry round each individual of them?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Then of one of them let us speak, and the same argument will apply to all.

Cle. Which will you take?

Ath. Every one sees the body of the sun, but no one sees his soul, nor the soul of any other body living or dead; and yet there is great reason to believe that this nature, unperceived by any of our senses, is circumfused around them all, but is apprehended by mind only; and only by reflection do we ascertain what I am about to mention.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. If the soul carries round the sun, we shall not be far wrong in supposing one of three alternatives.

Cle. What are they?

Ath. Either the soul which moves the sun this way and that, resides within the circular and visible body, just as the soul in us carries us about every way; or the soul provides herself with an external body of fire or air, as some affirm, and violently propels body by body; or thirdly, she is without a body, but has some extraordinary and wonderful guiding power.

Cle. Yes, certainly; the soul can only order all things in one of these three ways.

Ath. And this soul of the sun, which is therefore better than the sun, whether taking the sun about in a chariot to give light to men, or acting from without, or in whatever way, ought by every man to be deemed a God.
Cle. Yes, by every man who has the least particle of sense.

Ath. And of the stars too, and of the moon, and the years, and months, and seasons, must we not say in like manner, that since a soul or souls having every sort of excellence are the causes of all of them, those souls are divine, whether they are living beings and reside in bodies, and in this way order the whole heaven, or whatever be the place and mode of their existence;—and will any one who admits all this venture to deny that all things are full of Gods?

Cle. No one, Stranger, would be such a madman.

Ath. And now, Megillus and Cleinias, let us offer an alternative to him who has hitherto denied the existence of the Gods, and leave him.

Cle. What alternative?

Ath. Either he shall teach us that we were wrong in saying that the soul is the original of all things, and arguing accordingly; or, if he be not able to say anything better, then he must yield to us and live for the remainder of his life in the belief that there are Gods: Let us see, then, whether we have said enough or not enough to those who deny that there are Gods.

Cle. Certainly quite enough, Stranger.

Ath. Then to them we will say no more. And now we are to address him who, believing that there are Gods, believes also that they take no heed of human affairs: To him we say, O thou best of men, in believing that there are Gods you are led by some affinity to them, which attracts you towards your kindred and makes you honour and believe in them. But the fortunes of evil and unrighteous men in private as well as public life, which, though not really happy, are wrongly counted happy in the judgment of men, and are sung or spoken of by poets and prose writers, draw you aside from your natural piety. Perhaps you have seen impious men growing old and leaving their children's children in high offices, and their prosperity shakes your faith; you have known or heard or been yourself an eyewitness of many monstrous impieties, and have beheld men by these criminal means from small beginnings reaching the pinnacle of greatness, and considering all these things you do not like to accuse the Gods of them, because they are your
relatives; and so from some want of reasoning power, and also from an unwillingness to find fault with them, you are led to believe that they exist indeed, but have no thought or care of human things. Now, that your present evil opinion may not grow to still greater impiety, and that we may if possible use arguments which may drive away the pollution of error, we will add another argument to that which we addressed to him who utterly denied the existence of the Gods. And do you, Megillus and Cleinias, answer for the young man as you did before; and if there is any difficulty or impediment in the way, I will take the word out of your mouths, and carry you over the river as I did before.

_Cle._ Very good; do as you say, and we will help you as well as we can.

_Ath._ There will surely be no difficulty in proving to him that the Gods care about the small as well as about the great. For he was present and heard what was said, that they are perfectly good, and that the care of all things is most entirely natural to them.

_Cle._ He certainly heard that.

_Ath._ Let us consider together in the next place what we mean by this virtue which we ascribe to them. Surely we should say that to possess mind belongs to virtue, and the contrary to vice?

_Cle._ Certainly.

_Ath._ Yes; and courage is a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice?

_Cle._ True.

_Ath._ And the one is dishonourable, and the other honourable?

_Cle._ To be sure.

_Ath._ And the one, like other meaner things, is a human quality, but the Gods have no part in anything of the sort?

_Cle._ No one will deny that.

_Ath._ But do we imagine carelessness and idleness and luxury to be virtues? What do you think?

_Cle._ Certainly not.

_Ath._ They rank under the opposite class?

_Cle._ Yes.
Ath. And their opposites would fall under the opposite class? 90
Cle. Yes.
Ath. But can we suppose that one who takes care of great and small will be luxurious and heedless and idle, like those whom the poet compares to stingless drones?\(^1\)
Cle. And the comparison is a most just one.
Ath. Surely God must not be supposed to have a nature which he himself hates—and if any one dares to say anything of that sort, he must not be allowed for a moment.
Cle. He must not—of course not.
Ath. Should we not on any principle be entirely mistaken in praising any one who has some special business entrusted to him, if he have a mind which takes care of great matters and no care of small ones? Reflect; he who acts in this way, whether he be God or man, must act from one of two principles.
Cle. What are they?
Ath. Either he must think that the neglect of the small matters is of no consequence to the whole, or if they are of consequence, and he neglects them, his conduct must be attributed to carelessness and indolence. Is there any other way in which his neglect can be explained? For, surely, he will not neglect anything, whether small or great, from any impossibility of taking care of all—or be careless about those things of which an inferior being, who has not the power, whether God or man, might be unable to take care?
Cle. Impossible.
Ath. Now, then, let us examine the offenders, who both alike confess that there are Gods, but with a difference,—the one saying that they may be appeased, and the other that they have no care of small matters: there are three of us and two of them, and we will say to them, In the first place, you both acknowledge that the Gods hear and see and know all things, and that nothing can escape them which is matter of sense and knowledge:—do you admit this?
Cle. Yes.
Ath. And do you admit also that they have all power which mortals and immortals can have?
Cle. They will, of course, admit this also.

\(^1\) Hesiod, Works and Days, v. 307.
**BOOK X.**

*Ath.* And surely we three and they two—five in all—have acknowledged that they are good and perfect.

*Cle.* Assuredly.

*Ath.* But, if they are such as we conceive them to be, can we possibly suppose that they ever act in the spirit of carelessness and indolence? For in us inactivity is the child of cowardice, and carelessness of inactivity and indolence.

*Cle.* Most true.

*Ath.* Then not from inactivity and carelessness is any God ever negligent; for he has no cowardice in him.

*Cle.* That is very true.

*Ath.* Then the alternative which remains is, that if the Gods neglect the lighter and lesser concerns of the universe, they neglect them because they know that they ought not to care about such matters—what other alternative is there but their ignorance?

*Cle.* There is none.

*Ath.* And, O most excellent and best of men, do I understand you to mean that they are ignorant, and do not know that they ought to take care, or that they know and yet like the meanest sort of men, knowing the better, choose the worse because they are overcome by pleasures and pains?

*Cle.* Impossible.

*Ath.* Do not all human things partake of the nature of soul? And is not man the most religious of all animals?

*Cle.* That is certainly true.

*Ath.* And we acknowledge that all mortal creatures are the property of the Gods, to whom also the whole of heaven belongs?

*Cle.* Certainly.

*Ath.* And, therefore, whether a person says that these things are to the Gods great or small—in either case the Gods who own us and who are the most careful and the best of owners, are not likely to neglect us. There is also a further consideration.

*Cle.* What is that?

*Ath.* Sensation and power are in an inverse ratio to each other in respect to their ease and difficulty.

*Cle.* What do you mean?
Ath. I mean that there is greater difficulty in seeing and hearing the small than the great, but more facility in moving them and controlling them and taking care of them than of their opposites.

Cle. Far more.

Ath. Suppose the case of a physician who is willing and able to cure some living thing as a whole,—how will the whole fare at his hands if he takes care only of the greater and neglects the lesser?

Cle. Certainly not well.

Ath. No better would be the result with pilots or generals, or householders or statesmen, or any other class, if they neglected the small and regarded only the great;—as the builders say, the larger stones do not lie well without the lesser.

Cle. Of course not.

Ath. Let us not, then, deem God inferior to human workmen, who, in proportion to their skill, finish and perfect their works, small as well as great, by one and the same art; or that God, the wisest of beings, who is willing and able to extend His care to all things, like a lazy good-for-nothing, wants a holiday, and takes no thought of smaller and easier matters, but of the greater only.

Cle. Never, Stranger, let us admit a supposition about the Gods which is both impious and false.

Ath. I think that we have now said enough to him who charges the Gods with neglect.

Cle. Yes.

Ath. He has been forced to acknowledge that he is in error, but he still seems to me to need some words of consolation.

Cle. What consolation will you offer him?

Ath. Let us say to the youth: 'The ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a view to the preservation and perfection of the whole, and each part has an appointed state of action and passion; and the smallest action or passion of any part affecting the minutest fraction has a presiding minister. And one of these portions of the universe is thine own, stubborn man, which, however little, has the whole in view; and you do not seem to be aware that this and every other creation is for the sake of the whole, and in order that the life of the whole may
be blessed; and that you are created for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of you. For every physician and every skilled artist does all things for the sake of the whole, directing his effort towards the common good, executing the part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part. And you are annoyed because you do not see how that which is best for you is, as far as the laws of the creation admit, best also for the universe. Now, as the soul combining first with one body and then with another undergoes all sorts of changes, either of herself, or through the influence of another soul, all that remains to the player of the game is that he should shift the pieces; sending the better nature to the better place, and the worse to the worse, and so assigning to them their proper portion.

Cle. In what way?

Ath. In a way which may be supposed to make the care of all things easy to the Gods. For if any one were to form or fashion all things without any regard to the whole,—if, for example, he formed a living element of water out of fire, instead of forming many things out of one or one out of many in regular order attaining to a first or second or third birth (cp. Tim. 42 B. C.), the transmutation would have been infinite; but now the ruler of the world has a wonderfully easy task.

Cle. How so?

Ath. I will explain:—When the king saw that our actions had life, and that there was much virtue in them and much vice, and that the soul and body, although not eternal, were, like the Gods of popular opinion, indestructible (for if either of them had been destroyed, there would have been no generation of living beings); and when he observed that the good of the soul was by nature designed to profit men, and the evil to harm them—he, seeing all this, contrived so to place them in each of the parts that their position might in the easiest and best manner procure the victory of good and the defeat of evil in the whole. And he contrived a general plan by which a thing of a certain nature found a certain seat and room. But the formation of qualities he left to the wills of individuals. For every one of us

1 Reading μὴ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον.
2 Reading τοῦ πολοῦ.
is made pretty much what he is by the bent of his desires and
the nature of his soul.

Cle. Yes, that is probably true.

Ath. Then all things which have a soul change, and possess in
themselves a principle of change, and in changing move accord-
ing to law and the order of destiny: lesser changes of nature
move on level ground, but greater crimes sink into the abyss,
that is to say, into Hades and other places in the world below,
of which the very names terrify men, and about which they
dream that they live in them absent from the body. And
whenever the soul receives more of good and evil from her
own energy and the strong influence of others—when she has
communion with divine virtue and becomes divine, she is
carried into another and better place, which is also divine and
perfect in holiness; and when she has communion with evil,
then she also changes the place of her life.

'For that is the justice of the Gods who inhabit heaven.'

O youth or young man, who fancy that you are neglected by the
Gods, know that if you become worse you shall go to the worse
souls, or if better to the better, and in every succession of life
and death you will do and suffer what like may fitly suffer at
the hands of like. This is a divine justice, which neither you
nor any other unfortunate will ever glory in escaping, and which
the ordaining powers have specially ordained: take good heed 99
of them, for a day will come when they will take heed of you.
If you say:—I am small and will creep into the depths of the
earth, or I am high and will fly up to heaven, you are not so small
or so high but that you shall pay the fitting penalty, either in
the world below or in some yet more savage place still whither
you shall be conveyed. This is also the explanation of the fate
of those whom you saw, who had done unholy and evil deeds,
and from small beginnings had become great, and you fancied
that from being miserable they had become happy; and in their
actions, as in a mirror, you seemed to see the universal neglect
of the Gods, not knowing how they make all things work
together and contribute to the great whole. And thinkest
thou, bold man, that thou needest not to know this?—which he

1 Hom. Odyss. xix. 43.
who knows not can never have any true idea of happiness or unhappiness, or say any true word respecting them. If Cleinias and this our reverend company succeed in proving to you that you know not what you say of the Gods, then will God help you; but should you desire to hear more, listen to what we say to the third opponent, if you have any understanding left in you. For I think that we have sufficiently proved the existence of the Gods, and that they have the care of man,—that they are appeased by wicked men, and take gifts is what I will not allow, and what every man should disprove to the utmost of his power.

Cle. Very good; let us do as you say.

Ath. Well, then, by the Gods themselves I conjure you to tell me more about them,—if they are to be propitiated, how are they to be propitiated? Who are they, and what is their nature? Must not the eternal administrators of heaven be at least rulers?

Cle. True.

Ath. And to what earthly rulers can they be compared, or who to them? How in the less can we find an image of the greater? Are they charioteers of contending pairs of steeds, or pilots of vessels? Perhaps they might be compared to the generals of armies, or they might be likened to physicians providing against the strife of bodily disease, or to husbandmen observing anxiously the effects of the seasons or the growth of plants; or perhaps to shepherds of flocks. For as we acknowledge the heaven to be full of many goods and also of evils, and of more evils than goods, there is, as we affirm, an immortal conflict going on among us, which requires marvellous watchfulness; and in that conflict the Gods and demigods are our allies, and we are their property. Injustice and insolence and folly are the destruction of us, and justice and temperance and wisdom are the salvation of us; and the place of these latter is in the life of the Gods, and of their virtues some vestige may occasionally be discerned among mankind. But upon this earth there dwell souls who have an unjust spirit1, and they, like brute animals, fawn upon their keepers, who may be dogs

1 Reading λημα.
or shepherds, or may be the best and most perfect masters; and upon these, as the wicked declare, they prevail by flattery and prayers and incantations, and are allowed to make their gains with impunity. And this sin, which is termed dishonesty, is an evil of the same kind as what is termed disease in living bodies or blight in the seasons, and in cities and governments has another name, which is injustice.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. What else can he say who declares that the Gods are always lenient to the doers of unjust acts, if they divide the spoil with them? As if wolves were to toss a portion of their prey to the dogs, and they, mollified by the gift, suffered them to tear the flocks. Must not he who maintains that the Gods are to be propitiated argue thus?

Cle. Precisely so.

Ath. And to which of the above-mentioned classes of guardians would any man compare the Gods without absurdity? Will he say that they are like pilots, who are themselves turned away from their duty by draughts of wine and the savour of fat, and at last overturn both ship and sailors?

Cle. Certainly not.

Ath. And surely they are not like charioteers who are bribed to give up the victory to other chariots?

Cle. That would be a fearful image of the Gods.

Ath. Nor are they like generals, or physicians, or husbandmen, or shepherds; and no one would compare them to dogs who have been silenced by wolves.

Cle. A thing not to be spoken of.

Ath. And are not all the Gods the chiefest of all guardians, and do they not guard our highest interests?

Cle. Yes; the chiefest.

Ath. And shall we say that those who guard our noblest interests, and are the best of guardians, are inferior in virtue to dogs, and to men even of moderate excellence, who would never betray justice, for the sake of gifts which unjust men impiously offer them?

Cle. Certainly not; nor is such a notion to be endured, and he who holds this opinion may be fairly singled out and
characterized as of all impious men the wickedest and most impious.

Ath. Then are the three assertions—that the Gods exist, and that they take care of men, and that they will not be entreated to injustice, now sufficiently demonstrated? May we say that they are?

Cle. You have our entire assent to your words.

Ath. I have spoken with vehemence because I was jealous of evil men; and I will tell you, dear Cleinias, why I am so. I would not have the wicked suppose that they, having the superiority in argument, may do as they like in accordance with their various imaginations about the Gods; and this zeal has led me to speak more vehemently; but if we have at all succeeded in persuading the men to hate themselves and love their opposites, the preamble of our laws about impiety will not have been spoken in vain.

Cle. So let us hope; and even if we have failed, the style of our argument will not discredit the lawgiver.

Ath. After the preamble shall follow a discourse, which will be the interpreter of the law; this shall proclaim to all impious persons that they must depart from their ways and go over to the pious. And to those who disobey, let the law about impiety be as follows:—If a man is guilty of any impiety in word or deed, any one who happens to be present shall give information to the rulers, in aid of the law; and let the rulers who receive the information bring them before the appointed court according to the law; and if the magistrate, after receiving information, refuses to act, he shall be tried for impiety at the instance of any one who is willing to vindicate the laws; and if he be cast, the court shall estimate the punishment of each act of impiety; and let all such criminals be imprisoned. There shall be three prisons in the state: the first of them is to be the common prison in the neighbourhood of the agora for the safe-keeping of the generality of offenders; another is to be in the neighbourhood of the nocturnal council, and is to be called the ‘house of reformation’; another, to be situated in some wild and desolate region in the centre of the country, shall be called by some name expressive of retribution. Now, men fall into impiety from three causes, which have been
already mentioned, and from each of these causes arise two sorts of impiety, in all six, requiring judicial decision, but differing greatly in their degrees of guilt. For he who does not believe in the gods, and yet has a righteous nature, hates the wicked and dislikes and refuses to do injustice, and avoids unrighteous men, and loves the righteous. But they who besides believing that the world is devoid of Gods are intemperate, and have at the same time good memories and quick wits, are worse; although both of them are unbelievers, much less injury is done by the one than by the other. The one may talk loosely about the Gods and about sacrifices and oaths, and perhaps by laughing at other men he may make them like himself, if he be not punished. But the other unbeliever, who has ability, is full of stratagem and deceit—men of this class are prophets and jugglers of all kinds, and out of their ranks sometimes come tyrants and demagogues and generals and hierophants of private mysteries and the ingenuities of so-called Sophists. There are many kinds of unbelievers, but two only for whom legislation is required; one the hypocritical sort, whose crime is deserving of death many times over, while the others need only bonds and admonition. In like manner also the notion that the Gods take no thought of men produces two other sorts of crimes, and the notion that they may be propitiated produces two more. Assuming these divisions, let those who have been made what they are only from want of understanding, and not from malice or an evil nature, be placed by the judge in the house of reformation, and ordered to suffer imprisonment during a period of not less than five years. And in the meantime let them have no intercourse with the other citizens, except with members of the nocturnal council, and with them let them converse touching the improvement of their souls' health. And when the time of their imprisonment has expired, if any of them be of sound mind let him be restored to sane company, but if not, and if he be condemned a second time, let him be punished with death. As to that class of monstrous natures who not only believe that there are no Gods, or that they are negligent, or to be propitiated, but conjure the souls of the living and say that they can conjure the dead and promise to charm the Gods with sacrifices and prayers, and will utterly
overthrow whole houses and states for the sake of money—let him who is guilty of any of these things be condemned by the judge to be bound according to law in the prison which is in the centre of the land, and let no freeman ever approach him, but let him receive the rations of food appointed by the magistrates from the hands of slaves; and when he is dead let him be cast out of the borders unburied, and if any freeman assist in burying him let him pay the penalty of impiety to any one who is willing to bring a suit against him. But if he leaves behind him children who are fit to be citizens, let the guardians of orphans take care of them, just as they would of any other orphans, from the day on which their father was convicted.

In all these cases there should be one law, which will make men in general less liable to transgress in word or deed, and less foolish, because they will not be allowed to practise religious rites contrary to law. And let this be the simple form of the law:—No man shall have sacred rites in a private house. But when he is disposed to sacrifice, let him place his offerings in the hands of the priests and priestesses, who have under their care the holy rite, and let him pray himself, and let any one who pleases join with him in prayer. The reason of this is as follows:—Gods and temples are not easily established, and to establish them rightly is the work of a mighty intellect. And women especially, and men too, when they are sick or in danger, or in any sort of difficulty, or again on their receiving any good fortune, have a way of consecrating the occasion, offering up prayers and sacrifices, and promising statues to Gods, demigods, and sons of Gods; and when they are awakened by terrible apparitions, and have dreams or remember visions, they find in altars and temples the remedies of them, and will fill every house and village with them, placing them in the open air or in any chance place; and with a view to all these cases we should act as the law enacts. The law has also regard to the impious, and would not have them fancy that by the secret performance of these actions—by raising temples and altars in private houses, they can propitiate the God secretly with sacrifices and prayers, while they are really multiplying their crimes infinitely, bringing guilt from heaven upon themselves, and also upon those who permit them, and who
are better men than they are; and the consequence is that the whole state reaps the fruit of their impiety, which, in a certain sense, is deserved: assuredly God will not blame the legislator.

Let this, then, be the language of the law:—No one shall possess shrines of the Gods in private houses, and he who is found to possess them, and perform any sacred rites not publicly authorized,—supposing the offender to be some man or woman who is not guilty of any other great and impious crime,—shall be informed against by him who is acquainted with the fact, which shall be announced by him to the guardians of the law; and let them issue orders that he or she shall carry away his private rites to the public temples, and if they do not persuade them, let them inflict a penalty on them until they comply. And if a person be proven guilty of impiety, not merely from childish levity, but such as grown-up men may be guilty of, whether he have sacrificed publicly or privately to any Gods, let him be punished with death, for his sacrifice is impure. Whether the deed has been done in earnest, or only from childish levity, let the guardians of the law determine, before they prosecute the offender for impiety.
BOOK XI.

In the next place, dealings between man and man require to be suitably regulated. The principle of them is very simple: Thou shalt not touch that which is mine, if thou canst help, or remove the least thing which belongs to me without my consent; and may I, being of sound mind, do to others as I would that they should do to me. First, let us speak of treasure-trove: May I never pray the Gods to find the hidden treasure, which a man has laid up for himself and his family, he not being one of my ancestors, nor lift, if I should find, such a treasure. And may I never have any dealings with the diviners, as they are called, who in any way or manner counsel me to take up the deposit entrusted to the earth, for I should not gain so much in the increase of my possessions, if I take up the prize, as I should grow in justice and virtue of soul, if I abstain; and this will be a better possession to me than the other in a better part of myself; for the possession of justice in the soul is preferable to the possession of wealth. And of many things it is well said,—'move not the immovables,' and this may be truly regarded as one of them. And we shall do well to believe the common tradition which says, that such deeds prevent a man from having a family. Now, as to him who is careless about having children and regardless of the legislator, taking up that which neither he deposited, nor any ancestor of his, without the consent of the depositor, violating the simplest and noblest of laws which was the enactment of no mean man: 'Take not up that which you have not laid down,'—of him, I say, who despises these two legislators, and takes up, not some small matter which he has
not deposited, but perhaps a great heap of treasure, what he ought to suffer at the hands of the Gods, God only knows; but I would have the first person who sees him go and tell the wardens of the city, if the occurrence has taken place in the city, or if the occurrence has taken place in the agora he shall tell the wardens of the agora, or if in the country he shall tell the wardens of the country and their officers. When information has been received they shall send to Delphi, and, whatever the God answers about the money and the remover of the money, that the city shall do in obedience to the oracle; the informer, if he be a freeman, shall have the honour of doing rightly, or if he inform not, the dishonour of doing wrongly; and if he be a slave who gives information, let him be freed, as he ought to be, by the state, which shall give his master the price of him; but if he do not inform he shall be punished with death. Next in order shall follow a similar law, which shall apply equally to matters great and small: If a man happens to leave behind him some part of his property, whether intentionally or unintentionally, let him, who may meet with the left property, suffer it to remain, reflecting that such things are under the protection of the Goddess of ways, and are dedicated to her by the law. But if any one defies the law, and takes the property home with him, let him, if he be a slave of little worth, be beaten with many stripes by him who meets him, being a person of not less than thirty years of age. Or if he be a freeman, in addition to being thought a mean person and despiser of the laws, let him pay ten times the value of the treasure which he has moved to the leaver. And if some one accuses another of having anything which belongs to him, whether little or much, and the other admits that he has this thing, but says that the property in dispute belongs to him, if the property be registered with the archons according to law, the claimant shall summon the possessor, who shall appear before the magistrates; and when the matter is cleared up, if it be registered in the public registers, to which of the litigants it belonged, let him take it and go his way. Or if the property be registered as belonging to some one who is not present, whoever will give sufficient surety on behalf of the absent person that he will give it up to him, let him take it away as the representative of the other.
BOOK XI.

But if the property which is deposited be not registered with the archons, let it remain until the time of trial with three of the eldest of the archons; and if that for which bail is given be an animal, then he who loses the suit shall pay the archons for its keep, and the archons shall determine the cause within three days.

Any one who is of sound mind may carry off his own slave, and do with him whatever he will of such things as are lawful; and he may carry off the runaway slave of any of his friends or kindred with a view to his safe-keeping. And if any one takes away him who is being carried off as a slave, intending to liberate him, he who is carrying him off shall let him go; but he who takes him away shall give three sufficient sureties; and if he give them, and not without giving them, he may take him away, but if he take him away after any other manner he shall be guilty of violence, and being convicted shall pay double the penalty of the loss to him from whom he has taken the slave. Let him also carry off the freedman, if he do not pay respect or not sufficient respect to him who freed him. Now the respect shall be, that the freedman go three times in the month to the house of the person who freed him, and offer to do whatever he can and ought to do, and he shall agree to make such a marriage as his former master pleases. He shall not be permitted to have more property than he who gave him liberty, and what more he has shall belong to his master. The freedman shall not remain in the state more than twenty years, but like other foreigners shall go away, taking his entire property with him, unless he have the consent of the magistrates and of his former master to remain. If a freedman or any other stranger have a property greater than the census of the third class, at the expiration of thirty days from the day on which this comes to pass, he shall take that which is his and go his way, and in this case he shall not be allowed to remain any longer by the archons. And if any one disobeys this regulation, and is brought into court and convicted, he shall be punished with death, and his property shall be confiscated. Suits about these matters shall take place before the tribes, unless the plaintiff and defendant have got rid of the accusation either before their neighbours or before arbitrators. If a man lay claim to any
animal or anything else which he declares to be his, let him who
is the possessor refer to some honest and trustworthy person,
who has sold or given, or in some legitimate way made over the
property to him; if he be a citizen or a metic, sojourning in the
city, within thirty days, or, if the property have been delivered to
him by a stranger, within five months, of which the middle
month shall be the summer solstice. When goods are exchanged
by selling and buying, a man shall deliver them, and receive
the price of them, at a fixed place in the agora, and have done
with the matter; but he shall not buy or sell anywhere else,
nor give credit. And if in any other manner or in any other
place there be an exchange of one thing for another, and the
seller with whom he is dealing give him credit, he must do this
on the understanding that the law gives no protection in cases of
things sold not in accordance with these regulations. Again, as
to contributions, any man who likes may go about collecting
contributions as a friend with friends, but if any difference arises
about the collection, he is to act on the understanding that the
law gives no protection in such cases. He who sells anything
up to the value of fifty drachmas shall be required to remain in
the city for ten days, and the purchaser shall be informed of the
house of the seller, with a view to the sort of charges which are
apt to arise in such cases, and the restitutions which the law
allows. And let legal restitution be on this wise: If a man
sells a slave who is in a consumption, or who has the disease of
the stone, or of strangury, or epilepsy, or some other tedious and
incurable disorder of body or mind, which is not discernible to
the ordinary man, if the purchaser be a physician or trainer, he
shall have no right of restitution; nor shall there be any right of
restitution if the seller has told the truth beforehand to the
buyer. But if a skilled person sells to another who is not
skilled, let the buyer appeal for restitution within six months,
except in the case of epilepsy, and then the appeal may be
made within a year, and shall be determined by such physicians
as the parties may agree to choose; and he who loses the suit
shall pay double the price at which he sold. If a private person
sell to another private person, he shall have the right of resti-
tution, and the decision shall be given as before, but he who
loses the suit shall only pay back the price of the slave. If a
person sells a homicide to another, and they both know of the
fact, let there be no restitution in such a case, but if he do not
know of the fact, there shall be a right of restitution, whenever
the buyer makes the discovery; and the decision shall rest with
five of the youngest guardians of the law, and if the decision be
that the seller was cognisant of the fact, he shall purify the
house of the purchaser, according to the law of the interpreters,
and shall pay back three times the purchase-money.

He who exchanges either money for money, or anything
whatever for anything else, either with or without life, let
him give and receive them genuine and unadulterated, in
accordance with the law. And let us have a preamble about
all this sort of roguery, like the preambles of our other laws.
Every man should regard adulteration as a particular kind of
falsehood, concerning which the many are too fond of saying
that at proper times the practice may often be right. But
they leave the time and place and occasion undefined and
unregulated, and from this want of definiteness in their lan-
guage they do a great deal of harm to themselves and to others.
Now, a legislator ought not to leave the matter undefined;
he ought to prescribe some limit, either greater or less. Let
this, then, be the limit prescribed: No one shall call the Gods
to witness, when he says or does anything false or deceitful
or dishonest, unless he would be the most hateful of mankind
to them. And he is most hateful to them who takes a false
oath, and never thinks of the Gods; and in the second place,
he who tells a falsehood in the presence of his superiors. Now,
better men are the superiors of worse men, and in general elders
are the superiors of the young; wherefore also parents are the
superiors of their children, and men of women and children, and
rulers of their subjects; for all men ought to reverence any one
who is in any position of authority, and especially those who are
in state offices. And this is the reason why I have spoken of
these matters. For every one who is guilty of adulteration in the
agora tells a falsehood, and deceives, and when he invokes the
Gods, according to the customs and cautions of the wardens
of the agora, he is perjured, and has no respect either for God
or man. Certainly, it is an excellent rule not lightly to profane
the names of the Gods, after the fashion of men in general,
who care little about piety and purity in their actions. But if a man will not conform to this rule, let the law be as follows:—

He who sells anything in the agora shall not ask two prices of that which he sells, but he shall ask one price, and if he do not obtain this, he shall take away his goods; and on that day he shall not value them, either at more or less; and there shall be no praising of any goods, or oath taken about them. If a person disobeys this command, any citizen who is present, not being less than thirty years of age; may chastise and beat the swearer, and he shall be guiltless, but if he takes no heed and disobeys, he shall be liable to the charge of having betrayed the laws. If a man sell any adulterated goods and will not obey these regulations, he who knows and can prove the fact, and does prove it in the presence of the magistrates, if he be a slave or a metic, shall have the adulterated goods; but if he be a citizen, and do not prove it, he shall be disgraced and deemed to have robbed the Gods of the agora; or if he prove the charge, he shall dedicate the goods to the Gods of the agora. He who is proved to have sold any adulterated goods, in addition to losing the goods themselves, shall be beaten with stripes,—a stripe for a drachma, according to the price of the goods; and the herald shall proclaim in the agora the offence for which he is going to be beaten. The wardens of the agora and the guardians of the law shall obtain information from experienced persons about the rogueries and adulterations of the sellers, and shall write up what the seller ought and ought not to do in each case; and let them inscribe their laws on a column in front of the court of the agora, that they may be clear instructors of those who have business in the agora. Enough has been said in what has preceded about the wardens of the city, and if anything seems to be wanting, let them communicate with the guardians of the law, and write down the omission, and place on a column in the court of the city the first and second regulations which are laid down for them about their office.

After the practices of adulteration naturally follow practices of retail trade. Concerning these, we will first of all give a word of counsel and reason, and the law shall come afterwards. Retail trade in a city is not by nature intended to do any harm, but quite the contrary; for is not he a benefactor who
reduces the inequalities and immeasurabilities of goods to equality and measure? And this is what the power of money accomplishes, and the merchant may be said to be appointed for this purpose. The hireling and the tavern-keeper, and many other occupations, some of them more and others less seemly—all alike have this object;—they seek to satisfy our needs and equalize our possessions. Let us then endeavour to see what is the accusation brought against retail trade, and wherein lies the dishonour and unseemliness of it in order that if not entirely we may yet partially remove the objection by law. To effect this is no easy matter, and implies a great deal of virtue.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. Dear Cleinias, the class of men is small—they must have been rarely gifted by nature, and trained by education,—who, when compelled by wants and desires, are able to hold out and observe moderation, and when they might make a great deal of money are sober in their wishes, and prefer a moderate to a large gain. But the mass of mankind are the very opposite: their desires are unbounded, and when they might gain in moderation they prefer gains without limit; wherefore all that relates to retail trade and merchandise, and keeping of taverns, is denounced and numbered among dishonourable things. For if what I trust may never be and will not be, we were to compel, if I may venture to say a ridiculous thing, the best men everywhere to keep taverns for a time, or carry on retail trade, or do anything of that sort; or if, in consequence of some dire necessity, the best women were compelled to follow a similar calling, then we should know how agreeable and pleasant all these things are; and all such occupations if they were carried on according to pure reason, would be honoured as we honour a mother or a nurse: but now that a man goes to desert places and builds houses which can only be reached by long journeys, for the sake of retail trade, and receives strangers who are in need at the desired resting-places, and gives them peace and calm when they are tossed by the storm, or cool shade in the heat; and then instead of behaving to them as friends, and showing the duties of hospitality to his guests, treats them as enemies and captives
who are at his mercy, and will not release them until they have paid the highest, most abominable, and dishonest price,—these are the sort of practices, and foul evils they are, which cast a reproach upon the succour of adversity. And the legislator ought always to be devising a remedy for evils of this sort. There is an ancient saying, which is also a true one—'To fight against two opponents is a difficult thing,' as is seen in diseases and in many other cases. And in this case also the war is against two enemies—wealth and poverty; one of whom corrupts the soul of man with luxury, while the other drives him by pain into utter shamelessness. What remedy can a city of sense find against this disease? In the first place, they must have as few retail traders as possible; and in the second place, they must assign the occupation to that class of men whose corruption will be the least injury to the state; and in the third place, they must devise some way whereby the followers of these occupations themselves will not readily fall into habits of unbridled shamelessness and meanness.

After this preface let our law run as follows, and may fortune favour us:—No landowner among the Magnetes, whose city the God is restoring and resettling—no one, that is, of the 5040 families, shall become a retail trader either voluntarily or involuntarily; neither shall he be a merchant, or do any service for private persons who are not his equals, except for his father or his mother, and their fathers and mothers; and in general for his elders who are freemen, and whom he serves as a freeman. Now it is difficult to determine accurately the things which are worthy or unworthy of a freeman, but let those who have obtained the prize of virtue give judgment about them in accordance with their feelings of right and wrong. He who . in any way shares in the illiberality of retail trades may be indicted by any one who likes for dishonouring his race, before those who are judged to be the first in virtue; and if he appear to throw dirt upon his father's house by an unworthy occupation, let him be imprisoned for a year and abstain from that sort of thing; and if he repeat the offence, for two years; and every time that he is taken let the time of his imprisonment be doubled. This shall be the second law:—He who engages in retail trade must be either a metic or a stranger. And a third
law shall be: In order that the retail trader who dwells in our city may be as good or as little bad as possible, the guardians of the law shall remember that they are guardians not only of those who may be easily watched and prevented from becoming lawless or bad, because they are well-born and bred; but still more should they have a watch over those who are of another sort, and follow pursuits which have a very strong tendency to make men bad. And, therefore, in respect of the multifarious occupations of retail trade, that is to say, in respect of such of them as are allowed to remain, because they seem to be quite necessary in a state,—about these the guardians of the law should meet and take counsel with those who have experience of the several kinds of retail trade, as we before commanded concerning adulteration (which is a matter akin to this), and when they meet they shall consider what amount of receipts after deducting expenses will produce a moderate gain, and they shall fix in writing and strictly maintain what they find to be the right percentage of profit; this should be done by the wardens of the agora, and by the wardens of the city, and by the wardens of the country. And so retail trade will benefit every one, and do the least possible injury to those in the state who practise it.

When a man makes an agreement which he does not fulfil, unless the agreement be of a nature which the law or a vote of the assembly does not allow, or which he has made under the influence of some unjust compulsion, or which he is prevented from fulfilling against his will by some unexpected chance, the other party may go to law with him in the courts of the tribe, for not having completed his agreement, if the parties are not able previously to come to terms before arbiters or before their neighbours. The class of craftsmen who have furnished human life with the arts, is dedicated to Hephaestus and Athene; and there is a class of craftsmen who preserve the works of all craftsmen by arts of defence, the votaries of Ares and Athene; and they also deserve to be dedicated to the Gods. All these continue through life serving the country and the people; some of them are leaders in battle; others make for hire implements and works, and they ought not to deceive
in such matters, out of respect to the Gods who are their ancestors. If any craftsman through indolence omit to execute his work in a given time, not reverencing the God who gives him the means of life, but considering, foolish fellow, that he is his own God and will let him off easily; in the first place, he shall suffer at the hands of the God; and in the second place, the law shall follow in a similar spirit. He shall owe to him who contracted with him the price of the works which he has failed in performing, and he shall begin again and execute them gratis in the given time. When a man undertakes a work, the law gives him the same advice which was given to the seller, that he should not attempt to raise the price, but simply ask the value; this the law enjoins also on the contractor; for the craftsman assuredly knows the value of his work. Wherefore, in free states the man of art ought not to attempt to impose upon private individuals by the help of his art, which is by nature a true thing; and he who is wronged in a matter of this sort, shall have a right of action against the party who has wronged him. And if any one lets out work to a craftsman, and does not pay him duly according to the lawful agreement, disregarding Zeus the saviour of the city and Athene, who are the partners of the state, and overthrows the foundations of society for the sake of a little gain, in his case let the law and the Gods maintain the common bonds of the state. And let him who, having already received the work in exchange, does not pay the price in the time agreed, pay double the price; and if a year has elapsed, whereas usury in general is not to be taken on money lent in our state, let him for every drachma which he owes to the contractor pay a monthly interest of an obol. Suits about these matters are to be decided by the courts of the tribes; and by the way, now that we are mentioning craftsmen, we must not forget to speak of generals and tacticians, who are the craftsmen of our art of safety which is war, and like other craftsmen undertake some public work either of their own accord, or because they are appointed by the state; and if they execute their work well the law will never be tired of praising him who gives them

1 Reading, according to Schneider, ὅς τούτων αὐ.
BOOK XI.

those honours which are the just rewards of the soldier; but if
any one, having already received the benefit of any noble
service in war, does not make the due return of honour, the law
will blame him. Let this then be the law, having an ingredient
of praise, not compelling but advising the great body of the
citizens to honour the brave men who are the saviours of the
whole state, whether by their courage or by their military
skill;—they should honour them, I say, in the second place;
for the first and highest tribute of respect is to be given to
those who are able above other men to honour the words of
good legislators.

The greater part of the dealings between man and man
have been now regulated by us with the exception of those
that relate to orphans and the supervision of orphans by their
guardians. These follow next in order, and must be regulated
in some way. But to arrive at them we must begin with the
testamentary wishes of the dying and the case of those who may
have happened to die intestate. When I said, Cleinias, that
we must regulate them, I had in my mind the difficulty and
perplexity in which all such matters are involved. You cannot
leave them unregulated, for individuals would make regulations
at variance with one another, and repugnant to the laws and
habits of the living and to their own previous habits, if a
person were simply allowed to make any will which he pleases,
and this was to take effect in whatever state he may be at the
end of life; for most of us lose our senses in a manner, and are
prostrated in mind when we think that we are soon about to die.

Cle. What do you mean, Stranger?

Ath. O, Cleinias, a man when he is about to die is a fearful
thing, and may cause a great deal of anxiety and trouble to the
legislator.

Cle. In what way?

Ath. He wants to have the entire control of all his property,
and will use angry words.

Cle. Such as what?

Ath. O ye Gods, he will say, how monstrous that I am not
allowed to give, or not to give, my own to whom I will—less to
him who has been bad to me, and more to him who has been
good to me, and whose badness and goodness has been tested by
me in time of sickness or in old age and in every other sort of fortune?

Cle. Well, Stranger, and may he not very fairly say that?

Ath. In my opinion, Cleinias, the ancient legislators were too good-natured, and made laws without sufficient observation or consideration of human things.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. I mean, my friend, that they were afraid of the testator's reproaches, and so they passed a law to the effect that a man should be allowed to dispose of his property in all respects as he likes, but you and I, if I am not mistaken, will have something better to say to our departing citizens.

Cle. What?

Ath. O my friends, we will say to them, hard is it for you, who are creatures of a day, to know what is yours,—hard, too, to know yourselves, as the Delphic oracle says, at this hour. Now I, as the legislator, regard you and your possessions, not as belonging to yourselves, but as belonging to your whole family, both past and future, and yet more do I regard both family and possessions as belonging to the state; wherefore, if some one steals upon you with flattery, when you are tossed on the sea of disease or old age, and persuades you to dispose of your property in a way that is not for the best, I will not, if I can help, allow this; but I will legislate with a view to the whole, considering what is best both for the state and for the family, esteeming as I ought the feelings of an individual at a lower rate; and I hope that you will depart in peace and kindness towards us, as you are going the way of all mankind; and we will impartially take care of all your concerns, not neglecting any of them, if we can possibly help. Let this be our warning and consolation of the living and dying, Cleinias, and let the law be as follows:—He who makes a disposition in a testament, being a father and having children, shall first of all inscribe as his heir any one of his sons whom he may think fit; and if he have given any of his children to be adopted by another citizen, let the adoption be inscribed. And if he has a son remaining over and above who has not had any portion assigned to him, and who may reasonably be expected to go out to a colony according to law, to him his father may give as much
as he pleases of the rest of his property, with the exception of the paternal lot and the property on the lot. And if there are more sons than one, let the father distribute what there is more than the lot in any way that he pleases. And if one of the sons has the family inheritance, he shall not give him of the money, nor shall he give money to a daughter who is betrothed to a husband, but if she is not betrothed he may give her money. And if any of the sons or daughters shall be found to have a lot of land in the country, which has accrued after the testament has been made, he shall leave the lot which he has inherited to the heir of the man who has made the will. If the testator has no sons, but only daughters, let him choose the husband of any one of his daughters, and leave and inscribe him as his son and heir. And if a man have lost his son, when he was a child, and before he came to be reckoned among grown-up men, whether his own or an adopted son, let the testator make mention of the circumstance and inscribe whom he will to be his second son, in hope of better fortune; and if the testator has no children at all, he may select and give to any one whom he pleases the tenth part of the property which he has acquired. Let him, as he ought, give all the rest to his adopted son, and make a friend of him according to the law. If the sons of a man require guardians, and he dies and makes a will appointing guardians who are agreeable and willing to take charge of his children, whoever they are, and as many as he pleases, let the choice of the guardians have force according to what he has written. But if he dies and has made no will, or a will in which he has appointed no guardians, then the next of kin, two on the father's and two on the mother's side, and one of the friends of the deceased, shall have the authority of guardians; whom the guardians of the law shall appoint when the orphans require guardians. And fifteen of the eldest of the guardians of the law, according to seniority, shall have the whole care and charge of the orphans, and shall divide themselves into threes, —a body of three for one year, and then another body of three for the next year, until the cycle is complete, and this, as far as possible, is to continue always. If a man dies, having made no will at all, and leaves sons who require the care of guardians,
they shall share in the protection which is afforded by these laws. And if a man dying by some unexpected fate leave daughters behind him, let him pardon the legislator if he gives his daughter in marriage, having a regard only to two out of three conditions,—nearness of kin and the preservation of the lot, and omits the third condition, which a father would naturally consider, for he would choose out of all the citizens a son for himself, and a husband for his daughter, with a view to his character and disposition—he shall forgive the legislator, I say, if he disregards this, which to him is an impossible consideration. Let the law about these matters where practicable be as follows:—If a man dies without making a will, and leaves behind him daughters, let his brother, being the son of the same mother, having no lot, marry the daughter and have the lot of the dead man. And if he have no brother, but only a brother's son, in like manner let them marry, if they be of a suitable age; and if there be not even a brother's son, but only the son of a sister, let them do likewise, and so in the fourth degree if there be only a father's brother, or in the fifth degree a father's brother's son, or in a sixth degree the child of a father's sister. Let kindred be always reckoned in this way: if a person leaves daughters the relationship shall proceed upwards through brother's and brother's son, and first the males shall come, and after them the females in the same family. The judge shall consider and determine the suitableness or unsuitableness of age in marriage; he shall make an inspection of the males naked, and of the women naked down to the navel. And if there be a lack of kinsmen in a family extending to grandchildren of a brother, or to the grandchildren of a grandfather's children, the maiden may choose with the consent of her guardians any one of the citizens whom she will, and he shall be the heir of the dead man, and the husband of his daughter. Circumstances vary, and there may sometimes be a still greater lack of relations within the limits of the state; and if any maiden has no kindred living in the city, and there is some one who has been sent out to a colony, and she is disposed to make him the heir of her father's possessions, if he be indeed of her kindred, let him proceed to her lot according to the regulation
of the law; but if he be not of her kindred, and there be no kinsmen within the pale of the city, and he be chosen by the daughter of the dead man, and empowered to marry by the guardians, let him return home and take the lot of him who died intestate. And if a man has no children, either male or female, and dies without making a will, let the previous law in general hold; and let a man and a woman go forth from the family and share the deserted house, and let the lot belong absolutely to them; and let the heiress in the first degree be a sister, and in a second degree a daughter of a brother, and in the third, a daughter of a sister, in the fourth degree the sister of a father, and in the fifth degree the daughter of a father's brother, and in a sixth degree of a father's sister; and these shall dwell with their male kinsmen, according to the degree of relationship and right, as we enacted before. Now we must not conceal from ourselves that such laws are apt to be oppressive and that there may sometimes be a hardship in the lawgiver commanding the kinsman of the dead man to marry his relation; he may be thought not to have considered the innumerable hindrances which may arise among men in the execution of such ordinances; for there may be cases in which the parties refuse to obey, and are ready to do anything rather than marry, when there is some bodily or mental malady or defect among those who are bidden to marry or be married. Persons may fancy that the legislator never thought of this, but there they are mistaken; wherefore let us make a common prelude on behalf of the lawgiver and of his subjects, the law begging the latter to forgive the legislator, in that he, having to take care of the common weal, cannot order at the same time the various circumstances of individuals, and begging him to pardon them if they are sometimes unable to fulfil the act which he in his ignorance imposes upon them.

Cle. And how, Stranger, can we act most fairly under the circumstances?

Ath. There must be arbiters chosen to deal with such laws and the subjects of them.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. I mean to say, that a case may occur in which the brother's son, having a rich father, will be unwilling to marry
the daughter of his uncle; he will have a feeling of pride, and he will wish to look higher. And there are cases in which the legislator will be imposing upon him the greatest calamity, and he will be compelled to disobey the law, if he is required, for example, to take a wife who is mad, or has some other terrible malady of soul or body, such as makes life intolerable to the sufferer. Then let what we are saying concerning these cases be embodied in a law: If any one finds fault with the established laws respecting testaments, both as to other matters and especially in what relates to marriage, and asserts that the legislator, if he were alive, would not compel him to obey,—that is to say, would not compel those who are by our law required to marry or be given in marriage, to do either,—and some kinsman or guardian assent to this, let them say that the legislator left the fifteen guardians of the law to be, arbiters and fathers of orphans, male or female, and to them let the disputants have recourse, and by their aid determine any matters of the kind, admitting their decision to be final. But if any one thinks that too great power is thus given to the guardians of the law, let him bring his adversaries into the court of the select judges, and there have the points in dispute determined. And he who loses the cause shall have censure and blame from the legislator, which, by a man of sense, is felt to be a penalty far heavier than a great loss of money.

Thus will orphan children have a second birth: After their first birth we spoke of their nurture and education, and after their second birth, when they have lost their parents, we ought to take measures that the misfortune of orphanhood may be as little sad as possible to them. In the first place, as we are saying, we appoint them the guardians of the law, to be fathers to them, not inferior to their natural fathers. Moreover, they shall take charge of them year by year as of their own kindred; and we have given both to them and to the children's own guardians a suitable admonition concerning the nurture of orphans. And we seem to have spoken opportunely in our former discourse, when we said that the souls of the dead have the power after their death of taking an interest in human affairs, about which there are many tales and traditions, long indeed, but true; and seeing that they are so many and so
ancient, we must believe them, and we must also believe the lawgivers, who tell us that these things are true, if they are not to be regarded as utter fools. But if these things are really so, in the first place men—should have a fear of the Gods above; who regard the loneliness of the orphans; and in the second place of the souls of the departed, who by nature incline to take an especial care of their own children, and they are friendly to those who honour them, and unfriendly to those who do not. Men should also fear the living who are aged; wherever a city is well ordered and prosperous, their descendants cherish them, and so live happily; old persons are quick to see and hear all that relates to them, and are propitious to those who are just in the fulfilment of these duties, and they punish those who wrong the orphan and the desolate, considering that they are the greatest and most sacred of deposits. To all which matters the guardian and magistrate ought to apply his mind, if he has any, and take heed of the nurture and education of the orphans, seeking in every possible way to do them good, and contributing to his own good and that of his children. He who obeys the tale which precedes the law, and does no wrong to an orphan, will never have experience of the wrath of the legislator. But he who is disobedient, and wrongs any one who is bereft of father or mother, shall pay twice the penalty which he would have paid if he had wronged one whose parents had been alive. As touching other legislation concerning guardians in their relation to orphans, or concerning magistrates and their superintendence of the guardians, if they did not possess examples of the manner in which children of freemen should be brought up in the bringing up of their own children, and of the care of their property in the care of their own; or, if they had not just laws fairly stated about these very things,—there would have been reason in making laws for them, under the idea that they were a peculiar class, and we might distinguish and make separate rules for the life of those who are orphans and of those who are not orphans. But as the case stands, the condition of orphans with us is not different from the case of those who have a father, though in regard

1 Reading ἐν μηνήν.

K k 2
to honour and dishonour, and the attention given to them, the two are not usually placed upon a level. Wherefore, touch-
ing the legislation about orphans, the law speaks in serious
accents, both of persuasion and threatening, and such a threat as
the following will be by no means out of place: He who is
the guardian of an orphan of either sex, and he among the
guardians of the law who has the care of the guardians, shall
love the unfortunate orphan as though he were his own child,
and he shall be as careful and diligent as he would be in the
management of his possessions, or even more careful and dili-
gent than he would be if they were his own. Let every one
who has the care of an orphan observe this law. But if any one
acts contrary to the law on these matters, if he be a guardian
the archon may fine him, or if he be the archon, the guardian
may bring him before the court of select judges, and punish
him, if convicted, by a fine of double the amount, which the
court shall impose. And if a guardian appears to the relations
of the orphan, or to any other citizen, to act negligently or
dishonestly, let them bring him before the same court, and
whatever penalty is imposed upon him, let him pay fourfold,
and let half belong to the orphan and half to him who procured
the conviction. If any orphan arrives at years of discretion, and
thinks that he has been ill-used by his guardians, let him within
five years of the expiration of the guardianship be allowed
to bring his guardian to trial; and if he be convicted, the court
shall determine what he shall pay or suffer. And if the archon
shall appear to have wronged the orphan by his neglect, and he
be convicted, let the court determine what he shall suffer or pay
to the orphan, and if there be dishonesty in addition to neglect,
besides paying the fine, let him be deposed from his office of
guardian of the law, and let the state appoint another guardian
of the law for the city and for the country in his room.

Greater differences than there ought to be sometimes arise be-
tween fathers and sons, on the part either of fathers who will be
of opinion that the legislator should enact that they may, if they
wish, lawfully renounce their son by the proclamation of a herald
in the face of the world, or of sons who will be of opinion that
they should be allowed to indict their fathers on the charge of
imbecility when they are degraded by disease or old age. These
things only happen as a matter of fact, where the natures of men are very bad; for where only half is bad, as, for example, if the father be not bad, but the son is bad, or conversely, no bad effect is the offspring of this amount of hatred. In another state, a son disowned by his father would not of necessity cease to be a citizen, but in our state, of which these are to be the laws, the disinherited must necessarily emigrate into another country, for no addition can be made even of a single family to the households; and, therefore, he who deserves to suffer these things must be renounced not only by his father, who is a single person, but by the whole family, and what is done in these cases must be regulated by some such law as the following:—He who in the sad disorder of his soul has a mind, justly or unjustly, to expel from his family a son whom he has begotten and brought up, shall not lightly or at once execute his purpose; but first of all he shall collect together his own kinsmen, extending to cousins, and in like manner his son's kinsmen by the mother's side, and in their presence he shall accuse his son, setting forth that he deserves at the hands of them all to be dismissed from the family; and the son shall be allowed to address them in a similar manner, and show that he does not deserve to suffer any of these things. And if the father persuades them, and obtains the suffrages of more than half of his kindred, exclusive of the father and mother and the offender himself—I say, if he obtain more than half the suffrages of all the other grown-up members of the family, of both sexes, the father shall be permitted to put away his son, but not otherwise. And if any other citizen is willing to adopt the son who is put away, no law shall hinder him; for the characters of young men are subject to many changes in the course of their lives. And if he has been put away, and in a period of ten years no one is willing to adopt him, let those who have the care of the superabundant population that are sent out into colonies, see to him, in order that he may be suitably provided for in the colony. And if disease or age or harshness of temper, or all these together, make a man to be more out of his mind than the rest of the world are,—but this is not observable, except to those who live with him,—and he, being master of his property, is the ruin of the house, and his son doubts and hesitates about indicting his father for insanity, let
the law in that case ordain that he shall first of all go to the eldest guardians of the law and tell them of his father's misfortune, and they shall duly look into the matter, and take counsel as to whether he shall indict him or not. And if they advise him to proceed, they shall be both his witnesses and his advocates; and if the father is cast, he shall henceforth be incapable of ordering the least particular of his life; let him be as a child dwelling in the house for the remainder of his days. And if a man and his wife have an unfortunate incompatibility of temper, ten of the guardians of the law, who are impartial, and ten of the women who regulate marriages shall look to the matter, and if they are able to reconcile them they shall be formally reconciled; but if their souls are too much tossed with passion, they shall endeavour to find other partners. Now, they are not likely to have very gentle tempers; and, therefore, we must endeavour to associate with them deeper and softer natures. Those who have no children, or but a few, at the time of their separation, should choose their new partners with a view to the procreation of children; but those who have a sufficient number of children should separate and form new connections in order that one of the two partners may be able to take care of the other in old age. If a woman dies, leaving children, male or female, the law will advise rather than compel the husband to bring up the children which they have, and not introduce into the house a stepmother. But if he have no children, then he shall be compelled to marry until he have begotten a sufficient number of sons to his family and to the state. And if a man die leaving a sufficient number of children, the mother of his children shall remain with them and bring them up. But if she appears to be too young to live virtuously without a husband, let her relations communicate with the women who superintend marriage, and let both together do what they think best in these matters; if there is a lack of children, let the choice be made with a view to having them; two children, one of either sex, shall be deemed sufficient in the eye of the law. When a child is admitted to be the offspring of certain parents and is acknowledged by them, but there is need of a decision as to which parent the child is to follow,—in case a female slave have intercourse with a male slave, or with a freeman or freedman, the
offspring shall always belong to the master of the female slave. Again, if a free woman have intercourse with a male slave, the offspring shall belong to the master of the slave; but if a child be born either of a slave by her master, or of his mistress by a slave—and this be proven—the offspring of the woman and its father shall be sent away by the women into another country, and the guardians of the law shall send away the offspring of the man and the mother.

Neither God, nor a man who has understanding, will ever advise any one to neglect his parents. To a discourse concerning the honour and dishonour of parents, a prelude such as the following, about the service of the Gods, will be a suitable introduction:—There are ancient customs about the Gods which are universal, and they are of two kinds: some of the Gods we see with our eyes and honour them, of others we honour the images; raising statues of them which we adore; and though they be lifeless, yet we imagine that the living Gods have a good will and gratitude to us on this account. Now, if a man has a father or mother, or their father or mother treasured up in his house stricken in years, let him consider that no statue can be more potent to grant his requests than they are, who are sitting at his hearth, if only he knows how to show true service to them.

Cle. And what do you call the true mode of service?

Ath. I will tell you, O my friend, for such things are worth listening to.

Cle. Proceed.

Ath. Oedipus, as tradition says, when dishonoured by his sons, invoked on them the fulfilment of those curses from the God which every one declares to have been heard and ratified by the Gods, and Amyntor in his wrath invoked curses on his son Phoenix, and Theseus upon Hippolytus, and innumerable others have also called down wrath upon their children, which is a plain proof that the Gods listen to the imprecations of parents; for the curses of a parent are, as they ought to be, mighty against his children as no others are. And shall we suppose that the prayers of a father or mother who is specially dishonoured by his or her children, are heard by the Gods in accordance with nature; and that if a man is honoured by them, and in the gladness of his heart earnestly entreats the
Gods in his prayers to do them good, he is not equally heard, and that they do not minister to his request? If not, they would be very unjust ministers of good, and that we affirm to be contrary to their nature.

Clc. Certainly.

Ath. May we not think, as I was saying just now, that we can possess no image which is more honoured by the Gods, than that of a father or grandfather, or of a mother stricken in years? whom when a man honours, the heart of the God rejoices, and he is ready to answer their prayers. And, truly, the figure of an ancestor is a wonderful thing, far higher than that of a lifeless image. For when they are honoured by us, they join in our prayers, and when they are dishonoured, they utter imprecations against us; but lifeless objects do neither. And, therefore, if a man makes a right use of his father and grandfather and other aged relations, he will have the best of all images which can procure him the favour of the Gods.

Clc. Excellent.

Ath. Every man of understanding fears and respects the prayers of his parents, knowing well that many times and to many persons they have been accomplished. Now, these things being thus ordered by nature, good men think that they are the gainers by having aged parents living to the end of their life, or if they depart early, they are deeply lamented by them; and to the bad they are very terrible. Wherefore let every man honour with every sort of lawful honour his own parents agreeably to what has now been said. But if this prelude be an unmeaning sound in the ears of any one, let the law follow, which may be rightly imposed in these terms: If any one in this city be not sufficiently careful of his parents, and do not regard and gratify in every respect their wishes more than those of his sons and of his other offspring or of himself,—let him who experiences this sort of treatment either come himself, or send some one to inform the three eldest guardians of the law, and three of the women who have the care of marriages; and let them look to the matter and punish the evildoers with stripes and imprisonment until they are thirty years of age, that is to say, if they be men, or if they be women let them undergo the same punishment up to forty years of age. But if, when they are still more
advanced in years, they continue the same neglect of their
parents, and do them any hurt, let them be brought before a
court, in which every single one of the eldest citizens shall be
the judges, and if the offender be convicted, let the court
determine what he ought to pay or suffer, and any penalty
may be imposed on him which a man can do or suffer. If the
person who has been wronged is unable to inform the archons,
let any freeman who hears of his case inform, and if he do not,
he shall be deemed base, and shall be liable to pay damages on
the requisition of any one who likes. And if a slave informs, he
shall be free, and if he be the slave of the injurer or injured
party he shall be enfranchised by the magistrates, or if he
belong to any other citizen the public shall pay a price on his
behalf to the owner, and let the archons take heed, that no
one wrongs him out of revenge, and because he has given
information.

As to cases in which one injures another by poisons, where
they are fatal we have already spoken of them; but about other
cases in which a person intentionally and of malice harms
another with meats, or drinks, or ointments, nothing has as yet
been determined. For there are two kinds of poisons used
among men, which cannot clearly be distinguished. There is
one kind of poison which injures bodies by the use of other
33 bodies according to a natural law, and of this we have spoken;
but there is another kind which injures by sorceries, and in-
cantations, and magic bonds, as they are termed, and induces
one class of men to injure others as far as they can, and
persuades others that they above all persons are liable to be
injured by the powers of the magician. Now it is not easy to
know the nature of all these things; nor if a man do know can
he readily persuade others of his belief. And when men are
disturbed at the sight of waxen images fixed either at the doors,
or in a place where three ways meet, or in the sepulchres of
parents, there is no use in trying to persuade them that they
should despise all such things, because they have no certain
knowledge about them. But we must have a law in two parts,
concerning poisoning, in whichever of the two ways the attempt
is made, and we must entreat, and exhort, and advise men not
to have recourse to such practices, by which they scare the
multitude out of their wits, as if they were children, compelling the legislator and the judge to heal the fears which the sorcerer arouses, and to tell them in the first place, that he who attempts to poison or enchant others knows not what he is doing, either as regards the body (unless he have a knowledge of medicine), or as regards his enchantments, unless he happens to be a prophet or diviner. Let the law, then, run as follows about poisoning or witchcraft: He who employs poison to do any injury not fatal to a man himself, or to his servants, or any injury whether fatal or not, to his cattle or his bees, if he be a physician, and be convicted of poisoning, shall be punished with death; or if he be a private person, the court shall determine what he is to pay or suffer. But he who seems to be the sort of man who injures others by magic knots, or enchantments, or incantations, or any of the like practices, if he be a prophet or diviner, let him die; and if, not being a prophet, he be convicted of witchcraft, as in the previous case, let the court fix what he ought to pay or suffer.

When a man does another any injury by theft or violence, for the greater injury let him pay a greater penalty to the injured man, and a less penalty for the smaller injury; but in all cases, whatever the injury be, as much as will compensate the loss. And besides the compensation of the wrong, let a man pay a further penalty for the chastisement of his offence: he who has done the wrong instigated by the folly of another, through the lightheartedness of youth or the like, shall pay a lighter penalty; but he who has injured another through his own folly, when overcome by pleasure or pain, in cowardice and fear, or lust, or envy, or implacable anger, shall endure a heavier punishment. Not that he is punished because he did wrong, for that which is done can never be undone, but in order that in future times, he, and those who see him corrected, may utterly hate injustice, or at any rate abate much of their evil-doing. Having an eye to all these things, the law, like a good archer, should aim at the right measure of punishment, and in all cases at the deserved punishment. In the attainment of this the judge shall be a fellow-worker with the legislator,

1 Putting the comma after ἄλλοτρία.
whenever the law leaves to him to determine what the offender shall suffer or pay; and he, like a painter, shall fill up the outline with suitable details. This is what we must do, Megillus and Cleinias, in the best and fairest manner that we can: saying what the punishments are to be of all actions of theft and violence, and giving laws of such a kind as the Gods and sons of Gods would have us give.

If a man be mad he shall not be at large in the city, but his relations shall keep him at home in any way which they can; or if not, let them pay a penalty,—he who is of the highest class shall pay a penalty of one hundred drachmas, whether he be a slave or a freeman whom he neglects; and he of the second class shall pay four-fifths of a mina; and he of the third class three-fifths; and he of the fourth class two-fifths. Now, there are many sorts of madness, some arising out of disease, which we have already described; and there are other kinds, which originate in an evil and passionate temperament, and are increased by education; out of a slight quarrel this class of madmen will often raise a storm of abuse against one another, and nothing of that sort ought to be allowed to exist in a well-ordered state. Let this, then, be the law about abuse, which shall relate to all cases: No one shall speak evil of another; and when a man disputes with another he shall teach and learn of the disputant and the company, but he shall abstain from evil speaking; for out of the imprecations which men utter against one another, and the feminine habit of casting aspersions on one another, and using foul names, beginning in words light as air, they proceed to deeds, and the greatest enmities and hatreds spring up. For the speaker gratifies his anger, which is an ungracious element of his nature; and nursing up his wrath by the entertainment of evil thoughts, and exacerbating that part of his soul which was formerly civilized by education, he lives in a state of savageness and moroseness, and pays a bitter penalty for his anger. And in such cases almost all men have a way of saying something ridiculous about their opponent, and there is no man who is in the habit of laughing at another who does not miss virtue and earnestness altogether, or lose the better half of greatness. Wherefore let no one say anything of that sort at the temple, or at the public sacrifices, or at the
games, or in the agora, or in a court of justice, or in any public assembly. And let him who has the charge of such matters chastise an offender, and he shall be blameless; but if he fail in doing so, he shall not claim the prize of virtue; for he is one who heeds not the laws, and does not do what the legislator commands. And if in any other place any one indulges in these sort of revilings, whether he have begun the quarrel or is only retaliating, let any elder who is present support the law, and control with blows those who give way to passion, which is another great evil; and if he fail, let him be liable to pay the appointed penalty. And we say further, that he who is engaged in the practice of reviling cannot revile without attempting to say what is ludicrous; and this is the use of ridicule, employed in a moment of anger, which we condemn. Again, do we admit into our state the comic writers who are so fond of making mankind ridiculous, if they attempt in a good-natured manner to turn the laugh against our citizens? or do we draw the distinction of jest and earnest, and allow a man to make use of ridicule in jest and without anger about any thing or person; but as we were saying, not if he be angry and have a set purpose? We forbid earnest—that is unalterably fixed; but we have still to say who are to be sanctioned or not to be sanctioned by the law in the employment of innocent humour. A comic poet, or maker of iambic or satirical lyric verse, shall not be permitted to ridicule any of the citizens, either by word or image, either in anger or without anger. And if any one is disobedient, the judges shall either at once expel him from the place, or he shall pay a fine of three minae, which shall be dedicated to the God who presides over the contests. Those only who have already received permission shall be allowed to write verses at one another without anger and in jest, but in anger and in serious earnest they shall not be allowed. The decision of this matter shall be left to the superintendent of the general education of the young, and whatever he may license, the writer shall be allowed to produce, and whatever he rejects let neither the poet himself exhibit, nor ever teach any other, slave or freeman, under the penalty of being dishonoured, and held disobedient to the laws.

Now, he is not to be pitied who is only hungry, or who
suffers any bodily pain, but he who is temperate, or has other virtues, and at the same time suffers from misfortune, he is to be pitied; and it would be an extraordinary thing if such an one, whether slave or freeman, were utterly forsaken and fell into the extremes of poverty in any tolerably well-ordered city or government. Wherefore the legislator may safely make a law applicable to such cases in the following terms: Let there be no beggars in our state; and if anybody begs, seeking to collect the means of life by perpetual prayers, let the wardens of the agora turn him out of the agora, and the wardens of the city out of the city, and the wardens of the country send him out of any other part of the country over the border, that so the country may be cleared of this sort of animal.

If a slave of either sex injure anything, which is not his or her own, through inexperience, or some improper practice, and the injured person be not in part to blame, the master of the slave who has done the harm shall either make full satisfaction, or give up the person who has done the injury. But if the master argue that the charge has arisen by collusion between the injured party and the injurer, with the view of obtaining the slave, let him sue him who says that he has been injured for malpractices. And if he convict him let him receive double the value which the court fixes as the price of the slave; and if he lose his suit, let him make amends for the injury, and give up the slave. And if an animal, whether horse, or dog, or any other beast, injure a neighbour, the owner shall in like manner pay for the injury.

If any man voluntarily refuses to be a witness, he who wants him shall summon him, and he who is summoned shall come to the trial; and if he knows and is willing to bear witness, let him bear witness, but if he says he does not know let him swear by the three divinities Zeus, and Apollo, and Themis, that he does not know, and have done with the cause. And he who is summoned to give witness and does not answer to his summoner, shall be liable for the harm which ensues according to law. And if any one summons as witness one who is a judge, let him give his witness, but he shall not afterwards vote in the cause. A free woman may give her witness and plead, if she be more than forty years of age, and may
bring an action if she have no husband; but if her husband be alive she shall only be allowed to bear witness. A slave of either sex and a child shall be allowed to give evidence and to plead, but they must produce sufficient sureties that they will certainly remain until the trial, in case they should be charged with false witness. And either of the parties in the cause may bring an accusation of false witness against them, touching their evidence in whole or in part, if he asserts that such evidence has been given, previous to the final decision of the cause. The magistrates shall preserve the accusations of false witness, and have them kept under the seal of both parties, and produce them on the day when the trial for false witness takes place. If a man be twice convicted of false witness, he shall not be required, and if thrice, he shall not be allowed to bear witness; and if he dare to witness after he have been convicted three times, let any one who pleases inform against him to the magistrates, and let the magistrate hand him over to the court, and if he be convicted he shall be punished with death. And in any case in which the evidence is found to be false, and yet to have given the victory to him who wins the suit, and more than half the witnesses are condemned, the decision which was gained by these means shall be rescinded, and there shall be a discussion and a decision as to whether the suit was determined by that false evidence or not; and in whichever way the decision may be given, the previous suit shall be determined accordingly.

There are many noble things in human life, but to most of them attach evils which are fated to corrupt and spoil them. Is not justice noble, which has been the civilizer of humanity? How then can the advocate of justice be other than noble? And yet upon this profession which is presented under the fair name of science has come an evil reputation. In the first place, we are told that by ingenious pleas and the help of an advocate the law enables a man to win a particular cause, whether just or unjust; and that both the art and the power of speech which is thereby imparted are at the service of him who is willing to pay for them. Now, in our state this so-called art, whether really an art or only an experience and practice destitute of any art, ought if possible never to come into
existence, or if existing among us should listen to the request of the legislator and go away into another land, and not speak contrary to justice. If the offenders obey we say no more; but if they disobey let them hear the voice of the law: If any one thinks that he will pervert the power of justice in the minds of the judges, and unseasonably litigate or advocate, let any one who likes indict him for malpractices of law and dishonest advocacy, and let him be judged in the court of select judges; and if he be convicted let the court determine whether he may be supposed to act from a love of money or from contentiousness. And if he be supposed to act from contentiousness, the court shall fix a time during which he shall not be allowed to institute or plead a cause; and if he be supposed to act as he does from love of money, in case he be a stranger he shall leave the country, and never return under penalty of death; but if he be a citizen he shall die, because he is a lover of money, however gained; and equally, if he be judged to have acted more than once from contentiousness, he shall die.
BOOK XII.

If any herald or ambassador carry a false message to any other city, or bring back a false message from the city to which he is sent, or be proved to have brought back, whether from friends or enemies, in his capacity of herald or ambassador, what they have never said, let him be indicted for having offended, contrary to the law, in the sacred office and appointment of Hermes and Zeus, and let there be a penalty fixed, which he shall suffer or pay if he be convicted.

Theft is a mean, and robbery a shameless thing; and none of the sons of Zeus delight in fraud and violence, or ever practised either. Wherefore let no one be deluded by poets or mythologers into a mistaken belief of such things, nor let him suppose when he thieves or is guilty of violence, that he is doing nothing base, but only what the Gods themselves do. For such tales are untrue and improbable; and he who steals or robs contrary to the law, neither is nor ever was a God or the son of a God; of this the legislator ought to be a better judge than all the poets put together. Happy is he and may he be for ever happy, who is persuaded and listens to our words; but he who disobeys shall have the following law directed against him: If a man steals anything belonging to the public, whether that which he steals be much or little, he shall have the same punishment. For he who steals a little steals with the same wish as he who steals much, but with less power. He who takes up anything more than he has deposited is unjust in the highest degree; and therefore the law is not disposed to inflict a less penalty on the one than on the other, because his theft is less, but on the
ground that the thief may possibly be in the one case still curable, and in the other case is incurable. If any one convict in a court of law a stranger or a slave of a theft of public property, let the court determine what punishment he shall suffer, or what penalty he shall pay, bearing in mind that he is probably not incurable. But the citizen who has been brought up, as our citizens will have been, if he be found guilty of robbing his country by fraud or violence, whether he be caught in the act or not, shall be punished with death; for he is incurable.

Now for expeditions of war much consideration and many laws are required; the great principle of all is that no one of either sex should be without a commander; nor should the mind of any one be accustomed to do anything either in jest or earnest of his own motion, but in war and in peace he should look to and follow his leader, and in the least things be under his guidance; for example, he should stand or move, or exercise, or wash, or take his meals, or get up in the night to keep guard and deliver messages when he is bidden; and in the hour of danger he should not pursue and not retreat except by order of his superior; and in a word, not teach the soul or accustom her to know or understand how to do anything apart from others. Of all soldiers the life should be in common and together; there neither is nor ever will be a higher, or better, or more scientific principle than this for the attainment of salvation and victory in war. And from youth upwards we ought to practise this habit of commanding others, and of being commanded by others; anarchy should have no place in the life of man or of the beasts who are subject to man. I may add that all dances ought to be performed with a view to military excellence, and agility and ease should be cultivated with a similar view; and also endurance of the want of meats and drinks, and winter cold and summer heat, and hard couches; and, above all, care should be taken not to destroy the natural qualities of the head and the feet by surrounding them with extraneous coverings, and so hindering their natural growth of hair and soles. For these are the extremities, and of all the parts of the body, whether they are preserved or not is of the greatest consequence; the one is the servant of the whole body, and the other the master, in whom all the ruling senses are by nature set. Let the
young man, when I say this, imagine that he hears the praises of the military life; and the law shall be as follows: He shall serve in war who is enrolled or appointed to some special service, and if any one wrongly absents himself, and without the leave of the generals, he shall be indicted before the military commanders for failure of service when the army comes home; and the soldiers shall be his judges; the heavy-armed, and the cavalry, and the other arms of the service shall form separate courts; and they shall bring the heavy-armed before the heavy-armed, and the horsemen before the horsemen, and the others in like manner before their peers; and he who is found guilty shall never be allowed to compete for the prize of valour, or indict another for not serving on an expedition, or be an accuser at all in any military matters. Moreover, the court shall further determine what punishment he shall suffer, or what penalty he shall pay. When the several suits for failure of service are completed, the generals shall once more hold an assembly, and they shall adjudge the prizes of valour; and he who likes shall give judgment in his own rank of the service, saying nothing about any former expedition, nor producing any proof or witnesses to confirm his statement, but speaking only of the actual expedition. The crown of victory shall be an olive wreath which the victor shall offer up at the temple of any war God whom he likes, adding an inscription for a testimony to last during life, that such an one has received the first, the second, or the third prize. If any one goes on an expedition, and returns home before the appointed time, when the generals have not withdrawn the army, he shall be indicted for desertion before the same persons who took cognizance of failure of service, and if he be found guilty the same punishment shall be inflicted on him. Now, every man who is engaged in any suit ought to be very careful of bringing false witness against any one, either intentionally or unintentionally, if he can help, for justice is truly said to be an honourable maiden, and falsehood is naturally hateful to honour and justice. A witness ought to be very careful not to sin against justice, as for example in what relates to the throwing away of arms—he must distinguish the throwing them away when necessary, and not make that a

1 Reading αἱδοῆς.
reproach, or bring an action against some undeserving person on that account. To make the distinction may be difficult; but still the law must attempt to define the crime in some way. Let me endeavour to explain my meaning by an illustration: If Patroclus had been brought to the tent still alive but without his arms (and this has happened to innumerable persons), the original arms, which the poet says were given to Peleus by the Gods as a nuptial gift when he married Thetis, remaining in the hands of Hector, then the base spirits of that day might have reproached the son of Menoetius with having cast away his arms. Again, there is the case of those who have been thrown down precipices and lost their arms; and of those who at sea, and in stormy places, have been suddenly overwhelmed by floods of water; and there are numberless things of this kind which one might adduce by way of consolation, and with the view of glossing over a misfortune which looks suspicious. We must, therefore, endeavour to divide to the utmost of our power the greater and more serious evil from the lesser. And language admits of a distinction in the use of terms. A man does not always deserve to be called the thrower away of his shield; he may be only the loser of his arms. For there is a great or rather absolute difference between him who is deprived of his arms by a sufficient force, and him who voluntarily lets his shield go. Let the law then be as follows: If a person having arms be overtaken by the enemy and does not turn round and defend himself, but lets them go voluntarily or throws them away, choosing a base life and a swift escape rather than a courageous and noble and blessed death—in such a case of the throwing away of arms let justice be done; but the judge need take no note of the case just now mentioned, for the bad man ought always to be punished, in the hope that he may be improved, but not the unfortunate, for there is no use in that. And what shall be the punishment suited to him who has thrown away his weapons of defence? Tradition says that Caeneus, the Thessalian, was changed by a God from a woman into a man; but the converse miracle cannot now be wrought, or no punishment would be more proper than that the man who throws away his shield should be changed into a woman. This however is impossible, and therefore let us
LAWS.

make a law as nearly like this as we can—that he who loves his life too well shall be in no danger for the remainder of his days, but shall live for ever under the stigma of cowardice. And let the law be in the following terms: When a man is found guilty of disgracefully throwing away his arms in war, no general or military officer shall allow him to serve as a soldier, or give him any place at all in the ranks of soldiers; and if he give him any place; he shall suffer a penalty which the public examiner shall exact of him; and the general who gives him any place if he be of the highest class, shall pay a thousand drachmae; or if he be of the second class, five minae; or if he be of the third, three minae; or if he be of the fourth class, one mina. And he who is found guilty, shall not only be dismissed from manly dangers, which is a disgrace appropriate to his nature, but he shall pay a thousand drachmae, if he be of the highest class, and five minae if he be of the second class, and three if he be of the third class, and a mina, like the preceding, if he be of the fourth class.

What regulations will be proper about examiners, seeing that some of our magistrates are elected by lot, and for a year, and some for a longer time and from selected persons? Of such persons who will be a sufficient censor or examiner, if any of them, weighed down by the pressure of office and his own inability to support the dignity of his office, be guilty of any crooked practice—who will be a sufficient examiner of these things? It is by no means easy to find a ruler who excels rulers in virtue, but still we must endeavour to discover some censor or examiner who is more than man. For the truth is, that there are many elements of dissolution in a state, as there are also in a ship, or in an animal; they all have their cords, and girders, and sinews, and one nature diffused in many places, and called by many names; and the office of examiner is a most important element in the preservation and dissolution of states. For if the examiners are better than the magistrates, and their duty is fulfilled justly and without blame, then the whole state and country flourishes and is happy; but if the examination of the magistrates is carried on in a wrong way, then by the relaxation of that justice which is the uniting principle of all constitutions, every power in
BOOK XII.

the state is rent asunder from every other; they no longer incline in the same direction, but fill the city with faction, and make many cities out of one, and soon bring all to destruction. Wherefore the censors ought to be admirable in every sort of virtue. Let us invent a mode of creating them, which shall be as follows:—Every year, after the summer solstice, the whole city shall meet in the common precincts of Helios and Apollo, and shall present to the God three men out of their own number in the manner following: Each citizen shall select, not himself, but some other citizen whom he deems in every way the best, and who is not less than fifty years of age. And out of the selected persons who have the greatest number of votes, they shall make a further selection until they reduce them to one-half, if they are an even number; but if they are not an even number, they shall subtract the one who has the smallest number of votes, and make them an even number, and then take the half which has the greater number of votes. And if two persons have an equal number of votes, and thus increase the number beyond one-half, they shall withdraw the younger of the two and do away the excess; and then including all the rest they shall again vote, until there are left three having an unequal number of votes. But if all the three, or two out of the three, have equal votes, let them commit the election to good fate and fortune, and separate off by lot the first, and the second, and the third; these they shall crown with an olive wreath and give them the prize of excellence, at the same time proclaiming to all the world that the city of the Magnetes, by the providence of the Gods, is again preserved, and presents to the Sun her three best men as the first-fruits of Apollo, dedicated according to the ancient law to him and to the Sun, as long as their lives answer to the judgment formed of them. And these shall appoint in their first year twelve examiners, to continue until each has completed seventy-five years, to whom three shall afterwards be added yearly; and let these divide all the magistracies into twelve parts, and prove the holders of them freely by every sort of test; and let them live while they hold office in the precinct of Helios and Apollo, in which they were chosen, and let each one form a judgment of some things individually, and of others in company with his colleagues; and let him place a writing
in the agora about each magistracy, and what the magistrate ought to suffer or pay, according to the decision of the examiners. And if a magistrate does not admit that he has been justly judged, let him bring the examiners before the select judges, and if he is acquitted by their decision, let him, if he will, accuse the examiners themselves; and if he be convicted, and have been condemned to death by the examiners, let him die (and of course he can only die once). But any other penalties which admit of being doubled let him suffer twice over.

And now let us pass under review the examiners themselves; when are they to be examined? and what rewards or punishments are to be assigned to them? During the life of these men, whom the whole state counts worthy of the rewards of virtue, they shall have the first seat at all public assemblies, and at all Hellenic sacrifices and sacred missions, and other public and holy ceremonies in which they share. The chiefs of each sacred mission shall be selected from them, and they only of all the citizens shall be adorned with a crown of laurel; they shall all be priests of Apollo and Helios; and one of them, who is judged first of the priests created in that year, shall be high priest; and they shall write up his name in each year to be a measure of time as long as the city lasts; and after their death they shall be laid out and carried to the grave and entombed in a manner different from the other citizens. They shall be decked in a robe all of white, and there shall be no cryings or lamentations over them; but a chorus of fifteen youths, and another of men, shall stand around the bier on either side, hymning the praises of the dead in alternate responses, the priests blessing them in song all day long; and in the morning an hundred of the youths who practise gymnastic exercises, and whom the relations of the departed shall choose, shall carry the bier to the sepulchre, the young men marching first, dressed in the garb of warriors, the cavalry with their horses, the heavy-armed with their arms, and the others in like manner. And the youths around the bier and in front shall sing their national hymn, and maidens shall follow behind, and with them the women who have passed the age of childbearing; next, unless the Pythian Oracle forbid them, shall
follow priests and priestesses, because this burial is free from pollution, although they are interdicted from other burials. The place of burial shall be an oblong vaulted chamber constructed of tufa, which will last for ever, having stone couches placed side by side. And here they will lay the blessed person, and surround the sepulchre with a mound of earth and with a grove of trees on every side but one; and on that side the sepulchre shall be allowed to extend for ever, and will not need a mound. Every year they shall have contests in music and gymnastics, and in horsemanship, in honour of the dead. These are the honours which shall be given to those who are acquitted by the examiners; but if any of them, trusting to the scrutiny being over, should, after the judgment has been given, manifest the wickedness of human nature, let the law ordain that he who pleases shall indict him, and let the cause be tried in the following manner. In the first place, the court shall be composed of the guardians of the law, and to them the surviving examiners shall be added, as well as the court of select judges; and let the pursuer lay his indictment in this form:—He shall say that so-and-so is unworthy of the prize of virtue and of his office; and if the defendant be convicted let him be deprived of his office, and of the burial, and of the other honours given him. But if the prosecutor do not obtain the fifth part of the votes, let him, if he be of the first class, pay twelve minae, and eight if he be of the second class, and six if he be of the third class, and two minae if he be of the fourth class.

The so-called decision of Rhadamanthus is worthy of all admiration. He knew that the men of his own time believed and had no doubt that there were Gods, which was a reasonable belief in those days, because most men were the sons of Gods, and according to tradition he was one himself. He appears to have thought that he ought to commit judgment to no man, but to the Gods only, and in this way suits were simply and speedily decided by him. For he made the two parties at issue take an oath respecting the points in dispute, and so got rid of the matter speedily and safely. But now that a certain portion of mankind do not believe at all in the existence of the Gods, and others imagine that they have no care of us, and the opinion of most men and of the worst men is that
in return for a small sacrifice and flattering words they will aid them in abstracting a great deal of money, and deliver them from divers and great penalties, the way of Rhadamanthus is no longer suited to the needs of justice, for as the opinions of men about the Gods are changed, the laws should also be changed:—In the granting of suits a rational legislation ought to do away with the oaths of the parties on either side—he who obtains leave to bring in a lawsuit should write down the charges, but not add an oath; and the defendant in like manner should give his denial to the magistrates in writing, and not swear; for it is a dreadful thing to know, when many lawsuits are going on in a state, that almost half the people who are in the habit of meeting one another at the public meals and in other companies and relations of private life are perjured. Let the law, then, be as follows:—A judge who is about to give judgment shall take an oath, and he who appoints the magistrates of the state by oaths or by the giving of votes which he carries from the temple, shall take an oath; and the judge of dances and of all music, and the superintendents and umpires of gymnastic and equestrian contests, and any others in which, as far as men can judge, there is nothing to be gained by a false oath; but all cases in which a denial confirmed by an oath clearly results in a great advantage to the taker of the oath, shall be decided without the oath of the parties to the suit, and the presiding judges shall not permit either of them to use an oath for the sake of persuading, nor to call down curses on himself and his race, nor to use unseemly supplications or womanish laments. But they shall teach and learn what is just quietly, avoiding words of ill omen; and he who utters them shall be supposed to speak beside the point, and the judges shall again bring him back to the question at issue. On the other hand, strangers in their dealings with strangers shall legally give and receive oaths, for they will not grow old in the city or leave a fry of young ones like themselves to be the sons and heirs of the land.

In minor matters, when the penalty is less than stripes or imprisonment or death, permission shall be given to all persons who wish to prosecute any freeman who disobeys the law. But as regards the attendance at choruses or processions or any other
BOOK XII.

521

public shows or services, or the celebration of sacrifice in time of peace, or the payment of contributions in war—in all these cases, first the necessity of providing for the loss has to be met; and by those who will not obey, there shall be security given to those who are empowered by the city and the law to exact the sum due; and if they forfeit their security, let the goods which they have pledged be sold and the money given to the city; but if they ought to pay a larger sum, the several magistrates shall impose upon the disobedient a suitable penalty, and bring them before the court, until they are willing to do what they are ordered.

Now, a state which makes money from the cultivation of the soil only, and has no foreign trade, must consider what it will do about the emigration of its own people to other countries, and the reception of strangers from elsewhere. About these matters the legislator has to consider, and he will begin by using his influence as far as he can. The intercourse of cities with one another is apt to create a confusion of manners; strangers are always suggesting novelties to strangers. When states are well governed by good laws the mixture causes the greatest possible injury; but seeing that most cities are the reverse of well ordered, the confusion which arises in them from the reception of strangers, and from the citizens themselves rushing off into other cities, whenever any one young or old desires to travel abroad at any time or to go anywhere, is of no consequence. On the other hand, the refusal of states to receive others and to allow their own citizens to go to other places is utterly impossible, and to the rest of the world is likely to appear ruthless and uncivilized; we call the practice by the name xenelasia or banishment of strangers, which is a hard word, and is descriptive of hard and morose ways, as men think. And to be thought or not to be thought well of by the rest of the world is no light matter; for the many are not so far wrong in their judgment of who are bad and who are good, as they are removed from the nature of virtue in themselves. Even bad men have a divine instinct which guesses rightly, and very many who are utterly depraved form correct notions and judgments about the differences of good and bad. Wherefore also the generality of cities are right in exhorting men to value a good reputation
in the world, for there is no truth greater and more important than this—that he who is really good (I am speaking of him who would be perfect) seeks for reputation with, but not without, the reality of goodness. And our Cretan colony ought also to acquire the fairest and noblest reputation for virtue from other men; and there is every reason to expect that, if the reality answers to the idea, there will be few like her among well-ordered cities, beholding the face of the sun and of the other Gods. Wherefore, in the matter of emigration to other countries and the reception of strangers, we enact as follows:—

In the first place, let no one be allowed to go anywhere at all into a foreign country who is less than forty years of age; and no one shall go in a private capacity, but only in some public one, as a herald, or on an embassy, or on a sacred mission. Going abroad on an expedition or in war is not to be included among travels of the class authorized by the state. To Apollo at Delphi and to Zeus at Olympia and to Nemea and to the Isthmus citizens should be sent to take part in the sacrifices and games dedicated to these Gods; and they should send as many as possible, and the best and fairest that can be found, and they will make the city renowned at holy meetings in time of peace, procuring a glory which shall be the converse of that which is gained in war; and when they come home they shall teach the young that the institutions of other states are inferior to their own. And they shall send spectators of another sort, if they have the consent of the guardians, being such citizens as desire to look a little more at leisure at the doings of other men; and these no law shall hinder. For a city which has no experience of good and bad men or intercourse with them, can never be thoroughly and perfectly civilized, nor, again, can the citizens of a city properly observe the laws by habit only, and without an intelligent understanding of them. And there always are in the world a few inspired men whose acquaintance is beyond price, and who spring up quite as much in ill-ordered as in well-ordered cities. And he who lives in a well-ordered city should be ever tracking them out, going forth by sea and land to seek after him who is incorruptible—desiring to establish more firmly institutions which are good already, and amending what is deficient; for without this examination and enquiry a
city will never continue perfect any more than if the examination is ill-conducted.

Cle. How can these two objects be attained?

Ath. In this way: In the first place, our spectator shall be of not less than fifty years of age; he shall be a man of repute, especially in military matters, who will exhibit to other cities a model of the guardians of the law, but when he is more than sixty years of age he shall no longer continue in his office of spectator. And when he has carried on his inspection during as many out of the ten years of his office as he pleases, on his return home let him go to the assembly of those who review the laws. This shall be a mixed body of young and old men, who shall be required to meet daily between the hour of dawn and the rising of the sun. They shall consist, in the first place, of the priests who have obtained the rewards of virtue; and, in the second place, of guardians of the law, choosing the ten eldest of them; the general superintendent of education shall also be a member, as well the last of them as those who have been released from the office, and each of them shall take with him as his companion a young man, whomsoever he chooses, between the ages of thirty and forty. These shall compose the assembly, and they shall always discourse about the laws of their own city or any different ones of which they may hear existing elsewhere; also about kinds of knowledge which may appear to be of use, and will throw light upon the examination, or of which the want will make the subject of laws dark and uncertain to them. Any knowledge of this sort which the elders approve, the younger men shall learn with all diligence; and if any one of those who have been invited appear to be unworthy, the whole assembly shall blame him who invited him. The rest of the city shall watch over those among the young men who distinguish themselves, having an eye upon them, and especially honouring them if they succeed, but dishonouring them above the rest if they turn out to be inferior to the rest. This is the assembly to which he who has visited the institutions of other men, on his return home shall straightway go, and if he have discovered any one who has anything to say about the enactment of laws or education or nurture, or if he has himself made any observations, let him communicate his dis-
coveries to the whole assembly. And if he be seen to have come home neither better nor worse, let him be praised at any rate for his enthusiasm; and if he be much better, let him be much praised; and not only while he lives but after his death let the assembly honour him with fitting honours. Or if on his return home he appear to have been corrupted, pretending to be wise when he is not, let him be prohibited from speaking with any one, whether young or old; and if he will hearken to the rulers, then he shall be permitted to live as a private individual; but if he will not, let him die, if he be convicted in a court of law of interfering about education and the laws. And if he deserve to be indicted, and none of the magistrates indict him, let that be counted as a disgrace to them when the rewards of virtue are decided.

Let such be the character of the person who goes abroad, and let him go abroad under these conditions. In the next place, the stranger who comes from abroad should be received in a friendly spirit. Now, there are four kinds of strangers, of whom we must make some mention—the first is, he who comes and stays throughout the summer; this class are like birds of passage, taking wing in pursuit of commerce, and flying over the sea to other cities, while the season lasts; he shall be received in market-places and harbours and public buildings, near the city but outside, by those magistrates who are appointed to superintend these matters; and they shall take care that a stranger, whoever he be, duly receives justice; but he shall not be allowed to make any innovation. They shall hold 9; the intercourse with him which is necessary, and this shall be as little as possible. The second kind is just a spectator who comes to see with his eyes and hear with his ears the festival of the Muses; such ought to have entertainment provided them at the temples by hospitable persons, and the priests and ministers of the temple should see and attend to them. But they should not remain more than a reasonable time; let them see and hear that for the sake of which they came, and then go away, neither having suffered nor done any harm. The priests shall be their judges, if any of them receives or does any wrong up to the sum of fifty drachmae, but if any greater charge be brought, in such cases the suit shall come before
the wardens of the agora. The third kind of stranger is he who comes on some public business from another land, and is to be received with public honours. He is to be specially received by the commanders of horse and foot, and the host by whom he is entertained, in conjunction with the Prytanes, shall have a special care of what concerns him. There is a fourth class of persons answering to our spectators, who come from another land to look at ours. In the first place, such visits will be rare, and the visitor should be at least fifty years of age; he may possibly be wanting to see something that is rich and rare in other states, or himself to show something in like manner to another city. Let such an one, then, go unbidden to the doors of the wise and rich, being himself one of them: let him go, for example, to the house of the superintendent of education, confident that he is a fitting guest of such a host, or let him go to the house of some of those who have gained the prize of virtue and hold discourse with them, both learning from them, and also teaching them; and when he has seen and heard all, he shall depart, as a friend taking leave of friends, and be honoured by them with gifts and suitable tributes of respect. These are the customs, according to which our city should receive all strangers of either sex who come to them from other countries, and should send forth her own citizens, showing respect to Zeus, the God of hospitality, not driving away strangers at meats and sacrifices and by savage proclamations, as is the manner which prevails among the children of the Nile.

When a man becomes surety, let him give the security in a distinct form, acknowledging the whole transaction in a written document, and in the presence of not less than three witnesses if the sum be under a thousand drachmae, and of not less than five witnesses if the sum be above a thousand drachmae. He who is agent for another who sells dishonestly and is not able to make good the loss, shall himself be responsible; the agent and the principal shall be equally liable. If a person wishes to find anything in the house of another, he shall enter naked, or having only a short tunic and no upper girdle, having first taken an oath by the customary Gods that he expects to find it there; he shall then make his search, and the other shall throw open
his house and allow him to search things both sealed and unsealed. And if a person will not allow the searcher to make his search, he who is prevented shall go to law with him, estimating the value of the goods after which he is searching, and if he be convicted he shall pay twice the value of the article. If the master be absent from home, the dwellers in the house shall let him search the unsealed property, and on the sealed property the searcher shall set another seal, and shall appoint any one whom he likes, to guard them during five days; and if the master of the house be absent during a longer time, he shall take with him the wardens of the city, and so make his search, opening the sealed property as well as the unsealed, and then, together with the members of the family and the wardens of the city, he shall seal them up again as they were before. There shall be a limit of time in the case of disputed things, and he who has had possession of them during a certain time shall no longer be liable to be disturbed. This shall not, however, apply to houses and lands; but if a man has any other possessions which he has used and openly shown in the city and in the agora, and no one has put in a claim to them, and the other says that he was looking for the goods at the time, and the owner is proved to have made no concealment, if they have continued for a year, the one having the goods and the other looking for them, no one shall be permitted to claim them after the expiration of a year; or if he does not use or show the lost property in the market, but only in the country, and no one offers himself as the owner during five years, at the expiration of the five years the claim shall be barred for ever after; or if he uses them in the city, where there are houses, then the appointed time of claiming the goods shall be three years, or ten years if he has them in the country in private. And if he has them in another land, there shall be no limit of time or prescription, and whenever any one finds them he may claim them.

If any one prevents another by force from being present at a trial, whether a principal party or his witnesses;—if the witness prevented be a slave, whether his own or belonging to another, the suit shall be incomplete and invalid; but if he who is prevented be a freeman, besides the suit being incomplete
the other who has prevented him shall be imprisoned for a year, and may be made a slave by any one who pleases. And if any one hinders by force a rival competitor in gymnastic or music, or any other sort of contest, from being present at the contest, let him who has a mind inform the presiding judge, and they shall liberate him who is desirous of competing; and if they are not able, and he who hinders the other from competing wins the prize, then they shall give the prize of victory to him who is prevented, and inscribe him as the conqueror in any temples which he pleases, and he who hinders the other shall not be permitted to make any offering or inscription having reference to that contest, and he shall be liable for damages, whether he be defeated or whether he conquer.

If any one knowingly receives anything which has been stolen, he shall undergo the same punishment as the thief, and if a man receives an exile he shall be punished with death. Every man should regard the friend and enemy of the state as his own friend or enemy; and if any one makes peace or war with another on his own account, and without the authority of the state, he shall in like manner undergo the penalty of death. And if any fraction of the city declare war or peace against any, the generals shall indict the authors of this proceeding, and if they are convicted death shall be the penalty. Those who serve their country ought to serve without receiving gifts, and there ought to be no excusing or approving the saying, ‘Men should receive gifts as the reward of good, but not of evil deeds’; for to know what is good and to persevere in what we know is no easy matter. The safest course is to obey the law which says, ‘Do no service for a bribe,’ and let him who disobeys, if he be convicted, simply die. With a view to taxation, and for many reasons, every man ought to have had his property valued; and the tribesmen should likewise bring a register of the yearly produce to the wardens of the country, that in this way there may be two valuations; and the public officers may use annually whichever on consideration they deem the best, whether they prefer to take a certain portion of the whole value, or of the annual revenue, after subtracting what is paid to the common tables.

Touching offerings to the Gods, the moderate man should.
offer moderate ornaments. Now the land and the hearth of the house of all men is sacred to all Gods; wherefore let no man dedicate a second shrine to the Gods. In other cities, gold and silver, whether possessed by private persons or in temples, is an invidious thing, and ivory, the product of a dead body, is not a proper offering; brass and iron, again, are instruments of war—let a man, therefore, offer what he likes which is made of wood only, and in like manner of stone to the public temples, but of woven work let him not offer more than one woman can execute in a month. White colours are suitable to the Gods, especially in woven works, but dyes should only be used for the adornments of war. The most divine of gifts are figures of birds and similar offerings, and they should be such as one painter can execute in a single day, and let other offerings follow the same rule or pattern.

Now that the whole city has been divided into parts of which the nature and number have been described, and laws have been given about all the most important contracts as far as this was possible, the next thing will be to have justice done. In the first place, there shall be elected judges in the courts, who shall be chosen by the plaintiff and defendant in common: these shall be called arbiters rather than judges. And in the second place there shall be judges taken from the village and tribe, a twelfth part of whom will be selected, and before these the litigants shall go to contend for greater damages, if the suit be not decided before the first judges; the defendant, if he be defeated the second time, shall pay a fifth more than the damages mentioned in the indictment; and if he finds fault with his judges and would try a third time, let him carry the suit before the select judges, and if he be again defeated, let him pay the whole of the damages and half as much again. And the plaintiff, if when defeated before the first judges he persist in going on to the second, shall, if he wins receive a fifth part of the damages, and if defeated he shall pay a like sum; but if he is not satisfied with the previous decision, and will insist on proceeding to a third court, then if he win he shall receive from the defendant the amount of the damages and, as I said before, half as much again, but if he lose he shall pay half the assessed damages. Now of the assignation of courts and completion
of the number of the judges and the appointment of servants to the different magistrates, and the times at which the several causes should be heard, and the votings and delays and all the things that necessarily concern suits and the order of causes and the time in which answer is to be given and parties are to appear—of these and other things akin to these we have indeed already spoken, but there is no harm in repeating what is right twice or thrice:—All lesser and easier matters which the elder legislator has omitted may be supplied by the younger one. Private courts will be sufficiently regulated in this way, and the public and state courts, and those which the magistrates must use in the administration of their several offices, exist in many other states. Many very respectable institutions of this sort have been framed by good men, and from them the guardians of the law may by reflection derive what is necessary for the order of our new state, considering and correcting them, and bringing them to the test of experience, until every detail appears to be satisfactorily determined; and then putting the final seal upon them, and making them irreversible, they shall use them for ever afterwards. As to what relates to the silence of judges and the abstinence from words of evil omen and the reverse, and the differences that there are in the notions of the just and good and honourable which exist in other states, they have been partly mentioned already, and another part of them will be mentioned in their place toward the end. To all these matters he who would be an equal judge shall justly look, and he shall possess writings about them that he may learn them. For of all kinds of knowledge the knowledge of good laws has the greatest power of improving the learner; otherwise there would be no meaning in the divine and admirable law possessing a name akin to mind (νοῦς, νόμος). And of all other words, such as the praises and censures of individuals which occur in poetry and also in prose, whether written down or uttered in daily conversation, whether men dispute about them in the spirit of contention or weakly assent to them, as is often the case—of all these the one sure test is the writings of the legislator, which the righteous judge ought to have in his mind as the antidote of all other words, and thus make himself and the city stand upright, procuring for the good
the continuance and increase of justice, and for the bad, on the other hand, a conversion from ignorance and intemperance, and in general from all unrighteousness, as far as their evil minds can be healed, but to those whose web of life is in reality finished, giving death, which is the only remedy for souls in their condition, as I may truly say again and again. And such judges and chiefs of judges will be worthy of receiving praise from the whole city.

When the suits of the year are completed the following laws shall regulate their execution: In the first place, the judge shall assign to the party who wins the suit the whole property of him who loses, with the exception of mere necessaries, after the votes have been announced by the herald in the hearing of the judges, and when the month arrives following the month in which the courts are sitting, (unless the gainer of the suit has been previously satisfied,) the court shall follow up the case, and hand over to the winner the goods of the loser; but if they find that he has not the means of paying, and the sum deficient is not less than a drachma, the insolvent person shall not have any right of going to law with any other man until he have satisfied the debt of the winning party; but other persons shall still have the right of bringing suits against him. And if any one after he is condemned refuses to acknowledge the authority which condemned him, let the magistrates who are thus deprived of their authority bring him before the court of the guardians of the law, and if he be cast, let him be punished with death, as a subverter of the whole state and of the laws.

Thus a man is born and brought up, and after this manner he begets and brings up his own children, and has his share of dealings with other men, and suffers if he has done wrong to any one, and receives satisfaction if he has been wronged, and so at the appointed time, under the dominion of the laws, he grows old, and meets his end in the order of nature. Concerning the dead of either sex, the religious ceremonies which may fittingly be performed, whether appertaining to the Gods of the under world or of this, shall be decided by the interpreters with absolute authority. Their sepulchres are to be in places which are not cultivated, and there shall be no monu-
BOOK XII.

ments to them, either large or small, but they shall occupy that part of the country which is naturally adapted for receiving and concealing the bodies of the dead with as little hurt as possible to the living. No man, living or dead, shall deprive the living of the sustenance which the earth, our mother, is naturally inclined to bear to them. And let not the mound be piled higher than would be the work of five men completed in five days; nor shall the stone which is placed over the spot be larger than would be sufficient to receive the praises of the dead included in four heroic lines. Nor shall the laying out of the dead continue for a longer time than is sufficient to distinguish between him who is in a trance only and him who is really dead, and speaking generally, the third day after death will be a fair time for carrying out the body to the sepulchre. Now we must believe the legislator when he tells us that the soul is in all respects superior to the body, and that even in life what makes each one of us to be what we are is only the soul; and that the body follows us about in the likeness of each of us, and therefore, when we are dead, the bodies of the dead are rightly said to be our shades or images; for that the true and immortal being of each one of us which is called the soul goes on her way to other Gods, that before them she may give an account—an inspiring hope to the good, but very terrible to the bad, as the laws of our fathers tell us, which also say that not much can be done in the way of helping a man after he is dead. But the living—he should be helped by all his kindred, that while in life he may be the holiest and justest of men, and after death may have no great sins to be punished in the world below. If this be true, a man ought not to waste his substance under the idea that all this lifeless mass of flesh which is in process of burial is connected with him; he should consider that the son, or brother, or the beloved one, whoever he may be, whom he thinks he is laying in the earth, has gone away to complete and fulfil his own destiny, and that his duty is rightly to order the present, and to spend moderately on the lifeless altar of the Gods below. But the legislator does not intend moderation to be taken in the sense of mean- ness. Let the law, then, be as follows:—The expenditure on the entire funeral, of him who is of the highest class, shall not
exceed five minae, and for him who is of the second class, three minae, and for him who is of the third class two minae, and for him who is of the fourth class one mina, will be a fair limit of expense. The guardians of the law ought to take especial care of the different ages of life, whether childhood or manhood, or any other age. And at the end of all, let there be some one guardian of the law presiding, who shall be chosen by the friends of the deceased to superintend, and let it be glory to him to manage with fairness and moderation the affairs of the dead, and a discredit to him if they are not well managed. Let the laying out and other ceremonies be in accordance with the law, but the lawgiver may also concede in some points to the customs of his fellow citizens. It would be monstrous for example that he should command any man to weep or abstain from weeping over the dead; but he may forbid cries of lamentation, and not allow the voice of the mourner to be heard outside the house; also, he may forbid the bringing of the dead body into the open streets, or the processions of mourners in the streets, and may require that before daybreak they should be outside the city. Let these, then, be our laws relating to such matters, and let him who obeys be free from penalty; but he who disobeys even a single guardian of the law shall be punished by them all in a fitting penalty. Other modes of burial, or again of denial of burial, which is to be refused in the case of robbers of temples and parricides and the like, have been described and embodied in the preceding laws, so that now our work of legislation is pretty near an end; but in all cases the end does not consist in doing something or acquiring something or building something, but the end will be attained and finally accomplished, when we have provided for the perfect and lasting continuance of our institutions; until then the work is incomplete.

Cle. That is very good, Stranger; but I wish you would tell me more clearly what you mean.

Ath. O Cleinias, many things of old time were well said and sung; and the saying about the Fates was one of them.

Cle. What is it?

Ath. The saying that Lachesis or the giver of the lots is the first of them, and that Clotho or the weaver is the second of
them, and that Atropos or the unchanging one is the third of them; and that she is the preserver of the things which are woven, [which may be compared in a figure to the welding power of fire,] working\(^1\) the quality of unchangeableness in them. I am speaking of the things which in a state and government give not only health and salvation to the body, but law, or rather preservation of the law, in the soul; and, if I am not mistaken, this seems to be still wanting in our laws: we have still to see how we can implant in them this irreversible nature.

_Cle._ It will be a great thing if we can only discover how such a nature can be implanted.

_Ath._ But that is not impossible; so much I can quite clearly see.

_Cle._ Then let us not think of desisting until we have imparted this quality to our laws; for it is ridiculous, after a great deal of labour has been spent, to place a thing at last on an insecure foundation.

_Meg._ I approve of your suggestion, and am quite of the same mind with you.

_Cle._ Very good: And now what, according to you, is to be the salvation of our government and of our laws, and how is it to be effected?

_Ath._ Were we not saying that there must be in our city a council which was to be of this sort: Ten of the oldest guardians of the law, and all those who have obtained prizes of virtue, were to meet, and the council was also to include those who had visited foreign countries in the hope of hearing something that might be of use in the preservation of the laws, and who, having come safely home, and having been tested in these same matters, had proved themselves to be worthy to take part in the meeting;—each of the members was to select some young man of not less than thirty years of age, he himself judging in the first instance whether the young man is worthy by nature and education, and then introducing him to the others, and if he seem to them also to be worthy he was to be adopted by them; but if not, they are forbidden to elect him, and still more is

\(^1\) Reading ἀπεργαζομένη, as in Stallbaum's note.
he forbidden to accept their nomination. The meeting of the council was to be held early in the morning, when everybody was at leisure from all other business, whether public or private,—something of that sort was said by us before.

_Cle._ True.

_Ath._ Then now returning to the council, I would say further,—that this institution having all the required conditions, might save us all, and be the anchor of the state, if let down into the sea.

_Cle._ How so?

_Ath._ Now is the time for me to speak the truth in all earnestness.

_Cle._ Well said, and I hope that you will fulfil your intention.

_Ath._ Know, Cleinias, that every work has a saviour, as of the animal the soul and the head are the chief saviour.

_Cle._ Once more, what do you mean?

_Ath._ The well-being of those two is obviously the preservation of every living thing?

_Cle._ How is that?

_Ath._ The soul, besides other things, contains mind, and the head, besides other things, contains sight and hearing; and the mind, mingling with the noblest of the senses, and becoming one with them, may be truly called the salvation of all things.

_Cle._ Yes, quite so.

_Ath._ Yes, indeed; but with what is that intellect concerned which, mingling with the senses, is the salvation of ships in storms as well as in fair weather? In the ship, is it not the mind which pilots; and the sailors uniting their perceptions with the piloting mind, preserve themselves and the ship?

_Cle._ Very true.

_Ath._ We do not want many illustrations about such matters:—What aim would the general of an army, or what aim would a physician propose to himself, if he were seeking to attain salvation—?

_Cle._ Very good.

_Ath._ Does not the general aim at victory and superiority in war, and do not the physician and his minister aim at producing health in the body?

_Cle._ Certainly.
**BOOK XII.**

_Ath._ And a physician who is ignorant about the body, that is to say, who knows not that which we just now called health, or a general who knows not victory, or any others who are ignorant of the particulars of the arts which we mentioned, cannot be said to have understanding about any of these matters?

*Cle._ Impossible.

_Ath._ And what would you say of the state, if a person proves to be ignorant of the aim to which the statesman should look? Ought he to be called a ruler at all; and further, will he ever be able to preserve that of which he does not even know the aim?

*Cle._ Impossible.

_Ath._ And therefore, if our settlement of the country is to be perfect, we ought to have some institution, which, as I was saying, will tell what is the aim of the state, and will inform us how we are to attain this, and what law or what man will advise us with that view. Any state which has no such institution is likely to be devoid of mind and sense, and in all her actions will proceed by mere chance.

*Cle._ Very true.

_Ath._ In which, then, of the parts or institutions of the state is any such guardian power to be found? Can we say?

*Cle._ I am not quite certain, Stranger; but I have a suspicion that you are referring to the assembly which you just now said was to meet at night.

_Ath._ You have answered rightly, Cleinias; and we must assume, as the argument implies, that this council possesses all virtue; and the beginning of virtue is not to make mistakes by guessing many things, but to look at one thing, and on this to fix all our aims.

*Cle._ Quite true.

_Ath._ Then now we shall see why there is nothing wonderful in states going astray—the reason is that their legislators have such different aims; nor is there anything wonderful in some laying down as their rule of justice, that certain individuals should bear rule in the state, whether they be good or bad, and others that the citizens should be rich, not caring whether they are the slaves of other men or not. The tendency of
others, again, is towards freedom, and some legislate with a view to both at once; they want to be at the same time free and the lords of other states; but the wisest men, as they deem themselves to be, look to all these and similar aims, and there is no one of them which they exclusively honour, and to which they would have all things look.

Cle. Then, Stranger, our old assertion will hold, for we were saying that laws generally should look to one thing only; and this, as we admitted, was rightly said to be virtue.

Ath. Yes.

Cle. And we said that virtue was of four kinds?

Ath. Quite true.

Cle. And that mind was the leader of all four, and that to her the three other virtues and all other things ought to have regard?

Ath. You follow me capitally, Cleinias, and I would ask you to follow me to the end, for we have told you to what the mind of the pilot, the mind of the general and of the physician ought respectively to look; and now we may turn to mind political, of whom, as of a human creature, we will ask a question: O wonderful being, and to what are you looking? The physician is able to tell his single aim in life, but you, the superior, as you declare yourself to be of all intelligent beings, when you are asked are not to able to tell. Can you, Megillus, and you, Cleinias, say distinctly what is the aim of mind political, in return for the many explanations of things which I have given you?

Cle. We cannot, Stranger.

Ath. Well, but ought we not to desire to see it, and to see in what it is found?

Cle. For example, in what?

Ath. For example, we were saying that there are four kinds of virtue, and as there are four of them, each of them must be one.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And further, all four of them we call one; for we say that courage is a virtue, and that prudence is a virtue, and the same of two others, as if they were in reality not many but one.
BOOK XII.

Cle. Quite so.

Ath. There is no difficulty in seeing in what way the two differ from one another, and have received two names, and so of the rest. But there is more difficulty in explaining why we call these two and the rest of them by the single name of virtue.

Cle. How do you mean?

Ath. I have no difficulty in explaining what I mean. Let us distribute the subject into questions and answers.

Cle. Once more, what do you mean?

Ath. Do you ask me what is that one thing which I call virtue, and then again speak of as two, one part being courage and the other wisdom? I will tell you how that occurs: One of them has to do with fear; in this the beasts also participate, and quite young children.—I mean courage; for a courageous temper is a gift of nature and not of reason. But without reason there never has been, or is, or will be a wise and understanding soul; hence the difference.

Cle. That is true.

Ath. I have now told you in what way the two are different, and do you in return tell me in what way they are one and the same. Suppose that I ask you in what way the four are one, and when you have answered me, you will have a right to ask of me in return in what way they are four; and then let us proceed to enquire whether in the case of things which have a name and also a definition to them, true knowledge consists in knowing the name only and not the definition? Can he who is good for anything be ignorant about great and glorious truths without discredit?

Cle. I suppose not.

Ath. And is there anything greater to the legislator and the guardian of the law, and to him who thinks that he excels all other men in virtue, and has the rewards of virtues, than these very qualities of which we are now speaking,—courage, temperance, wisdom, justice?

Cle. How can there be anything greater?

Ath. And ought not the interpreters, the teachers, the lawgivers, the guardians of others to excel all other men, and perfectly to show him who desires to learn and know, or whose evil actions require to be punished and reproved, what is the
nature of virtue and vice—shall the teacher be some poet who may find his way into the city, or some chance instructor of youth who professes to be better than him who has won the palm in every virtue? And can we wonder that when the guardians are not adequate in speech or action, and have no adequate knowledge of virtue, the city being unguarded should experience the common fate of cities in our day?

_Cle._ Wonder! no.

_Ath._ Well, then, as I was saying just now, what are we to do? How can we provide our guardians with a more than common virtue in speech or action, or in what way can our city be truly likened to the head and senses of rational beings because possessing such a guardian power?

_Cle._ What, Stranger, is the drift of your comparison?

_Ath._ Do we not see that the city is the trunk, and are not the younger guardians, who are chosen for their natural gifts, placed in the head of the state, having their souls all full of eyes, with which they look about the whole city? They keep watch and hand over their perceptions to the memory, and inform the elders of all that happens in the city; and those whom we compared to the mind, because they have many wise thoughts—that is to say, the old men—take counsel, and making use of the younger men as their ministers, and advising with them,—in this way both together truly preserve the whole state:—Shall this be the order of our state, or shall we have some other order? Shall we say that they are all alike the owners of the state, and not merely individuals among them who have had the most careful training and education?

_Cle._ That, my good sir, is impossible.

_Ath._ Then we ought to proceed to some more exact training than that which has preceded.

_Cle._ Certainly.

_Ath._ And must not that of which we are in need be the one to which we were just now alluding?

_Cle._ Very true.

_Ath._ Did we not say that the workman or guardian, if he be perfect in every respect, ought not only to be able to see the many aims, but he should press onward to the one, which he should know, and knowing, order all things with a view to that?
Cle. True.

Ath. And can any one have a more exact way of considering or contemplating anything, than the being able to look at one idea gathered from many different things?

Cle. Perhaps not.

Ath. Not 'perhaps not,' but 'certainly not,' my good sir, is the right answer. There never has been a truer method than this discovered by any man.

Cle. I bow to your authority, Stranger; let us proceed in the way which you propose.

Ath. Then, as would appear, we must compel the guardians of our divine state to perceive, in the first place, what that principle is which is the same in all the four—the same, as we affirm, in courage and in temperance, and in justice and in prudence, and which, being one, we call as we ought, by the single name of virtue. To this, my friends, we will, if you please, hold fast, and not let go until we have sufficiently explained what that is to which we are to look, whether to be regarded as one or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way. Are we likely ever to be in a virtuous condition, if we cannot tell whether virtue is many, or four, or one? Certainly, if you will take our advice, we shall in some way contrive that this principle has a place amongst us; but if you have made up your mind that we should let the matter alone, we will.

Cle. We must not, Stranger, by the God of strangers I swear that we must not; for in our opinion you speak most truly, but we should like to know how you will accomplish your purpose.

Ath. Wait a little before you ask; and let us, first of all, be quite agreed with one another that the purpose has to be accomplished.

Cle. Certainly, if that is possible.

Ath. Well, and about the good and the honourable, are we to take the same view—that each of them are many, but that our guardians are to regard them as in some sense one?

Cle. We must consider in what sense.

Ath. And are we to consider only, and to be unable to say what we think?

Cle. Certainly not; that would be the state of a slave.
LAW S.

_Ath._ And may not the same be said of all good men—that the true guardians of the laws ought to know their truth, and to be able to interpret them in words, and carry them out in action, judging of what is and of what is not well, according to nature?

_Cle._ Certainly.

_Ath._ Is not the knowledge of the Gods one of the noblest sorts of knowledge;—to know that they are and know how great is their power, as far as in man lies? We do indeed excuse the majority of mankind, who only follow the voice of the laws, but refuse to admit as guardians any who do not labour to obtain every possible evidence that there is respecting the Gods; they are forbidden and not allowed to choose as a guardian of the law, or to place in the select order of virtue, him who is not an inspired man, and has not laboured at these things.

_Cle._ It is certainly just, as you say, that he who is indolent about such matters or incapable should be rejected, and that things honourable should be put away from him.

_Ath._ Are we assured that there are two things which lead men to believe in the Gods, as we have already stated?

_Cle._ What are they?

_Ath._ One is the argument about the soul, which has been already mentioned—that it is the eldest and most divine of all things, to which motion attaining generation gives perpetual existence; the other was an argument from the order of motion of the heavens, and of all things under the dominion of the mind which ordered the universe. If a man look upon the world not lightly or foolishly, there was never any one so godless who did not experience an effect opposite to that which the many imagine. For they think that those who handle these matters by the help of astronomy, and the accompanying arts of demonstration, may become godless; because they see, as far as they can see, things happening by necessity, and not by an intelligent will accomplishing good.

_Cle._ But what is the fact?

_Ath._ Just the opposite of the opinion which once prevailed among men, that the sun and stars are without soul. Even in those days men wondered about them, and that which is now
ascertained was then conjectured by some who had a more exact knowledge of them—that if they had been things without soul, and had no mind, they could never have moved according to such exact calculations; and even at that time some ventured to hazard the conjecture that mind was the orderer of the universe. But these same persons again mistaking the nature of the soul, which they conceived to be younger and not older than the body, once more overturned the world, or rather, I should say, themselves, for what they saw before their eyes in heaven, all appeared to be full of stones, and earth, and many other lifeless bodies, and to these they assigned the various causes of all things. Such studies gave rise to much atheism and perplexity, and the poets took occasion to be abusive,—comparing the philosophers to she-dogs uttering vain howlings, and saying other nonsense of the same sort. But now, as I said, the case is reversed.

Cle. How is that?

Ath. No man can be a true worshipper of the Gods who does not know these two principles—that the soul is the eldest of all things which are born, and is immortal and rules over all bodies; moreover, as I have now said several times, he who has not contemplated the mind of nature which is said to exist in the stars, and gone through the previous training, and seen the connection of them with music, and harmonized them all with laws and institutions, is not able to give a reason of such things as have a reason. And he who is unable to acquire this in addition to the ordinary virtues of a citizen, can hardly be a good ruler of a whole state; but he should be the subordinate of other rulers. Wherefore, Cleinias and Megillus, let us consider whether we may not add to all the other laws which we have discussed this further one,—that the nocturnal assembly of the magistrates, which has also been associated with us in our whole scheme of education, shall be a guard set according to law for the salvation of the state. Shall we propose this?

Cle. Certainly, my good friend, we will if the thing is possible.

Ath. Let us strive to the utmost that we may attain this object; you shall have my best assistance. Of these matters
I have had much experience, and have often considered them, and I dare say that I shall be able to find others who will also help.

Cle. I agree, Stranger, that we should proceed along the road in which God is guiding us; and how we can proceed rightly has now to be investigated and explained.

Ath. O, Megillus and Cleinias, about these matters we cannot legislate further until the city is established; when that is done, then we will determine what authority the citizens shall have of their own; but the explanation of how this is all to be ordered would only be given rightly in a long discourse.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. In the first place, a list would have to be made out of those who by their ages and studies and dispositions and habits, are well fitted for the duty of a guardian. In the next place, it will not be easy for them to discover themselves what they ought to learn, or become the disciple of one who has already made the discovery. Furthermore, to write down the times at which, and during which, they ought to receive the several kinds of instruction, would be a vain thing; for the learners themselves do not know what is learned to advantage until the knowledge which is the result of learning has found a place in the soul of each. And so these details, although they could not be truly said to be secret, might be said to be incapable of being stated beforehand, because when stated they would have no meaning.

Cle. What then are we to do, Stranger, under these circumstances?

Ath. There is a proverb of universal application which may also be applied to us: We must risk the whole constitution on the chance of throwing thrice six or thrice ace, and I am willing to share with you the danger of stating and explaining to you my views about education and nurture, which is the question coming to the surface again. The danger is not a slight or ordinary one, and I would advise you, Cleinias, in particular, to see to the matter; for if you order rightly the city of the Magnetes, or whatever name God may give it, you will obtain the greatest glory; or at any rate you will be thought the most courageous of men in the estimation of posterity.
Dear companions, if this our divine assembly can only be established, to them we will hand over the city; none of the present company of legislators, as I may call them, would hesitate about that. And the state will be perfected and become a waking reality, which a little while ago we attempted to create as a dream and in idea only, mingling together reason and mind in one image, in the hope that our citizens might be duly mingled and rightly educated; and being educated, and dwelling in the citadel of the land, might become perfect guardians, such as we have never seen in all our previous life, by reason of the saving virtue which is in them.

Meg. Dear Cleinias, after all that has been said, either we must detain the Stranger, and by supplications and in all manner of ways make him share in the foundation of the city, or we must give up the undertaking.

Cle. Very true, Megillus; and you must join with me in detaining him.

Meg. I will.
The following Index refers to the pages of Stephens, which are given in the margin of the translation. The page of Stephens is divided into five parts by the letters A, B, C, D, E, which are retained in the Index of Proper Names, though they are not given in the margin. Thus the letter A signifies the first portion of the page, the letter B the second, and so on.

The order in which the dialogues are arranged in the translation is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lysis</td>
<td>40—70</td>
<td>ii. 203.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Laches</td>
<td>79—103</td>
<td>ii. 177.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protagoras</td>
<td>121—179</td>
<td>i. 309.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euthydemus</td>
<td>193—236</td>
<td>i. 271.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ion</td>
<td>243—266</td>
<td>i. 530.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meno</td>
<td>269—304</td>
<td>ii. 70.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euthyphro</td>
<td>315—333</td>
<td>i. 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apology</td>
<td>349—375</td>
<td>i. 17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crito</td>
<td>383—396</td>
<td>i. 43.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phaedo</td>
<td>429—500</td>
<td>i. 57.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phaedrus</td>
<td>103—159</td>
<td>iii. 227.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cratylus</td>
<td>203—267</td>
<td>i. 383.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gorgias</td>
<td>315—409</td>
<td>i. 447.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Lesser Hippias</th>
<th>pages 423—439</th>
<th>i. 281.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First Alcibiades</td>
<td>447—492</td>
<td>ii. 103.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Menexenus</td>
<td>499—514</td>
<td>ii. 233.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Timaeus</td>
<td>601—676</td>
<td>iii. 17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crittas</td>
<td>687—703</td>
<td>iii. 106.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vol. IV</th>
<th>Philebus</th>
<th>pages 49—117</th>
<th>Stephens, ii. 11.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parmenides</td>
<td>159—220</td>
<td>iii. 126.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theaetetus</td>
<td>285—370</td>
<td>i. 147.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sophist</td>
<td>415—492</td>
<td>i. 216.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statesman</td>
<td>533—650</td>
<td>ii. 250.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|--------|------|---------------|---------------------|
INDEX.

A.

Abaris, the Hyperborean, his charms, Charm. 158 B.
Abdera, Protagoras of, Protag. 309 C; Rep. 10. 600 C.
Abolition of debt, Laws 5. 736.
Abortion allowed, Rep. 5. 461.
Absolute, the, unknown, Parm. 133, 134; absolute knowledge possessed by God, ib. 134.
Abstract ideas, origin of, Rep. 7. 523; Phaedo 74; abstract and concrete in opposition, Phaedo 103.
Cp. Ideas.
Academia, Lysis 203 B.
Acarnanians, the two, Euthyd. 271 C.
Accents, change of, Crat. 399 B.
Acisembrotus, a physician's name, Crat. 394 C.
Achaean, Rep. 3. 389 E, 390 E, 393 D, D, 394 A; Laws 3, 682 D, E, 685 E, 706 D, E; 1 Alcib. 112 B.
Achaemenes, 1 Alcib. 120 E.
Acharnian, Callicles the, Gorg. 495 D.
Achelous, Phaedr. 250 B, 263 D.
Achelorton, Phaedo 112 E, 413 D.
Acherusian lake, Phaedo 113 A, B, C, 114 A.
Achilles, the son of Thetis, Apol. 28 C; Hipp. min. 371 D; attacks Scamander, Protag. 340 A; better than Odysseus, Hipp. min. 363 B, E, 364 B, C, D, 365 B, 369 B, C, 371 D; attacks Hector, I on 535 B; his grief, Rep. 3. 388 A; his avarice, ib. 390 E; son of Peleus, ib. 391 C; sent to the Islands of the Blest, Symp. 179 E, 180 A, B; dies for Patroclus, ib. 208 D; Brasidas compared to, ib. 221 C; taught by Cheiron, Hipp. min. 371 D; his master Phoehix, Rep. 3. 390 E; his speech to Ajax (II. 9. 644), Crat. 428 C.
Acquaintance, importance of friendship and, Laws 6. 771.

Acropolis, the, in ancient Athens, Crit. 112 A; in Atlantis, ib. 115 D foll.
Actions, kinds of, Laws 9. 864; voluntary and involuntary, Hipp. min. 373; 374.
Active life, age for, Rep. 7. 539, 549.
Acumenus, a physician, Phaedr. 269 A; father of Eryximachus, ib. 268 A; Symp. 176 B; a companion of Socrates, Phaedr. 227 A.
Acusilaus, Symp. 178 C.
Adamant, Tim. 59.
Adeimantus, son of Ariston, a person in the dialogue Parmenides, Parm. 126 A; a person in the dialogue Republic, Rep. 1. 327 C, 2. 362 D, 376 D; brother of Plato, Apol. 34 A; his genius, Rep. 2. 368 A; takes up the discourse, ib. 368 E, 376 E, 4. 419 A, 6. 487 E, 548 E.
Adeimantus, son of Cepis, present at the Protagoras, Protag. 315 E.
Adeimantus, son of Leucolophides, present at the Protagoras, Protag. 315 E.
Admetus, Symp. 179 B, 208 D.
Admonition, Soph. 230.
Adonis, the gardens of, Phaedr. 276 B.
Adoption, Laws 9. 877, 878.
Adrastia, her ordinance, Phaedr. 248 C; prayed to, Rep. 5. 451 A.
Adrastus, the 'mellifluous,' Phaedr. 269 A.
Adulteration, Laws 11. 916; punishment of, ib. 917.
Advocates, Laws 11. 938.
Aeacus, a judge in Hades, Apol. 41 A; Gorg. 523 E, 524 A, 526 C, E; son of Aegina, ib. 526 E; grandfather of Achilles, Hipp. min. 363 B; 1 Alcib. 121 B.
Aeantodorus, brother of Apollodorus, Apol. 34 A.
Aegina, Crat. 433 A; Phaedo 59 D; Laws 4. 707 E; 1 Alcib. 121 B; two obols required for the passage from Aegina to Athens, Gorg. 511
INDEX.

D; the nymph, mother of Aeacus, ib. 526 E.

Aeginetans, in Crete, Laws 4. 707 E.

Aeneas, his horses (ll. 5. 223, 8. 108), Laches 191 B.

Aeschines, son of Lysanias, Apol. 33 E; was present at the death of Socrates, Phaedo 59 B.

Aeschylus, an orator, Menex 234 B.


Aesculapius (Asclepius), not ignorant of the lingering treatment, Rep. 3. 406 D; bribed to restore a rich man to life, ib. 408 B; descendants of, ib. 406 A; his sons at Troy, ibid. (cf. Asclepiadæ); left disciples, ib. 10. 599 C; father of physicians, Symp. 186 E; ‘we owe a cock to,’ Phaedo 118 A; festival in honour of, at Epidaurus (Asclepiae), Ion 530 A.

Aesop, his fables, Phaedo 60 C, D, 61 B, C; his fable of the fox and lion (fab. 137), 1 Alcib. 123 A.

Aexone, the deme of, Democrates of, Lysis 204 E; Laches of, Laches 197 C.

Affinity, degrees of, Rep. 5. 461.

Agamemnon, and Achilles, Hipp. min. 370 C; meaning of the name, Crat. 395 A, B; his excellence, Symp. 174 C; reprov’d in the tragedies by Palamedes, Rep. 7. 522 D; abused by Odysseus, Laws 4. 706 D; his soul became an eagle, Rep. 10. 620 B; his dream, ib. 3. 383 A; his gifts to Achilles, ib. 390 E; his anger against Chryses, ib. 392 E. foll.

Agathocles, a great Sophist, Protag. 316 E; a teacher of Damon, Lach. 180 D.

Agathon, and Pausanias, Protag. 315 E; absent from Athens, Symp. 172 C; his first victory, ib. 173 A; his wisdom, ib. 175 E; his speech, ib. 194 E. foll.; Agathon and Alcibiades, ib. 212 D. foll.

Age, for philosophy, Rep. 7. 539; for active life, ib. 540; authority of, Laws 3. 690, 9. 879; for service, ib. 6. 785; of the guardians ib. 755; for marriage, ib. 774 (cp. Rep. 5. 460).

Agent and patient have the same qualities, Gorg. 476; Rep. 4. 437.

Agis, a general’s name, Crat. 394 C; the son of Archidamus, 1 Alcib. 124 A.

Aglauphon, a painter, father of Aristophon, Gorg. 448 B; of Polygnotus, Ion 532.

Agora, Laws 8. 819.

Agra (Artemis), Phaedr. 229 C.

Agreement, breach of, Laws 11. 920.

Agriculture, tools required for, Rep. 2. 379; wild trees, etc., older than domesticated, Tim. 77; irrigation, ibid.; laws concerning (cp. Model City), about boundaries, Laws 8. 842; about neighbours, ib. 843; about trespass of cattle, ibid.; about swarms of bees, ibid.; about damage by fire, ibid.; about distances in planting, ibid.; about watering, ib. 844; about rain-water, ib.; about tasting fruits, ib. foll.; about pollution of water, ib. 845; about harvesting, ib. 846; agriculture allowed in the model state, ib. 5. 743; among the nobler arts, ib. 16. 889.


Air, Tim. 49; form of, ib. 56; air-passage, ib. 78.

Ajax the son of Telamon, Apol. 41 A; Ajax and Odysseus, Hipp. min. 371 B, D, E; Ajax and Achilles (ll. 9. 614), Crat. 428 C; the reward of his bravery, Rep. 5. 408 D; his soul turns into a lion, ib. 10. 620 B; not to be wounded by steel, Symp. 219 E.

Alcestis, her love for Admetus, Symp. 179 B, D, 180 B, 208 D.

Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas, Gorg. 471 A.

Alcibiades, father of Axiochus, Euthyd. 275 B.

Alcibiades (a person in the dialogues, 1 Alcibiades, Protagoras, and Symposium), Euthyd. 275 A; Alcibiades and Socrates, Protag. 359 A; Gorg. 481 D; Symp. 213 B; son of Cleinias, ibid.; son of Dinomaché, 1 Alcib. 105 D; a descendant of Eurysaces, ib. 121 A; his attendant Zopyrus, ib. 122 B; Pericles his guardian, ib. 104 A, 118 C; his property, ib. 123 C; his beauty, Protag. 309 A; would not learn the flute, 1 Alcib. 106 E; his praise
INDEX.

of Socrates, Symp. 215 A foll.; his drunken entry into Agathon’s house, ib. 212 C; with Socrates at Delium, ib. 220 E foll.; at Potidæa, ib. 220 A, 221 A.

Alcibiades, ‘tales of,’ Rep. 110. 614 B.

Alcuaedæ, Meno 75 B.

Alexander, son of Alcetas, Gorg. 471 B.

Alexidemus, father of Meno, Meno 76 E.

Aliens, chosen to be generals at Athens, Ion 541.

‘All’ or ‘one,’ Soph. 244, 245.

Allotments in the model city, Laws 5.

Alpabet, Phil. 17, 18; of things, Pol. 278. Cp. Letters.

Alternation, a condition of existence, Phædo 72.

Amazons, their invasion of Attica, Menex. 239 B; famous as archers, Laws 7, 806 A.

Ambassadors, laws concerning, Laws 12, 941.

Amasis of Sais, Tim. 21 E.

Amber, attraction of, Tim. 80.

Ambition is of immortality, Symp. 208.

Ameles, the river (= Lethe), Rep. 10. 621 A, C.

Ainestris, the wife of Xerxes, 1 Alcib. 133 C.

Amusement defined, Laws 2. 667; comparative value of, ib. 658.

Ammon, a god in Egypt, Phædr. 274 D; the oracle of, ib. 275 C; Laws 5. 738 C; ‘by Ammon,’ the oath of Theordus, Pol. 257 B.

Amphereus, a son of Poseidon, Crit. 114 B.

 Amphion in the play of Euripides, Gorg. 485 E, 506 B.

Amphipolis, Socrates at, Apol. 28 E.

Amphiþryon, Theaet. 175 A.

Amycus, a boxer, Laws 7. 796.

Amynander, a tribesman of Critias, Tim. 21 C.

Aymonter, father of Phoenix, Laws 11. 931 B.

Anacharsis the Scythian, his inventions, Rep. 10. 600 A.

Anacreon, ‘the wise,’ Phædr. 233 C; his verses in honour of the house of Critias, Charm. 157 E.

Analogy of the arts and justice, Rep. 1. 349; of the arts applied to rulers, ib. 341; of men and animals, ib. 2.

Antaeus, a wrestler, Theaet. 169 B; Laws 7. 796 A.

Antenor, may have been like Pericles, Symp. 221 C.

Anthemion, father of Anytus, acquired wealth, Meno 90 A.

Antilochus, Ion 537 A.

Antimocerus of Mende, most famous of the disciples of Protagoras, Protag. 315 A.

375, 5. 459; of medicine and friendship, Lysis 217; of medicine and education, Laches 185; of sense and mental qualities, ib. 190; of death and sleep, Phædo 71; of thought and sense, Theaet. 188; use of in arguments, Pol. 285, 286, 297; of arts and politics, 1 Alcib. 107; argument from, Hipp. min. 373; of arts and moral qualities, ibid.

Analysis of language, Crat. 421, 422; of primary names, ib. 424.


Anarchy to be expelled, Laws 12. 942.

Anatomy discussed at length, Tim. 68 foll.

Anaxagoras, a friend of Pericles, Phædr. 270 A; 1 Alcib. 118 C; a Clazomenian, his books and opinions, Apol. 26 D; ‘Chaos’ of, Phædo 72 C; Gorg. 465 D; Socrates heard some one reading out of his book, Phædo 97 B, D, 98 B; the ‘mind’ of, ib. 97 C; Crat. 400 A; his discovery that the moon draws her light from the sun, ib. 409 B; his definition of justice, ib. 413 B; disciples of, ib. 409 B.

Anaximenes, his principle of growth, Phædo 96 C.

‘Ancient story,’ the, Pol. 269 foll.

Ancients, the, nearer the gods, Phil. 16.

Andromache, her sorrows told by rhapsodes, Ion 535 B.

Andron, with Hippias, Protag. 315 C; studied with Calliicles, Gorg. 487 C.

Andrortion, father of Andron, Protag. 315 C; Gorg. 487 C.

Angler and Sophist, Soph. 219 foll.

Angling, an acquisitive art, Soph. 219; defined, ib. 221.

Animals, division of, Pol. 262; great destruction of, ib. 273; animals as property, Laws 11. 915; ideal animal, Tim. 39; four kinds of, ib. 40 foll.

Antaeus, a wrestler, Theaet. 169 B; Laws 7. 796 A.

Anteon, may have been like Pericles, Symp. 221 C.

Anthemion, father of Anytus, acquired wealth, Meno 90 A.

Antilochus, Ion 537 A.

Antimocerus of Mende, most famous of the disciples of Protagoras, Protag. 315 A.
INDEX.

Antiochis, Socrates of the Antiochid tribe, Apol. 32 B.
Antiphon, Parm. 126 B foll.
Antiphon of Cephus, present at the trial of Socrates, Apol. 33 E.
Antiphon of Rhamnus, a teacher of rhetoric, Menex. 236 A.
Antiquarianism, Crit. 110.
Antisthenes, present at the death of Socrates, Phaedo 59 B.
Anytus, representative of the craftsmen against Socrates, Apol. 23 E, 25 B; not the destruction of Socrates, ib. 28 A; wishes for Socrates to be put to death, ib. 29 B, 31 A; a bad man, ib. 30 D (cp. 34 B), 36 A; a friend of Meno, Meno 90 A; takes part in the dialogue Meno, ib. 90 B-95 A; his advice to Socrates, ib. 94 E; in a rage, ib. 95 A.
Apaturia, Tim. 21 A.
Apemantus, father of Eudicus, Hipp. min. 363 A, 373 A.
Aphrodite, meaning of the name, Crat. 406 B, C; mother of Eros, Phaedr. 242 E; her inspiration, ib. 265 B; Aristophanes always in her company, Symp. 177 E; two goddesses of this name, ib. 180 D, C; goddess of peace and friendship, Soph. 243 A; bound by Hephæstus, Rep. 3. 390 C.
Apollo, meaning of the word, Crat. 404 B, C, D, 405 D; his followers, Phaedr. 253 B; his inspiration, ib. 265 B; his declaration with regard to Socrates, Apol. 21 B; discovered the arts of medicine, archery, and divination, Symp. 197 A; Theseus' vow to, Phaedo 58 B; swans sacred to, ib. 85 A; ancestral Apollo among the Ionians, Euthyd. 302 D; lawgiver of Lacedæmon, Laws 1. 624 A; his presence at festivals, ib. 2. 653 D, 665 A, D, 7. 796 E; education first given through Apollo and the Muses, ib. 2. 654 A; his oracle, 3. 686 A; his temple, ib. 8. 833 B; oath by, ib. 11. 936 E; the citizens to meet in his precincts, ib. 12. 945 D; the three best men of the state dedicated to him, ib. 946 C, D; his priests, ib. 947 A; sacrifice to at Delphi, ib. 950 E; his song at the nuptials of Thetis, Rep. 2. 383 A; Apollo and Achilles, 3. 391 A; Chryses' prayer to, ib. 394 A; lord of the lyre, ib. 399 E.

Apollodoros, brother of Aeantodoros, present at the trial of Socrates, Apol. 34 A, 38 B.
Apollodoros of Cyzicus, general of the Athenians, Ion 541 C.
Apollodoros, father of Hippocrates, Protag. 310 A, 316 B.
Apollodoros of Phalerum, narrates the Symposium, Symp. 172 A; his acquaintance with Socrates, ib. E; the 'madman,' ib. 173 D, E; present at the death of Socrates, Phaedo 59 A, B; his passionate grief, ib. 117 D.
Appetites, Rep. 9. 572 (cp. ib. 4. 439).
Appetitive elements of the soul, Rep. 4. 439.
Arbiters, Laws 12. 956.
Arcadian temple of Lycaean Zeus, Rep. 8. 565 D.
Arcadians dispersed into villages by the Lacedæmonians, Symp. 193 A.
Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, ruler of Macedonia, Gorg. 470 D; his crimes, ib. 471 A; thought happy by the sophist Polus, ib. 470 D, 472 D; will be found punished in the next world, ib. 525 D.
Archeopolis, meaning of the name, Crat. 394 C.
Archidamus, King of Sparta, 1 Alcib. 124 A.
Archilochus, quoted, Rep. 2. 365 C; not included in the rhapsode's art, Ion 531 A; inferior to Homer, ib. 532 A.
Architecture, Pol. 280; Rep. 4. 438; instruments required in, Phil. 56; Crit. 116.
Archon, King Archon a priest, Pol. 290; lists of archons, Laws 6. 785; images set up by the archons at Delphi, Phaedr. 235.
Arcturus brings the vintage, Laws 8. 844 E.
Ardius, tyrant of Pamphylia, his eternal punishment, Rep. 10. 615 C, E.
Areopagus, scene of the rape of Orthilia, Phaedr. 229 D.
Ares, meaning of the name, Crat. 407 C, D; effect of love on his companions, Phaedr. 252 C; conquered by love, Symp. 196 D; Ares and Aphroditē, Rep. 3. 390 C; temple of, Laws 8. 833 B; his votaries a class of craftsmen, ib. 11. 920 D.
Argimus, condemnation of the generals after, Apol. 32 B.
Argives defended by Athenians, Me-
INDEX.

nex. 239 B; assisted by Athenians, ib. 244 D; willing to give up the Asiatic allies, ib. 245 C; the Argive oath, Phaedo 89 C.

Argos, kings of, 1 Alcib. 121 A; subject to Dorians, Laws 3. 683 D; ruin of the kings of, ib. 690 D; Cretans from, ib. 4. 708 A; Agamemnon, king of, Rep. 3. 393 E.

Ariphron, teacher of Alcibiades, Protag. 320 A.

Aristides, son of Lysimachus, famous for his virtue, Gorg. 526 B; failed in training his son Lysimachus, Meno 94 A.

Aristides the younger, Laches 179 A; attended by Socrates, Theaet. 150 E.

Aristippus of Cyrene, not present at the death of Socrates, Phaedo 59 C.

Aristippus, of Larisa, lover of Meno, Meno 70 B.


Aristocrates, son of Scellius, his offering at Delphi, Gorg. 472 B.

Aristocratic State, the decline of, Rep. 8. 546.

Aristodemus, his portion in Peloponnese, Laws 3. 692 B.

Aristodemus, of the deme of Cydathenaeum, an admirer of Socrates, Symp. 173 B; narrates the dialogue Symposium, ib. 174 A; a 'weak head,' ib. 176 C (cp. ib. 223 C, etc.).

Aristogeiton overthrew the tyrants, Symp. 182 C.

Ariston, father of Adeimantus (and Plato), Apol. 34 A; father of Glaucos, Rep. 1. 327 A (cp. ib. 2. 368 A).

Aristonymus, father of Cleitophon, Rep. 1. 328 B.

Aristophanes, the comedian, satirized Socrates, Apol. 10 C; unwilling to drink, Symp. 176 A; in the company of Dionysus and Aphrodite, ib. 177 E; has a hiccough, ib. 185 G, E; his speech in honour of love, ib. 189 B foll.; a professor of jokes, ib. 213 C; his description of Socrates, ib. 221 B; converses with Socrates, ib. 223 C.

Aristophon, son of Aglaophon, a painter, Gorg. 448 B.

Aristoteles, one of the Thirty, Parm. 127 D; a friend of Socrates, ib. 135 D; respondent in the dialogue Parmenides, ib. 136 E.


Arms, manufacture of, Laws 8. 847; throwing away of, ib. 12. 914, 945.

Army needed in a state, Rep. 2. 374.

Art, influence of, on character, Rep. 3. 400 foll.; art-criticism, Ion 532 foll.; Laws 2. 667-669; requires knowledge, Ion 532, 540; exercised for the good of the subject, Euthyph. 13; Rep. 1. 342, 346-7; correlative to the subject matter, Ion 537; differ according to their functions, Rep. 1. 346; interested in their own perfection, ib. 342; causes of the deterioration of, ib. 4. 421; three arts concerned with all things, ib. 10. 601; art of fence, Laches 178, 183; Euthyd. 273; Sophist's art, Euthyd. 274; Gorg. 449; art of speech-making, ib. 290 (cp. Speech-making); of the general, ibid.; the rightly art, ib. 291; classification of, ibid.; Gorg. 450; art of rhapsody, Ion 533, 541; of horsemanship, etc., Euthyph. 13; is piety an art? ibid.; art and the preliminary conditions of art, Phaedr. 268, 269; art and experience, Gorg. 448, 501; art of calculation, ib. 451; art of pleasure, ib. 501; training required in, ib. 513; of the pilot, ib. 512; of command divided, Pol. 260; art and language, ib. 277; art of measurement divided, ib. 284; rejects bad material, ib. 308; arts differ in exactness, Phil. 56; productive, Soph. 219; acquisitive, ibid.; subdivided, ib. 219 foll.; of exchange, ib. 222; cooperative and causal, Pol. 281, 282; of composition and division, ib. 283; depend on a mean, ib. 284; unknown for many centuries, Laws 3. 677; art and chance, ib. 4. 709, 10. 889; art and nature, ib. 10. 889, 890; in politics, ib. 889; arts and moral qualities, Hipp. min. 373; 1 Alcib. 125; arts and politics, analogy of, 1 Alcib. 107 foll. For the analogy of the arts and virtues, cp. Analogy.

Artemis, goddess of childbirth, Theaet. 149 B; meaning of the
name, Crat. 406 B; temple of Agra, Phaedr. 229 B.
Aristeius, battle of, Menex. 241 A; Laws 4. 707 C.
Artist, the Great, Rep. 10. 596; artists dispose things in order, Gorg. 503, 504; artists and dialecticians, Phil. 59.
Artisans, not wise, Apol. 22; no citizen to be an artisan, Laws 8.
846; rules concerning, ib. 846, 847.
Asclepiadae, Rep. 4. 405 D (cp. Aesculapius); Hippocrates the Coan, an Asclepiad, Protag. 311 B (cp. Phaedr. 270 C).
Asclepiadae at Epidaurus, Ion 530 A.
Asia, Tim. 24 B, E; Crit. 108 E, 112 E.
Asopus, the ancient boundary of Attica, Crit. 110 E.
Aspasia, her speech, Menex. 236 A foll. (cp. 249 D); her eloquence, ib. 235 E.
Assaults, Rep. 5. 464; Laws 9. 879-882; on strangers, ib. 879; on elders, ib. 880; in self-defence, ibid.; on parents, ibid.; by slaves, ib. 882.
Assembly, attendance at, in the model city, Laws 6. 764.
Association of ideas, Phaedo 73.
Assyrians, Laws 3. 685 C.
Astronomy, Rep. 7. 527; ib. 529 foll.; defined, Gorg. 451; a discovery of Theuth, Phaedr. 274; is it impious? Laws 7. 821.
Astyanax, meaning of the name, Crat. 392 D.
Astylus, his continence, Laws 8. 840 A.
Atalanta, chose the life of an athlete, Rep. 10. 620 B.
Atheists, Laws 10. 885, 887 foll.; advice to, ib. 888.
Athena, Goddess of Attica, Crit. 109 C; why armed, ib. 110 A (cp. Tim. 24 B); = Neith, Tim. 21 E; her temple on the Acropolis, Crit. 112 B; goddess of arts, Pol. 274 C; Athena phratría, Euthyd. 302 D; Prometheus' theft upon, Protag. 321 D, E; her weaving due to love, Symp. 197 B; her name Pallas Athena, Crat. 407 A foll.; not to be considered author of the strife between Trojans and Achaeans, Rep. 2. 379 E; in the model state, Laws 5. 745 B (cp. 8. 848 D); goddess of the craftsmen, ib. 11. 920 E foll.; dances in honour of, ib. 7. 796 C, D.
Athenian confectionery, Rep. 3. 404 D.
Athenians at Naos, Euthyph. 4 C; exile of, Apol. 21 A; at Potidaea, Delium, and Amphipolis, ib. 28 E; under the thirty tyrants, ib. 32 C; at Corinth, Theaet. 142 A; at Tanagra and Coronea, Alcib. 1. 112 C foll.; at war with Sparta and the great king, 1 Alcib. 120 A; slain at Potidaea, Charm. 153 B, C; early wars of, Menex. 239 B foll.; pure blood of, ib. 245 D; history of, from the Persian war, ib. 231 foll.; compelled to pay tribute to Minos, Laws 4. 706 A; subjugate the Cnossians, ib. 1. 638 B; Megillus their πρόξενος, ib. 642 B; friendship of Athenians and Cretans, ib. 642 D; Athenians and Lacedaemonians savours of Greece, ib. 3. 692 E; laws of (have no law about the time of deciding causes), Apol. 37 B; the law compels the plaintiff to answer questions, ib. 25 D; laws for the sake of punishment, not of teaching, ib. 26 A; prisoners not put to death till the return of the mission-ship from Delphi, Crit. 43 D (cp. Phaedo 58 A foll.); laws on education, marriage, etc., ib. 50 foll.; the 'Eleven,' Phaedo 59 E; laws about love-affairs, Symp. 182 A, etc., 183 C; archons set up a golden image at Delphi, Phaedr. 235 D; early republic, Laws 3. 698 B foll.; nature of the republic, Menex. 238 C; have no Zeus πατρός, Euthyd. 302 D; intoxication at the Dionysia, Laws 1. 637 C; their dances in honour of Athena, ib. 7. 796 C, D; early history of, Tim. 21 D foll.; Crit. 110 A foll.; wisdom of, Protag. 337 D; free speech allowed among, Gorg. 461 E; tragic poets among, Laches 183 B; named from the goddess, Laws 1. 626 D; reputed fond of conversation, ib. 641 E; if good, very good, ib. 642 C; breeding of birds among, ib. 7. 789 B; Athenian speakers dragged from the bema by force, Protag. 320 C.
Athens, the King's Porch at, Euthyph. 2 A (cp. Theaet. 210 D); the Tholus, Apol. 32 C, D; judgment-hall and prison of Socrates, Phaedo 59 D; the walls and harbours due to Themistocles and Pericles, Gorg. 455 E; the palaestra of Taureas,
Charm. 153 A; the fountain of Panops, Lysis 203 A; Melité, Parm. 127 A; Ceramicus, outside the wall, ib. C; house of Morychus, Phaedr. 227 B; corpses exposed outside the northern wall, Rep. 4. 439 E (cp. Leontius); early topography of, Crit. 109 B–112 E; temple of Athena and Hephaestus, ib. 112 B; Athens and Atlantis, ib. 108 E; ancient Athens, Tim. 21 A, D, E.

Athletes, Rep. 3. 404 A; victorious athletes maintained in the Prytaneium, Apol. 36 D; held in honour, so that Atalanta chooses the soul of an athlete, Rep. 10. 620 B.

Athos, cut through by Xerxes, Laws 3. 699 A.

Atlantic Ocean, navigable in early times, Tim. 24 E; origin of the name, Crit. 114 A.

Atlantis, Tim. 25 A; Crit. 113 C foll.; productions of, ib. 115 A, B; arrangement of the country, ib. 115 C; temples, ib. 116 C, D, E; baths, ib. 117 A; the plain in, ib. 118 C; population, ib. 119 A; army of, ib. A, B; government of, ib. C; sacrifice of a bull in, ib. D, E.

Atlas, Crit. 114 A; his family, ib. 114 C (cp. 120 D; Phaedo 99 C).


Atreus, his name, Crat. 395 B; quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes, Pol. 268 E.

Atridae, Rep. 3. 393 A.

Atropos (one of the Fates), her song, Rep. 10. 617 C; spins the threads of destiny and makes them irreversible, ib. 620 E (cp. Laws 12. 960 C).

Attention, various meanings of the word, Euthyph. 13.

Attic heroes, Crit. 110 A; confections, Rep. 3. 404 E.

Attica, old language of, Crat. 398 B, D (cp. 401 C, 410 C, 418 B); old Attics used o for ω, ib. 420 B; e for η, ib. 426 C; ancient population of, Crit. 110 C; fertility of, ib. 111 C; government of, reviewed, Laws 3. 698 A; tribute paid to Minos, ib. 4. 706 A; little wood in, ib. 4. 706 B.

Audience at theatres includes women, children, and slaves, Gorg. 502; Laws 2. 658, 7. 817; as judges, ib. 2. 659.

Authorship honourable, Phaedr. 258.

Autochthon, Crit. 114 B.

Autolycus, Rep. 1. 334 A.

Avarice a cause of murder, Laws 9. 870.

Avariness in the mind, Theaet. 198.

Axiom, father of Cleinias, Euthyd. 271 B; 275 A.

Azaes, Crit. 114 C.

B.

Bacchic dances, Laws 7. 815 A; women, Ion 534 D, E; Laws 7. 790 D, E.

Balance of power required, Laws 3. 691.

Balls, the earth compared to leathern, Phaedo 110. Cp. Games.

Barbarians older than Greeks, Crat. 425 E.

Baths, Symp. 223; Crit. 117; Laws 6. 761.

Bathea, name of a hill near Troy (Hom. Il. 2. 813 foll.), Crat. 392 A.

Beast, the many-headed, Rep. 9. 588, 589; beasts which have killed a man, Laws 9. 673.

Beautiful, the, and the good, are one, Rep. 5. 452; Symp. 201; Lysis 216.

Beauty as a means of education, Rep. 3. 401; absolute, ib. 5. 476; Symp. 211; beauty and goodness, Symp. 201; gradations of, ib. 210; universal science of, ibid.; nature of, Phaedr. 250 foll.; Lysis 216; standard of, Gorg. 474; pleasure of, Phil. 51; in the scale of goods, ib. 65, 66.

Beds, the figure of the three beds, Rep. 10. 597.

Bees, laws concerning, Laws 8. 843.

Beggars, Laws 11. 930.

Being and not-being, Rep. 5. 477; being and becoming, Theaet. 157 (cp. Protag. 340); being in early Greek philosophy, Soph. 243, 244; being and unity, ib. 245; being (existence) defined as power, ib. 247, 248; being and motion, ib. 249; movable and immovable in, ibid.; neither in motion nor rest, ib. 250; being and the philosopher, ib. 254; as a genus, ib. foll.; being and not-being, ib. 257; being and other, ib. 259.


Belly, the, Tim. 73.
INDEX.

Bendidea, a feast of Artemis, Rep. i. 354 A (cp. 327 A, B).

Bendis, a title of Artemis, Rep. i. 327 A.


Bias of Priene, one of the Seven Wise Men, Protag. 343 A; not the author of the principle attributed to him (justice = doing harm to our enemies), Rep. i. 335 E.

Bile, Tim. 83.

Birds, Tim. 91; breeding of, at Athens, Laws 7. 789; habits of, ib. 8. 840; as offerings, ib. 12. 956.

Birth, authority of, Laws 3. 690.

Blood, Tim. 86.

Bodies, nature of, Tim. 54; forms of, ibid.; change of, ib. 56; bodies and shades, Laws 12. 959.

Body, human, Tim. 44; channels in the, ib. 77; youthful, ib. 81; symmetry of soul and body, ib. 88; motions of, ib. 89; a source of evil, Phaedo 66; soul and body, ib. 79; a prison, ib. 80, 82, 83; honour due to the, Laws 5. 728, 729; operations dealing with the, Gorg. 517.

Boeotians, Socrates’ bones, if free, would go to the, Phaedo 99 A; who fell at Tanagra, i Alcib. 112 C (cp. Menex. 242 A, B); ask aid of Athens, Menex. 244 D; willing to betray Asiatic Greece, ib. 245 C; common meals among, Laws 1. 616 B; honourable to gratify lovers among, Symp. 182 B.

Bones, Tim. 73.


Boreas carried off Orithya, Phaedr. 229 B, C; Thracian Boreas, Laws 2. 660 E.

Boundaries, laws concerning, Laws 8. 842, 843.

Bowls, Tim. 73.

Bowmen, mounted, Laws 8. 834.

Boxing, Rep. 4. 422.

Boys, boy-life at Athens, Charm. 154; Lysis 206–208; ib. 211, 223; unmanageable, Laws 7. 808 (cp. Alcibiades, Charmides, Lysis, Theaetetus).

Brain, Tim. 73.

Brasidas compared to Achilles, Symp. 221 C.

Brass, Tim. 59.

Briareus, how armed, Euthyd. 299 C; with a hundred hands, Laws 7. 793 C.

Bulls sacrificed in Atlantis, Crit. 119.

Buying and selling, regulations concerning, Laws 8. 849, 11. 915.

C.

Cadmeans at war with Argives, Menex. 239 B; ‘Cadmean Victory,’ Laws i. 641 C.

Cadmus of Thebes, Phaedo 95 A; the story of, Laws 2. 663 E; a barbarian, Menex. 245 C.

Caeneus the Thessalian, changed from woman to man, Laws 12. 944 D.


Callaeschrus, father of Critias, Protag. 316 A; Charm. 153 C.

Calliades, i Alcib. 119 A.

Callias, son of Calliades, i Alcib. 119 A.

Callias, son of Hipponicus, Protag. 314 E, 335 D; ‘the noble,’ ib. 362 A; paid large sums to the Sophists, Apol. 20 A; Crat. 391 C; Protagoras at his house, Protag. 311 A; guardian of Protagoras’ interests at Athens, Thracet. 165 A; his house the wealthiest in the city, Protag. 337 D; half-brother by the same mother to Paralus, son of Pericles, ib. 314 E.

Callicles, a person in the dialogue Gorgias, Gorg. 481 B, 505 E; Socrates’ account of him, ib. 487 A foll.; a public man, ib. 515 A; his view of temperance, ib. 491 E foll.; unfair in argument, ib. 499 C foll.; will not continue the argument, ib. 506 C; an Acharnian, ib. 495 D; loves the son of Pyrillames, ib. 481 D.

Calliope, eldest of the Muses, Phaedr. 259 D.

Cambyses, the son of Cyrus, his conquests, Menex. 239 E; nearly ruined the Persian empire, Laws 3. 694 G; his folly, ib. 695 B, C.


Captain, parable of the deaf, Rep. 6. 488.

Carelessness, not to be ascribed to the gods, Laws 10. 900 foll.

Carian (proverbial), Euthyd. 285 C; Laches 187 B; Carian wailers, Laws 8. 800 E.

Carthaginians given to intoxication,
INDEX.

Laws 1. 637 D; restrictions on drinking among, ib. 2. 674 B.
Caste, in Egypt, Tim. 24; in ancient Athens, ibid.
Causal arts, Pol. 282.
Causes, second, Tim. 46; two kinds of, ib. 68, 69; final, Phaedo 97, 98; cause and condition distinguished, ib. 99; the good denied by some to be a cause, ibid.; the idea of the cause, cause and effect, Euthyph. 105; Phil. 26, 27; creative causes, Phil. 27; causes of crimes, Laws 9. 863.
Gave, the image of the, Rep. 7. 514, 515.
Gebes, willing to provide money for Socrates’ escape, Crit. 45 B; a Theban, present at the death of Socrates, and taking part in the dialogue Phaedo, Phaedo 59 B; his native speech, ib. 62 A; his earnestness, ib. 63 A; his incredulity, ib. 70 A; fell, ib. 77 B; he compares the soul to a weaver’s coat, ib. 87 B; a friend of Philolaus, ib. 61 D.
Cercops, Crit. 110 A.
Ceans, subject to Athenians, Laws 1. 638 B; their use of the word χαλκην, Protag. 341 B.
Celibacy, fines on, Laws 6, 774.
Celts given to intoxication, Laws 1. 637 D.
Censorship of fiction, Rep. 2. 377, 3. 386 foll.; censors of magistrates, Laws 12, 945-947; creation of censors, ib. 946; burial of, ib. 947; trial of, ib. 947, 948.
Centaurs, Phaedr. 229 D; chorus of, Pol. 303 D.
Cephalus, father of Polemarchus, Rep. 1. 327 B; offers sacrifice, ib. 328 B, 331 D; his views on old age, ib. 328 E; his views on wealth, ib. 330 A; fell; father of Lysias, Phaedr. 227 A, 263 D.
Cephalus of Glazomenae, Rep. 1. 330 B; Parm. 126 A foll.
Cepis, father of Adeimantus, Protag. 315 E.
Ceramicus, outside the wall of Athens, Parm. 127 C.
Cerberus, two natures in one, Rep. 9. 588 C.
Cercyon, a wrestler, Laws 7. 796 A.
Chaerephon, father of Patrocles, half-brother to Socrates, Euthyd. 297 E, 298 A, B.
Chaerephon, his impetuosity, Apol. 21 A; goes with Socrates to Gorgias, Gorg. 447 A, etc.; a kind of madman, Charm. 153 B (cp. Apol. 21 A); consulted the oracle at Delphi concerning Socrates, Apol. 20 E; dead at the time of the Apology, ib. 21 A; a person in the dialogue Charmides, Charm. 153 A foll.
χαλκην, use of the word, Protag. 341.
Chance, the great legislator, Laws 4. 709; together with God, ibid.; and art, ib. 10, 889; and nature, ibid.
Change, evil of, Laws 7. 797, 798; in music, ib. 800.
Chaos, Tim. 53 A, 69 B.
Character, difference of, in women, Rep. 5. 456; formed in infancy, Laws 7. 791, 792; national character, Rep. 4. 435.
Charioteer of the soul, Phaedr. 246.
Charmantides, a Paeonian, present at the Republic, Rep. 1. 328 B.
Charmers, punishment of, Laws 10, 909.
Charmides, a person in the dialogue Charmides (see Temperance); son of Glauccon, Protag. 315 A; Socrates’ influence on him, Symp. 222 B; most beautiful youth of his time, Charm. 154 A, C; his disposition, ib. 154 E, 157 D; Critias his guardian, ib. 155 A; 176 C; his family, 157 E.
Charondas, lawyer of Italy and Sicily, Rep. 10. 599 E.
Chastisement, Gorg. 505.
Cheiron, teacher of Achilles, Hipp. min. 371 C; Rep. 3. 391 C.
Children, in the state, Rep. 5. 460; exposure of, ib. 461; to ride, ib. 467; instincts of, Laws 2. 653; education of, ib. 664; procreation of, ib. 6. 784, 785; registration of, ib. 785; fear and courage in, ib. 7. 791; care in the education of, ib. 808, 809; sports of, ib. 793; to meet at temples, ib. 794; innovation in the games of, ib. 797; a means of immortality, ib. 4. 721 (cp. Symp. 207); and parents, ib. 11. 928 foll.; desirability of, ib. 930; of slaves, ibid.; loss of, consolated, Menex. 247, 248; ‘children of the mind,’ Symp. 209.
Chilo, the Lacedaemonian, one of the Seven Wise Men, Protag. 343 A.
Chimaera, two natures in one, Rep. 9. 588 C; Phaedr. 229 D.
Chios, home of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Euthyd. 271 C, 288 B.
INDEX.

Choral art, Gorg. 501; 1 Alcib. 125 (cp. Laws 2. 672).
Chorus, parts of, Laws 2. 654; of Apollo and the Muses, ib. 664, 665; of Dionysus, ib. 665; the three, ib. 664; the aged, ib. 670, 671; *chorus* from ἥραπα, ib. 654; choric song, ib. 665; at Crete and Lacedaemon, ib. 666; choral art = education, ib. 672; choruses, ib. 6. 764, 765; of boys and girls, ib. 772; imitative, ib. 7. 798; in Egypt, ib. 799 (cp. 6. 764); judges of, ib. 12. 949.

Chryses, the priest of Apollo (II. 1. 11 foll.), Rep. 3. 392 E. foll.
Chryssippus murdered by Arethus, Crat. 395 B.
Chryson, his abstinence in training, Laws 8. 840 A.

Cimon, a good man, Gorg. 503 C, 515 D; ostracised, ib. 516 D; real author of the Athenian calamities, ib. 519 A.

Cinesias, a dithyrambic poet, Gorg. 501 E.

Cinyras, his wealth, Laws 2. 660 E.

Cithaeron, Crit. 110 D.


Citizens, assortment of, Pol. 308, 309; number of, Laws 5. 737, 738, ib. 6. 771; to be happy rather than rich, ib. 5. 743; classes of, in the model state, ib. 744, 6. 754; true praise of, ib. 7. 823; not to be retail traders, ib. 11. 919.

City, situation of the, Rep. 3. 415; early cities, Laws 3. 680, 681; name of, ib. 4. 704; situation of, ib. 5. 745; divisions of, ibid.; purification of, ib. 735, 736; compared to a ship, ib. 6. 758; compared to a man, ib. 12. 964, 965; the heavenly, Rep. 9. 592; the ‘city of pigs,’ ib. 2. 372. Cp. Constitution, State.

Clans, Laws 3. 68.

Classes, division into, Pol. 285.

Clazomenae, Parm. 126 A, B.

Cleiniás, father of Alcibiades, Protag. 309 C; 1 Alcib. 103 A, 105 D, 131 D; Gorg. 481 D; fell at Coronea, 1 Alcib. 112 C.

Cleiniás, younger brother of Alcibiades, Protag. 320 A; 1 Alcib. 104 B, ib. 118 E.

Cleiniás, son of Axiochus, Euthyd. 271 A, 273 A; his education, ib. 275 A; falls in the conversation in the dialogue Euthydemus, ib. 275 D–282 D, 288 D–290 E.

Cleinias, the Cretan of Cnosus, a person in the Laws, Laws 1. 624 foll. (cp. ib. 3. 702 C, 6. 752 A).

Cleito, Crit. 113 D, 116 C.

Cleitophon, the son of Aristonymus, Rep. 1. 328 B; interposes on behalf of Thrasymachus, ib. 340 A.

Cleobulus of Lindus, one of the Seven Wise Men, Protag. 343 A.

Cleombrotus, absent at the time of Socrates’ death, Phaedo 59 C.

Cleopatra, mother of Perdiccas, Gorg. 471 C.

Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, a famous horseman, Meno 93 D, E.

Cleomenes, Rep. 7. 519; in excess, Laws 7. 819.

Climate, influence of, on men, Laws 5. 747.

Clotho, second of the fates, Rep. 10. 617 C, 620 E; Laws 12. 960 C; sings of the present, Rep. 10. 617 C; the souls brought to her, ib. 620 E.

Cnosians, Cleinias a Cnosian, Laws 1. 629 C; colony of, ib. 3. 702 C, 752 D, E, 754 B, G, D.

Cnosus, a city in Crete, Laws 1. 625 A, 6. 752 E, 754 D; form of government in, ib. 4. 712 E.

Cocks, training of, Laws 7. 789.

Cocytus, Rep. 3. 387 B; described, Phaedo 113 C; homicides cast forth by, ib. 114 A.

Codrus died to preserve the kingdom for his sons, Symp. 208 D.

Colonization, Laws 4. 708, ib. 5. 736.

Colonies, Gortyn or Cnosian, Laws 3. 702; and metropolis, ib. 6. 752 and passim (cp. Model State); younger sons sent into, ib. 11. 923, 925, 929.

Colour, Tim. 67, 68; a common notion, Meno 74; defined, ib. 76; origin of, Theaet. 153; metaphorical use of the word, Laws 2. 654; difficulty in distinguishing, Rep. 9. 585; indelible, ib. 4. 429.

Columns, with figures on them, Symp. 193; with laws written on them, Crit. 118 C.

Comedy, effect of, Rep. 10. 666; Phil. 48 (cp. Laws 2. 658); amusement of slaves, Laws 7. 816 foll.; same poet can write comedy and tragedy, Symp. 223; same actors cannot act both, Rep. 3. 395; imitative, ib. 394.
INDEX.

Comic poets, Laws 11. 935; the enemies of Socrates, Apol. 18. 19; Phaedo 70.
Command and obedience, Laws 6. 762.
Commensurable things, Laws 7. 819, 820.
Common life in the state, Rep. 5. 458; common meals of the guardians and property, ib. 3. 416; common meals (αναστάτων), Laws 1. 625, 633; evil of, ib. 636, 8. 842; common meals of warders, ib. 6. 762; common notions, Meno 74.
Communism, highest form of, Laws 5. 739.
Community, of women, Rep. 5. 457; of property, useful, ib. 462; of property, ib. 464.
Compassionateness of Athens to the weak, Menex. 244, 245.
Condemnation of Socrates, Apol. 38. 39.
Confidence and courage, Protag. 351, 359 foll.
Conflication, a great, Tim. 22.
Conflict, the immortal, Laws 10. 906.
Connus, son of Metrobius, music-master of Socrates, a harp-player, Euthyd. 272 C (cp. Menex. 235 E); disliked opposition, ib. 295 D.
Constitution, the aristocratic, is the ideal state sketched in Rep. bk. 4; defective forms of constitution, Rep. 8. 544 foll; 'timocracy,' ib. 545 foll; oligarchy, ib. 550 foll; democracy, ib. 555 foll; tyranny, ib. 562 foll; Lacedaemonian, ib. 544; Laws 3. 692; of Athens in early times, Laws 3. 700; Athenian, Menex. 258. Cp. Crcte, Government, Lacedaemon, State.
Contests, no abuse allowed at, Laws 10. 935 (cp. ib. 936); umpires of ibid; musical, ib. 2. 657; various kinds of, ib. 658; musical and gymnastic, ib. 6. 764 foll., 8. 828, 12. 947; contests of horses, ib. 764; preparation for, ib. 7. 731; judges at, ib. 12. 949; Theact. 173; law against the obstruction of competitors, ib. 12. 955; contests of rhapsodes, Ion 530; the cithara in, Gorg. 501 E.
Contracts, laws concerning, Laws 8. 847; are holy, ib. 5. 729.
Contradiction, nature of, Rep. 4. 436; proved impossible, Euthyd. 285.
Contributions, Laws 11. 915; compulsory, ib. 12. 949.
Convention, and nature, Laws 10. 889, 890; in morals, Gorg. 483.
Convivial meetings, Laws 1. 639 foll.; a kind of education, ib. 641; bring out character, ib. 650. For a description of a Greek banquet, cp. the Symposium, and references under 'Greek Life.'
Cook and physician, Gorg. 521, 522.
Cookery, how far an art, Gorg. 462, 463; art of, ib. 465, 518; and medicine, ib. 501.
Co-operative arts, Pol. 281, 287.
Corinth, battle of, Theat. 142 A.
Corinthian courtzeans, Rep. 3. 404 D.
Corinthians, the, feel a need of Athens, Menex. 244 D; willing to betray the Asiatic Greeks, ib. 245 C; ὁ Δίως Κάρυδος, Euthyd. 292 E.
Coronea, battle of, 1 Alcib. 112 C.
Corpses, not to be spoiled, Rep. 5. 469.
Correction, art of, Soph. 229.
Corruptio optimi pessima, Rep. 6. 491.
Corybantes, at the mysteries, Euthyd. 277 D; not in their right mind, Ion. 534 A; medical effects of their dances, Laws 7. 790 D.
Cosmos, Gorg. 508; Phil. 29.
Council in the model city, Laws 6. 756; division of, ib. 758; duties of, ibid. nocturnal, ib. 12. 951, 961, 968.
Country, best defence of the, Laws 6. 760; country to be served without pay, ib. 12. 955.
Courage in the state, Rep. 4. 429; defined, ibid.; = staying at the post, Laches 190; = endurance of the soul, ib. 192; = knowledge of that which inspires fear or confidence, ib. 195; in animals, ib. 196; distinguished from fearlessness, ib. 197; concerned with the good and evil of all time, ib. 199; a part of virtue, ib. 190, 199; Protag. 349, 359, 359; courage and wisdom, Protag. 350, 360 (cp. Gorg. 495; Laws 12. 263); = knowledge of that which is not dangerous, ib. 360; contradiction in ordinary courage, Phaedo 68; courage and temperance opposed, Pol. 357; in excess, ib. 358, 359; to be blended with temperance, ib. 310; which resists pleasure, Laws 1. 633; a good, i Alcib. 115.
Courts of Law, at Athens, Apol. 34; Laws 5. 766, 9. 876.
Cowardice, Protag. 359 foll.
INDEX.

Crane, nurseries of, Pol. 263, 264.
Cratylus, his name, Crat. 383 B; on names, ib. 383 A, 428 B foll.; Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, ib. 432 B.
Creation, reason of, Tim. 29; species of, ib. 39, 40; myth of, Protag. 320 foll.; Greek view of, Soph. 265; physical theories of, Laws 10. 889.
Creator of the world, Tim. 28.
Creon, a Thessalian, father of Scopas, Protag. 339 A.
Creophylus, 'the child of flesh,' companion of Homer, Rep. 10. 600 B.
Cresphontes, King of Messene, Laws 3. 683 D; an early legislator, ib. 692 B.
Cretan young men not allowed to go into other cities, Protag. 342 D; naked exercises among, Rep. 5. 452 C; Cretan government generally applauded, ib. 8. 544 C; a timocracy, ibid.; Cretan opinion of Rhadamantus, Laws 1. 625 A; legislator, ib. 626 A, B; institutions, ib. 631 B; evil effect of gymnasia in Crete, ib. 636 B; colony, ib. 3. 702; state has a certain moderation, ib. 3. 693 E; opinion of the battle of Salamis, ib. 4. 707 B; Cretans in part of Argive descent, ib. 708 A; mounted bowmen, ib. 8. 834 D.
Cretan, good government of, Crito 53 A; laws of, derived from Zeus, Laws 1. 624 A; scenery of, ib. 625 B; institutions of, ibid.; laws of, give no experience in pleasure, ib. 635 B foll.; imperfect, ib. 2. 662 C; look to warlike virtues, ib. 4. 703 E; treatment of love at, ib. 8. 836 B; distribution of fruits in, ib. 847 E; gymnastic and music in, ib. 2. 673 A foll.; Crete and Lacedaemon, ib. 3. 683 A, 693 E; Theseus' voyage to, Phaedo 58 A; Crete sends out a colony, Laws 3. 702 C, 4. 707 E; rocky nature of, ib. 704 C; nature of the country not suitable for horses, ib. 8. 834 B; furnishes help to lawgivers, ib. 8. 836 B; common tables in, ib. 8. 842 B; ancient philosophy of, Protag. 342 A.
Criminals, Laws 9. 853; the children of, ib. 855, 856; criminal law, ib. 853 foll.
Crisis of Himera, a runner, Protag. 336 A; his abstinence during training, Laws 8. 840 A.
Crito the elder, Tim. 20 E, 21 A; Charm 157 E; Crit. 113 B.
Crito the younger, son of Callaecchus, present at the Protagoras, Protag. 316 A foll.; a descendant of Solon, Charm. 153 C, 155 A; guardian and cousin of Charmides, Charm. 155 A, 156 A, 176 C (cp. Tim. 19 C); well acquainted with politics, Tim. 20 A; tells the 'ancient tale,' ib. 21 A, B (cp. Crit. 106 B); a friend of Socrates, Charm. 156 A; a wise man, ib. 161 B. Crito takes part in the dialogues Charmides, Critias, and Timaeus.
Criticism of speeches, Phaedr. 262 foll.; verbal criticism, Protag. 342 foll.; applies to good and bad equally, Ion 531; of poetry, ib. 532; of painting, sculpture, and music, ib. 533; of sophistry, Euthyd. 303, 304; implies knowledge of the whole, Ion 532; value of, in science, Pol. 298; qualities necessary for criticism of the soul, Gorg. 487.
Crito comes to Socrates in prison, Crito 45 A, etc.; urges Socrates to escape, ib. 45 A foll.; will go to Euthydemos with Socrates, Euthyd. 272 E; joins in the dialogue Euthydemos, ib. 290 E—292 E; 304 C—307 B; doubts the value of philosophy, ib. 305 B; anxious about the education of his son, ib. 306 D; his means, Crito 45 A; his friends in Thessaly, ib. 45 B, 53 D; with Socrates at the last, Phaedo 60 A, 63 D; receives the last commands, ib. 115 A, 118 D; of the same age and deme as Socrates, Apol. 33 D; offers to be one of the sureties, ib. 38 B; Socrates entrusts Xanthippe to his care, Phaedo 60 A.
CritoEnus, son of Crito, Apol. 33 E; offers to be one of the sureties, ib. 38 B; his appearance as a boy, Euthyd. 271 B; needs a teacher, ib. 306 D; present at the death of Socrates, Phaedo 59 B.
Croesus, 'as the oracle said to Croesus,' Rep. 8. 566 C.
Crommyonian sow, not to be called courageous, Laches 196 E.
Cronos, age of, Pol. 269 A foll.; Laws 4. 713 A foll.
Cronos, ill treated by Zeus, Euthyph.
INDEX.

6 A, 8 B; Rep. 2, 377 E; judgment of men under, Gorg. 523 A, B; etymology of, Crat. 396 B; old-fashioned days of, ib. 402 A; kingdom of, Pol. 269 A (cp. ib. 271 C); life in the days of, ib. 272, A, B (cp. 276 A); his treatment of Uranus, Rep. 2. 377 E; love not older than, Symp. 195 D; his stupidity, Crat. 396 B.

Crypelia, Laws 1. 633 C.

Ctesippus, the Paeanian, well-bred, but wild, Euthyd. 273 A; friend of Cleinias, ib. 274 B, C, 283 E, etc.; eager for virtue, ib. 285 C; his passionate character, ib. 283 E, 288 A, 294 C, 300 E; present at the death of Socrates, Phaedo 59 B.

Cupping-glasses, Tim. 80.

Curetes, Laws 7. 796 B.

Currency in the model city, Laws 5. 742.


Custom, varieties of, Laws 6. 782.

Cyclopes, Homer’s picture of the (Od. 9. 112-115), Laws 3. 680 B (cp. ib. 682 A).

Cydathecaem, the deme of, Symp. 173 B.

Cydias quoted on love, Charm. 155 D.

Cypress-wood, Laws 4. 705 C; groves of, ib. 1. 624 B; used for writing, ib. 5. 741 C.

Cyprus, the expedition to, Menex. 241 E; Cyprian rites, Laws 5. 738 C.

Cypselids, their offering at Olympia, Phaedr. 236 B.

Cyrene, Theodorus of, Theact. 143 C.

Cyprus, Laws 1. 630 A.

Cyrus, an object of ambition to Alcibiades, 1 Alcib. 105 C, D; freed the Persians, Menex. 239 D; never had any real education, Laws 3. 694 A foll.; his sons, etc. ib. 695 B foll.

Cyzicus, Apollodorus of, Ion 541 C.

D.

Dactyllic metre, warlike nature of, Rep. 3. 400 foll.

Daedalus, moving figures of, Meno 97 D foll.; arguments compared to them, Euthyph. 11 B foll., 15 B; son of Motion, a sculptor, Ion 533 A; ancestor of Socrates, 1 Alcib. 121 A; his date, Laws 3. 677 D; beauty of his works, Rep. 7. 529 D; forefather of the Athenians, Euthyph. 11 A.

Damon, tutor of Pericles, 1 Alcib. 118 C; of the sons of Nicias, recommended by Socrates, and accomplished, Laches 180 C; a friend of Socrates, always with Prodicus, ib. 197 D; his wisdom, ib. 200 A; an authority on rhythm, Rep. 3. 406 B (cp. ib. 4. 424 C).

Danaus, descendants of, Menex. 245 D.

Dancing in education, Rep. 3. 412; Laws 2. 655; at Crete and Laccadmon, Laws 2. 660; dancing and gymnastic, ib. 673; origin of dancing due to a sense of rhythm, ibid.; dances of youths and maidens, ib. 6. 771; two kinds of, ib. 7. 795; imitative nature of, ib. 796, 798, 814; military dances, ib. 796, 12. 942; Pyrrhic, ib. 815, 816; dance of peace, ibid.


Darius, his conquests, Menex 239 E; his parentage and laws, Laws 3. 695 C, D; his invasion of Greece, ib. 698 C, D, E; an author, Phaedr. 258 B; his wealth, Lysis 211 E; his expedition against the Scythians, Gorg. 483 E.

Datis, commander of the Persian army, Menex. 240 A; Laws 3. 698 C.

Day and night, Tim. 39; dies fasti and nefasti, Laws 7. 800 E; of festival, ib. 8. 828, 834; days for selling and buying, ib. 8. 849.

Daydreams, Rep. 5. 458.

Dead, judgment of the, Gorg. 523; condition of, ib. 524; eulogies over, Laws 7. 801; souls of, take an interest in human affairs, ib. 11. 927; sepulchres of, ib. 12. 958; laying out of, ib. 959; honour paid to, at Athens, Menex. 249.

Death, Tim. 81; Apol. 37; no one knows what it is, ib. 29; either a sleep or a migration, ib. 40; philosophic desire of, Phaedo 64, 67, 80; nature of, ib. 64; necessary to pure knowledge, ib. 66; fears of, ib. 77; such fears natural, ib. 95; Gorg. 524; death and life, which is better? Laws 8. 828; death the punishment of parricide, ib. 9. 869, 873; of murder, ib. 871; of slaves, ib. 872; of the unknown murderer, ib. 874; punishment by death, ib. 9. 880, 881 (cp. ib. 854).

Decemvirs for founding a Cretan colony, Laws 3. 702, 6. 751.
Definition, difficulty of obtaining definitions, Euthyph. 10; by enumeration, Meno 71, 72; Euthyph. 6; definition and common notions, Meno 74 foll.; not to be given in terms unexplained, ib. 79; necessary in speech-writing, Phaedr. 263; definition or explanation, Theaet. 266; definition and names, Soph. 218.

Deformity and vice, Soph. 228, 229. Δεινοσ, use of the word, Protag. 341.

Delium, Socrates at, Laches 181 B; Apol. 28 E; Symp. 221 A.

Delos, the mission-ship to, Crito 43 D; Phaedo 58 A, B, 59 E.

Delphi, the god at, a witness to the wisdom of Socrates, Apol. 20 E, 21 A; religion left to the god at, Laws 5. 738 B, 6. 759 C, D; Rep. 4. 427 B; Delphian god consulted, Laws 9. 856 E; Delphian priestess mad, Phaedr. 244 A; golden images at, ib. 235 D (cp. Euthyd. 299 B); Delphian god an authority in removing deposits, Laws 11. 914 A; inscriptions in the temple at, Charm. 164 D foll.; Protag. 343 B; Phaedr. 229 E; i Alcib. 1. 124 B, 129 A, 132 C; Phil. 48 C; Laws 4. 923 A.

Delta, the Egyptian, Tim. 21 E.

Deluge, Tim. 22; of Deucalion, Crit. 112; tradition of, Laws 3. 677, 678.

Demeter, etymology of the name, Crit. 404 B; her gifts to men, Laws 6. 782 B.


Democracy, spoken of under the parable of the ship, Rep. 6. 488; philosophy and democracy, ib. 494, 500; the third form of imperfect state, ib. 8. 544; detailed account of, ib. 555 foll.; elements combined in, ib. 564; democracy in animals, ib. 563; evil of, Pol. 293, 302, 303; Laws 3. 705; to be combined with monarchy, Laws 2. 693, 698; the democratic mun, Rep. 8. 558, 559 foll., 562.

Democrats, father of Lysis, Lysis 204 E; his wealth, ib. 205 C.

Demodocus, father of Paralus, Apol. 33 E.

Demons (spirit, genius, δαιμων), Laws 4. 717; prayers to, ib. 7. 801; have separated men into classes, Pol. 271; Socrates’ denial of the existence of, Apol. 27 foll.; every man has a demon (genius), Phaedo 108; nature and name of, Crat. 397; midway between men and gods, Symp. 202; Love a great demon (spirit), ibid.; worship of, Rep. 4. 427 B; intermediate between God and man, Symp. 202 E.

Demophon, father of Menexenus, Lysis 208 B.


Demus, son of Pyrilampes, Gorg. 481 E.

Dependants as day-labourers, Euthyph. 4.

Depletion, Tim. 81.

Deposits, Laws 11. 913.

Desertion, indictment for, Laws 12. 943.

Desires, simple and qualified, Rep. 4. 437 foll.; nature of, Symp. 192, 200, 201 (cp. Phaedr. 257, 251); desire is of the soul only, Phil. 34; desires of men, Laws 6. 782, 783; control of, ib. 8. 835, 836. Cp. Love.

Despots (masters), Rep. 5. 463. See Tyrants.

Despotism, Laws 3. 697, 701.

Deucalion, Tim. 22 A; flood in the time of, Crit. 112 A.

Diagnosis, Greek method of, Protag. 352.

Dialect, Old Attic, Crit. 398, 418; = α =, ib. 410; = η, ib. 426; Thessalian, ib. 405; Doric, ib. 409; Eretrian, ib. 434.

Dialectical, division of, Soph. 253; distinguished from eristic, Phil. 17; Rep. 7. 539; a gift of the gods, ibid.; first among all learning, ib. 57 (cp. Rep. 7. 534); (division), Pol. 258, 262, 265 (cp. 261-268); (dichotomy), ib. 262; where dialectic fails, ib. 285; the best method of, ib. 286; dialectical method of argument, Parm. 135; synthetic and analytic method, Phaedr. 265; dialectic and rhetoric, ib. 266, 270; and writing, ib. 277; effect of, ib. 277; double method of, Rep. 7. 511; capable of attaining to the idea of good, ib. 532; gives firmness to hypotheses, ib. 533; time for, ib. 537; effect of the study of, ibid.; years to be spent in, ib. 539; Athenian skill in, Laws 10. 892; the ‘dialectical net,’ Soph. 235; the
INDEX.

561
dialectical method 'no respecter of persons,' Pol. 266; regardless of fine names, Soph. 227; the young dialectician, Phil. 15, 16; has a conception of essence, Rep. 7, 534; dialectic and artists, Phil. 59.
Diaprepes, son of Poseidon, Crit. 114 C.
Diet, Rep. 3. 494.
Differences, accidental and essential, Rep. 5. 454; in natural inclination explained, Phaedr. 252.
Dinomachê, mother of Alcibiades, 1 Alcib. 105 D; her wardrobe not worth fifty minae, ib. 123 D.
Dioeces, father of Euthydemus, Symp. 222 B.
Diomedes, his command to the Greeks, (II. 4. 412); Rep. 3. 389 E.
Dion, an orator, Menex. 234 B.
Dione, mother of Aphrodite Pandemos, Symp. 180 E.
Dionysiac festivals, Laws 1. 637 B; Rep. 5. 475 E.
Dionysodorus comes to Athens, Euthyd. 271 B; in a large way of wisdom, ib. 273 C; his disciples, ib. 274 B; elder of the 'Thurian brothers,' ib. 283 A; converses with Ctesippus, ib. 283 E, 285 D foll., 298 D; converses with Socrates, ib. 293 E foll., 297 A foll.
Dionysus, his influence on Bacchic maidens, Ion 534 A; Aristophanes always in his company, Symp. 177 E; his festivals, Laws 1. 653 D, 665 A, 672 B; Rep. 5. 475 E; may be invited by men over forty years of age, Laws 1. 666 B; his gifts not to be censured, ib. 672 A; choristers of, ib. 7. 812 B; the joy of, ib. 8. 844 E; temple of, Gorg. 472 A.
Diopompus, his abstinence, Laws 8. 840 A.
Dioscuri, Euthyd. 293 A; games in honour of, Laws. 7. 796 B.
Diotima, the wise woman of Mantinea, Symp. 201 D-212 A.
Discerning, art of (bakriptikê), sub-divided, Soph. 226.
Discord, causes of, Rep. 5. 462; the ruin of states, ibid.; in Greek cities, ib. 470; discord and disease, Soph. 228; discord and vice, ibid.
Discourse, Greek love of, Apol. 23, 33; Rep. 5. 459; exemplified in Phaedrus, Phaedr. 228, 258; in Socrates, ib. 230, 236; nature of, Soph. 260 foll.; = connection of verbs and nouns, ib. 262; false, ib. 263; length of, Pol. 286, 287; to be learnt, Laws 7. 811.
Disease, Rep. 3. 405, 408 foll.; inherent in everything, ib. 10. 609; origin of, Tim. 81, 82 foll.; Symp. 188; diseases of the soul, Tim. 86; of body and soul compared, Crito 48; disease and discord, Soph. 228; disease and vice, ib.; in life, Laws 5. 734; injustice compared to, ib. 10. 606.
Display, art of, Soph. 224.
Dispositions, difference of, Theaet. 144.
Disputation, Greek love of, Gorg. 458.
Cp. Discourse.
Dithyrambic poetry, seeks pleasure only, Gorg. 501; sacred to Bacchus, Laws 3. 700; nature of, Rep. 3. 394.
Diversities of natural gifts, Rep. 2. 370.
Divine beauty, wisdom, goodness, etc., Phaedr. 247.
Divination, Symp. 188; maartêi, Phaedr. 244; olaamartêi, ibid.; of the dying, Apol. 39; by the liver, Tim. 71.
Diviners, Tim. 72; Ion 534; Euthyph. 4; Pol. 290; Laws 11. 913, 913.
Division and generalization in disputation, Phaedr. 265; logical method of, Phil. 16; Soph. 219; division and predication, Soph. 253 (cp. Dialectic); of sciences, Pol. 258; of knowledge, ib. 259, 260; of objects of production, ib. 261; of the art of command, ibid.; of the breeding of living creatures, ibid.; process of, ib. 262; of animals, ib. 263; of herds, ib. 264, 265; process of, illustrated by weaving, ib. 279; into classes, ib. 285; into members, ib. 287.
Division of labour, Rep. 2. 370, 4. 443; Laws 8. 846, 847.
Division of land, Laws 5. 736; in the model state, ib. 737.
Divorce, Laws 11. 930.
Dodona, the oaks of, Phaedr. 275 B; the priestesses of, mad, ib. 244 B; oracle of, Laws 5. 738 C.
Dogô, Socrates' oath by the, Charm. 172; Lysis 211, 212; Apol. 21; Phaedo 99; Gorg. 461, 482; Rep.
INDEX.

3. 399, 9. 592; dogs are philosophers, Rep. 2. 376.
Dolphin, Arion's, Rep. 5. 453; as ornaments, Crit. 116.
Dorian harmony, Rep. 3. 399 A; Laws 2. 670 B; = the true Hellenic mode, Laches 188 D; a harmony of words and deeds, ib. 193 D; dialect, Crit. 409 A.
Dorians, origin of, Laws 3. 682 E; = Heracleidae, ib. 685 E; settlement of Dorian army, ib. 702 A.
Draughts, Laws 7. 820; Rep. 6. 487.

Cp. Games.

Dreams, Crito 44; Phaedo 60; dream of the reign of knowledge, Lysis 173; dream of Socrates, Theaet. 201, 202; impure, Rep. 9. 572; cause of, Tim. 46.

Drinking and music, Laws 1. 642; regulations on, ib. 2. 671–674.

Drones, the, Rep. 8. 552.

Dropidas, great grandfather of Critias, Charm. 157 E; Tim. 20 E.

Drunkenness at marriages unlawful, Laws 6. 775.

Duty not to be paid, Laws 8. 847.

Dyeing, Rep. 4. 429.

E.

Early society, Rep. 2. 359; early man, Laws 3. 678, 679; early rising, ib. 7. 808.

Earth, eldest of the gods, Tim. 40; position in the universe, ib. 49; form of the, ib. 55; earth and water, compounds of, ib. 60, 61; description of, Phaedo 109–114; sacredness of, Laws 5. 740, 12. 955; a goddess, ib. 10. 886; origin of, ib. 889; the mother of Athens, Tim. 23; mother of Oceanus, ib. 40; mother of the female sex, Symp. 190; earth and fire source of the universe, Tim. 31; men sprung from, Pol. 271; an element in animals, Phil. 29.

Eating, pleasure accompanying, Laws 2. 667.

Echecrates of Phlius, Phaedo 57 A, 88 C, 102 A.

Education (see Gymnastic and Music), of guardians, Rep. 2. 376 foll., ib. 7. 521; use of fiction in, ib. 2. 377 foll., 392; music and gymnastic both for the soul, ib. 3. 410 (but cp. Laws 7. 795); melody in, ib. 3. 398 foll.; mimetic art in, ib. 399; influence of, on manners, ib. 4. 424, 425; innovation in, dangerous, ibid.; philosophic, ib. 6. 498; the longer way in, ib. 504; the higher, ib. 7. 514–537; professors of, ib. 518; real nature of, ibid.; not compulsory, ib. 536; age for the higher, ib. 537; the prelude, ib. 532; influence of, Tim. 87; Laws 7. 788; division of, Soph. 229; good of, Laws 1. 641; by convivial meetings, ib. 2. 653, 657; nature and power of, ib. 1. 643 foll.; must begin early, ibid.; aims at ideals, ib. 643, 644; is the first and fairest thing, ib. 644; in temperance, ib. 647; = training of instincts in children, ib. 2. 653; music in, ib. 654; given through Apollo and the Muses, ibid.; in Egypt, ib. 656, 7. 819; education and legislation, 2. 659; at Crete and Lacedaemon, ib. 666, 667; parts of, ib. 672, 673; minister of, ib. 6. 765; importance of, ib. 766; of young children, ib. 768 foll., 791 foll.; compulsory, ib. 7. 804; guardians of, ib. 809; Athenians careless of, ib. 812; sometimes neglected, Laches 179; care due to, ib. 185, 186; what advice to be taken about, ib. 186; seriousness of, Protag. 313; of sons of good men, ib. 320, 324, 325; popular, ib. 325, 326; a life-long process, ib. 325; Greek not taught in, ib. 328; a Sophist's view of, ib. 339; subjects of, with boys, Euthyd. 276; value of, ib. 306, 307; difficulty of finding a teacher, Apol. 20.

Influences of existence, Meno 76.

Egypt, education in, Laws 2. 656 D, 7. 819 A; painting in, ib. 657 A; tale brought by Solon from, Tim. 21 C; embalmment in, Phaedo 80 C; passage-money from, to Athens = two drachmae, Gorg. 511 D; kings are priests, Pol. 290 E; Athenian expedition to, Menex. 241 E.

Egyptian Delta, Tim. 21 E; deity Neith, ibid.; deity Theuth, Phaedr. 274 C, D; Egyptians characterized by love of money, Rep. 4. 436 A; habit of craft in the, Laws 5. 747 C; consecrate every sort of dance, ib. 7. 799 A; 'Egyptian tales,' Phaedr. 275 B; Proetus the wizard, Euthyd. 288 B; names translated, Crit. 113 A.

Eileithyia, women to assemble in the
INDEX.

563

Elasippus, son of Poseidon, Crit. 114 C.
Elea, Soph. 216 A.
Eleatic philosophy criticized, Soph. 241 E. foll.; Eleatic stranger, ib. 216 A; Zeno (Palamedes), an Eleatic, Phaedr. 261 D.
Election of magistrates in the model city, Laws 6. 753 foll.; of council, ib. 756; of officers, ib. 759; of the wardens of the country, ib. 760; of judges, ib. 767; mixed mode of election, ib. 759, 763, 767; best mode of, ib. 756, 757.
Elements, the four in creation, Tim. 32; nature of, ib. 49; origin of, ib. 52, 53; the primal, ib. 51; the four, various kinds of, ib. 58; as letters, Theaet. 202; four elements, Phil. 27, 29; Laws 10. 891.
Elephants in Atlantis, Crit. 115.
Eleusis, war against the tyrants in, Menex. 243 E.
Elis, house of Hippias at, Hipp. min. 363 C; treatment of love at, Symp. 182 B.
Emigration, rules concerning, Laws 12. 949 foll.
Emmeleiai, Laws 7. 816 B.
Empedocles, Meno 76 C; Theaet. 152 E.
End, the, and use of the soul, Rep. 1. 353; distinguished from the means, Laches 185; of life, Laws 7. 807.
Ends and excellences (ἀπεραι) of things, Rep. 1. 353; ends as final causes, Lysis 219, 220; as causes, Gorg. 467.
Endymion, Phaedo 72 C.
Engine-makers, Gorg. 512.
Enquiry, sophistical limitation of, Meno 80; into things unknown is possible, ib. 81 foll.; "duty of, ib. 86; Phaedo 85.
Envy, Phil. 49; evil of, Laws 5. 731.
Epicus, invented tricks of boxing, Laws 7. 766 A; his soul, Rep. 10. 620 C; a sculptor, Ion 533 A.
Ephesians, mad about Heracleitus, Theaet. 179 E; originally Athenians, Ion 541 D.
Ephesus, the native city of Ion, Ion 530 A, 533 C; "no mean city," ib. 541 D.
Ephialtes, Symp. 190 B.
Ephors, watch over the queen of Lacedaemon, 1 Aleib. 121 B; their power, Laws 3. 692 A; 4. 712 D.
Epicharmus, quoted, Gorg. 505 D; the 'prince of comedy,' Theaet. 152 E.
Epicrates, Lysias with, Phaedr. 227 B.
Epidaurians have contests of rhapsodes, Ion 530 A.
Epidaurus, Festival of Asclepius (Asclepius) at, Ion 530 A.
Epigenes, a pupil of Socrates, Apol. 33 E; present in the prison, Phaedo 59 B.
Epimenides at Athens, Laws 1. 642 D; his ingenuity, ib. 3. 677 D.
Epimetheus, Protag. 320 D; 321 B, foll.
Epitaph on the tomb of Midas, Phaedr. 264 D.
Er, myth of, Rep. 10. 614 B foll.
Erato, muse of lovers, Phaedr. 259 D.
Erchiae, Alcibiades owned 300 acres there, 1 Aleib. 123 C.
Eretheus, demus of, 1 Aleib. 133 A; prior to Theseus, Crit. 110 A.
Eretria invaded by Persians, Menex. 240 B, C; Laws 3. 699 A.
Eretrians and Darius, Menex. 240 A, C; Laws 3. 698 C, D; Eretrian dialect, Crat. 434 C.
Erichthonius, prior to Theseus, Crit. 110 A.
Eridanus, hill of the Acropolis once extended to, Crit. 112 A.
Erineus, in Attica, Theaet. 143 B.
Eriphyle, Rep. 9. 590 A.
Eristic, distinguished from dialectic, Rep. 7. 539; Meno 75; Euthyd. 275 foll.; ib. 293 foll.; Phaedo 101; Eristic arguments, Theaet. 165; subdivisions of, Soph. 225; nature of, ib. 259.
Eros, a 'mighty god,' Phaedr. 242 E; Socrates prays to, ib. 257 A; lord of Phaedrus and Socrates, ib. 265 C; Eros and Pteros, ib. 252 B. Cp. Love.
Erysichthon, Crit. 110 A.
Eryximachus, a physician, Phaedr. 268 A; objects to drinking, Symp. 176 A; cures Aristophanes of the hic-cough, ib. 185 D; his speech in praise of love, ib. 186 foll.; with Hippias, Protag. 315 C.
Essence (οὐσία) and attribute to be distinguished, Euthyp. 11; nature of, Phaedo 78; perceived by the mind, ib. 79; Phaedr. 247; essence
INDEX.

Euclid, Theaet. 142 A foll.; with Socrates at the last, Phaedo 59 C.
Eudicus, son of Apeamantus, Hipp. min. 363 B foll.
Eumelus, son of Poseidon, = Gadeirus, Crit. 114 B.
Eunomus, invades Attica with Amon-pons, Menex. 239 B.
Eunuch, the riddle of the, Rep. 5. 479; eunuchs as doorkeepers, Protag. 314.
Euphemism in names, Crat. 405.
Euphemus, Phaedr. 244 A.
Euphony, in etymology, Crat. 412, 414.
Euphronius, the Sunian, father of Theaetetus, Theaet. 144 C.
Eupolemus, name of a general, Crat. 394 C.
Euripides, a distinguished tragedian, Rep. 8. 568 A; his maxims about tyrants, ibid.; inventor of the name magnet, Ion. 533 D. Quoted:—
Antiope, fr. xx. Gorg. 484 E.
xxxvii. 485 E.
xxxvii. 486 B.
Hippolytus, l. 352, 1 Alcib. 113 C.
E. 1. 612, Theaet. 154 D.
Melanippe, fr. vi. Symp. 177 A.
Troades, l. 1169, Rep. 8. 568.
Euripus, currents in the, Phaedo 90 C.
Europe, the dead from, judged by Acacus, Gorg. 524 A; Alcibiades not content with, 1 Alcib. 105 B; Persians attempt to enslave, Menex. 239 D; Laws 3. 698 B; empire of Atlantis extended to Tyrrhenia in, Tim. 25 B; ancient Athenians renowned over, Crit. 112 E.
Eurybatus, a notorious villain, Protag. 327 D.
Euryclas, a wonderful ventriloquist, Soph. 252 C.
Eurymedon, battle of, Menex. 244 E.
Euryphylus, treatment of the wounded, Rep. 3. 405 E, 408 A.
Eurytides, ancestor of Alcibiades, 1 Alcib. 121 A, B.
Eurysthenes, king of Lacedaemon, Laws 3. 683 D.
Euthydemus the Chian, younger of the ‘Thorian brothers,’ comes to Athens from Thrull, Euthyd. 271 B; his disciples, ib. 273 A; a sophist instead of a pancretianist, ib. 273 D; his method of questioning, ib. 275 D; discourses, ib. 275 foll., 284 foll., 293 foll.; his thesis, Crat. 386 D.
Euthydemus, son of Diocles, Symp. 222 B.
Euthydemus, brother of Polemarchus, Rep. 1. 328 B.
Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, a soothsayer, Euthyph. 3 B; prosecu- cutes his father, ib. 4 A. foll.; has a knowledge of piety, ib. 5 A; his knowledge of religion, ib. 13 E; on names, Crat. 396 D, 400 A, 407 E, 428 C.
Eutychides, meaning of the name, Crat. 397 B.
Evenor of Atlantis, Crit. 113 C.
Evenus, the poet, Socrates’ message to, Phaedo 60 D; of Paros, his inventions, Phaedr. 267 A.
Evidence, law of, Laws 11. 937.
Evil, involuntary, Protag. 345 foll.; Tim. 86; Laws 9. 860; Hipp. min. 372; evil and ignorance connected, Meno 77; Protag. 353 foll.; nobody desires, Meno 78; evil men incapable of friendship, Lysis 214; has no love for wisdom, ib. 218; removed by wisdom only, Phaedo 107; evils, Gorg. 467; worse to do than to suffer, ib. 475; origin of, Pol. 273; prosperity of evil men, Laws 10. 899, 900, 905; evil speaking, ib. 11. 924, 935.
Evil eye, Phaedo 95.
Examiners; see Censors of magistrates.
Examples, use of, illustrated, Pol. 279 foll.
Excellences and ends of things, Rep. 1. 353.
Excess in argument, Pol. 283, 286, 287.
Exchange, forcible, Soph. 219; art of, ib. 223.
Exercise, bodily, needed, Tim. 88.
Exile, punishment of involuntary homicide, Laws 9. 865, 867, 868.
Existence a participation in essence, Phaedo 101 (cp. Rep. 9. 585); revolu- tions of, Pol. 270, 271, 272; absolute and individual, 1 Alcib. 130; of the gods proved, Laws 10. 886.
Expedit and good, Protag. 333.
Expediency, the aim of the legislator, Theaet. 177; expediency and justice, 1 Alcib. 113, 116.
Experience and the arts, Gorg. 501.
Explanation or definition, meanings of, Theaet. 206.
Expiation of guilt, Rep. 2. 364; Laws 8. 831, 9. 854, 865, 868, 869, 881;
INDEX.

of a state, ib. 872; of a house, ib. 877.
Expiration, Tim. 78, 79.
Exports and imports, Laws 8. 847.
Exposure of children, Rep. 5. 460, 461.
Extremes in men uncommon, Phaedo 90.
Eyes, Tim. 45; medicine for, Phaedo 210.

F.
Faction, prevention of, Rep. 7. 521; causes of, Laws 5. 744.
Faculties, how different, Rep. 5. 477.
Failure of military service, Laws 12. 943.
Fallacies, sophistical, Euthyd. 275 foll.; 284 foll., 293 foll., 298 foll.
False, discussion of the word, Hipp. min. 365; false and good, ib. 367; false opinion, Euthyd. 286; Soph. 240; false witness, Laws 12. 943.
Falsehood, impossible, Euthyd. 284, 286; Crat. 429; a medicine, Rep. 5. 459; falschool and the assertion of not-being, Soph. 240, 211; in language, ib. 263; in opinion, ib. 264; sophist's denial of, ib. 260, 261; in the lawgiver, Laws 2. 663; intentional, Hipp. min. 371.
Family life in the state, Rep. 5. 449; families in the State, ib. 461; family and state, ib. 463; manners of family life, ib. 465.
Fate, Pol. 272 E; Fates, Laws 12. 960.
B. See Atropos, Clotho, Lachesis.
Fear, Protag. 358; fear and reverence, Euthyd. 12; of evil and of disgrace, Laws 1. 616, 617; fear-potion, ib. 648; = wine, ib. 649.
Feeling, and the memory of feeling, Theaet. 166.
Festivals (Hermae), Lysis 206 D; of Asclepius at Epidaurus, Ion 530 A; Panathenaea, ib. 530 B; Euthyd. 6 C; festivals for rest, Laws 2. 653; to encourage friendship, ib. 5. 738; at marriage, ib. 6. 775; of the Egyptians, ib. 7. 799; of women, ib. 8. 828; number of, ibid.
Festivities, true use of, Laws 2. 657; mixed amusements at, ib. 2. 658.
Fever, Tim. 86.
Fiction in education, Rep. 2. 377; censorship of, ib. 3. 386; stories of the world below, ib. foll.; not to represent sorrow, ib. 387 foll.; re-presenting intemperance to be discarded, ib. 390. Cp. Allegory.
Figs, fresh and for storing, Laws 8. 844, 845.
Fighting, an art, Soph. 219; subdivisions of, ib. 225; fighting in armour, Laches 182; Euthyd. 273; Gorg. 456; Laws 8. 833, 834.
Figure, a common notion, Meno 74; = that which follows colour, ib. 75; = the limit of solid, ib. 76.
Final causes, argument from, applied to justice, Rep. 7. 352.
Finite, Phil. 25.
Fire, Tim. 49; form of, ib. 56; fire an element, Phil. 29; obtained by friction, Rep. 4. 435.
First principles, importance of, Crat. 436.
Fish, Tim. 92; fish preserves in the Nile, Pol. 264; fishing, Soph. 220.
See Angling.
Flatterers, Soph. 222, 223; and rhetoricians, Gorg. 403.
Flesh, Tim. 73.
Flutes, Rep. 3. 399; flute-girls, Protag. 347, Symp. 176; flute-playing, an art which seeks pleasure only, Gorg. 501; flute-makers, Rep. 10, 601; flute-playing, Laws 3. 700; flute music, Phil. 56.
Flux, of being, Symp. 207.
Foreign origin of words, Crat. 410, 416, 421; foreigners, Laws 12. 950.
Form and matter, Crat. 389, 390.
Fountains, to be ornamented, Laws 6. 761; ancient, in Attica, Crit. 111; in Atlantis, ib. 113, 117.
Freedmen, Laws 11. 915.
Freedom, depends on knowledge, Lysis 299; of speech in Greece, Gorg. 461, 462.
Friendship, Phaedr. 255, 256; Lysis 212 foll. (see Love); friendship and love, Laws 8. 837; like and unlike in, ibid.; friendship and agreement, i Alcib. 127.
Frost, Tim. 59.
Funerals, Laws 4. 719; expenditure on, ib. 12. 959; funeral orations, Menex. 235; washing of the corpse, Phaedo 115; corpses placed on the pyre on the twelfth day, Rep. 10. 614; lamentations, Laws 7. 800, 12. 960 (cp. Menex. 248); funeral of a magistrate, ib. 947.
INDEX.

567

Future life, Crat. 398, 403; Rep. 3. 387, 10. 614 foll.; Phaedo 63, 67; union of friends in, ib. 68; mystic view of, ib. 69; the good happy in, ib. 107; Apol. 41; Phaedo 114; Gorg. 527; punishment in, Rep. 2. 363; 10. 615; Gorg. 525; Laws 9. 870; Greek views of, Menex. 248.

G.

Gadeirus = Eumelus, Crit. 114 B.

Gades, country of, Crit. 114 B.

Games, odd and even (αὐτράγαλοι), i Alcib. 110 B; Lysis 206 E; πετεῖνα, Laws 7. 820 C, D, 5. 739 A; Rep. 6. 487 C; i Alcib. 110 E; πετετυκαί, Gorg. 456 D; prisoner’s base (ʔ) (διὰ γραμματέων παίζειν), Theaet. 181 A; κύθοι, Rep. 10. 604 C; draughts and dice invented by, Theuth, Phaedr. 274 D; ball (σφαίρα), Euthyd. 277 B; Theaet. 146 A; city (πόλις), Rep. 4. 422 E; puppets, Laws i. 644 E; wooden horses, Theaet. 184 D; dancing on a leathen bottle (αὐτ-κωλιδίζων), Symp. 190 D; games as a means of training, Laws i. 643 B; influences of games, ib. 7. 797 (cp. Gymnastic); games common to both sexes, ib. 771 E; teachers of games, i Alcib. 110 B; παιδοτριβής, Rep. 3. 389 C.

Ganymede, Phaedr. 255 G; story of Ganymede invented by the Cretans, Laws i. 636 C.

Geese, nurseries of, Pol. 264.

Genealogies, Tim. 23.

Genera and species distinguished, Euthyp. 12; difficulty in fixing, Soph. 267.

General ideas, unity and existence of, Phil. 15; division of, ib. 16; general ideas, Soph. 254.

Generalization in speeches, Phaedr. 265.

Generals, election of, Laws 6. 755; generals and tacticians, ib. 11. 921.

Generation (γένεσις), Phaedo 71; cause of, ib. 96 (cp. 101, Phil. 27); of animals, Tim. 90, 91; generation and essence, Phil. 54; Soph. 248, 249; and pleasure, Phil. 55 foll.

Genesis, of animals, Protag. 321; of man, Symp. 190.

Geography, value of, Laws 6. 763.

Geometry, Rep. 7. 526, foll.; Greek study of, ib. 527 foll.; of solids, ib. 528; Theaet. 147 foll.; Meno 82.

Geryon, Euthyd. 299 C; Laws 7. 795 C; Heracles and Geryon, Gorg. 484 B.

Gestation and nursing, Laws 7. 789.

Ghosts, Phaedo 81.

Gifts given to victors, Rep. 3. 414; 5. 460, 468.

Givers of names, Crat. 436, 437.

Glaucos, son of Ariston, Rep. 1. 327 A; takes up the discourse, ib. 347 A, 2. 372 C, 3. 398 B, 4. 450 A, 6. 566 D, 9. 576 B; anxious to contribute money for Socrates, ib. 337 E; the boldest of men, 2. 357 A; Glaucos’ genius, ib. 368 A; a musician, ib. 3. 398 D; a lover, ib. 5. 474 D; breeds dogs and birds, ib. 5. 459 A; character of, ib. 7. 548 E; mentioned, Parm. 126 A.

Glaucos, father of Charmides, Protag. 315 A; Charm. 154 B, 158 B.

Glauclus, the sea-god, Rep. 10. 611 C; Phaedo 108 D.

God, not the cause of evil, Rep. 2. 379; never changes, ib. 380; will not lie, ib. 382; quarrels of the gods, Euthyd. 7; the givers of good, ib. 11, 15; only is wise, Apol. 233; sun and moon are gods, ib. 26; Laws 7. 821; Socrates’ belief in, Apol. 26; masters of men, Phaedo 62; in a future world, ib. 63; in Hades, ib. 80; procession of, Phaedr. 247; influence of, on love, ib. 252, 253; names of, Crat. 397–400; nothing known of, ib. 400; they love a joke, ib. 406; of the natural world, ib. 408; are there any? Rep. 2. 265; stories of, ib. 378 foll.; not to lament, ib. 3. 388; laughter in, ib. 389; inimiceness of, to fiction, ib. 390; avow of, ib. 390; children of, Tim. 40; immortality of, ib. 41; ignorance of, Crit. 107; have neither joy nor sorrow, Phil. 33; God the creator, Soph. 265; Tim. 30 foll.; the shepherd, Pol. 271; Crit. 109; God’s gifts to men, ib. 274; God and chance, Laws 4. 709; laws about, ib. 716 foll.; sacrifice to, ib. 716; gods below, ib. 717; nature of, ib. 716 (cp. 10. 905; 906); a man’s most precious possession, ib. 5. 726, 727; of generation, ib. 729; of strangers, ib.; oppose men, ib. 732; in a new state, ib. 738; local, ib.
the twelve, in the model state, ib. 745; in model state, ib. 6. 771, 772; heavenly and infernal, ib. 8. 828; disbelief in, ib. 10. 885 foll. 887; punished, ib. 909; existence of, ib. 886–900; 12. 966; said to exist by convention ib. 889, 890; in all things, ib. 899; take no heed of human affairs, ib. 890 foll.; not careless ib. 900; of popular opinion, ib. 904; not to be appeased by riches, ib. 905; invocation of, at sales, ib. 11. 916, 917; have care of orphans, ib. 927; the aged bear their likeness, ib. 930, 931; belief in, not universal, ib. 12. 948; offerings to, ib. 955, 956; knowledge of, ib. 966; belief in, whence arising, ib.; the guardians of Socrates, 1 Alcib. 124.

Goddess of ways, Laws 11. 914.

Gold (and silver) not allowed to the guardians, Rep. 3. 417; not to be possessed in the model city, Laws 5. 742; nature of, Tim. 59.


Good, the, hard to know, Crat. 384; the idea of, Rep. 6. 505, 508, 517; is pleasure in wisdom, ib. 6. 505; nature of, ib. 506; not a pleasure, ib. 509; self-sufficient, Lysis 215; sufficient, Phil. 60; = the beautiful, Lysis 216; universally desired, Euthyd. 279; good fortune = wisdom, ib. 279; use of, depends on knowledge, ib. 281; corruptio optimi per sima, ib. 281; good things made hurtful or profitable by wisdom or folly, Meno 88; the good is the beautiful, Symp. 201; the good and the expedient, Protag. 333; good in relation to pleasure, ib. 356; Phil. 55, 60; the chief, ib. 20; needs no addition, ib. 21; the cause of, ib. 23; Gorg. 497; mixture of, Phil. 62; measure the source of, ib. 64; cause of good is in the mind only, ib. 65; in the mixed life, ib. 61, 65; good and wisdom, ib. 60; authorship of good and evil divided, Laws 10. 896, 897; good and false, Hipp. min. 367; and good and honourable, 1 Alcib. 116; good and order, Gorg. 504; good the end of action, ib. 499; good classified, Rep. 2. 357; Protag. 334; Phil. 66; Laws 1. 631, 3. 697; enumerated, Euthyd. 279; Meno 78; good how far painful, Protag. 334; goods of the soul, Meno 88.

Good men unfortunate, Rep. 2. 364; good men self-sufficient. ib. 3. 387; good men not good by nature, Meno 89; no evil can happen to a good man, Apol. 41; sons of good men, Laches 179; Protag. 324, 325; Meno 93.

Gorgias, his influence at Larisa, Meno 70 A; his style of answer, ib. (cp. 76 C); his influence on Meno, ib. 71 E; does not teach virtue, ib. 95 C; defines virtue, ib. 73 D; fails to educate Meno, ib. 96 E; goes the round of the cities, Apol. 19 E; a great master of rhetoric, Symp. 198 C; Phaedr. 261 C; knows that probability is superior to truth, ib. 267 A; converses with Socrates, Gorg. 449 A–461 A; his deference to opinion, ib. 482 D, 487 A, 494 D; on persuasion, Phil. 58 B foll.; goes with his brother Herodicus to persuade patients to take medicine, Gorg. 456 B. Cp. Rhetoric.

Gorgons, Phaedr. 229 E.

Gortys, Gortynians came from Gortys in Peloponnesus, Laws 4. 708 A.

Government, forms of, Pol. 291 foll., 301 foll.; a science, ib. 292; must be scientific, ib. 293; government and laws, ib. 294; science of, attained by few, ib. 292, 300; without knowledge, a source of misery, ib. 301; origin of, Laws 3. 676 foll.; change of, ibid.; primitive form of, ib. 680; progress of, ib. 680, 681; mother forms of, ib. 693; Persian, ib. 694; of Attica reviewed, ib. 698 foll.; development of, ib. 4. 710; of Lacedaemon, ib. 712; principle of, ib. 714; highest form of, ib. 5. 731; prevent the practice of war, ib. 8. 839. Cp. Constitution, Model city, State.

Grammar, and music in education, Euthyd. 276; and predication, Soph. 253; the invention of Theuth, Phil. 18; combination of letters, Soph. 253; 'a copulativus,' Crat. 405; change of letters in Greek, ib. 418, 420, 426; Eretrian dialect, ib. 434. Cp. Dialects, Etymology.

Grasshoppers, Phaedr. 259.


Greek life, procession in honour of
INDEX.

Artemis, Rep. i. 327 A; sacrifices in houses, ib. 3. 328 C; athletes, ib. 404 A; dinners, ibid.; naked exercises, ib. 5. 452 A, B (cp. Exercises); female occupations, ib. 455 C; love of disputation, Gorg. 458 C; Greeks and barbarians, Pol. 262 C foll.; Greek games, Theaet. 146 A (see Games); the holy season at Athens, Phaedo 58 B, C; incidents of a dinner, Symp. 174, 175, 176, 212 foll., 223; drinking, ib. 176 E; flute girls, ibid. (see Flute-girls); conversation, ib. 177 A; hours of rising, Protag. 310 A, 311 A; door-keepers, ib. 314 D; house of Callias, ib. 315 D, 335 C, 337 E; after-dinner amusements, ib. 347 C; lovers, Lysis 204 B; Euthyd. 273 A; delight in intellectual experiences, Protag. 335 D; Euthyd. 274 D, E, 303 B; Apol. 33 B; practical joking, Euthyd. 278 C; wit, Meno 77 A; young men at Athens, Apol. 23 C; courts of justice, ib. 34 C; amusements of boys, Lysis 206 C. For the characters of Greek youth, see Alcibiades, Charmides, Cleinias, Ctesippus, Lysis; and cp. Phaedr. 239 A.

Greek states, causes of the ruin of, Rep. 8. 564; Laws 8. 839.

Guardians of the state, Rep. 2. 375; good guardians are philosophers, ib. 376; their education, ib. 376 foll.; laughter among the, ib. 388; trial of the, ib. 3. 413; distinguished from auxiliaries, ib. 414; common meals of, ib. 416; happiness of the, ib. 5. 466; knowledge of the good necessary to the, ib. 6. 506; education of the ib. 7. 521; of laws, Laws 6. 755 (cp. Magistrates); teachers of virtue, ib. 12. 964; to practise induction, ib. 965; to know the gods, ib. 966.

Gyges, Rep. 2. 359 C, 10. 612 B.

Gymnasia, Pol. 294; ἀσπιδήθροι, Euthyd. 272; κατάστασις ἄρησι, ib. 273; masters of, Protag. 326; gymnasia at Crete, Laws 1. 625 (cp. 633, 636); effect of, ib.; where to be built, ib. 6. 761; 7. 804.

Gymnastic in education, Rep. 3. 403 foll.; Protag. 326; Gorg. 518; Soph. 228; Laws 7. 813, 814; effect of excessive, Rep. 3. 411, 7. 521, 522; Tim. 88; fighting in armour, how far advantageous, Laches 182; not practised by the Lacedaemonians and useless, ib. 183 foll.; gymnastic and medicine, Gorg. 464; Soph. 228; gymnastic exercises, Laws 1. 625, 633; evil of, ib. 1. 636; origin of, ib. 2. 653, 654, 672; includes both dancing and wrestling, ib. 7. 795; suitable to women, ib. 804, 833 (cp. Rep. 5. 452); ministers of, ib. 6. 764; to be military, ib. 8. 832; running, ib. 833; conflicts in armour, ibid.; horse contests, ib. 834; = care of the body, 1 Alcib. 128.

II.

Hades (ἀδείς) the invisible world, Gorg. 493 B; tales about the terrors of, Rep. 1. 330 D, 2. 356 A; Musaeus' account of the good and the bad in, ib. 2. 363 C; treatment of the tales of, ib. 3. 386 B; the place of punishment, Laws 10. 904 C; (Pluto) helmet of, Rep. 10. 612 B.

Hail, Tim. 59.

Hair, Tim. 76; cut in mourning, Phaedo 89.

Hamlets, Laws 8. 838.

Hands, both to be trained equally, Laws 7. 794.

Handicraft arts, a reproach, Rep. 9. 590.

Happiness, of citizens, Rep. 4. 420 foll.; connected with knowledge, Charm. 173; universally desired, Euthyd. 279; = use of good things, ib. 280; knowledge necessary to, ib. 281; art of, ib. 290; the kingly art inadequate, ib. 290; depends on justice, Gorg. 470; the object of laws, Laws 1. 631; happiness and wealth, ib. 5. 743.

Hardness, Tim. 62.

Harmonius and Aristogeiton, Symp. 182 C.

Harmonia of Thebes, Phaedo 95 A.

Harmonies, the various kinds, Rep. 3. 398, 399.

Harmony, the soul compared to a, Phaedo 86 (cp. 91 foll.); nature of, ib. 92, 93; Symp. 187; Phil. 17; Laws 2. 665; harmony and rhythm, Laws 3. 689; pleasure and harmony, Phil. 31; science of, Rep. 531; Tim. 47.

'Having' and 'possessing,' Theaet. 197.

Head, Tim. 75, 76.

Headache, charms for, Charm. 155.

Health and justice compared, Rep. 4. 444; health in life, Laws 5. 734.

Hearing, Tim. 47, 67.
INDEX.

Heart, Tim. 70.
Heat, Tim. 62.
Heaven above the heavens, Phaedr. 247.
Heaviness, Tim. 63.
Hecamedê, the concubine of Nestor, Ion 538 C.
Hector, meaning of the name, Crat. 393 A, 394 B; attacked by Achilles, Ion 535 B; Apol. 28 C; Symp. 180 A; slew Patroclus, Laws 12. 944 A; dragged by Achilles round the tomb of Patroclus, Rep. 3. 391 B.
Hecuba, her sorrows, Ion 535 B.
Helen reviled by Stesichorus, Phaedr. 243 A; never went to Troy, Rep. 9. 586 C.
Helios, meeting in the precincts of, Laws 12. 945 E; priests of, ib. 947 A.
Hellas, youth of, Tim. 23 B; invasion of, by Atlantis, ib. 24 E foll.; conduct of, in the Persian war, Laws 692 C, D, E; administered by ancient Athenians, Crit. 112; not to be devastated in civil war, Rep. 5. 470 D foll., 471 A.
Hellenes in the Persian invasion, Menex. 240 B foll., 241 A foll.; subsequent wars among the, ib. 242 A foll., 243 B foll., 244 B foll., 245 A foll.; protected against the barbarian, Laws 3. 685 C; not to be enslaved by Hellenes, Rep. 5. 469 B, C; united by ties of blood, ib. 470 C; not to devastate Hellas, ib. 471 A foll.; Hellenes and barbarians are strangers, ib. 5. 469 B, 6. 494 C; Laws 1. 635 B; prevented from mingling by the Persian war, Laws 3. 693 A; admire wealth, ib. 9. 870; worship sun and moon, ib. 10. 887 E. Cp. Lysis 210 B; 1 Alcid. 105 D, 124 B; Theaet. 175 A.
Hellenic and barbarian names, Crat. 383 A, 385 E, 390 C, 409 E.
Hellespont, Rep. 3. 404 C; naval engagements at, Menex. 243 A; bridge over, Laws 3. 699 A.
Helots, Laws 6. 766; 1 Alcid. 122 D.
Hephaestus, etymology of the name, Crat. 404 B, 407 C; his arts stolen by Prometheus, Protag. 321 D, E; supposed to wield a pair of lovers together, Symp. 192 C; his metalurgy due to love, ib. 197 B; his combat with Xanthus, Crat. 391 E; arts given to men by, Pol. 274 C; fellow-worker with Athena, ib. (cp. Protag. 321 D); god of mixing, Phil. 61 B; craftsmen dedicated to, Laws 11. 920 E; binds Hèrè, Rep. 2. 378 D (cp. Euthyph. 8 B); bound Ares and Aphrodite, ib. 3. 390 C; the god of Attica, Crit. 109 C; Socrates' descent from, 1 Alcid. 121 A.
Heraclea, inhabitants of, have enslaved the Mariandynians, Laws 6. 776 D; Zeuxippos of, Protag. 318 B.
Heraclea, stone of = magnet, Ion 533 D; Tim. 80 C.
Heracleidae, their expedition against the Argives, Menex. 239 B; constitution of, Laws 3. 685 D; the Heraclid colony, ib. 5. 736 C; ruling at Argos and Lacedaemon, 1 Alcid. 121 A.
Heracleides of Clazomenae chosen general by the Athenians, Ion 541 D.
Heracleitus, Crat. 440 C; his thesis, ib. 401 D, 402 A, B; the 'sun of Heracleitus,' Rep. 6. 498 A; his philosophy in regard to perception, Theaet. 152 E, 156 A foll., 160 D; his sect, ib. 179 D foll.; his theory discussed, ib.; his reconciliation of opposites, Symp. 187 A.
Heracles (Hercules), 'not a match for two,' Phaedo 89 C; could not fight against the Hydra, Euthyd. 297 C; brother and nephew of Heracles, ib. D, E; 'Bravo! Heracles,' ib. 303 A; connected with the family of Lysis, Lysis 205 C; Prodicus on the virtues of, Symp. 177 B; Heracles and Geryon, Gorg. 484 B; a Heracles of argument, Theaet. 169 B; genealogies traced to, ib. 175 A; sons of, Laws 3. 685 D.
Heracles, columns of, Phaedo 109 B; Tim. 24 E, 25 B; Crit. 114 B.
Heralds, laws concerning, Laws 12. 941.
Herd divided, Pol. 264, 265; art of managing herds, ib. 275, 276.
Herè, meaning of the name (eparî 715), Crat. 404 B, C; her followers seek a royal love, Phaedo 253 B; bound by Hephaestus, Rep. 2. 378 D (cp. Euthyph. 8 B); Herè and Zeus, ib. 390 B; daughter of Cronos and Rhea, Tim. 41 A; fines on celibacy, etc., to be paid to, Laws 6. 774 A foll. Cp. Rep. 2. 381 E; Laws 2. 672 B.
INDEX.


Hermæa, Lysis 206, 223.

Hermes, meaning of the name, Crat. 408 A, 429 C; messenger of Zeus, Protag. 322 C; the star sacred to (Mercury), Tim. 38 D; Rep. 10. 607 A; the god of heralds, Laws 12. 941 A.

Hermocrates, Tim. 20 B; his promised speech, Crit. 108 A.

Hermogenes, his name, Crat. 383 B, 384 C, 408 B, 429 C; with Socrates at the last, Phaedo 59 B.

Hermus, Rep. 8. 566 C.

Herodicus of Selymbria, a valetudinarian, Rep. 3. 406 A foll.; recommends the walk to Megara and back, Phaedr. 227 C; a first-rate sophist, Protag. 316 E.

Herodicus, brother of Gorgias, a physician, Gorg. 418 B, 456 A.

Heroes, origin of, Crat. 398; not to lament, Rep. 3. 387, 388: to be rewarded, Rep. 5. 468; after death, ib., Laws 4. 717; prayers to, Laws 7. 801 (cp. 5. 738).

Hesiod, quoted:—

Theogony,
  l. 116, foll., Symp. 178 B.
  l. 154, 459, Rep. 2. 377 E.
  l. 195, Crat. 406 C.
  l. 203, Crat. 398 A.
  l. 780, Theaet. 155 D.

Works and Days,
  l. 25, Lysis 213 C.
  l. 49, Rep. 5. 466 B; Laws 3. 690 E.
  l. 41, Laws 3. 677 E.
  l. 109, Rep. 8. 546 E.
  l. 120, Crat. 398 A.
  l. 122, Rep. 5. 468 E.
  l. 233, Rep. 2. 353 B.
  l. 256 foll., Laws 12. 943 E.
  l. 287, Protag. 340 C; Rep. 2.
  l. 364 D; Laws 4. 718 E.
  l. 303 foll., Laws 10. 901 A.
  l. 309, Charm. 163 B.
  l. 359, Crat. 428 A.
  l. 454, Theaet. 207 A.

Frag. 117, Rep. 3. 390 E; incert. Crat. 402 B.

Genealogies of Hesiod, Crat. 396 C; his children (poems) Symp. 209 C; his fame, Tim. 21 C; his works recited by rhapsodes, Laws 2. 658 D; Hesiod and Epimenides, ib. 3. 677 E; as a story-teller, Rep. 2. 377 D, E (cp. Symp. 195 C); his story of Uranos and Cronos, Rep. 2. 378 A; his classification of the races, Rep. 8. 547 A; not studied by rhapsodes, Ion 531 A, B; a sophist, Protag. 316 D; pleasure of conversing with him, Apol. 41 A; a wandering rhapsode, Rep. 10. 600 D; his rewards of justice, ib. 612 B.

Hestia, meaning of the name, Crat. 401 D; a temple founded to her, Laws 5. 745 B; to have temples everywhere, ib. 8. 848 D; seals and signatures of the judges to be placed on her altar, ib. 9. 856 A; remains at home while the other gods go in procession, Phaedr. 247 A.

Hiccough, Symp. 185, 189.

Hieronymus, father of Hippothales, Lysis 203 A.

Himera, Crison of, Protag. 335 E; Stesichorus of, Phaedr. 244 A.

Hippias of Elis, Phaedr. 267 B; goes the round of the cities, Apol. 19 E (cp. Protag. 314 C, 315 C, 337 D foll.); offers an interpretation of Simonides, ib. 347 A; at Olympia, willing to answer all, Hipp. min. 363 E foll.; his view of the Trojan heroes, ib. 364 C foll.; a skilful calculator, ib. 366 C foll.; his boasting, ib. 368 B foll.; his art of memory, ib. 368 E. A person in the dialogues Protagoras and Hippias Minor.

Hippocentaur, Phaedr. 229 D.

Hippocrates the Physician, contends that the knowledge of a part requires knowledge of the whole, Phaedr. 270 C (cp. Charm. 156 E). See Aesculapius.

Hippocrates, son of Apollodorus, his visit to Socrates, Protag. 310 A; carries Socrates to Protagoras, ib. 314 D.

Hippodamia, Crat. 395 D.

Hippolytus, cursed by his father Theseus, Laws 3. 687 E, 11. 931 B.

Hippionicus, father of Callias, Protag. 314 A; Apol. 20 A.

Hippothales, lover of Lysis, Lysis 203 A, 207 B; is 'stark-mad,' ib. 205 A foll.

Hire, laws concerning, Laws 8. 847.

History, early Greek, Laws 3. 682, 683; of Athens sketched, Menex. 239 foll.

INDEX.

Homer, and tragic poetry, Rep. 10. 595 B, 598 D, E; not a legislator, ib. 599 E; or a general, ib. 600 A; or inventor, ibid.; or teacher, ibid.; no educator, ib. 606 E, 607 B; his knowledge of the arts, Ion 537 A foll.; sole study of the rhapsodes, ib. 531 A; subjects of his poetry, ib. C; like a magnetic ring, ib. 536 A, B; some striking passages quoted, ib. 538 C foll.; his golden chain, Theaet. 153 C; not read by the Cretans, Laws 3. 680 B; an Ionian, ib. C; a witness to early life, ib. D; not much esteemed in his lifetime, Rep. 10. 600 B foll.; went about as a rhapsode, ibid.; quoted on names, Crat. 391 D foll.; in support of the theory that justice is a thief, Rep. 1. 334 B; his stories not approved for youth, ib. 2. 377 D foll.; Homeric apocrypha quoted, Phaedr. 252 B; his mode of narration, Rep. 3. 393 A foll.; his heroes, ib. 404 C; Socrates' feeling of reverence for him, ib. 10. 593 C; his poems pleasing to age, Laws 2. 658 E; had not the wit to discover why he was blind, Phaedr. 243 A. Passages quoted or referred to:

Iliad i.
  l. 11 foll., Rep. 3. 392 E foll.
  l. 131, ib. 6. 501 B.
  l. 169 foll., Hipp. min. 370 D.
  l. 225, Rep. 3. 389 E.
  l. 343, Crat. 428 D.
  l. 590 foll., Rep. 2. 378.
  l. 599 foll., ib. 3. 389.

Iliad ii.
  l. 365, Phaedr. 260 A.
  l. 408, Symp. 174 C.
  l. 547, r Alcib. 132 A.
  l. 623, Rep. 6. 501 C.
  l. 813, Crat. 392 A.
  l. 851, Theaet. 194 D.

Iliad iii.
  l. 8, Rep. 3. 389 E.
  l. 109, Crat. 428 D.
  l. 172, Theaet. 183 E.

Iliad iv.
  l. 50 foll., Rep. 2. 379 E.
  l. 218, ib. 3. 408 A.
  l. 412, ib. 3. 389 E.
  l. 431, ibid.
  l. 453, Phil. 62 D.

Iliad v.
  l. 221, Crat. 407 D.
  l. 223, Laches 191 A.
  l. 845, Rep. 10. 612 B.

IIiad vi.
  l. 211, Soph. 268 D.
  l. 265, Crat. 415 A.
  l. 402, ib. 392 B.
  l. 493, ib. 392 E.

IIiad vii.
  l. 321, Rep. 5. 468 D.

IIiad viii.
  l. 13, Phaedo 112 A.
  l. 19, Theaet. 153 D.
  l. 168, Laches 191 A.
  l. 162, Rep. 5. 468 E.

IIiad ix.
  'Prayers,' Hipp. min. 364 E; Crat. 428 B.
  l. 308 foll., Hipp. min. 370 A.
  l. 312 foll., ib. 370 B.
  l. 337 foll., ib. 370 B.
  l. 363, Crito 44 B.
  l. 441, Gorg. 485 D.
  l. 447, Laws 11. 931 B.
  l. 497 foll., Rep. 2. 364 D.
  l. 500, Laws 10. 906 D.
  l. 513 foll., Rep. 3. 390 E.
  l. 644 foll., Crat. 428 B.
  l. 650 foll., Hipp. min. 371 B.

IIiad x.
  l. 244, Protag. 348 C.
  l. 482, Symp. 179 A.

IIiad xi.
  l. 514, Symp. 214 B.
  l. 576, Rep. 3. 405 E.
  l. 624, ibid.
  l. 638, 630, Ion 538 C.
  l. 844, Rep. 3. 406 A.

IIiad xii.
  'Battle at the Wall,' Ion 539 A.
  l. 200 foll. ibid.
  l. 311, Rep. 5. 468 E.

IIiad xiv.
  l. 96, Laws 4. 706 E.
  l. 201, Theaet. 152 E (cp. Crat. 402 B).
  l. 291, Crat. 392 A.
  l. 294 foll., Rep. 3. 390 C.

IIiad xv.
  l. 187 foll., Gorg. 523 A.
  l. 262, Symp. 179 A.

IIiad xvi.
  l. 433, Rep. 3. 388 C.
  l. 554, Theaet. 194 D.
  l. 776, Rep. 8. 566 D.
  l. 805 foll., Rep. 3. 386 E.

IIiad xvii.
  l. 23 foll., Rep. 3. 388 A.
  l. 54, ib. 388 B.
  l. 84 foll., Laws 12. 944 A.
INDEX.

1. 96 foll., Apol. 28 C.
1. 108 foll., Phil. 47 E.

Iliad xix.
1. 92 foll., Symp. 195 D.
1. 278 foll., Rep. 3. 390 D.

Iliad xx.
1. 4 foll., Rep. 2. 379 E.
1. 64 foll., ib. 3. 386 C.
1. 74 foll., Crat. 391 E.
1. 216 foll., Laws 3. 681 E.

Iliad xxii.
1. 222 foll., Rep. 3. 391 B.
1. 308, Protag. 340 A.

Iliad xxiii.
1. 15, 20, Rep. 3. 391 A.
1. 168 foll., ib. 388 C.
1. 362 foll., ib. 386 E.
1. 414, ib. 388 B.
1. 507, Crat. 392 E.

Iliad xxiv.
1. 100 foll., Rep. 3. 387 A.
1. 103 foll., ib. 386 D.
1. 157, ib. 391 B.
1. 175, ibid.
1. 335, Ion 537 A.

Odyssey i.
1. 351 foll., Rep. 4. 424 B.

Odyssey iii.
1. 26 foll., Laws 7, 803 E.

Odyssey iv.
1. 252, Symp. 220 C.

Odyssey v.
1. 193, Phaedr. 266 B.

Odyssey viii.
1. 22, Theaet. 183 E.
1. 266 foll., Rep. 3. 390 D.

Odyssey ix.
1. 9 foll., Rep. 3. 390 B.
1. 91 foll., Rep. 8. 560 C.
1. 112 foll., Laws 3. 680 B.

Odyssey x.
1. 279, Protag. 399 A.
1. 495, Rep. 3. 386 E.

Odyssey xi.
1. 489 foll., Rep. 3. 386 C,7, 516 D.
1. 569, Gorg. 526 D.
1. 570 foll., Gorg. 525 E.
1. 582, Protag. 315 D.
1. 601, ib. B.
1. 633 foll., Symp. 198 C.

Odyssey xii.
1. 342, Rep. 3. 390 B.

Odyssey xiv.
1. 234, Theaet. 183 E.

Odyssey xvii.
1. 21, 8, Lysis 214 A.
1. 322, Laws 6. 777 A.
1. 347, Charm. 161 A; Laches 201 B.
1. 383 foll., Rep. 3. 389 D.
1. 485 foll. ib. 2. 381 D.

Odyssey xix.
1. 43, Laws 16, 904 E.
1. 109 foll., Rep. 2. 363 B.
1. 163, Apol. 34 D.
1. 174 foll. Laws 1. 624 B.
1. 395, Rep. 1. 334 B.
1. 563, Charm. 173 B.

Odyssey xx.
1. 17, Rep. 3. 390 D, 4. 441 B; Phaedo 94 E.
1. 351 foll., Ion 539 A.

Odyssey xxiv.
1. 6, Rep. 3. 387 A.
1. 46, ib. 8. 566 D.

Homer quoted, Euthyd. 288 B; Ion 535 B; Phaedo 93 B; Symp. 179 E; ib. 180 A; ib. 216 A; Phaedr. 275 C; Rep. 1. 328 E, 2. 381 D, 3. 390 E; 8. 544 D; Theaet. 194 C; Soph. 216 B.

Homer Apocrypha quoted, Phaedr. 252 B.

Homeridae, Rep. 10, 599 E; Ion 530 E.

Homicide, the, exiled, Laws 9, 864; involuntary homicide, ib. 865-869; at games, ib. 865; of a slave, ib.; of a freeman, ib.; of a stranger, ib. 866; of a metic, ib.; by a stranger, ib.; manslaughter, ib. 866, 867; with premeditation, ib. 867; return of the homicide, ib. 867, 868; the disobedient, ib. 868: by a slave, ib.; by a father or mother, ib.; by a husband or wife, ib.; by a brother or sister, ib.; by a child, ib. 869; by brothers, citizens, strangers, slaves, ib.; voluntary, ib. 870-874; causes of, ib. 870; homicide of a kinsman, ib. 871; punishment of, ib.; indirect, ib. 872; by slaves, ib.; of a father, mother, etc., ib. 873; by beasts, ib.; by inanimate objects, ib. 873, 874; by persons unknown, ib. 874; justifiable, ib.; sale of when discovered, ib. 11. 916.

Honey, Tim. 60.

Honour, where to be given, Laws 3. 697; due to the soul, ib. 727, 728; due to the body, ib. 5. 728, 729; honourable and good, 1 Alcit. 116.

Hope, the comfort of the righteous in old age, Rep. 1. 331; pleasures of, Phil. 39.
INDEX.

Horse contests, Laws 8. 834; horse of the soul, Phaedr. 253.
Horsemanship, suitable to women, Laws 7. 804.
Hospitals, Laws 6. 761.
Hours (δόρα) derivation of the name, Crat. 410.
Houses, Tim. 70; of the citizens, Laws 8. 848.
Household and state compared, Pol. 259; the childless household, Laws 11. 925.
Human sacrifices, Laws 6. 782.
Hunting, Laws 1. 633; an art, Soph. 219; divisions of, ib. 220 foll.; valuable to the young, Laws 6. 763; honourable and dishonourable, ib. 7. 823.
Hurts, voluntary and involuntary, Laws 9. 862; hurts and injustice, ib.
Husbandmen, laws concerning, Laws 8, 842, 843 foll.
Hydra, Heracles and the, Euthyd. 297 C.
Hyperborean, Abaris the, Charm. 158 B.
Hypothesis, use of in mathematics, Rep. 6. 510; in sciences, ib. 7. 533; use of, Meno 86, 87; Phaedo 100; hypothetical case at law, Phaedr. 273; use of hypotheses in method, Parm. 156; of the one, ib. 137 foll. Cp. One.

I.
Iambic Poets, Laws 11. 935; Iambic measure, Rep. 3. 400.
Iapetus, love is older than, Symp. 194 B.
Iatroles, name of a physician, Crat. 394 C.
Iberians, given to intoxication, Laws 1. 637 D.
Ibis, the bird sacred to Theuth, Phaedr. 274 C.
Ibycus, 'like Ibycus I was troubled,' Phaedr. 242 C; fell in love in his old age, Parm. 156 E.
Iccus of Tarentum, a gymnastic master and sophist, Protag. 316 D; his self-restraint, Laws 8. 839 E.
Ice, Tim. 59.
Ida, altar of the gods on, Rep. 3. 391 E; dwellers at the foot of, Laws 3. 681 E.

Idea, ideas, innate ideas, Euthyd. 296; Meno 81, 86; of beauty, ib. 301; difficulties in the way of, Phil. 15 foll.; in individuals, ib. 16; knowledge and ideas, Laws 12. 965; doctrine of, Lysis 217 foll.; re-collection of, Phaedr. 249 (cp. Myth of the Soul); ideas and phenomena, Rep. 6. 507; idea of good the source of truth, ib. 508 (cp. 505); a cause like the sun, ib. 6. 508, 7. 516, 517; ideas in the creation of the world, Tim. 30 foll. (cp. 37); ideas and names, Crat. 389; existence of, ib. 439; knowledge connected with, ib. 440; absolute, Rep. 5. 476; origin of abstract, ib. 7. 523; nature of, ib. 10. 596; single, ib. 597 (cp. Tim. 28, 51); existence of ab-tract, Phaedo 65, 74; knowledge of, must precede particular knowledge, ib. 75; the idea prior to the reality, ibid.; ideas and re-collection, ib. 75 foll.; ideas and immortality, ib. 76; a kind of stepping-stones, ib. 100; are causes, ibid.; names of, ib. 103; loveliness of, Phaedr. 250; the cause of love, ib. 251; of likeness and unlikeness, Parm. 129; distinguished from things, ibid.; ideas and moral qualities, ib. 130; one and many in, ib. 131; participation of things in, ibid.; infinite, ib. 132; exist in the mind, ibid.; are patterns, ibid.; necessary to philosophy, ib. 135; = common notions, Soph. 240; general ideas, ib. 254; require examples, Pol. 277.
Ideal, ideals, ideal state is possible, Rep. 5. 472; idealists, Soph. 246, 248; ideals, Rep. 5. 472; use of in legislation, Laws 5. 746. For the ideal state of the Republic, see City, Constitution, Education, Guardians, etc.
Ignorance, nature of, Rep. 5. 477, 478; the source of evil, Protag. 355 foll.; ignorance and pleasure, ib. 357; impossible, Euthyd. 286; of self, Phil. 48; involuntary, Soph. 228; an evil of the soul, ib.; divisions of, ib. 229; is ruin, Laws 3. 688; the greatest, ib. 689; in kings, ib. 691; a cause of crime, ib. 9. 863; having the conceit of knowledge, 1 Alcb. 117 foll.; mischief of, ib. 118; of statesmen, ib. 118, 119; excludes knowledge, Meno 80; an inanition (κένωσις) of the soul, Rep. 9. 583.
Iliad, the style of the Iliad illustrated,
INDEX.

Rep. 3. 392 E foll.; the Iliad and Odyssey mentioned, Rep. 3. 393 A; Hipp. min. 363 B; 1 Alcib. 112 B.
Ilion, foundation of, Laws 3. 681 E, foll.; Ilion (Troy), Rep. 3. 393 B.
Illissus, hill of the Acropolis once extended to, Crít. 112 A; Socrates and Phaedrus sit beside the, Phaedr. 229 A, B.
Ill-health destroys the profit of life, Gorg. 505. See Invalids.
Images, Rep. 7. 510 (cp. 10. 596); Tim. 52; golden, at Delphi, Phaedr. 235; at Olympia, ib. 236; images and not-being, Soph. 240; waxen, at doors, Laws 10. 933 B.
"I pareos, Phaedr. 251.
Imitation, Crát. 423; in style, Rep. 3. 393; 394; 10. 596 foll., 600 foll.; concerned with the weaker part of the soul, ib. 10. 604; Tim. 19; Soph. 234, 234; a kind of production, ib. 265; kinds of, ib. 266 (cp. 235); scientific, ib. 267; of appearances, ibid.; in music, Laws 2. 655; pleasure accompanying, ib. 667; criteria of, ib. 667, 668; in dancing, ib. 7. 814.
Imitative gestures, Crát. 423; poetry, Rep. 10. 593; arts inferior, ib. 605; divisions of them, Soph. 235.
Imitators ignorant, Rep. 10. 602.
Immortality and love, Symp. 206-209; of the soul, Meno 81; after death, Apol. 41; arguments in favour of, Phædo 70; immortality and the theory of recollection, ib. 72; arguments against this (Simmias), ib. 86; (Cebes), 87; answer to these arguments, ib. 91 foll.; final proof of, ib. 105 foll.; immortality of the soul, and motion, Phaedr. 245 foll.; Laws 12. 959; proof of, Rep. 10. 608 foll. (cp. 6. 498); immortality by children, Symp. 208; Laws 4. 721. Cp. Psychology.
Imports and exports, Laws 8. 847.
Inanimate objects guilty, Laws 9. 873, 874.
Inachus, Hérë asks alms for the daughters of, Rep. 2. 381 D.

'Indifferent' things, Gorg. 468.
Induction, the source of knowledge, Laws 12. 965.
Infants, to be exercised, Laws 7. 789, 790; nature of, Rep. 4. 441.
Infinite, nature of, Phil. 24; comprises what admits of degrees, ib. 25.
Inflammations, Tim. 85.
Inheritance in the model city, Laws 5. 740.
'Injuries' and 'hurts,' Laws 9. 862.
Injustice, in perfection, Rep. 2. 360; eulogists of, ib. 361; in the state, ib. 4. 434; in the individual, ib. 444; brings no profit, ib. 9. 589, 590; an evil to the unjust, Crito 49; doing is worse than suffering. Gorg. 469, 508; injustice and justice, Laws 2. 663; ib. 5. 730; curable and incurable, ib. 731; involuntary, ibid.; to be pitied, ibid.; the destruction of men, ib. 10. 606; injustice and disease, ibid.; injustice and hurt, ib. 9. 862.
Inspiration of poets, Ion 534; of rhapsodes, ib. 536, 541; of statesmen, Meno 99.
Instrument and user distinguished, 1 Alcib. 129.
Intellect, objects of opinion and intellect classified, Rep. 7. 534; relation of the intellect and the good, ib. 6. 508; intellect and true opinion, Tim. 51.
Intemperance of love, Tim. 86.
Interest forbidden, Laws 5. 742.
Intermediates, Euthyd. 306.
Interpreters, election of, Laws 6. 759.
Intestate, children of the, Laws 11. 924.
Intoxication, not allowed in the state, Rep. 3. 403; forbidden at Laco- daemon, Laws 1. 637; allowed among the Scythians, etc., ibid.; nature of, discussed, ibid., and foll.; use of, ib. 645; 646. See Drinking; Festivities.
Intuition, Phædo 66.
Involuntary and voluntary actions, Laws 9. 861.

Iolaus and Heracles, Phaedo 89 C; Euthyd. 297 D.

Ion (of Ephesus), knows Homer better than anyone, Ion 530 D; a rhapsode, knows Homer only, ib. 533 D foll.; inspired, ib. 533 D foll.; not chosen general, ib. 541 B; inspired rather than dishonest, ib. 541 E; professes to speak well on all Homer, ib. 536 E; quotes Homer, ib. 537 A foll.; a Proteus, ib. 541 D.

Ion (of mythology), Euthyd. 302 D.

Ionia, progress of doctrine of Protagoras in, Theaet. 179 D.

Ionian harmony, Laches 188 D; Rep. 3. 399 A; philosophy, Soph. 242; philosophers, Theaet. 179; life described by Homer, Laws 3. 680; Ioni ans have no ancestral Zeus, Euthyd. 302 C; averse to the love of boys, Symp. 182 B.

Iphicles, brother of Heracles, Euthyd. 297 E.

Iris, daughter of Thaumas, Theaet. 155 D; ἀνδρὶ τοῦ ἐλευθ., Crat. 408 B.

Iphis, Egyptian chants are the composition of, Laws 2. 657 B.

Ismenias, the Theban, his wealth, Meno 90 A; a ‘rich and mighty man,’ Rep. 1. 336 A.

Isocrates, Socrates prophesies of him, Phaedr. 279 A B.

Isolochus, father of Pythodorus, 1 Alcib. 119 A.

Isthmus, Socrates once went to the games there, Crito 52 B; ancient boundary of Attica fixed at, Crit. 110 D; citizens to be sent to the games, Laws 12. 950 E.

Italy can tell of Charondas as a law-giver, Rep. 10. 599 E; in Italy the spectators are judges of theatrical performances, Laws 2. 659 B; Italian banditti, ib. 6. 777 C.

Ithaca, Ion 335 C.

J.

Jasper, Phaedo 110.


Judge, the good, Rep. 3. 409; judge of amusements, Laws 2. 659; judge of art, ib. 6. 669; laws concerning judges, ib. 6. 767, 9. 856, 857; judges of music, ib. 7. 802; election of judges, ib. 12. 956; select judges, ib. 11. 926, 928, 938, 12. 946, 947.

Juices, Tim. 60.

Just man, the, is happy, Rep. 3. 354; just and unjust are at heart the same, ib. 360; the just the happiest, ib. 9. 580; ‘just’ defined, Laws 9. 863, 884; just and unjust, 1 Alcib. 109; the just learn from the many, ib. 110.

Justice, among goods, Euthyd. 279; love the cause of, Symp. 196; popular definitions of, Crat. 413; = to speak the truth and pay debts, Rep. 1. 331 foll.; the art which gives good and evil to friends and enemies, ib. 332 foll., 356; in time of peace, ib. 333; is a thief, ib. 334; is human virtue, ib. 335; can do no harm, ibid.; = the interest of the stronger, ib. 338; is ‘sublime simplicity,’ ib. 348; does not aim at excess, ib. 349; identified with wisdom and virtue, ib. 351; a principle of harmony, ibid.; = ‘honour among thieves,’ ib. 352; = the excellence of the soul, ib. 353; in the highest class of goods, ib. 357; nature and origin of (Glauc), ib. 358, 359; the result of a compromise, ib. 359; in perfection, ib. 361; praised for its consequences only (Aci- mantus), ib. 362; poets on, ib. 363; is to some, ib. 364; a matter of appearance only, ib. 365; not praised for its own sake, ib. 366; in the state, ib. 369, 4. 433; in the individual, 4. 4. 435, 441; a division of labour, ib. 443; compared to health, ib. 444; more profitable than injustice, ib. 445; superior to injustice, ib. 9. 589; just men of the gods, ib. 10. 613; final triumph of, ib. 612, 613; justice and holiness, Protag. 330, 331; a part of virtue, Meno 73, 79; justice and the art of politics, Gorg. 404; happiness depends no, ib. 470; natural, ib. 483, 484, 488; the life of, pleasant, Laws 2. 662; justice and injustice, ib. 663; said to be the interest of the stronger, ib. 4. 714 (cp. Rep. 1. 338); justice and retribution, ib. 5. 728; worthy of honour, ib. 730; justice and equity, ib. 757; all citizens to partake in, ib. 6. 768; justice and dishonour inconsistent, ib. 9. 859; conventional, ib. 10. 889, 890; divine, ib. 904; the salvation of men, ib. 906; courts of, ib. 12. 956; = power of knowledge, Hipp. min. 375;
INDEX.

637 A foll.; condition of women among, ib. 637 B, 6. 781 B foll.; their superiority in war, ib. 1. 638 A; conservative in music, ib. 2. 660 B; better at gymnastic than at music, ib. 673 C; account of the early troubles of Greece, ib. 3. 682 E; early history of the, ib. 683 D foll.; have preserved the ancient laws, ib. 685 A; constantly at war with the sister states, ib. 686 B; constitution, ib. 691 E; defenders of Greece, ib. 692 D; Lacedaemonians and Cretans preserve the mean between democracy and monarchy, ib. 693 E; Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions akin, ib. 683 A; equality of society among, ib. 696 A; constitution in some respects like a despotism, ib. 4. 712 D; Helots among, ib. 6. 776 C; syssitia among, ib. 780 C foll., 8. 842 B; virgins take part in gymnastic exercises, ib. 7. 806 A; games in honour of the Dioscori at Lacedaemon, ib. 796 B; ideas about walls to cities, ib. 6. 778 D; gymnasts naked among the, Theaet. 162 B.

Laches, a person in the dialogue Laches, Laches 180 A foll.; a public man, ib. 180 B; was with Socrates at Delium, ib. 181 B (cp. 188 E; Symp. 221 A); his view of fighting in armour, ib. 182 D foll.; not given to speaking, ib. 188 C foll.; his wealth, ib. 186 C; discusses courage with Socrates, ib. 190 B foll.

Lachesis, eldest of the fates, Laws 12. 960 C; turns the spindle of Necessity together with Clotho and Atropos, Rep. 10. 617 C; daughter of Necessity, her speech, ib. D; apportions a genius to each soul, ib. 620 D.


Lamachus, his bravery, Laches 197 C.

Lamentation at sacrifices, Laws 7. 800; over the dead, ib. 12. 959, 960; to be checked, Rep. 3. 387.

Lampido, mother, daughter, and wife of a king, 1 Alcib. 124 A.

Lamprus, a musician, Menex. 236 A.

Land, legislation respecting, Laws 3. 684; distribution of in the model city, ib. 5. 739, 740; not to be sold or bought, ib. 741.

Language, analysis of, Crat. 421, 422; of the deaf and dumb, ib. 422, 423; origin of, ib. 425, 426; scientific construction of, ib. 425; ancient framers of, ibid.; complete analysis of, impossible, ibid.; greatness of, ib. 427; proper use of, Theaet. 184; analysis of, Soph. 261 foll.; language and art, Pol. 277; languages altered by time Crat. 418, 421.

Larisaeans given to philosophy, Meno 70 B.

Latonia, whence her name Leto, or Letho, Crat. 406 A.

Laughter not to be allowed in guardians, Rep. 3. 388; not to be represented in Gods, ib. 389.

Law (Laws), on what principle made, Rep. 1. 329, 2. 359; are teachers of youth, Apol. 24; plead their cause against Socrates, Crit. 50 foll.; are powerful in the next world, ib. 54; cause of, Rep. 3. 405; on special subjects of little use, ib. 4. 425, 426; bring help to all in the state, ib. 9. 590; of the Egyptians, Tim. 24; with regard to oracles, ib. 72; of Atlantis, Crit. 119, 120; laws and government, Pol. 294; criticism of, ib. 294, 295, 299; how far to be changed, ib. 295, 296; authority of, ib. 297; compulsory observance of, ib. 300; laws of Crete, Laws 1. 625, 626, 631, 633 foll.; of Lacedaemon, ib. 626; young men are not to criticise, ib. 634; criterion of, ib. 638; of the banquet, ib. 2. 671 (cp. Ruler of the Feast); influence of, on states, ib. 4. 711; etymology of the word (νόμος = νοον διανοητικόν), ib. 4. 714; forms of, ibid.; supremacy of is the salvation of a state, ib. 715; divine, ib. 716; shorter and longer, ib. 720; law and the prelude, ib. 722; obedience to, ib. 5. 729; unwritten, ib. 7. 793; laws and music, ib. 800; necessity of, ib. 9. 875; value of written, ib. 10. 890, 891; reviewers of, ib. 12. 951; knowledge of most valuable, ib. 12. 937; the Laws a romance, ib. 6. 752. Cp. Agriculture, Athenians, Model State.

Law-courts in the porch of the king archon, Euthyph. 2; attempts to influence the dicasts in Athenian law.
INDEX.

courts, Apol. 34, 35; fixing of the penalty by the accused, ib. 37, 38; position of, Laws 6. 778.
Law-giver, Gorg. 483; his falsehood, Laws 2. 663; object of the, ib. 3. 701; aims at virtue, ib. 4. 705, 706; assembly of law-givers, Laws 12. 951. Cp. Legislator.
Lawyer, the, Theaet. 173, 174.
Learning, pleasure accompanying, Laws 2. 667; is recollecting, Meno 81. Cp. Knowledge.
Lechaeum, Athenians defeated at, Menex. 246 A.
Legislation, a subdivision of the art of politics, Gorg. 464; principle of, Pol. 297; and education, Laws 2. 659, 660; conditions of, ib. 4. 709; order of, ib. 721; imperfection of, ib. 6. 769, 772; aim of, ib. 770; of minute details, ib. 7. 808; origin of, ib. 3. 681; early legislation, ib. 684; at Sparta, ib. 692. Cp. Laws.
Legislator, aims at expediency, Theaet. 178; legislator and physician compared, Pol. 295, 298; Laws 4. 720; compared to the pilot, ib. 298; object of, Laws 1. 627, 628, 630-632; aim of the, ib. 3. 693; and shepherd compared, ib. 5. 735; cannot reach the minutiae of life, ib. 7. 788; to have a care of women, ib. 806; the ancient, ib. 9. 853; legislator and the poets, ib. 858; to teach the truth about religion, ib. 10. 888-890; writings of, ib. 12. 957. Cp. Model State.
Leisure and philosophy, Theaet. 172.
Leon of Salamis, Apol. 32 D, E.
Leontines assisted by Athenians, Menex. 243 A.
Leontius, story of, Rep. 4. 439 E.
Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, 1 Alcib. 123 E.
Leprosies, Tim. 85.
Lesbian language, Protag. 341 C, 346 E.
Lethe, Rep. 10. 621 C.
Leto or Letho, Crat. 406 A.
Letters, insertion of, Phaedr. 244; Crat. 414, 417; Greek, Crat. 393, 394; changes of, ib. 399, 418; classification of, ib. 424; Phil. 18; meaning of, illustrated, ib. 427; image of the large and small, Rep. 2. 368; invention of, Phaedr. 274; make men forgetful, ib. 275; primaeval, Theaet. 201, 202; letters and syllables, ib. 202; combination of analogous to predication, Soph. 253; how learnt, Pol. 277, 278; Laws 7. 810; names of, different from the figures with four exceptions, ζ, τ, ο, α, Crat. 393; letter η, ib. 427; θ, ψ, α, ζ, ib.; θ, τ, ib.; λ, ib. (cp. 434); ν, ib.; α, ib., η, ib.; η, ib.; α, ib.; η, ib. 428, 434; ib. 434.
Leucippe and Evenor, Crit. 113 D.
Leucolophides, father of Adeimantus, Protag. 315 E.
Libations, Laws 7. 807.
Libya, Tim. 24 E, 25 B; Crit. 108 E.
Licentiousness forbidden, Rep. 5. 458.
"Lycymnaean names," Phaedr. 267 C.
Lie, the 'true lie,' Rep. 2. 782; the lie in words, ibid.; rulers of the state may lie, ib. 389; lies of poets, ib. 377; 'honest lie,' Laws 2. 663.
Lightness, Tim. 63.
Life in the early state, Rep. 2. 372; value of, Apol. 28, 38; Gorg. 512; Laws 8. 831; only valuable when good, Crit. 48; a guardianship of the gods, Phaedo 62; a future, ib. 63 (cp. 'Future life'); a true way of, Gorg. 527; Laws 7. 803; life of pleasure, Phil. 21; of wisdom, ibid.; mixed life, ib. 21, 22; the just is pleasant, Laws 2. 662; the pleasant life, ib. 5. 733 foll.; four kinds of, ibid.; health and disease in, ib. 734; according to nature, ib. 10. 890.
Ligures, a musical race, Phaedr. 237 A.
Like and unlike, Protag. 331; like, friend or enemy of the like, Lysis, 215; like and congenial, ib. 222.
Limit, the (τὸ πέρατος), Phil. 26.
Limitations in dispute, Laws 12. 954.
Lion and ape, Rep. 9. 590.
Liturgies (Λειτουργίαι), Laws 12. 949.
Liver, the, Tim. 71.
Living men not to be praised, Laws 7. 802.
Locrians conquered by the Syracusans, Laws 1. 638 B.
Locris celebrated for her laws, Tim. 20 A.
Logic, method of residues, Rep. 4. 428; accidents and essence distinguished, ib. 5. 454; essence and attribute distinguished, Euthyph. 11; (definitions), difficulty of obtaining definitions, Euthyph. 11; Meno 71, 75; definitions must contain no unexplained term, Meno
INDEX.

79; (opposition), nature of opposition, Protag. 331, 332; Rep. 4. 436; essential opposites, Phaedo 102; opposites exclude each other, ib. 104; opposition and negation, Soph. 257; predication, ib. 231; division of noun and verb, ib. 262; categories, Parm. 135; Laws 10. 895; ποιοτής, Theaeet. 182; πίσον, Soph. 245; πόσ τι, Rep. 4. 437; quality and relation, ibid.; γένεσις δύναμις, στάσις, κινησις, Soph. 254; classification, Pol. 262; division and generalization, Phaedr. 265 foll.; distinction of species and individual, ib. 277; of species, Pol. 285; of accident, Soph. 247; fallacies, Rep. 6. 487. For Plato's method of definitions, see Knowledge, Temperance; and the opening of the Sophist, and Politicus. Cp. Dialectic, Metaphysics.

Loquacity, Soph. 225.

Lotophagi, Rep. 8. 560 C.


Love, (ἔρως), lovers.

Symposium.—Love neglected by the poets, 177; Phaedrus' speech in praise of love, 178-180; eldest of the gods, etc. 178; stronger than death in Alcestis and Achilles, 179.

Pausanias in praise of love, 180—185.—Two loves, heavenly and common, 180; common love of male and female parents; heavenly love of male only, 181; love of boys forbidden, 182; feeling on this subject in various parts of Greece, 182 (cp. Laws 1. 636); Athenian views of, 182-184; virtuous service in love honourable, 184; heavenly love, 185.

Eryximachus in praise of love, 186-188.—Desire of the healthy and diseased distinguished, 186; reconciliation of these loves in medicine, 186; in music also, 187; love in the seasons, 188; in divination, 188.

Aristophanes in praise of love, 189-193.—Love neglected, 189; origin of love, 191-192; love the lord of good, 193.

Agathon in praise of love, 195—198.—Love the youngest and fairest of the gods, 195; histenderness, 195; his virtue, 196; love a poet, 196; master of all arts and source of peace, etc., 197.

Socrates in praise of love, 201—212.—Love a desire of what it needs, 200, 201; love neither fair nor foul, 202: not a god, 202; a great spirit, 202; the birth of love, 203; qualities of love, 203; love not to be confused with the beloved, 204; love only a part of love, 205; = the desire of good, 205, 206; is birth in beauty, 206; love and immortality, 207, 208; love in creative minds, 209; love and the science of beauty, 210; leads up to absolute beauty, 211.

Phaedrus.—Advantages of unimpassioned love, 231-234, and 237—242; of passionate love, 244-257; love a madness, 231; excites jealousies, 233; is fickle, 234; nature of love defined, 237; passionate love leads to loss of character, 239; of health and possessions, 240; an old love intolerable, 240; a passionate lover changeable, 241; love-madness a blessing, 245; the true nature of love-madness, 251-256; love a mighty god, 242.

Lysis.—The ridiculous lover, 204 foll.; the lover not to write poetry, 205; love of father and mother, 207 foll. Love and friendship (φίλια). Friends must be useful, 210, 215; better than the gold of Darius, 211; the nature of friendship, 212 foll.; the poets on friendship, 214; friendship between likes, ibid.; between unlikes, 215 foll.; between the indifferent and the good, 216; defined, 218; has an alternate end, 219; is of the natural or congenital, 221.

Love of the beautiful, Rep. 3. 403; and the love of knowledge, ib. 5. 474 foll.; a tyrant, ib. 9. 573 (cp. ib. 1. 329); sexual love, Tim. 91; mingled of pain and pleasure, ib. 42; three kinds of love, Laws 8. 837 foll., 11. 929; is of the whole, not of the part, Rep. 5. 475; unlawful love condemned, Laws, 1. 636, 8. 836; and friendship, ib. 8. 837; lovers' names, Rep. 5. 474; ways of lovers, Lysis, 204 foll.; praises of lovers, ib. 205; Aleibiades, love of Socrates, Symp. 215 foll.

Lucifer and Mercury (the stars), Tim. 38 D.

Lucina (Eileithyia), her temple, Laws, 6. 784 A; see Eileithyia.
INDEX.

than women, Crat. 392; the nature of men and women, Rep. 5. 453-455; analogy of men and animals, ib. 459; three classes of, ib. 9. 581; creation of, Tim. 42. 43, 69 foll.
Management, voluntary and compulsory, Polit. 276.
Μαντική (μαντική), Phaedr. 244.
Many, the, their opinion not to be regarded, Crito 44. 48; their power, ib. 44; opinion of = opinion of the stronger, Gorg. 488; Zeno’s argument concerning, Parm. 127; as teachers, Alcb. 110, 111.
Marathon, Miltiades the hero of, Gorg. 516 D; battle of, Menex. 240 C-241 B; trophies of, ib. 245 A; ‘a day too late for,’ Laws 3. 698 E; battle of, ib. 699 A, ib. 4. 707 C.
Mariandyrians, Laws 6. 776 D.
Maritime towns, Laws 4. 705.
Marriage, age for, Rep. 5. 460; Laws 4. 721, 6. 772, 775; prayers and sacrifices at, Rep. 5. 460; regulated by law, Polit. 310; rules concerning, Laws 4. 721, 6. 773 foll.; marriage festivals, ib. 775; Rep. 5. 459, 460; early married life, Laws 6. 780; if barren, ib. 784; second, ib. 11. 930.
Marrow, Tim. 73.
Marsyas, Socrates like, Symp. 215 B foll.; invented music, Laws 3. 677 D; his skin made into a leathern bottle, Euthyd. 285 D; Apollo preferred to, Rep. 3. 399 E.
Materialism, Soph. 247; materialists, ib. 246, 247; Laws 10. 889 foll.
Mathematics, Rep. 6. 510, 522; the square, Meno 82; use of hypothesis in, ib. 87; arithmetic, computation, mensuration, Phil. 56, 57; Greek, Theaet. 147; the diameter as a measure of difference, Polit. 266; value of, in education, Laws 7. 818; mathematical education in Egypt, ib. 819; commensurable and incommensurable in, ib. 819, 820; Greek ignorance of, ib. 820.
Matter and form, Crat. 389, 390.
Mean, the, required as a standard of relation, Polit. 284; arts depend on the existence of, ibid.
Measure, the source of good, Phil. 64.
Measurement, art of, Polit. 284.
Meats and drinks, custom in, Laws 6. 782.
Medea, the Colchian, Euthyd. 285 C.
Medes, subjected by Cyrus, Menex. 239 E; ‘corrupt Median fashions,’ Laws 3. 695 B.
Medicine, cause of, Rep. 3. 405; true use of, ib. 406; Greek use of, ib. 459; Tim. 89; Polit. 293; medicine and love, Symp. 186; compared to friendship, Lysis 217; to rhetoric, Phaedr. 270; medicine and gymnastic, Gorg. 464, 518; compared to punishment, ib. 479; must consider the whole, Charm. 156; dear for the sake of health, Lysis 219; Greek method of diagnosis, Protag. 352; cure for the headache, Charm. 175; Soph. 228; Greek practice of, Laws 4. 720; ashes for sore eyes, Lysis 210.
Megara, Crito 53 B; walk to and back, recommended by Herodicus, Phaedr. 227 D; Euclid and Terpion of, Phaedo 59 C; ib. 99 A. Cph. Theaet. 142 D.
Megarian, Herodicus, by origin a, Protag. 316 E.
Megillus, a person in the Laws, Laws 1. 624 B, etc.
Melampodidae, Theodylemenus, prophet of the, Ion 538 E.
Melenippe in Euripides, Symp. 177 A: see Euripides.
Meles, a bad harp-player, Gorg. 502 A.
Melesias, son of Thucydides, a person in the Laches, Laches 178 A foll.; lives with Lysimachus, ib. 179 B; joins in the conversation, ib. 184 E; one of the best wrestlers in Athens, Meno 94 C.
Meletus, of the deme of Pitthis, Euthyph. 2 B; his appearance, ibid.; his impeachment, ib. 2 A, 3 B (cp. Apol. 19 B); defender of the poets, Apol. 23 E; conversation with Socrates, ib. 24 C foll.; fails in his conviction, ib. 36 A.
Memoria technica, of Evenus, Phaedr. 267.
Memory, Phil. 34; art of, Hipp. min. 368.
Mendê, Antimoerus of, Protag. 315 A.
Menelaus and Proteus, Euthyd. 288 C; a ‘soft-hearted warrior,’ Symp. 174 C; his treatment when wounded, Rep. 3. 408 A.
Menexenus, pugnacious, Lysis 211 B; converses with Socrates, Lysis 212
A foll., 216 A foll.; present at the death of Socrates, Phaedo 59 B; a person in the dialogue Menexenus, Menex. 234 A.

Meno, Meno 70 A, etc.; 'a fair creature,' ib. 76 B, 80 C; son of Alexidemus, ibid.; torpified by Socrates, ib. 80 A; examination of his slave by Socrates, ib. 82 A foll.; beloved by Aristippus, ib. 70 A.

Menoechus, father of Patroclus, Rep. 3. 388 C; Laws 12. 944 A.

Mental blindness, causes of, Rep. 7. 518.

Mercenary soldiers, Laws 1. 630.

Merchandise of the soul, Soph. 224.

MERCHANTS, Soph. 223, 224.

Messene, richness of, 1 Alcib. 122 D, E; early history of, Laws 3. 683 D; Messenians, Laws 6. 777 C.

Mestor, Crit. 114 C.

Metaphysics, absolute ideas, Rep. 5. 476; analysis of knowledge, ib. 6. 510; abstract and relative ideas, ib. 7. 524; being and becoming, Tim. 27. 28; cause and effect distinguished, Euthyph. 10; essence and attribute distinguished, ib. 11; genera and species distinguished, ib. 12; existence revealed by thought, Phaedo 65; thought at its best, ib. 65; thought gains the idea of the absolute, ib. 65, 66; abstract essence, absolute ideas, existence of, ib. 74; knowledge of, ib. 75; unchangeable, ib. 78; progress toward, Symp. 211; intuition, Phaedo 79; difficulty of relation, ib. 96, 97, 101; Charm. 168; recollection and generalization, Phaedr. 249; qualification of correlatives, Gorg. 476; Rep. 4. 437 foll.; Elate metaphysics, Parm. 137 foll. Cp. Logic, One.


METICS, rules concerning, Laws 8. 850; duration of their stay in a city, ibid.; murders of, ib. 9. 866; who are murderers, ibid.; to be retail traders, ib. 11. 920.

METION, father of Daecalus, Ion 533 A.

METIS (Discretion), father of Poros (Plenty), Symp. 203 B.

METROBIUS, father of Connsus, Euthyd. 272 C.

METRODORUS, of Lampscus, a famous rhapsode, Ion 530 C.

MICCUS, palæstra of, Lysis 204 A.

MIDAS, his wealth, Rep. 3. 408 B; Laws 2. 660 E; the Phrygian, his tomb, Phaedr. 264 D.

MIDIAS, a quail breeder, 1 Alcib. 120 A.

MIDRIFF, Tim. 70.

MIDWIVES, Theaet. 149 foll.


MILESIAN youths degrade love, Laws 1. 636 B; Aspasia the Milesian, Menex. 249 D; Thales the Milesian, Protag. 343 A; Rep. 10. 600 A.

MILITARY profession, the, Rep. 2. 374; science, Polit. 304, 305; age for service, Laws 6. 785; rules for, ib. 12. 942; military exercises, ibid.

Miltiades, a good man, Gorg. 503 C (Cp. ib. 515 D); condemned, ib. 516 D.

MIMICRY, in education, Rep. 3. 394 foll.; the same person cannot succeed in tragedy and comedy, ib. 395; actors in tragedy and comedy not the same, ibid.; imitations lead to habit, ibid.; men acting women's parts, ibid.; influence on character, ib. 395 foll. Cp. Imitation.

Mimicry, Soph. 267.

Mind, the cause of names, Crat. 416; * = beauty, ibid.; orders all things, Phil. 28; belongs to the cause, ib. 31; as a good, ib. 66; of men differ, Theaet. 171; mind and motion, Soph. 249; nature of, Laws 10. 897.

MINISTERS of the state must be educated, Rep. 7. 519.

MINOS 'went every ninth year to converse with his Olympian sire,' Laws 1. 624 A; a Cretan lawgiver, ib. 630 D; his laws derived from Pythian Apollo, ib. 632 D; harassed the Athenians, ib. 4. 706 B; a judge among the dead, Gorg. 523 E; Apol. 41 A.

MIRRORS, images in, Tim. 46.

Misanthropists, Phaedo 89.

MISOGISTS, Phaedo 89, 96.

MISSIONS, Sin. 44; Phaedo 58.

Mithoeus, wrote the Sicilian cookery-book, Gorg. 518 B.

MITYLENE, Athenian ships blockaded at, Menex. 243 C; Pittacus of, Protag. 339 C foll.

MIXED principles, Phil. 25, 26.

MNEMOSyne (Memory), mother of the Muses, Theaet. 191 D; invocation of, Euthyd. 275 D; Crit. 108 D.

MNENAEUS, Crit. 114 D.

MNESEUS (Mindful of God), Crat. 394 E.
INDEX.

Model city, Laws 5, 735 foll.; number of citizens, ib. 737; festivals, ib. 738; distribution of lands, ib. 740; population, ib.; land not to be sold, ib. 741; no gold or silver, ib. 742; currency, ib.; dowry not allowed, ib.; interest forbidden, ib.; wealth in, ib. 742, 743; no ignoble occupations allowed, ib. 743; agriculture allowed in, ib. 743; classes of citizens, ib. 744; poverty in, ib.; situation of the city, ib. 745; tribes in, ib. 745; divisions of allotments, ib.; every man to have two habitations, ib.; numerical system to be commensurate, ib. 746; magistrates in, ib. 6. 752, 753 foll.; register of property in, ib. 754; classes of citizens, ib.; age of the guardians, ib. 755; generals etc., ib. 755, 756; council, ib. 756; public affairs, ib. 758, 759; religious rules to be obtained from Delphi, ib. 759; priesthood, ib.; interpreters, ib.; care of temples, ib. 759, 760; defence of the country, ib.; wardens of the country, ib. and 762; roads, ib. 761; fountains, ib.; irrigation, ib.; hospitals, ib.; decision of suits, ib.; common meals of wardens, ib. 762; wardens to have no servants, ib. 763; to know geography, ib.; wardens of the city, ib. 763; election of wardens, ib.; attendance at the assembly, ib. 764; wardens of the agora, ib.; ministers of music and gymnastic, ib. 764; ministers of education, ib. 765; decease of officers, ib. 766; judges, ib. 767; courts of law, ib. 766, 768; number of citizens, ib. 771; sacrifices, ib.; Gods, ib.; both sexes to join in games, ib.; rules about marriage, ib. 772 foll.; property, ib. 776 foll.; slave, ib. 777, 778; buildings of the, ib. 778; walls not required, ib. 778, 779; private life to be controlled, ib. 780; early married life in, ib.; common tables, ib. 783; rules about children, ib. 783 foll.; age for marriage, ib. 785; age for military service, ib.; for office, ib.; education up to three years old, ib. 7. 788, 794; subsequent education, ib. 794 foll.; nursing of infants, ib. 789 foll.; separation of the sexes, ib. 794; use of arms, ib.; both hands to be trained, ib. 794, 795; gymnastic, ib. 795; dancing, ib. 795, 796; wrestling, ib. 796; music, ib. 800 foll.; sacrifices, ib. 800; prayers, ib. 800, 801; worship of gods, demons, horses, ib. 801; praise of the dead, ib. 802; judges of music, ib.; gymnasia and schools, ib. 804; teachers, ib.; compulsory education, ib.; life of the women, ib. 805, 806; life of the men, ib. 807 foll.; boys, ib. 808; tutors, ib.; education of children, ib. 808, 809; learning of letters, ib. 809, 810; of the lyre, ib. 810-812; of prose compositions, ib. 810; of poetry, ib. 811; of gymnastic, ib. 813 foll.; dancing, ib. 815, 816; comedy, ib. 816; poets, ib. 817; mathematics, ib. 818 foll.; astronomy, ib. 821, 822; the praiseworthy citizen, ib. 823; festivals, ib. 8. 828; practice of war and tournaments, ib. 829, 830; martial poets, ib.; military gymnastic, ib. 832 foll.; running, ib. 833; women in gymnastic contests, ib.; fighting in armour, ib.; horse contests, ib. 834; mounted bowmen, ib.; rhapsodes, ib.; musical contests, ib. 835; laws concerning love, ib. 840, 841; common tables, ib. 842; laws of husbandmen, boundaries, neighbours, water, ib. 842-844; fruits, ib. 844, 845; pollution of water, ib. 845; right of way, ib. 846; judges of these laws, ib.; rules concerning artisans, ib. 846, 847; laws concerning hire, ib. 847; import and export, ib.; arms, ib.; retail trade, ib.; distribution of produce, ib. 848; houses of the citizens, ib.; craftsmen and their dwellings, ib.; agora, ib. 849 foll.; buying and selling, ib. 849; metrics, ib. 850; suits at law, ib. 9. 853; robbing temples, ib. 854; penalties. ib. 854, 855; trial, ib. 855; crimes against the state, ib. 856; theft, ib. 857; quacks, ib.; homicide, ib. 865, 874; involuntary homicide at games, ib. 865; death of patients, ib.; killing of slaves, ib.; unintentional killing of freemen, ib.; killing of strangers, ib. 866; manslaughter, ib. 866, 867; premeditated murder, ib. 867; return of the exiled homicide, ib.; disobedient homicide, ib. 868; slave who kills his master, ib.; parricide, ib., and 872, 873; murder,
INDEX.

ib. 871; indirect homicide, ib. 872; murder by a slave, ib.; suicide, ib. 873; beasts which ‘kill a man,’ ib.; inanimate objects which cause death, ib. 873, 874; murder by persons unknown, ib. 874; justifiable homicide, ib.; assault and wounding, ib. 874–882; wounding with intent, ib. 876, 877; childless houses, ib. 877; adoption, ib. 877, 878; wounding in a passion, ib. 878; wounding by slaves, ib. 879; assaults upon strangers, ib.; upon elders, ib. 880; upon parents, ib. 881; by slaves, ib. 882; law of violence, ib. 10. 884, 885; laws about impiety, ib. 907–909; prisons, ib. 908; kinds of impiety, ib.; punishment of, ib. 908, 909; charmers and wizards, ib. 909; rites in private houses, ib.; laws about rites and shrines, ib.; property, ib. 11. 913–917; treasure-trove, ib. 913; deposits, ib.; property left behind or in dispute, ib. 914; slaves, ib.; animals, ib. 915; exchange, ib. 915, 916; sale of diseased slaves or homicides, ib. 916; adulteration, ib. 916, 917; prices, ib. 917; retail-trade, ib. 918–921; taverns, ib. 919; no citizen to trade, ib.; metrics, ib. 920; contract, breach of, ib. 921; laws concerning payment, ib.; generals and tacticians, ib. 921, 922; wills and testamentary disposition, ib. 922–924; orphans, ib. 924–928; guardians of orphans, ib. 928; marriage of, ib. 924–926; family disagreements, ib. 928–930; second marriages, ib. 930; children of slaves, ib.; honour due to parents, ib. 931, 932; witch-craft, and poison, ib. 933; theft, ib.; lunatics, ib. 934; evil-speaking, ib. 934, 935; satiric poets, ib. 935, 936; beggars, ib. 936; injury done by slaves, ib.; witnesses and evidence, ib. 936, 937; advocates, ib. 937, 938; Laws concerning ambassadors, ib. 12. 941; theft, ib.; military life, ib. 942, 943; failure of service, ib. 943; throwing away armour, ib. 943–945; censors or examiners, ib. 945, 946; burial of, ib. 947; trial of, ib. 948; oaths, ib. 948, 949; contributions, attendance at choruses, etc., ib. 949; emigration and foreigners, ib. 950 foll.; travelling spectators, ib. 951, 952; nocturnal council, ib. 951, 961, 968; strangers, ib. 952, 953; surety, ib. 953; unlawful sale, ib. 953, 954; search, ib. 954; limitations of disputes, ib.; obstruction of witnesses and competitors, ib. 954, 955; receiving stolen goods, ib. 955; private enmities, ib.; service not paid, ib. 955; valuation of property, ib. 955; offering to gods, ib. 955, 956; courts of justice, ib. 956 foll.; select judges, ib. 956; execution of suits, ib. 958; rules about the dead, ib. 958 foll.; sepulchres, ib. 958; laying out, ib. 958, 959; funerals, ib. 959; lamentations, ib. 959, 960; burial when refused, ib. 960.

Moderation, Laws 5. 732.

Momus (god of jealousy), Rep. 6. 487 A.

Monarchy, divisions of, Pol. 302; origin of, Laws 3. 681; to be combined with democracy, ib. 693.

Money, a medium, Laws 11. 918.

Money-making, evil of, Rep. 8. 556.

Moon, created, Tim. 38 D; reputed mother of Orpheus, Rep. 2. 364 E; Anaxagoras on the nature of, Apol. 26 D; a goddess, Laws 7. 821 B; orbit of, ib. 822 A; Tim. 38 C; has a soul, Laws 10. 828 D, 899 B.

Moral qualities and arts, Hipp. min. 373; moral differences the cause of war, 1 Alcib. 112, 113; Euthyph. 7.

Morychus, house of, Phaedr. 227 B.

See Epicrates.

Mothers in the state, Rep. 5. 466; mother country, Menex. 237, 238.


Mourners, Laws 7. 800; hair cut in mourning, Phaedo 89.

Mouth, Tim. 75.

'Move not the immovable,' Laws 11. 913.

Murder, Laws 9, 865–874. (See Homocide, Model city.)


Musaeus, his pictures of a future life, Rep. 2. 363 D, E, 364 E; a sophist, Protag. 316 D; in the other world, Apol. 41 A; a source of inspiration, Ion 536 B.
INDEX.

Muse, Muses, compared to a magnet, Ion 533 E, 536 A; Muses inspire madness, Phaedr. 245 A (cp. 265 A); the Muses and the grasshoppers, ib. 259 A foll.; Terpsichore, Erato, Calliope, ibid.; invocation to the, Euthyd. 275 D; the name (ἀνδρι
τοῦ μουρθοῦ), Crat. 406 A; the melody of, due to love, Symp. 197 B; the Muses, 1 Alcib. 108 C; partners in the revels of men, Laws 2. 653 D; 665 A; give education, ib. 654 A; use of, ib. 670 A; source of the sense of harmony, ib. 672 D; help poets to truth, ib. 682 A; aid against passion, ib. 6. 783 A; their gifts, ib. 7. 796 E.

Music, an art of imitation, Crat. 423; music and education, Rep. 2. 377, 403; Laws 2. 654, 660; effect of excessive, Rep. 3. 411; influence of, ib. 4. 424 (cp. ib. 7. 522); Phaedo 60, 61; music and love, Symp. 187, Phil. 17; flute, ib. 56; music and predication, Soph. 253; origin of, Laws 2. 653, 654, 672; figures in, ib. 655; not to give pleasure, ibid.; wrong use of, ib. 655, 656; in Egypt, ib. 657; the fairest, ib. 659; music and virtue, ibid.; in Crete and Lacedaemon, ib. 660; imitative, ib. 668, 7. 798; importance of, ib. 669; poets’ corruption of, ibid.; music and metre separated, ibid.; in ancient Athens, ib. 3. 700; effect of, ib. 700, 701; solo singing, ib. 6. 764; imitation, ibid.; choruses, ibid.; ministers of, ib. 6. 764; innovations in, ib. 7. 800; music and morals, ib. 798; music and laws, ib. 800; songs, ib. 802.

Musical education, effect of, Rep. 3. 401, 402; amateurs, Rep. 5. 475; modes, Laches 188; contests, Laws 8. 830.

Myr rhina, tomb of (Batiaca), Crat. 392 A.

Myr rhinusian, Phaedrus the, Symp. 176 D; Phaedr. 244 A.

Myrtilus, the murder of, Crat. 395 C.

Mysian, a term of reproach, Gorg. 521 B.

Myson the Chenian, one of the Seven Wise Men, Protag. 343 A.


Myth of Er, the, Rep. 10. 614 foll.; of the origin of love, Symp. 191, 192; of the soul, Phaedr. 245-257; of the grasshoppers, ib. 259; of Th euth, ib. 274; more interesting than arguments, Protag. 320; of the creation of man, ibid. foll.; of Zamolxis, Charm. 156; the ‘Sicilian’ tale, Gorg. 493; parable of the Casks, ibid.; Socrates’ tale, ib. 523 foll.; the ‘ancient story,’ Polit. 269 foll.

Mythology, appealed to, Euthyph. 6; Socrates disbelieves in, ibid.; attempts to rationalize, Phaedr. 229; Socrates’ use of, ib. 265, 275; theft of Prometheus explained, Protag. 321; in families, Lysis 205; mythology a sort of ignorance, Laws 10. 886; represents the gods as thieves, ib. 12. 941.

N.

Nails, Tim. 76.

Names, natural truth of, Crat. 383; conventional theory of, ib. 384, 385 foll.; are parts of propositions, ib. 385; things have an essence, ib. 386; actions have an essence, ib. 386, 387; naming a kind of action, ib. 387; names the instruments of naming, ib. 388; defined, ibid.; the work of a legislator, ib. 389 (cp. 429); formed on an ideal, ibid.; speech must be natural, ibid.; differ in syllables, ib. 390; the true judge of, ibid.; barbarian and Hellenic, ib. 386, 390; syllables of, ib. 393; of Greek letters, ibid.; meaning and form of, ib. 394; reason in, ib. 393, 394; of men and heroes, ib. 394 foll.; of Gods, ib. 400 foll.; the imposers of, ib. 401, 411; foreign, ibid. (cp. 416); foreign origin of, ib. 409; the cause of, ib. 416; primary and secondary, ib. 422; names indicate nature of things, ibid.; names are vocal imitations, ib. 423; sophistical view of, ib. 428 foll.; names and pictures compared, ib. 430; how true, ib. 431; how related to things, ib. 432; when good, ib. 433; theories of names, ib. 433, 434; convention in, ib. 435; knowledge given by, ib. 436; first givers of, ibid.; rest rather than motion signified by, ib. 437; more than human, ib. 438; in education, ib. 440; distinction of ascribed to Prodicus, Charm. 163; Protag. 337, 358; generic, Phaedo 104; names of ideas, ibid.; Greek habit of giving family
INDEX.

names, Lysis 204; names and definitions, Soph. 218; have no real existence, ib. 244; connection of, ib. 261; not to be pressed, Pol. 261.

Narration, styles of, Rep. 3. 392, 393.


Natural, justice, Gorg. 483–485; Callicles’ view of, ib. 492; right, Laws 10. 890; philosophy and pleasure, Phil. 44; scenery, Greek feeling for, Phaedr. 230; science, Phaedo 96.

Nature in names, Crat. 387, 390, 393, 394, 422, 423; nature and convention in morals, Gorg. 483; Laws 10. 889, 890; nature and habit, Laws 2. 655; nature, art and chance, ib. 10. 889; in politics, ibid.; life according to, ib. 890; meaning of the word, ib. 10. 892.


Naucratis, the home of Theuth, in Egypt, Phaedr. 274 C.

Nausicydes, of the deme of Cholarges, a student of philosophy, Gorg. 487 C.

Nautical population, evil of, Laws 4. 706.

Naxos, the field-labourer at, Euthyp. 4 C.

Negation and opposition, Soph. 257.

Neighbours not to be injured, Laws 8. 843.

Neith = Athena, Tim. 21 E.

Nemea, Lysis, 205 C; citizens to be sent to, Laws 12. 950 E.

Nemesis, the messenger of justice, Laws 4. 717 D.

Nereids, Crit. 116 E.

Nestor, excelled men in speech and temperance, Laws 4. 711 E; wisest of the Greeks, Hipp. min. 364 C; like Pericles, Symp. 221 C; his rhetoric, Phaedr. 261 C; his counsel to Antilochus, Ion 537 A; his concubine, ib. 558 C.

Neutral state, Phil. 33.

Niceratus, father of Nicias, Gorg. 472 A.

Niceratus, son of Nicias, Rep. 1. 327 C; Nicias wishes Socrates to be his tutor, Laches 200 D.

Nicias, Gorg. 472 A; Rep. 1. 327 C; a person in the dialogue Laches, Laches 178 A, etc.; his opinion on the art of fighting in armour, ib. 182 A foll.; used to cross-examination by Socrates, 188 A; B; his opinion on courage, ib. 195 A foll.

Nicostratus, pupil of Socrates, Apol. 33 E.

Night and day, Tim. 39.

Nightingale, Thamyris changed into a, Rep. 10. 620.

Nile, children of the, savage, Laws 12. 953 E; ‘the long and difficult arm’ of the, Phaedr. 257 E; divided by the Delta, Tim. 21 E; saviour of Egypt, ib. 22 D; preserves of fishes in the, Pol. 264 C.

Ninus, empire of, Laws 3. 685 C.

Niobe, Tim. 22 A; sufferings of in tragic poetry, Rep. 2. 380 A.


Nómai, ‘strains’ and ‘laws,’ Laws 7. 800.

‘Not-beautiful,’ the, Soph. 257.

‘Not-being,’ Soph. 237 (cp. ib. 257); cannot be predicated of being, ibid.; ‘not-being,’ ‘nothing,’ ibid.; not-being and number, ib. 238; in the abstract, ibid.; not-being and images, Soph. 240; not-being and falsehood, ibid.; not-being and being, ib. 257; exists, ib. 258; not-being and language, ib. 260.

Not-great, the, Soph. 257.

Nouns, Soph. 261, 262.

Number of the State, the, Rep. 8. 546; of citizens, Laws 5. 737; of families not to change, ib. 5. 740.

Numerical systems to be commensurate, Laws 5. 746.

Nursing and gestation, Laws 7. 789.

Nymphs overtake Socrates, Phaedr. 241 E; Bacchic inspired by Zeus, ib. 253 A; of Achelous and Pan better rhetoricians than Lysias, ib. 263; their message to Lysias, ib. 278 B.

O.

Oaths in suits, Laws 12. 948; how far to be taken, ib. 948, 949.

Obedience, principle of, Laws 3. 690.

Occupations, ignoble, not permitted in the model state, Laws 5. 741.

Oceanus, Phaedo 112 E.

Oceanus and Tethys, parent of all, Crit. 402 B; Tim. 40 E; Theaet. 152 E, 180 D.

Odyssey, Hipp. min. 363 B; 1 Alcib. 112 A; Rep. 3. 393 A; Ion. 539 D: see Homer.

Oeagrus, father of Orpheus, Symp. 179 D.

Oedipus, on the stage, Laws 8. 838 C;
INDEX.

his curse upon his sons, ib. 11. 931 B.
Oenoe, Protag. 310 C.
Oenophyta, battle of, Menex. 242 B.
Offerings to the Gods, Laws 12. 955, 956.
Officers, decease of, Laws 6. 766.
Oil, Tim. 60; properties of, Protag. 334.
Oiovostiki, Phaedr. 244.
Old age, complaints against, Rep. 1. 328, 329; Sophocles quoted in regard to, ib. 329; wealth, a comforter of age, ib.; old men think more of the future life, ib. 330; old men not students, ib. 7. 536; (Lysimachus), Laches 181 foll.; may go to school, ib. 201; old men as singers, Laws 2. 665, 666.
Oligarchical man, the, Rep. 8. 553; the pros, ib. 555.
Oligarchy, Rep. 8. 544; origin of, ib. 550; nature of, ib. 551; Pol. 301, 302.
Olympic games, victors in, maintained in the Prtyneum, Apol. 36 A.
Olympia, Olympic victory, Laws 5. 729 D, ib. 7. 807 C; the heavenly victories of, Phaedr. 236 B; horses and men who ran at, Laws 7. 822 B; training for, ib. 8. 840 A; citizens to be sent to, ib. 12. 950 E; Hippias at, Hipp. min. 363 C–364 A; offering of the Gypselids at, Phaedr. 236 B.
Olympian Zeus, his temple, Phaedr. 227 B; the Saviour, Rep. 9. 583 B.
Olympus, melodies of, Ion 533 B; Symp. 215 C; inventor of music, Laws 3. 677 D.
One, and many, Phil. 14; hypotheses of the one, Parm. 137 foll.; I. a. that the one is, ib. 137; I. b. that the one has been, ib. 142 foll.; I. b. 2. if one is one and many, ib. 155; I. a. a. if one exists, ib. 157; I. bb. if one is, ib. 159; II. a. if one does not exist, ib. 160; II. b. if one is not, ib. 163; II. aa. if one has no existence, ib. 164; II. bb. if the others exist, ib. 165; one cannot have parts, ib. 137; is unlimited, ib.; is formless, ib. 138; cannot be anywhere, ib.; incapable of motion, ib. 139; is never the same, ib.; never in rest, ib.; not the same with other, or other of itself, ib.; one and the same, ib.; one not like or unlike itself or other, ib. 140; neither equal nor unequal to itself or other, ib.; not older or younger, ib. 141; does not partake of time, ib.; is not one, ib. 142; is infinite, ib. 143; has infinite parts, ib. 144; is limited, ib. 145; has form, ib.; is in itself and other, ib.; is in rest and motion, ib. 146; is the same and other with itself, ib. 146; is like and unlike itself and others, ib. 147; touches and does not touch itself and others, ib. 148; is equal and unequal to itself and others, ib. 149; partakes of time, ib. 151, 152; becomes older and younger than itself, ib. 155; has name and definition, ib.; is generated and destroyed, ib. 156; is exposed to many affections, ib.; others of the one are infinite, ib. 158; are like and unlike, ib.; non-existent one may participate in many, ib. 161; is unlike others and like itself, ib.; partakes of inequality, ib.; partakes of existence and non-existence, ib.; has motion, ib. 162; and stands, ib. 163; is changed and not changed, ib.; philosophy of the one, Soph. 244.
Opinion and knowledge, Rep. 5. 476–478, 534; the lovers of, ib. 479, 480; a blind guide, ib. 6. 506; objects of opinion and intellect classified, ib. 7. 534; origin of, Tim. 37, 51; true, Meno 97, 98; a guide in action, ibid.; like the images of Daedalus, ib. 97; source of, Phaedr. 248; right opinion, Symp. 202; of the many, its value, Protag. 353; Crito 47; Laches 184; true and false, Phil. 38 foll.; false, Theaet. 187 foll.; Soph. 264; not heterodoxy, ib. 191; how far possible, ib. 192; false opinion in regard to numbers, ib. 196; false, not = exchange of knowledge, ib. 199; opinion and wisdom, Pol. 278; opinion and knowledge, Phaedr. 247, 248.
Opium, Tim. 60.
Opposites generated out of opposites, Phaedo 103; exclusion of, ib. 102; everything has one opposite, Protag. 332; opposites desire each other, Lysis 215; qualification of, Rep. 4. 436. Cp. Contradiction.
Opposition, nature of, Phaedo 104, 105, 495 foll.; of ideas and things, Parm. 129; of ‘like’ and ‘unlike,’ ‘many’ and ‘one,’ ib.; opposition and negation, Soph. 257; opposition
and essence, ib. 258; in virtues, Pol. 307, 308.
Oratory, the true principles of, Phaedr. 271, 277.
Orestes, etymology of the name, Crat. 394 E.
Organs of sense, Theaet. 184.
Orithyia, carried off by Boreas, Phaedr. 229 B.
Oropia, ancient boundary of Attica, Crit. 110 E.
Orphans, Laws 11. 922 foll.; guardians of, ib. 924, 925; marriage of, ib. 924, 925; impediments to, ib. 926; especial care due to, ib. 926, 927; care of, at Athens, Menex. 249.
Orpheus quoted, Crat. 402 B; Rep. 2. 364 E; Phil. 66 C; Laws 2. 669 D; Protagoras like Orpheus, Protag. 315 A; a sophist, ib. 316 D; theme of rhapsodes, Ion 533 C; a source of inspiration, ib. 536 D; a 'cowardly harper,' Symp. 179 D; antiquity of 'Iris discoveries, Laws 3. 677 D; songs of, ib. 8. 829 E; child of the Moon and the Muses, quoted on ritual, Rep. 2. 364 E; soul of, chooses a swan's life, ib. 10. 620 A.
Orphic poems, Crat. 400 C; life, Laws 6. 782 C, D.
Ortagoras, the Theban, a famous flute player, Protag. 318 C.
Other, the meaning of, Soph. 254, 255; nature of, ib. 257.
Otus, tale of, Symp. 190 B.

P.
Paeanian, Ctesippus the, Euthyd. 273 A; Phaedo 59 B; Charmantides the, Rep. 1. 328 B.
Pain, Tim. 64; Phaedo 83; pain and pleasure simultaneous, Gorg. 496; not = evil, ib. 497; pain and pleasure in different goods, Phil. 32; of the soul, ib. 47; pain and pleasure, Laws 1. 653-653.
Painters, Rep. 10. 596, 597; are imitators, ib. 597; painters and poets, ib. 605; of landscape, Crit. 107; of figure, ibid.
Painting, an art of imitation, Crit. 423; in Egypt, Laws 2. 657; endless labour of, ib. 6. 769; compared to legislation, ibid.
Palaestra of Micus, Lysis 204 A, 206 E; of Taureas, Charm. 153 A.
Palamedes, interest of conversing with, Apol. 41 B; the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeus), Phaedr. 261 C, D; Palamedes and Agamemnon in the play, Rep. 7. 522 D; antiquity of his discoveries, Laws 3. 677 D.
Pamphylia, Ardiaeus, a tyrant of some city in, Rep. 10. 615 C.
Pan, etymology of the name (ὁ πᾶν μὴνων καὶ ἄι ἀπόλον), Crat. 408 B, C, D; prayer to, Phaedr. 279 B; imitated in Bacchic dances, Laws 7. 815 C.
Panathenaeas, Ion 530 B; Parm. 127 A.
Pancratium, Laws 7. 798.
Pandarus, author of the violation of the oaths, Rep. 2. 379 E; wounded Menelaus, ib. 3. 408 A.
Panharmonic scale, the, Rep. 3. 399.
Panopeus, father of Epeius, Ion 533 A; Rep. 10. 620 B.
Panops, the fountain of, Lysis 203 A.
Pantomime, Rep. 3. 397.
Paradox about justice and injustice, the, Rep. 1. 348; sophistical, Euthyd. 275 foll., 293 foll.; Meno 80.
Paralus, son of Pericles, Protag. 314 E; very inferior to his father, Meno 94 B (cp. Protag. 328 D).
Paralus, son of Democritus, Apol. 34 A.
Parental love, Lysis 207 foll.
Parents and children in the state, Rep. 5. 461; to rule over children, Laws 3. 690; honour due to, ib. 4. 717, 11. 930, 931; remembrance of dead, ib. 718; difference between parents and children, ib. 11. 928 foll.; lunatic, ib. 929; curse of, ib. 931; laws concerning, ib. 932.
Parian, Evenus the, Apol. 20 A; Phaedr. 267 A. See Evenus.
Parians, Athens fought in behalf of, Menex 215 B.
Parmenides, his method, Parm 136 A; his theory of rest, Theaet. 180 E, 183 E; Parm. 152 E; description of, Parm. 127 B; Parmenides and Zeno, ib. 128 A; his 'process,' ib. 137 A foll.; Parmenides, Soph. 216 A, 217 C; quoted, ib. 237 A, 244 E, 258 C; talked in rather a light and easy strain, ib. 242 C.
Parnes, ancient boundary of Attica, Crit. 110 D.
'Part' and 'class,' Pol. 262, 263; parts and whole, Theaet. 204.
Participation and predication, Soph. 252.
INDEX.

Passage money, rates of, in Greece, Gorg. 511.
Passionate element of the soul, Rep. 4, 440.
Patient and agent equally qualified, Gorg. 476 (cp. Rep. 4, 436); patient and physicians, Laws 9, 865.
Patriotism, Crito 51.
Patroclus 'the stauary,' Euthyd. 297 D, E.
Patroclus, Apol. 28 C; horse race in honour of, Ion 537 A (cp. Rep. 3. 388 C); tomb of, Rep. 3. 391 B (cp. Laws 12. 944 A); Patroclus and Achilles, Symp. 179 E, 208 A.
Patrol of the country, Laws 6. 760.
Patronymics used of young children, Lysis 204.
Patterns, the two, Theaet. 177.
Pausanias, of the deme of Cerameis, with Prodicus, Protag. 315 D; wishes to have the drinking easier, Symp. 176 A; his speech in honour of Love, ib. 180 C foll.
Payment for teaching, Apol. 20; Gorg. 520; laws concerning payment, Laws 11. 921.
Peace and war, Laws 1. 628, 629; life of peace, ib. 7. 804; dances of peace, ib. 815, 816.
Pegasi (winged steeds), Phaedr. 229 D.
Peleus, nuptial gift of arms to, Laws 12. 944 A; the gentlest of men, Rep. 3. 391 C.
Pellias, father of Alcestis, Symp. 179 B.
Pelopidae, Rep. 2. 380 A; Pelopidae and Heraclidae, Laws 3. 685 D.
Peloponnesians, their jealousy of Athenians, Menex. 235 D.
Peloponnesus, Laws 3. 685 B.
Pelops, his name, Crat. 395 C; descendants of, see Pelopidae.
Penelope's web, Phaedo 84 A.
Penestae, Laws 6. 776 D.
Peparethians, the 'ignoble,' 1 Alcib. 116 D.
Perception (άναθεσις), Phaedo 65, 79; Phil. 33, 39; Theaet. 151 foll.; contradictions of, Theaet. 154; theory of motion in relation to, ib. 150; misuse of, ib. 159; relativity of, ib. 160; perception and understanding, ib. 160; perception and the memory of perception, ib. 163; Heraclitean, theory of, ib. 182 (cp. 160); perception and knowledge, ib. 184, 192; organs of, ib. 184, 185; of universals, ib. 185; medium of, ibid. Cp. Rep. 6. 508 foll., Pleasure, Sensation.
Perdiccas, father of Archelaus, Gorg. 470 D (cp. 471 A, B); Rep. 1. 336 A.
Perfect state, difficulty of, Laws 4. 711.
Pergama, the citadel of Troy, Phaedr. 243 B.
Periander, a tyrant, Rep. 1. 336 A.
Pericles, Meno 94 A; effect of his administration, Gorg. 515 D, E; guardian of Alcibiades, 1 Alcib. 104 B; Protag. 320 A; is said to have associated with the philosophers, 1 Alcib. 118 C, D; Pericles and Aspasia, Menex. 235 E; his funeral oration, ib. 236 B; long walls partly built by his counsel, Gorg. 455 E; his family, ib. 472 B; his recent death, ib. 503 C; first to give the people pay, ib. 515 D, E; his badness, ib. 516 A; one of the real authors of the calamities of Athens, ib. 519 A; sons of, Meno 94 A; Protag. 319 E; not = Socrates as an orator, Symp. 215 E; Nestor and Pericles, ib. 221 C; what he would have said about rhetoric, Phaedr. 269 A; Pericles and Anaxagoras, ib. 270 A; like a book, Protag. 329 A.
Peripneum, sends souls back to the light in the ninth year, Meno 81 C; meaning of the name, Crat. 404 C.
Perseus, ancestor of the Achaemenids, 1 Alcib. 120 E.
Persia, kings of, 1 Alcib. 121 A.
Persian government, Laws 3. 694 A foll., 697 C; Persian invasion, ib. 692 C foll., 698 B foll., 4. 707 B, C; Persians at the battle of Plataea, Laches 191 C; Persian kings, 1 Alcib. 121 A; wealth and luxury of, 122 C; history of the Persians, Menex. 239 D foll. (cp. Laws 3. 694 A foll.); as sailors, ib. 241 B; as drinkers of wine, Laws 1. 637 D, E; invasion, prophecies concerning, ib. 642 D, E; have the highest form of monarchy, ib. 3. 693 D; are shepherds, ib. 695 A.
Personal identity, Symp. 207; Theaet. 154.
Personification, the argument like a lark, Euthyd. 291; like a whirlpool, ib. 293; hides her face, Rep. 6. 605. Cp. Protag. 338.
Persuasion, two kinds of, Gorg. 454;
INDEX.

art of, Phil. 58; persuasion and force, Laws 4.722; persuasion and truth, Phaedr. 260

Phaedo, present at Socrates' death, Phaedo 57 A foll.; Socrates plays with his hair, ib. 89 B; Phaedo and Simmias, ib. 102 B; narrates the Phaedo to Echecrates of Phlius, ib. 57 A foll.

Phaedondes, present at the death of Socrates, Phaedo 59 C.

Phaedrus, eagerness of, Phaedr. 228, A, B, 236 D, E; a lover of discourse, ib. 242 A; son of Vain man, ib. 244 A; with Hippias, Protag. 315 C; a 'weak head,' Symp. 176 D; complains that love has no encomiast, ib. 177 A; his speech in honour of love, ib. 178 A foll.

Phaenaretê, mother of Socrates, 1 Alcib. 131 E; a midwife, Theaet. 149 A.

Phaethon, story of, Tim. 22 C.

Phalermus, Apollodorusof, Symp. 172 A.

Phanosthenes of Andros, a foreigner, chosen general by the Athenians, Ion 541 C.

Phantastic art, Soph. 236; divisions of, ib. 266, 267.

Pharmacia and Orithyia, Phaedr. 299 C.

Phasis, eastern extremity of the Grecian world, Phaedo 109 B.

Phason, brother of Hippocrates, Protag. 310 A.

Phédius, an Athenian, the statuary, Protag. 311 C; not so wealthy as Protagoras, Meno 91 D.

Phæleus, Plains of, Crit. 111 C.

Phæmus, the rhapsode of Ithaca, Ion 533 C.

Pherecrates, exhibited savages at the Lenaean festival, Protag. 327 D.

Philebus, a person in the dialogue Philebus, Phil. 11 A, etc.; maintains that enjoyments, etc., are a good to every living being, ibid. (cp. 12 A); joins in the conversation, Phil. 18 A, 20 A, 28 A.

Philippides, son of Philomelus, with Protagoras, Protag. 315 A.

Philippus, (Philip), father of Phoenix, Symp. 172 B.

Philolaus, Phaedo 61 D.

Philomelus, father of Philippides, Protag. 315 A.

Philosophers, of the Heracleian school, Crat. 411; are to be kings, Rep. 5. 473 (cp. 6. 498 foll., 502); lovers of all knowledge, ib. 475; true and false, ib. 475, 6. 500; to be guardians, ib. 6. 484; qualifications of, ib. 485 foll.; why philosophers are useless, ib. 487 foll.; their love of knowledge, ib. 490; corruption of the, ib. 494; sham philosophers, ib. 494; few in number, ib. 496; sketch the state, ib. 501; education of, ib. 503; desire death, Phaedo 61, 64; will not commit suicide, ib. 61; avers to pleasure, ib. 64, 82; virtues of the, ib. 68; the natural philosophers, Lysis 214; politicians, Euthyd. 306; popular view of, Phaedo 64; Euthyd. 304; philosophers and lovers, Phaedr. 248; in the train of Zeus, ib. 250; not defenceless, Gorg. 508, 509; their view of life, ib. 512; training required for, Parm. 135; picture of, Theaet. 174 foll.; divine, Soph. 216; philosophers and the multitude, ib. 254; philosophers and poets, Laws 12. 667; physical not godless, ib. 966, 967.

Philosophic nature, the, rarity of, Rep. 6. 491; causes of the ruin of, ib.

Philosophy, love of real knowledge, Rep. 6. 485; the corruption of, ib. 491; the desolation of, ib. 495; philosophy and governments, ib. 497; prejudice against, ib. 500, 501; why it is useless, ib. 7. 517; time set apart for, ib. 539; philosophy and poetry, ib. 16. 607; the practice of death, Phaedo 80; a purification, ib. 82; effect of on the soul, ib. 83; censured, Euthyd. 304; confused with sophistry at Athens, ib. 305; Socrates defends, ib. 307; the love of Socrates, Gorg. 481; moderate study of recommended, ib. 484, 487; impossible without ideas, Parm. 135; philosophy of relativity, Theaet. 155; the uninstructed in, ib. 155; philosophy and leisure, ib. 172.

Phlegm, Tim. 83, 84.

Phlius, Phaedo 57 A.

Phocyldes, his saying, 'that as soon as a man has a livelihood he should practice virtue,' Rep. 3. 407 B.

Phoenician tale, Rep. 3. 414 C foll.

Phoenicians, their love of money, Rep. 4. 436 A; (cp. Laws 5. 747 C).

Phoenix, tutor of Achilles, Rep. 3. 390 E; cursed by Anytontor, his father, Laws 11. 931 B.

Phoenix, son of Philip, Symp. 172 B, 173 B.
Phorcy, son of Oceanus and Tethys, Tim. 40 F.

Phoroneus, called 'the first,' Tim. 22 A.

Phrygian harmony, Rep. 3. 399; (cp. Laches 188); Phrygian words, see κύρων, τύρο, ἢδορ, under Etymology.

Phrygians, Pol. 262 E; Midas the Phrygian, Phaedr. 264 D.

Phryndonas, a notorious villain, Protag. 327 D. Cp. Eurybatus.

Phthia, 'The third day hence to Phthia shalt thou go' (Il. ix. 363), Crito 44 B (cp. Hipp. min. 370 C).

Phylarch, Laws 6. 756.


Cp. Phaedo, 97.


Piety defined = prosecuting the guilty, Euthyp. 5; = that which is dear to the gods, ib. 6; further defined, ib. 9; a part of justice, ib. 12; a ministration, ib. 13; an art, ibid.; a science of praying, ib. 14.

Pig, the sacrifice of a, common, Rep. 2. 378.

Pilot and legislator compared, Pol. 298; pilot's art, Gorg. 511; the philosophic pilot, ibid. Cp. Captain.

Pindar, on the hope of the righteous, Rep. 1. 331 A; on Asclepius, ib. 3. 408 B; his natural justice, Gorg. 484 B, 488 B; Laws 4. 714 E; believed the soul immortal, Meno 81 A; quoted, Rep. 2. 365 B; Meno 76 D; Phaedr. 227 B; Theaet. 173 E; (Ol. 1. 1) Euthyd. 304 B.

Piraeus, Rep. 1. 327 A, 4. 439 E; Gorg. 511 E; Socrates seldom goes there, Rep. 1. 328 C; citizens in, Menex. 243 E.

Pirithous, his 'horrid rape,' Rep. 3. 391 C.

Pittacus of Mitylene, one of the Seven Wise Men, Protag. 343 A; his saying criticised, ib. 339 G; a sage, Rep. 1. 335 E.

Pithis, deme of, Euthyp. 2 B.

Plataea, Lacedaemonians at, Laches 191 C; battle of, Menex. 241 C, 245 A; Laws 4. 707 C.

Plato, present at the trial of Socrates, Apol. 34 A; was ill at the time of Socrates' death, Phaedo 59 B.

Pleasure, excess of, Rep. 3. 403; pleasure and love, ibid.; sensual, ib. 7, 519, 9, 586; division of into necessary and unnecessary, ib. 8, 558, 559; three classes of, ib. 9, 581; criterion of, ib. 582; the highest, ib. 583; classification of, ibid.; a motive, ibid.; without pain, ib. 584; of the passionate, ibid.; of the philosopher, ib. 586, 587; real unknown to the tyrant, ib. 587; nature of, Tim. 64; of replenishment, ib. 65; connect soul and body, Phaedo 83; their connection with good and evil, Protag. 352–354 foll.; 'overcome' by, ib. 353, 357; (cp. Laws 1, 633); degrees of, ib. 356; pleasure and the philosopher, Gorg. 495 foll.; Phaedo 64; the pleasant not the good, ib. 497; pleasure and good, ib. 498 foll.; arts of, ib. 501; = the good, Phil. 11; varieties of, ib. 12; how far one, ibid.; needs addition, ib. 21; belongs to the infinite, ib. 27, 28; to the mixed, ib. 31; a replenishment, ibid.; pleasure of memory, ib. 35; are pleasures false? ib. 36; pleasure and opinion, ib. 37; pleasure qualified, ibid.; false, ib. 40, 41; pleasure and the theory of flux, ib. 43; denied by natural philosophers, ib. 44; of the body, ib. 45; arising from diseased state, ib. 46 (cp. Tim. 86); mixed, ibid.; unmixed, ib. 51; true, ibid.; of sight, smell, beauty, ibid.; of knowledge, ib. 52; true belong to the idea of measure, ibid.; without pain, ib. 53; a generation, ibid.; not the good, ib. 55; Socrates' view of, ib. 60; insufficient, ibid.; in relation to good, ib. 66; Cretan laws against, Laws 1. 634, 635; the just life the pleasantest, ib. 2, 662; in eating, ib. 667; in learning, ibid.; in imitative arts, ibid.; no criterion of rightness, ibid.; pleasure and reason, ib. 3, 689; pleasure and the soul, ib. 5, 727; desired, ib. 733; true pleasure in life, ib. 734; not allowed to young children, ib. 7, 792; pleasure and passion, ib. 9, 863; pleasure and pain, Phaedo 60; simultaneous, Gorg. 496; Phil. 31 (cp. ib. 42); in alternation, Phil. 46; coalescing, ib. 47; in the mind, ib. 50 (cp. Laws 1, 633); two counsellors, Laws 1. 644; in children, ib. 2, 653; natural ib. 5, 732; in life, ib. 733.
INDEX.

Pluto, his complaint to Zeus, Gorg. 523 A, B; meaning of the name, (παλοντος), Crat. 402 D foll.; not the blind God, Laws 1. 631 C; the twelfth month to be sacred to, ib. 8. 828 C; a great Sophist, Crat. 403 E.

Pnyx, included in the Acropolis in early times, Crit. 112 A.

Poetry, styles of, Rep. 3. 392, 394; in the state, ib. 10. 595 foll., 607; effect of, ib. 605; feeds the passions, ib. 606; poetry and philosophy, ib. 607 (cp. Laws 12, 967); its place in Greek education, Protag. 325, 326, 339; Laws 2. 659 foll.; is a whole, Ion 532; poetry and inspiration, ib. 533; Tragic poetry native to Athens, Laches 183; a sort of rhetoric, Gorg. 502; poetry and prose, Laws 7. 811; learnt by heart, ib. 810, 811; elements which make up poetry, song, rhythm, metre, speech, Gorg. 502.

Poets, the, on justice, Rep. 2. 363; as educators, ib. 377, Laws 7. 811; their teaching censured, ib. 3. 391, 392; banished from the state, ib. 398 (cp. Tim. 19, Laws 7. 817); poets and tyrants, ib. 8. 568; imitators, ib. 10. 601; poets and painters, ib. 605; not wise, Apol. 22; tragic at Athens, Laches 183; criticism on the name, Symp. 205; fathers of wisdom, Lysis 214; talk about them commonplace, Protag. 347; inspired, Ion 534; winged and holy, ibid.; sing by inspiration, ibid.; Apol. 22; various kinds of, Ion 534; each poet good in his own kind only, ibid.; quoted on friendship, Lysis 212; to be under supervision, Laws 2. 656, 4. 719; controlled by law, ib. 2. 660, 8. 801; their corrupt use of music, ib. 669; often attain truth, 3. 682; authors of misrule, 3. 700; makers of prayers, 7. 801; martial, ib. 8. 829; poets and legislators, ib. 9. 858; comic and Iambic, ib. 11. 935; poets and philosophers, ib. 12. 967.

Poison, its action hindered by exercise, Phaedo 63; operation of, ib. 117; poisoning, Laws 11. 932, 933.

Polemarchus, brother of Lysias, a student of philosophy, Phaedr. 257 B; the son of Cephalus, Rep. 1. 327 B; argues concerning justice, ib. 331 C foll.; meaning of the name, Crat. 394 C.

Politicians, not wise, Apol. 21, Meno 99; politicians and sophists, Pol. 291, 303.

Politics, taught by Protagoras, Protag. 319; not to be taught, ibid.; do not require special knowledge, ib. 322, 323; political virtue may be taught, ib. 324; art of, Gorg. 464; its subdivisions, ibid.; want of science in, Pol. 298 (cp. 292); = management of the voluntary, Pol. 276; science of, Pol. 304, 305; 1 Alcib. 107 foll., 124; politics and states, Laws 4. 715; nature and art in, ib. 10. 889; politics and arts, 1 Alcib. 107 foll.; of Athens, ib. 120.

Pollution of families, Laws 9. 872, 873.

Polus, takes up the discussion, Gorg. 461 D, 481 A; his rudeness, ib. 448 A; a rhetorician, ib. E; like a young colt apt to run away, ib. 463 E; Callicles and Polus, ib. 482 C; too modest, ib. 482 E, 487 A (cp. ib. 494 D); his schools, Phaedr. 267 B.

Polycleitus of Argos, the statue, Protag. 311 C, 328 C.

Polycrates, his wealth, Meno 90 A.

Polydamas, the pancratist, Rep. 1. 338 C.

Polygnutus, son of Aglaophon the painter, Ion 532 E.

Pontus (Black Sca), voyage from to Athens for two drachms, Gorg. 511 D; Laws 7. 804 E.

Population of the state, Rep. 5. 460; in the model city, Laws 5. 749.

Porch of the King Archon, Euthyph. 2 A.

Poros (plenty), Symp. 203 B, C.

Poseidon, meaning of the name, Crat. 402 D, E; sons of Poseidon and Clyto, Crit. 113 C foll.; their temple, ib. 116 C; grove of, ib. 117 B; the laws of, ib. 119 C, D; divided the empire with Zeus and Pluto, Gorg. 523 A; 'earth-shaker,' Hipp. min. 370 C.

Potidaea, battle at, Charm. 153 B; Socrates at, ib. A; Apol. 28 E; Symp. 219 E, 221 A.

Pottery, Tim. 60.

Poverty, and riches in the state, Laws 3. 679; = increase of desires, ib. 5. 736; limits of in the state, ib. 744; poverty and wealth, ib. 11. 919.

Power useless without knowledge, Gorg. 468; arbitrary, a temptation,
Laws 3. 691; meaning of the word, Hipp. min. 366.
Practice for war necessary, Laws 8. 830; homicide in the practice for
war, ib. 831.
Praise, Protag. 337; Symp. 198, 199.
Pramnian wine, Ion 538 C; Rep. 3.
405 E.
Prayers, phraseology of, Crat. 400, 401; to the gods, Tim. 27, 48;
of Timaeus, Crit. 106; of the fool
dangerous, Laws 3. 688; at sacri-
fice, ib. 7. 801; made by poets, ibid.;
prayer, ib. 3. 687.
Preambles to law, Laws 4. 722, 723.
Predication, Soph. 251; denial of, ib.
251, 252; universal, ibid.; partial,
ibid.; compared to the combination
of letters, ib. 253; to music, ibid.
Preludes to law, Laws 4. 722, 723.
Pre-Socratic philosophy, Soph. 242 foll.
Priam, Homer's delineation con-
demned, Rep. 3. 388 B; his sor-
rows, Ion 535 B.
Priests, Pol. 290; Laws 6. 759.
Primary names, analysis of, Crat. 424.
Primitive man, Laws 3. 679, 688 foll.;
form of government, ib. 3. 680.
Prince of Asia, Lysis 209 D.
Principles of existence, Phil. 23.
Prison-attendant of Socrates, Phaedo
63, 116.
Prisoners in war, Rep. 5. 468.
Private property not allowed to the
guardsmen, Rep. 3. 416.
Private life to be controlled, Laws 6.
780 foll., 7. 788 foll.
Probability, Tisias' definition of,
Phaedr. 273; arguments from,
Phaedo 92.
Probation, states of, Phaedr. 248.
Prodicus of Ceos, Protag. 314 C; cost
of his teaching, Crat. 384 B; his
distinctions of words, Charm. 163
D; Meno 75 E; Protag. 340 A, 358 A; corrects Socrates, Protag.
341 A; on the Cean dialect, ib.
B; on the Sophistic ritual, Euthyd.
277 E; a tutor of Socrates, Meno
96 D; his discourse on Heracles,
Symp. 177 B; description of, Pro-
tag. 313 C; Socrates' opinion of,
ib. E; goes the round of the cities,
Apol. 19 E (cp. Rep. 10. 600 C);
divides philosophers and statesmen,
Euthyd. 395 C; his rule of art,
Phaedr. 267 B; best at taking words
to pieces, Laches 197 D.
Produce, division of, in Crete, Laws
8. 847.
Productions, division of, Soph. 265,
266; Pol. 261.
Prometheus, myth of, Protag. 320 D-
321 E; fire given by, Pol. 274 C;
Phil. ib. 16 C; deprives men of the
foreknowledge of death, Gorg. 523 D.
Proper names, etymology of, Crat. 392.
Property, classes of, Pol. 287-289;
registered in the model city, Laws
6. 754; principle of, ib. 11. 913;
left behind or in dispute, ib. 914;
valuation of, ib. 12. 955.
Prophets, Rep. 2. 364; Socrates' pro-
phecies, Apol. 39; prophetic art in
Homer, Ion 538, 539. Cp. Diviners.
Prose writers on justice, Rep. 2. 364;
compositions, Laws 7. 810.
Prosecution for murder, Euthyph. 4.
Prosopalian deme, Crat. 396 D.
Protagoras, his success in teaching,
Meno 91 D, E; excitement on his
arrival at Athens, Protag. 310 B, C,
D; will teach for money, ib. 310 E;
a sophist, ib. 311 E; like Orpheus,
ib. 315 B; desires a display, ib. 317
C; differs from other sophists—
teaches politics, etc., ib. 318 D, E;
his myth, ib. 320 D foll.; his views
of punishment, ib. 324 A foll.; his
scale of payment, ib. 328 B; he
objects to Socrates' method, ib. 338
A, 348 A; his thesis, Crat. 386 A
foll.; his theories in regard to
perception, Theaet. E foll. 152 foll.;
his work on Truth, Crat. 391 C;
Theaet. 161 B, C, D, 166 A, 168
C; his measure applies to gods
as well as men, ib. 162 C; Prota-
gorean fable, ib. 164 D; his axiom
discussed, ib. 170 A foll.; at variance
with opinion, ib. 171 A; his conven-
tional theory of justice, ib. 172 A;
his axiom not applicable to the
future, ib. 178 B, E; his precepts
about wrestling, Soph. 232 D;
disciples of, on contradiction, Eu-
thyd. 286 C; his rules of correct-
ness, Phaedr. 267 D; Protagorans as
a teacher, Rep. 10. 600 C.
Protarchus, a person in the dialogue
Philebus, Phil. 11 A—18 B; son of
Callias, ib. 19 B; continues the
conversation, ib. 21 A.
Proteus, Euthyph. 15 D; Ion has as
many forms as, Ion 541 E; the
Egyptian wizard, Euthyd. 288 B;
not to be slandered, Rep. 2. 381 D.
Proverbs. 'Give a pledge and evil is nigh at hand,' Charm. 165; 'know thyself,' ibid. (cp. Delphi); 'never too much,' ibid.; Protag. 343, etc.; 'the beautiful is the friend,' Lysis 216; Carian (proverbial), Laches 187, Euthyd. 285; 'break the large vessel in learning to make pots,' ibid.; which every pig would know,' ib. 196; Δίος Κόρανθος ('why here is iteration'), Euthyd. 292; 'ready to start at a shadow,' Phaedo 101; 'many are the thyrus-bearers,' ib. 69; 'to the feasts of lesser men,' etc., Symp. 174; 'birds of a feather,' ib. 195, Phaedr. 240, Rep. 1, 329, Gorg. 510; 'in una veritas,' ib. 217; 'invulnerable as Ajax,' ib. 219; 'fools learn by experience,' ib. 222; 'sweet elbow,' Phaedr. 257; 'wolf may claim a hearing,' ib. 272; 'over the barriers,' Crat. 413, Gorg. 494; 'shave a lion,' Rep. 1, 3. 141; 'let brother help brother,' ib. 2, 362; 'one great thing,' ib. 4, 423; 'what is more than human,' etc., ib. 6, 492; 'out of the smoke into the fire,' ib. 8, 569; the wise man is late for a feast, Gorg. 447; 'make the best of a bad business,' ib. 499; 'to fight against two is hard,' ib. 505, Laws 11, 919; 'like to like,' ib. 510; 'to begin with a wine jar,' ib. 514; 'land ahead,' Phil. 29; 'the good to be repeated twice or thrice,' ib. 60, Gorg. 498; 'your will is my will,' Theaet. 162; 'caught in a well,' ib. 165; χίες δεδινείται (a trille), ib. 174; Mysian (proverbial), ib. 209; 'when every way is blocked,' Soph. 231; 'faint heart never took a city,' ib. 261; Crat. 108; 'too much haste too little speed,' Pol. 264; 'suicidal victory' (Καλλίεσ τινα), Laws 1, 641; 'second childhood,' ib. 646; 'they know neither how to read nor swim,' ib. 3, 689; 'fall off an ass,' ib. 701; make a second beginning, ib. 4, 723; 'property of friends is common,' ib. 5, 739; 'equality makes friendship,' ib. 757 (cp. 'birds of a feather'); 'setting the river on fire,' ib. 6, 780; 'not even a god can fight against necessity,' ib. 7, 818; 'move the immovable,' ib. 8, 843, 12, 913,
Proxeni, Laws 1, 642.

Prytaneum, maintenance in, Apol. 37.

Psychology, the soul — better and worse principles in, Rep. 4, 431; principles of the, ib. 439 foll., 6, 504; four faculties of the, ib. 511; triple division of the, ib. 9, 580, 581; souls do not increase, ib. 10, 611; transmigration of souls, ib. 617; higher and lower parts of the, Tim. 90; prior to the body, Laws 10, 893, 896; = life, ib. 895; self-moving, ib. 896; immortality of the, Rep. 10, 608; doubted, Phaedo 70; argument of transmigration, ibid.; proved from the nature of opposites, ib. 71; revival, ib. 72; argument of recollection, ib. 73-76; immortality dependent on existence of general ideas, ib. 76; immortality ex parte post, ib. 77 foll.; the soul unchangeable, ib. 79; relation of soul and body, ib. 86, 94; and God, ib. 81, 82; a harmony, and so perishable, ib. 86; figure of the weaver's coat, ib. 87; the soul is not a harmony, ib. 93; admits of no degrees, ibid.; argument of opposition, ib. 103 foll.; the soul the opposite of death, ib. 105; condition of the, after death, ib. 107, 108, 113, 114 (cp. Gorg. 523, 524); nature of the soul, Phaedr. 245 foll., Phaedo 78; triple division of, Phaedr. 246; conflict of the soul, 248; transmigration, ib. 248, 249; recollection, ib. 249, 250; the soul's wings, ib. 251; horses, ib. 254; the basis of rhetoric, ib. 271, 273. Cp. Soul.

Public, the, compared to a beast, Rep. 6, 494; cannot be philosophic, ibid. (cp. Pol. 292); public men should improve citizens, Gorg. 515; public games, Laws 12, 950.

Punishment, preventive, Protag. 323, 324; Gorg. 525; paradox concerning, Gorg. 472, 473; nature of, ib. 477 foll.; punishment compared to medicine, ib. 479; wholesome, ib. 508; twofold office of, ib. 525; of the wicked, ib. 523; Theaet. 176; Rep. 2, 363, 10, 614; Phaedo 114; Laws 10, 905; the true likeness to evil, ib. 5, 728; of the temple robber, ib. 9, 854; of women, ib. 11, 932; object of, ib. 11, 934; use of, ib. 12, 944 (cp. 872). Cp. Death, Retribution.

Puppets, the moral tale of the, Laws 1, 644; puppet shows, ib. 2, 658.
INDEX.

Purgation, Tim. 89.
Purgatory, Phaedo 108, 113.
Purification, Soph. 226; divisions of, ib. 226, 227; of a city, Laws 5. 735, 736.
Puzzles, in disputation, Soph. 259.
Pyrilampes, maternal uncle of Charmides, Charm. 158 A.
Pyrilampes, father of Antiphon, Parm. 126 B.
Pyrilampes, father of Demus, Gorg. 481 D, 513 B.
Pyrrhic dance, Laws 7. 815 A foll.
Pythagoreans, Laws 7. 807 C, 12. 950 E; Lysis 205 C.

Q.
Quacks, Laws 9. 857.
Quails, training of, Laws 7. 789.

R.
Rational element of the soul, Rep. 4. 439; superior to irrational, Tim. 30.
Realities of virtues, Phaedr. 250.
Reason and appetite, Rep. 9. 571 (cp. 4. 439); Reason's 'golden cord,' Laws 1. 644, 645; reason and pleasure, ib. 3. 689.
Receiving stolen goods, Laws 12. 955.
Recollection (anâmyropsis), a proof of immortality, Phaedo 73; connected with association, ibid.; explained, ib. 73-76; Phaedr. 250; knowledge and recollection, Phaedo 75, 92; implies the departure of knowledge, Symp. 208; recollection = recovery of knowledge, Phil. 34; Laws 5. 732; Meno 81. Cp. Reminiscence.
Reflection and sensation, Theaet. 186.
Refutation, Soph. 230.
Relation, to self, contradictory in magnitudes, Charm. 168; difficulty of understanding, Phaedo 96, 101; relation and the object of relation, Charm. 168; axiom of, Theaet. 155; 'greater and less,' Pol. 283-285.
Relationship, degrees of, Laws 11. 924, 925.
Relative and correlative, qualifications of, Rep. 4. 437 foll.; Gorg. 476; relative notions, Parm. 141, 155; how corrected, Rep. 7. 524.
Relativity of things and individuals, Crat. 168; Rep. 5. 479; fallacies caused by, ib. 9. 584, 585; relativity in philosophy, Theaet. 152 foll.
Religion, Greek, Apol. 26 foll.; Euriph. 7 foll.; Phaedo 58; Laws 4. 716, 718; early Greek, Crat. 397; left to the god at Delphi, Rep. 4. 427; sacrifices, etc., Laws 7. 800 foll.; sacrifices at the three ways, Phaedo 108; worship of Aesculapius, ib. 118; prayers to gods, demons, heroes, Laws 7. 801; praises of the dead, ibid.; religion in Greek life, ib. 10. 887; convention in, ib. 889; of sick people, ib. 909. Cp. Gods.
Reminiscence (anâmyropsis), a source of knowledge, Meno 81 foll.; illustrated by questions to the slave-boy, ib. 82 foll. Cp. Recollection.
Replenishment (πληρωσις), Phil. 31.
Repletion (πληρωσις), Tim. 81.
Republic, narration of the dialogue of the, Tim. 17 B.
Reputation, value of, Laws 12. 950.
Respiration, Tim. 78, 79.
Rest, and motion, Tim. 57 foll.; Soph. 250; Laws 10. 893; rest and motion source of life and death, Theaet. 153; as a genus, Soph. 254 foll.
Retaliation not to be practised, Crito 49.
Retail traders, Greek feeling about, Rep. 2. 371; retail trade, Laws 8. 847, 849; laws concerning, ib. 11. 918 foll.; its dishonourable nature, ib. 918; not allowed to citizens, ib. 919 (cp. 8. 847).
Retribution (τιμωρία), Laws 5. 728; cannot be escaped, ib. 10. 904, 905;
INDEX.

Reverence, Laws 1. 647; in the young, ib. 5. 729.
Reviewers of laws, Laws 12. 951.
Revival, Phaedo 72.
Revolution of the heavens, Pol. 269 foll.
Rhadamantus, a judge in the other world, Apol. 41 A; judges those who come from Asia, Gorg. 524 A, E (ep. 526 B); reputed the justest of men, Laws 1. 624 B; the decision of, ib. 12. 948 B, C.
Rhamnusian, Antiphon the, Menex. 236 A.
Rhapsodes, Laws 2. 658; ib. 8. 834; contests of, Ion 530; inspired, ib. 533 foll.; moved at their own stories, ib. 535; are paid, ibid.; their knowledge of arts, ib. 537 foll.; art of, in Homer, ib. 541; have golden crowns, ib. 535, 541; rhapsodes and generals, ib. 541.
Rhen, Crat. 401 E, 402 A, B; Tim. 41 A.
Rhetoric, the art of persuasion, Phaedr. 260; knowledge of the truth required, ib. 262 (cp. 273); division of subject matter necessary, ib. 263; definition, division, and generalization required, ib. 264-266; distinguished from dialectic, ib. 266; art of, according to books, ibid.; professors of, ibid. foll.; not true knowledge, ibid. 268; and psychology, ib. 271; concerned with probabilities, ib. 272; Socrates' view of, ib. 273, 277; of Nestor and Odysseus and Palamedes, ib. 261; rhetorical and dialectic, Gorg. 448; the business of, ib. 449; the artificer of persuasion about the just and unjust, ib. 453, 455; power of, ib. 456, 466; defended, ib. 457; ignorance of, ib. 459; rhetoric and justice, ib. 460; Socrates' definition of, ib. 462; rhetoric and flat-terry, ibid. foll.; useless, ib. 480; rhetoric and poetry, ib. 502; at Athens, ib. 502, 503; of two sorts, ib. 503; rhetoric and sophistry, ib. 520; rhetoric and politics, Pol. 304; Rhetoricians, Menex. 235; the true rhetorician, Gorg. 504.
Rhythm, Symp. 187; Crat. 424; Rep. 3. 400; Phil. 17; Laws 2. 665.
Right and might, Gorg. 489; Laws 1. 627; natural principle of right, ibid.
Rites forbidden in private houses, Laws 10. 909.
Rivers (underground), Phaedo 113.
Roads to be made, Laws 6. 761; right of road, ib. 8. 845, 846.
Rock, Tim. 60.
Rocking of infants, Laws 7. 790.
Rulers of States are not infallible, Rep. 1. 339; how rulers are paid, ib. 347; why good men become rulers, ibid.; qualities of rulers, ib. 7. 535; ruler of the feast, Laws 1. 640.
Running, Laws 8. 833.

S.
Sacrifice, to the gods, Laws 4. 716, 717; to promote friendship, ib. 6. 771; human, ib. 782; outrages at, ib. 7. 800; mourning at, ibid.; number of, in the model city, ib. 8. 828; offered by boys, Lysis 297; private, Rep. 1. 328; in atonement, ib. 2. 364.
Sailors, Phaedr. 243.
Sais, Tim. 21 E.
Salaminian, Leo the, Apol. 32 C, D, E.
Salamis, the island of Euryssaces, i Alcib. 121 B; the sailors of, the schoolmasters of Hellas, Menex. 241 A, B; trophies of, ib. 245 A; battle of, Laws 3. 698 C, 4. 707 B, C.
Sales, limit in, Laws 8. 849; of diseased slaves, ib. 11. 916; of homicides, ibid.; invocation of gods at, ib. 916, 917; prices not be altered, ib. 917; unlawful sales, ib. 12. 954.
Salt, Tim. 60; utility of, Symp. 177; in cooking, Lysis 209.
Same, meaning of the word, Soph. 254, 255.
Samian, Theodorus the, Ion 533 B.
Sappho, the fair, Phaedr. 235 C.
Sarambus, the vintner, Gorg. 518 B.
Sards, Athenian conspiracy against, Menex. 240 A.
Sarpidon, Rep. 3. 388 C.
Satire, personal not allowed, Laws 11. 935.
Satyr, Socrates compared to a, Symp. 216 C, 221 D, E, 222 D; satyrs imitated in dances, Laws 7. 815 C.
Satyrs, a runaway slave of Hippocrates', Protag. 510 C.
Sauromatides, the women ride on horseback, Laws 7. 804 E; like men, ib. 806 B.
Scamander, Crat. 391 E; beleaguered
INDEX.

Scamandrius, = Astyanax, Crat. 392 B f.oll.
Scellius, father of Aristocrates, Gorg. 472 B.
Schools, situation of, Laws 7. 804.
Scirrhon, threw travellers from the rocks, Theaet. 169 A.
Science (ἐναρτήματος), distinguished by the object, Rep. 4. 438; Charm. 171; their unity, Rep. 7. 531; use hypotheses, ib. 533; correlation of, ib. 537; in relation to good, Phil. 66; pure and impure, ib. 56; divided, Pol. 258; of statesman, ib. 259; of government found in a few only, ib. 292, 293, 297; sub-ordination of, ib. 304; the royal, ib. 309, 310; distinguished from the object of science, Charm. 165; a science of science, ib. 167; compared with the senses, ibid; requires a subject matter, ib. 168; teaches that we know, not what we know, ib. 170; of good and evil, ib. 174; universal, Laches 198.
Scopas, son of Creon, Protag. 339 A.
Sculpture, proportion in, Soph. 235, 236; Rep. 4. 420.
Scylla, Rep. 9. 588 C.
Scythia, invaded by Darius, Gorg. 483 D; Menex. 239 E.
Scythians, use both hands alike, Laws 7. 795 A; characterized by spirit or passion, Rep. 4. 435 E; Anacharsis the Scythian, ib. 10. 600 A; Scythian cavalry, Laches 191 A, B; count those the bravest of men who have gold in their own skulls, Euthyd. 299 E; drink unmixed wine, Laws 1. 637 D, E.
Search, right of, Laws 12. 954.
Seasons, difficulty of obtaining, Laws 8. 829.
Selfishness the greatest evil, Laws 5. 731, 732.
Selymbria, Herodicusof, Protag. 316 E.
Sensation (αιρθήτωρ), origin of, Tim. 43; Heracleitean theory of, Theaet. 182; sensation and reflection, ib. 186.
Sense, objects of, Rep. 7. 523; knowledge given by, ibid.; Phaedo 75; sense and intellect, ib. 524; perceptions of, Tim. 66; senses inaccurate witnesses, Phaedo 65; cannot give abstractions, ib. 65, 66, 79; senses and objects of, Charm. 167; sense and thought compared, Theaet. 188.
Sentence, the, Soph. 262; false and true, ib. 263.
Separation universal, irrational, Soph. 259, 260.
Seriphan, story of Themistocles and the, Rep. 1. 329 E.
ServIce, kinds of, Pol. 289, 290; without gifts, Laws 12. 955.
Sextes, equality of, advantageous, Rep. 5. 456, 457; to follow the same training, Laws 7. 805; Rep. 5. 451; separation of, Laws 7. 794; relation between the, ib. 839, 841.
Cp. Women.
Shades and bodies, Laws 12. 959.
Shepherds, Pol. 267, 268; shepherd and king, ib. 275; Laws 5. 735; the Divine Shepherd, Pol. 275, 276.
Ship-building, woods used in, Laws 4. 705.
Sibyl, the, Phaedr. 244 B.
Sicilian philosophy, Soph. 242 E; cookery, Rep. 3. 404 D; the ‘Sicilian tale,’ Gorg. 493 A.
Sicily, rivers of mud in, Phaedo 111 D; can tell of Charondas, Rep. 10. 599 E; Athenians killed in, Menex. 242 E; spectators are judges in Sicilian theatres, Laws 2. 659 B.
Sight, Rep. 6. 508, 7. 517; Tim. 47; compared to mind, Rep. 6. 508; illusions of, ib. 10. 602; pleasure of, Phil. 51.
Sign, the, of Socrates, Apol. 31, 40; Euthyd. 273; Euthyphr. 3; Phaedr. 242, etc., Rep. 6. 496 (cp. Theages 128).
Silenus, imitated in dances, Laws 7. 815 C; Socrates compared to a figure of, Symp. 215 A, 216 D, 221 E.
Simile in multii, or ‘common notion,’ Meno 74.
Simmias, the Theban, has brought money for Socrates’ escape, Crito 45 B; an interlocutor in the Phaedo, Phaedo passim; believes in
INDEX.

599

ideas, ib. 74 B, 76 E; his earnestness in enquiry, ib. 85 C; believes the soul a harmony, ib. 85 E foll.; cause of more speeches than any one living, Phaedr. 242 B.

Simoa, summoned to aid Scamander, Protag. 340 A.

Simonides, his definition of justice discussed, Rep. 1. 331 D–335 E; a poem of, criticised, Protag. 339 A–347 A; a sophist in disguise, ib. 316 D.

Simplicity in education, Rep. 3. 397, 405.


Sincs, Tim. 74.

Siphons of wool, Symp. 175.

Sirens, have been laid under the spells of Pluto, Crat. 403 D; Socrates a Siren, Symp. 216 A; harmony of the, Rep. 10. 617 B.

Sisyphus, Apol. 41 B; suffers punishment in the world below, Gorg. 525 E.

Skin of the head, Tim. 76.

Slavery of Hellenes, Rep. 5. 469;


Slaves, Gorg. 483; proper treatment of, Laws 6. 777; killing of, ib. 9. 865, 872; slave who kills his master, ib. 868 (cp. 872); runaway, ib. 11. 914; diseased, ib. 916; children of, ib. 930; injury done by, ib. 936; slaves and masters, Rep. 9. 578; Meno's slave speaks Greek, Meno 82; a slave killed, Euthyph. 4; employment of, Lysis 208; the 'Carian Slave,' Laches 187. Euthyd. 285.

Slecp, Tim. 46; much, not required, Laws 7. 808.

Sleeping and waking, Theaet. 158.

Smell, Tim. 66; pleasure of, Phil. 51.

Smicrion, (imaginary) father of Hermogenes, Crat. 429 E.

Society, origin of, Protag. 320, 322. Cp. 'State.'

Socrates.

Charmides, returns from Potidaea, 153 A; his interest in philosophy and youth, ibid.; his charm for the headache, 156 B foll.; his dream of the reign of knowledge, 175 A; his self-deprecation, 175 C.

Lysis, understands love, 204 B; his passion for friends, 211 D foll.

Laches, his reputation, 180 C; his father, 181 A; at Delium, ib.

B; has had no teachers, 186 C; his poverty, ib.; his method of examination, 187 E, 188 A; his humour, 196 D, E; will go to school, 200 E, 201 A.

Protagoras, as a lover, 309 A; his memory, 334 D; cannot make long speeches, 335 C; power of criticism, 343 D foll.

Euthydemus, talking at the Lyceum, 271 A; intends going to school to Euthydemus 272 B; his sign, 273 E; his care for youth, 275 A, 306 C; his view of verbal discussions, 278 A; offers himself to the Sophists, 285 C; not wise, 295 B; quotes mythology, 297 C; his religion, 302 C; his irony, 303 C; praises the Sophists, 303 C; his view of philosophy, 307 A.

Meno, does not know what virtue is, 71 B; has a weakness for the fair, 76 C; a torpedo-fish, 80 A.

Euthyphro, accused by Meletus as a maker of gods, 3 A; his sign, 3 B; a neologian, ibid.; will be a disciple of Euthyphro, 5 A; averse to mythology, 6 D; a relation of Daedalus, 11 B.

Apology, has only the eloquence of truth, 17 B; has never appeared in a court of law, 17 D; his worst slanderers, 18 B; the accusation against him, 19 B; his views on natural philosophy, 19 E; takes no money, 19 D, 31 C; is no teacher, 20 C; declared by the oracle to be wise, 21 A; examines the politicians, 21 C; the poets and artisans, 22 A, D; his obedience to the god, 22 A; his enemies and poverty, 23 B, 31 C; his connection with Athenian youth, 23 C; the charge of Meletus, 24 B, 28 A; his view of the value of life, 28 B; at Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium, ib. E; will continue to teach, 29 D; has a divine mission, 30 A; a gad-fly, 30 E; his sign, 31 C, 40 A; as a politician (Arginusae, León), 32 B, C; his pupils, 33 E, 31 A; will not bring his children into court, 34 C; his conviction, 36 A; proposes his penalty, 36 E, 38 B; his view of death, 37 B, 39 A, 40 C; his accusers will be punished, 39 G; his death a gain to him, 40 B; sons of Socrates, 34 D, 41 E.

Crito, his cheerfulness at the pros-
pect of death, 43 B; his dream, 44 A; his view of the world and the good man, 44 C; devotion of his friends, 45 B; will obey reason only, 46 B; regards the opinions of the good, 47 A; values only the good life, 48 A; will not return evil for evil, 49 C; his regard for the laws, 50 B; his patriotism, 51 A; never left Athens, 52 B; his view of a future life, 54 B.

*Phaedo*, his death delayed, 58 A, B; his calmness, 58 E; friends present at his death, 59 B; last morning of his life, 59 D foll.; his wife and children, 60 A, 116 B; makes poetry, 60 D; his dream, 60 E; view of suicide, 61 D; pleased with the earnestness of Cebes, 63 A; ready to die, 63 B; belief in a future state, 63 C, 69 C, 73 D, 80 C; has sought to find a place among philosophers, 69 D; his humour, 77 B, 95 A; compares himself to a swan, 85 A; compared to a general, 89 A; plays with the hair of Phaedo, 89 B; a partisan, 91 B; his study of natural science, 96 A foll.; his death, 115 B foll.

*Symposium*, his use of sandals, 174 A; goes to Agathon’s supper, 174 B; his fits of abstraction, 174 D, 175 A; has a knowledge of love, 177 E; his love of talk, 194 D; cannot praise love, but will speak the truth, 199 A, B; his capacities for drinking, 214 A; like the masks of Silenus, 215 A; a great flute player, 215 C; power of his conversation, 215 E, 216 A; his temperance with Alcibiades, 217 A foll.; his conduct at Potidaea, 219 E, 220 A; his powers of thought, 220 C; his conduct at Delium, 221 A; talks only of packasses, etc., 221 E.

*Phaedrus*, never wears sandals, 229 A; a stranger in Attica, 230 D; knows nothing, 235 C; his sign, 242 C; has enough religion for his needs, *ib.*; his humour in parodying names, 261 B; inspired, 238 D, 263 D; has no skill in rhetoric, 262 D; his power of invention, 275 B; his religious feeling, 273 E, 279 B; a great lover of generalization and division, 266 B.

*Cratylos*, a prophet, 396 D; humour of, 407 D, 411 A; is afraid of the gods, Crat. 407 D, 408 D; enquiry of concerning justice, *ib.* 413 A.

*Gorgias*, heard a speech of Pericles, 455 E; his love of discussion, 458 A; alone in his view of tyranny, 472 B; not a public man, 473 E; as a senator, *ibid.*; a lover, 481 D; description of by Callicles, 485 E, 486 A; his conversation, 490 E, 491 A; Socrates of Foxmoor, 495 D; his humour, 505 D; the only politician, 521 D; his position at Athens, 522 D; anticipates death, *ibid.*; his defence, *ibid.*

*Republic* and *Timaeus*, irony of, 1. 337 A; a sharper in argument, 340 D; ignorant of what justice is, 354 C; must praise justice *per se*, 2. 367 B; the oath of, 3. 399 E, 8. 592 A (cp. *Dog*); his love of truth, 5. 451 A; power of in argument, 6. 487 B; earnestness of in behalf of philosophy, 7. 536 B; his feeling about the state, Tim. 19 A.

*Philebus*, etc., considers wisdom the good, 11 B; his religious feeling, 12 C, 25 B, 61 C; his method, 16 A; inspired, 20 B; his conversation with Parmenides, Parm. 127 C; a Spartan hound, 128 C; his youth, 130 E, 135 D; his prediction about Theaetetus, Thaet. 142 C; his interest in Athenian youth, *ib.* 143 D; his appearance, *ib.* 143 E, 144 D, 209 C (cp. Pol. 257 E); a man mid-wife, *ib.* 149 A foll.; his love of argument, *ib.* 169 B; Socrates and Parmenides, *ib.* 183 E; his dream about letters, *ib.* 201 E foll.; goes to meet Meletus, *ib.* 210 D; his sign, 1 Aleib. 103 A, 105 D. Cp. Sign.

Socrates, young, *ib.* 257 C; a person in the *Politicus*, *ib.* passim.

Softness, Tim. 62.

Soldiers, life of, Laws 12. 942.


Solon, quoted, Rep. 7. 536 D, Laches 188 B; the tale of, Tim. 20 E foll.; Crit. 108 D foll. (cp. 110 B); translated the Egyptian names, *ib.* 113 A; in Egypt, Tim. 22 A; a poet, Charm. 155 A, 157 E; one of the Seven Wise Men, Protag. 343 A; revered father of Athenian laws, Symp. 209 D; had the power of gaining an immortality of authorship, Phaedr. 258 B; writer of laws, *ib.* 278 C;
INDEX.

a legislator, Rep. 10. 599 E.; Laws 9. 858 E.
Song, parts of, Rep. 3. 398; for the old men, Laws 2. 665; for men and women, ib. 7. 802.
Sons of great men, Laches 179, 180, Protag. 325, Meno 93 foll.; the expelled son, Laws 11. 929.
Sophists, hold enquiry impossible, Meno 80; Anytus' view of, ib. 91; as teachers of virtue, ib. 92, 95; their teaching, Euthyd. 272, 273, 274; exhibition of sophistical dialectics, ib. 276 foll., 284 foll., 296 foll.; holding lying impossible, ib. 284 (cp. Soph. 260); contradiction impossible, ib. 285; like Proteus, ib. 288; on knowing and not knowing, ib. 293; omniscient, ib. 294; deny relativity, ib. 297; Sophists of mythology, ib. 275, 297; Socrates' advice to, ib. 305, 306; the character a reproach, Protag. 312, 316; what do they teach? ib. 312, 318; retailers of knowledge, ib. 313; their art ancient, ib. 316; but concealed, ib. 317; payment of, ib. 328, Meno 91; Crat. 391 (cp. Gorg. 519); soul of the sophist, Phaedr. 248; their view of justice, Rep. 1. 338 foll.; verbal quibbles of, ib. 340 (cp. Verbal); the public the great sophist, ib. 6. 492; the sophists compared to feeders of a beast, ib. 493; incompetent as managers, Tim. 19; not easily defined, Soph. 218; sophist and anger, ib. 218, 219; a hunter, ib. 221, 222; a trader in virtue, ib. 224; a money-making Eristic, ib. 225, 226; description of the, ib. 231; a disputer, ib. 232; has only apparent knowledge, ib. 233; an imitator of true being, ib. 235; concerned with ideas, ib. 240; final description of the, ib. 265 foll., 268; sophist, statesman, and philosopher, Pol. 257; sophist and politician, ib. 291, 393. Cp. Gorgias, Hippias, Prodictus, Protagoras, Thrasymachus.
Sophistry, Gorg. 449, 463, 465; sophistry and rhetoric, ib. 520; defined, Soph. 223; = art which retails knowledge, ib. 224; = refutation of vain conceit, ib. 231.
Sophocles, a remark of, quoted, Rep. 1. 329 B; supposed to discourse on the art of tragedy, Phaedr. 268 C.
Sophroniscus, father of Socrates, Laches 181 A; Euthyd. 297 E, 298 B; 1 Aleib. 131 E; a friend of Lysimachus, Laches 180 D.
Sorrow, in a good man, Rep. 3. 387, 10. 603; indulgence of, ib. 606.
Sosias, the name an expression of a wish, Crat. 397 B.
Soul, immortality of, Phaedo 70, 77, 86, 87, 92 foll., 105 foll., Phaedr. 245 (see Psychology); pure and impure, Phaedo 81 foll. (see Transmigration) civil and social, ib. 82; opposition of soul and body, ib. 94; the soul's eye, ib. 99; form of, Phaedr. 247; procession of the souls, ibid.; order of, ib. 248; five forms of the state and soul, Rep. 5. 449; image of, ib. 9. 588 (cp. 10. 611); the uncorrupt souls, ib. 10. 611; transmigration of, ib. 617; souls and stars, Tim. 41; soul of man, the, ib. 44; higher and lower, ib. 70; appetitive souls, the, ibid.; diseases of, ib. 86; symmetry of soul and body, ib. 88; ambition in, ib. 90; desire of knowledge in, ibid.; soul and universe, ibid. (cp. Phil. 30); nakedness of, Gorg. 523; judgment of, ibid.; origin of, Phil. 30; memory in the, ib. 34; compared to a book, ib. 38, 39; the soul's painter, ibid.; merchandise of the, Soph. 224; food of the, ibid.; evil in, ib. 227, 228; forming notions, Pol. 278; a precious possession, Laws 5. 726, 727; honours of, ibid.; pleasure and the soul, ibid.; passion in, ib. 9. 863; prior to the body, ib. 10. 893, 896; nature of, ib. 892; = life, ib. 895; = self-moved, ib. 896; = the cause of moral qualities, ibid.; orders the heavens, ibid.; two souls, a good and evil, ib. 896, 897; in the universe, ib. 898; of the sun, ib. 899; in all things, ibid.; influence of on character, ib. 904; = principle of change, ib.; soul and body, ib. 12. 959; soul and mind, ib. 961; in man, 1 Aleib. 130.
Sounds, Tim. 80.
Sous (Rush), Crat. 412 B.
Space, Tim. 52.
Sparta, proud, Laws 6. 753 A; walls not approved of there, ib. 778 D; licence of women at, ib. 7. 806 C. Cp. Lacedaemonians.
Spartans call men 'divine,' Meno 99 D; Spartan rhetoric, Phaedr. 260 E; drunkenness not allowed among
INDEX.

Speaking, first rule of. Phaedr. 260.
Spercheius, hair of Achilles dedicated to, Rep. 3. 391 B.
Species, Phil. 17; Pol. 262.
Speech, Tim. 47; speech and thought, Soph. 263.
Speech, speech-making, (of Lysias), Phaedr. 231-234; criticized, ib. 235 foll.; ib. 263, 264; (of Socrates), ib. 237-241; (of Socrates again), ib. 244-257; speech-writing of politicians, ib. 258; speeches of Socrates and Lysias compared, ib. 262 foll.; to be duly arranged, ib. 263; motive of the good in, ib. 273; true art of writing, ib. 276; written speeches condemned, ib. 275; the place of writing in, ib. 277; compared to conversation, like brazen pans, Protag. 329; art of speech-making a kind of enchantment, Euthyd. 290. Cf. Rhetoric and Writing.
Spendthrifts, in Greek states, Rep. 8. 564.
Sphagia, Spartans at, Menex. 242 C.
Sphettus, Lysianias of, Apol. 33 E.
Spleen, the, Tim. 72.
Stars, seven created, Tim. 38; motions of the stars, ib. 39, 40; fixed stars, ib. 40; stars and souls, ib. 41; orbits of, Laws 7. 822; have souls, ib. 12. 967.
Stasinus quoted, Euthyph. 12 B.
State, the, origin of, Rep. 2. 369 foll.; Laws 3. 680 foll.; the luxurious, Rep. 2. 372 foll.; at war, ib. 4. 422; unity of, ib. 422, 423; size of, ib. 423; relation of state and individual, ib. 435; 8. 544, 9. 577; Laws 3. 689, 9. 875, 877; virtue of state and individual, Rep. 4. 441; five forms of, ib. 445; family life in, ib. 5. 449; a large family, ib. 463 (cp. Pol. 259); the philosophic state, Rep. 6. 497 foll.; 501 foll.; happiness of the, ib. 7. 519; claims of, on the individual, ib. 520; rulers of the, ib. 520; possibility of the, ib. 540; brief description of, Tim. 17. 18; existence of, depends on virtue, Protag. 322, 325, 326, 327; states and politics, Laws 4. 715; state-offences, ib. 6. 768; how preserved, ib. 12. 961; why states go wrong ib. 962; order in, how preserved, 1 Alcib. 126; agreement in, ib. 126; individuals to do their own work, ib. 127.
Statesmen at Athens, Gorg. 515, 519; 1 Alcib. 119, 122; vocation of, Gorg. 515; Laws 12. 963; science of, Pol. 258, 259; statesmen and king, ib. 259; art of, in division, ib. 267; statesman and herdsman, ib. 275; statesmen and laws, ib. 300; are not teachers of virtue, Meno 93; have right opinion, not knowledge, ib. 99.
Statuaries, Pol. 277.
Statues of Daedalus, Euthyph. 11 C. See Daedalus.
Stephanus, son of Thucydides, a famous wrestler, Meno 94 C.
Stesichorus, his Recantation, Phaedr. 243 A (cp. Rep. 9. 586 C); Socrates compares himself to, ib. 244 A.
Stesilas, his invention of the scythe-spear, Laches 183 C.
Stesimbratus, of Thasos, a rhapsode, Ion 530 D.
Strangers under the protection of God, Laws 5. 729, 730; may partake of fruits, ib. 8. 845; murder of, ib. 9. 866; reverence for, ib. 879; strangers on travel, ib. 12. 952, 953.
Style of poetry, Rep. 3. 392; styles, various, ib. 397.
Styx, Phaedo 113 C; Rep. 3. 387 B.
Subject of the sentence, Soph. 262.
Substances, assimilation of, Lysis 217.
Suits, decision of, in the model city, Laws 6. 761; at law, ib. 766, 9. 853; execution of, ib. 12. 958.
Sun, the, compared with the idea of good, Rep. 6. 508; creation of, Tim. 38; orbit of, Laws 7. 822; sun as god, ib. 821, 10. 886, 887 (cp. Apol. 26); has a soul, ib. 12. 967; contemplation of, ibid.
Sunian, Euphronius the, Theact. 144 C.
Sunium, Crito 43 D.
Suppliants, Laws 5. 730.
Supposititious son, parable of the, Rep. 7. 538.
Surety, rules about, Laws 12. 953.
Swallowing, Tim. 80.
Swans, Phaedo 85.
Syllables and letters, Theaet. 202, Tim. 48.
Symmetry is a good, Phil. 65, 66.
Synonyms, Prodicus' 'charming philosophy' of, Protag. 340.
Syracusan dinners, Rep. 3, 404 D.
Syracusans have conquered Locrians, Laws 1, 638 A.

T.
Tacticians and generals, Laws 1, 921.
Tanagra, battle of, 1 Alcib. 112 B.
Tantalus ('my eyes beheld Tantalus' = Prodicus), Protag. 315 C; his wealth, Euthyph. 11 D; his name, Crat. 395 D, E; suffers in the world below, Gorg. 525 E.
Tarentic intoxication, Laws 1, 637 B, C.
Tarentum, Icous of, Protag. 316 D.
Tartarus, a chasm piercing through the whole world, Phaedo 112 A, D (cp. 113 B, E, 114 A); (= hell), Rep. 10, 616 A; Gorg. 523 A.
Taste, Tim. 65.
Taurocas, the palaestra of, Charm. 153 A.
Taverns, Laws 11, 918, 919.
Taxiarchs, Laws 6, 755.
Teachers, foreign, Laws 7, 804; of virtue, ib. 12, 964.
Teiresias, alone has understanding among the dead (Od. x. 495), Meno 100 A; Rep. 3, 386 E.
Telamon, Apol. 41 B; Rep. 10, 620 B; Crat. 428 G. See Ajax.
Telemachus, Laws 7, 804 A.
Te'iephus of Aeschylus, Phaedo 108 A.
Temenus, king of Argos, Laws 3, 683 D, 692 B.
Temperance (σωφροσύνη), defined as quietness, Charm. 159; as modesty, ib. 160; as doing one's own business, ib. 161; as doing good actions, ib. 163 fin.; as self-knowledge, ib. 165; as knowing what we know and do not know, ib. 167; the science of itself and of other sciences, is wisdom, ib. 170; how far possible or advantageous, ib. 167, 170; is a good, ib. 159, 160, 169; a part of virtue, Meno 73; in the ordinary view of, Phaedo 68, 69; to be taught in the state, Rep. 3, 389, 4, 430 foll.; a sort of harmony, ib. 430; the order of the soul, Gorg. 507, 508; Calliicles' view of, ib. 492, 494; = health of the soul, ib. 504, 507; temperance and courage opposed, Pol. 306; to be blended with courage, ib. 309, 310; requires experience of pleasure, Laws 1, 649; temperance and virtue, ib. 3, 666; in the tyrant, ib. 4, 710; in the state, ib. 712; worthy of praise, ib. 5, 730; in love, ib. 8, 839, 840; principles to support, ib. 841.
Temperate life, Laws 5, 734.
Temples in a new state, Laws 5, 738; of Hestia, Zeus, and Athena, ib. 745, 8, 848; officers of, ib. 6, 759; temples, temple robbing, ib. 9, 854.
Terpsichore, Phaedr. 259 C.
Terpsichore, present at the death of Socrates, Phaedo 59 C (cp. Theaet. 142 A–143 C).
Territory, devastation of, Rep. 5, 470; size of, Laws 5, 737.
Testamentary disposition, Laws 11, 923, 924.
Tetanus, Tim. 84.
Tethys and Oceanus, parents of all, Crat. 402 B, C, D; Tim. 40 E; Theaet. 152 E, 180 D.
Thales and the Thracian maid, Theaet. 174 A; one of the Seven Wise Men, Protag. 343 A; his inventions, Rep. 10, 600 A.
Thamus, Phaedr. 274 D–275 B.
Thamyras, a singer, Laws 8, 829 E; Ion 533 B; his soul chooses the life of a nightingale, Rep. 10, 620 A.
Thasos, Stesimbratus of, Ion 530 D.
Thaumas, Iris is the child of Thaumas (wonder), Theaet. 135 D.
Theaetetus, a person in the dialogue Theaetetus, Theaet. 144 E foll.; wounded at Corinth, ib. 142 A; his appearance and mental powers, ib. 143 E; his studies in mathematics, ib. 147 E (cp. Knowledge); a person in the dialogue Sophist, Soph. 218 A foll. (cp. Pol. 257 A).
Theaetetus, time of the dialogue, Theaet. 142 E; the dialogue written down by Euclid, ib. 143 A.
Theages, the bride of, Rep. 6, 496 B; the brother of Paralus, Apol. 33 E.
Theban, Orthogoras the, Protag. 318.
INDEX.

C; Simmias the Theban, Phaedo 59 C, 92 A; Harmonia the Theban goddess, ib. 95 A.

Themis, did not instigate the strife of the gods, Rep. 2. 380 A; the oath by Zeus, Apollo and Themis, Laws 11. 936 E.

Themistocles, answer of, to the Sperphian, Rep. 1. 330 A; a good man in common opinion, Gorg. 503 C, 515 D (cp. Meno 93 B); real author of Athenian calamities, Gorg. 519 A (cp. Meno 99 B); originator in part of the docks and walls, ib. 455 E; exiled, ib. 516 D.

Theoclymenus (the seer in Homer), Ion 538 E.

Theodorus, of Cyrene, a geometrical, Theaet. 143 B foll.; joins in the conversation, ib. 168 C foll. (cp. Soph. 216 A; Pol. 257 A).

Theodorus, of Samos, a sculptor, Ion 533 A.

Theodorus, of Byzantium, compared to Odysseus, Phaedr. 261 C, 266 E.

Theodotus, dead at the time of Socrates' trial, Apol. 33 E.

Theognis, quoted, Meno 95 D, E; his definition of virtue, Laws 1. 630 A, C.


Thoneoe, meaning of the name, Crat. 407 B.

Theophilus, meaning of the name, Crat. 394 E, 397 B.

Theosdotides, father of Nicostratus, Apol. 33 E.

Thersites, puts on the form of a monkey, Rep. 10. 620 C.

Theseus, his expedition to Crete, Phaedo 55 A; names recorded prior to the time of, Crat. 110 A; cursed his son, Laws 3. 687 E, 11. 931 B; the tale of Theseus and Peirithous not permitted, Rep. 3. 391 C; a Theseus of argument, Theaet. 169 B.

Thessalians, their wisdom, Meno 70 A; willing to receive Socrates, Crito 45 C; Thessalian enchantresses, Gorg. 513 A; Penaeas, Laws 6. 766 D; Caeneus the Thessalian, ib. 12. 944 D, E; Creon the Thessalian, Protag. 339 A.

Thessaly, Crito has friends in, Crito 45 C; disordered state of, ib. 53 D; nurseries of geese in, Pol. 264 C; a large plain, Laws 1. 625 D.

Thetis, mother of Achilles, Apol. 28 C; Symp. 179 E; Hipp. min. 371 C; marriage of Peleus and Thetis, Laws 12. 944 A; not to be slandered, Rep. 2. 381 D; her accusation of Apollo, ib. 383 A.

Theuth, Phil. 18 B; Phaedr. 274 C.

Thinking = the soul's conversation with herself, Theaet. 190.

Thorax, Tim. 69.

Thought, when best, Phaedo 65; thought and speech, Soph. 263.

Thracians, their procession in honour of Bendis, Rep. 1. 327 A; characterized by spirit or passion, ib. 4. 435 E; drink unmixed wine, Laws 1. 637 D, E; use their women to till the ground, etc., ib. 7. 805 D; the Thracian Zamolxis, Charm. 156 D, E (cp. 175 E); the Thracian handmaid and Thales, Theaet. 174 A, C, 175 D; Zopyrus the Thracian, tutor of Alcibiades, 1 Aleib. 122 B.

Thrasymachus, the Chalcedonian, Rep. 1. 328 B (cp. 6. 498 C); a description of, ib. 336 B; will be paid, ib. 337 D; defines justice, ib. 338 C foll.; his rudeness, ib. 343 A; his views of government, ibid.; his encomium on injustice, ibid.; his manner of speech, ib. 345 B; his paradox about justice and injustice, ib. 348 B foll.; he blushes, ib. 350 D; would have Socrates discuss women and children, ib. 5. 450; never Socrates' enemy, ib. 6. 498; his rhetoric, Phaedr. 261 C, 269 E, 271 A; the 'Chalcedonian giant,' ib. 267 D.

Thycydides, father of Melesias, Meno 94 C; the younger, Laches 179 A.

Thurii, Euthyd. 271 C, 283 E, 288 A; Thurian youth, Laws 1. 636 B.

Thyestes, cruelty of Atreus to, Crat. 395 B; and the golden lamb, Pol. 268 E; on the stage, Laws 8. 838 C.

Timaeus, the principal speaker in the dialogue Timaeus, 17 A foll.; begins his discourse, 27 C; prayer of, Crit. 106 A, B.

Time, created, Tim. 37, 38.

Timocracy, Rep. 8. 545 foll.
INDEX.

Timocratic man, described, Rep. 8. 549; his origin, ibid.
Timocratic state, the, origin of, Rep. 8. 547.
Tiring, art of, Gorg. 463.
Tisander, of Aphidnae, a student of philosophy, Gorg. 487 C.
Tisias, aware that probability is superior to truth, Phaedr. 267 A; his definition of probability, ib. 273 A foll.
Tityus, suffers punishment in Tartarus, Gorg. 525 E.
Tops, Rep. 4. 436.
Torch race, an equestrian, Rep. 1. 328.
Torpedo, Meno 80.
Tournaments, Laws 8. 829.
Trades, no one to profess two, Laws 8. 846, 847.
Tragedy, Laws 2. 658; = the goat song, Crat. 408; tragedy and comedy in the state, Rep. 3. 394; tragedy and comedy the same as to genius, Symp. 223 (but cp. Ion 534); Gorg. 592; effect of, Phil. 48.
Tragic poets, the, imitators, Rep. 10. 597, 598.
Transmigration of souls, Meno 81 foll.; Phaedo 70, 81; Phaedr. 248; Tim. 42, 92.
Travel, value of, Laws 12. 950, 951.
Treasure-trove, Laws 11. 913.
Trees, Tim. 77.
Trial, conduct of, Laws 9. 855.
Triangles in bodies, Tim. 54 foll.; perfect forms of, ib. 54.
Tribes, twelve in the model city, Laws 5. 745 (cp. ib. 6. 771).
Tribunals, Laws 6. 767.
Triptolemus, one of the judges in Hades, Apol. 41 A; minister of Demeter, Laws 6. 782 B.
Trojan horse, Theaet. 184 D; war, Apol. 41 C; Laws 2. 682 C, 3. 685 C.
Trojans, press hard on the Achaean (II. xiv. 96), Laws 4. 766 D, E.
Troy, Rep. 3. 393 E; Helen at, ib. 9. 586 C (cp. Phaedr. 243 B); heroes at, Ion 535 C; Apol. 28 C; overthrown after ten years, Laws 3. 682 D; a part of the Assyrian empire, ib. 685 C, D.
Truth, = the right assignment of names, Crat. 431; how obtained, Phaedo 65; the vision of truth, Phaedr. 248; the basis of good speaking, ib. 260; truth and persuasion, ibid.; the beginning of goods, Laws 5. 730; Protagoras on, Crat. 391, etc.
Tunnels, Crit. 116 A.
Tutelary deities of craftsmen, Laws 11. 920, 921.
Tutors, Lysis 208, 223; Symp. 183; Laws 7. 808.
Tynnichus of Chalcis, author of one famous poem, Ion 534 D.
Typho the serpent, Phaedr. 230 A.
Tyrannical man, the, Rep. 9. 571 foll.; life of, ib. 573; his treatment of his parents, ib. 574 foll.; most miserable, ib. 578.
Tyranny, Rep. 1. 344, 8. 544; Gorg. 469; origin of, Rep. 8. 562; the wretchedest form of government, ib. 9. 576; = management of the violent, Pol. 276.
Tyrant, the, origin of, Rep. 8. 563; happiness of, ib. 566; oppression of, ib.; his army, ib. 567 foll.; has no real pleasures, ib. 9. 587; how far distant from pleasure, ibid.; tyrants have no friends, ib. 576; slaves, ib. 577; misery of, ib. 579; Laws 2. 661, 662; tyrants and poets, Rep. 8. 568; have no power, Gorg. 461; Laws 4. 718; paradox concerning, Gorg. 468; punishment of, ib. 525; described, Pol. 301, 302; the young, Laws 4. 709; friend of the tyrants, Gorg. 510.
Tyrrhenic rites, Laws 5. 738 C.
Tyrtæus, 'of all men most eager about war,' Laws 1. 629 A foll. (cp. ib. 2. 667 A); not to lay down evil precepts, ib. 9. 858 E.

U.

Unity of the state, Rep. 5. 462, 463; unity and being, Soph. 245.
Universe, body of, Tim. 31, 32; motion of, ib. 34; pattern of, ib. 48; guided by mind, Phil. 28; nature of, Pol. 269; soul in, Laws 10. 898; whole and parts of, ib. 903.
Union impossible among the bad, Lysis 214 (cp. Rep. 1. 352); of friends after death, Phaedo 68.
Unjust man, the, happy, Rep. 1. 343, 344; injustice = private profit, ib. 344; 'unjust' defined, Laws 9, 863.
INDEX.

Unwritten laws, Laws 7. 822, 823.
Urania, Phaedr. 259 D.

User and instrument distinguished, 1 Alcib. 129.
Usury on overdue accounts, Laws 11. 921.

V.

Vegetarians, Laws 6. 782.
Ventiloquism, Soph. 252.
Verbal quibbles of sophists, Rep. 1. 340; distinctions, 'having' and possessing, Theaet. 197; 'making' distinguished from 'doing,' Charm. 163; 'being' and 'becoming' distinguished, Protag. 340, 344; fallacy, 'justice dishonourable,' Laws 9. 860; discussions, Euthyph. 276 foll. ib. 284 foll., 293 foll.; Socrates' use of the word διένασα, Protag. 341; learning and knowing, Euthyph. 278.
Verbs, Soph. 261, 262.
Vested interests, Laws 3. 684.
Vice, in the soul, Soph. 228; = virtue out of place, Pol. 307; the destruction of men, Laws 10. 906; slavish, 1 Alcib. 135. Cp. Injustice.
Victories, Olympian, Phaedr. 256 (cp. Laws 7. 807).

Virtue, contrasted with the arts, Protag. 323; how far hereditary, ib. 324; not a private possession, ib. 325; whether one or many, ib. 329 (cp. Pol. 306); nature of virtues, ib. 330; justice and holiness, ib. 331 (cp. Laches 199); wisdom and temperance, ib. 333; virtue according to Simonides, ib. 339 (cp. Justice); courage, ib. 349, 350, 359; unity of virtue re-stated, ib. 349; virtue and knowledge, ib. 356 foll.; how does it come, Meno 71; virtues numberless, ib. 72; always the same, ib. 73; defined as the power of governing mankind, ibid.; more than one virtue, ib. 74; = the love and attainment of the honourable, ib. 77; = the power of attaining good, ib. 78; can it be taught? ib. 86 (cp.

Protag. 324, 361, Euthyd. 274); is virtue knowledge? ib. 87; a sort of wisdom, ib. 88; (good men not good by nature, ib. 89); no teachers of, ib. 89 foll.; 96; great men are great by inspiration, ib. 99; the ordinary views of, paradoxical, Phaedo 68, 69; true virtue and wisdom, ib. 69; true motives of, ib. 83, 84; Socrates' great desire for; Euthyd. 285; absolute seen by the soul, Phaedr. 247; in the individual and state, Rep. 4. 441 (cp. Justice); virtue, Gorg. 506; invisible, Phaedr. 250; misplaced = vice, Pol. 307; in war, Laws 1. 630; according to Theognis, ibid.; four virtues, ib. 1. 631; is greatest of goods, ib. 2. 661; honoured of the temperate, ib. 3. 696; virtue and temperance, ibid.; object of the legislator, ib. 4. 706; to be imparted, ib. 5. 730, 731; the chief business of life, ib. 7. 807; the salvation of men, ib. 10. 906; kinds of, ib. 12. 963; one or many, ib. teachers of, ib. 964; the prize of life, Menex. 246, 247.

Visible and intellectual world compared, Rep. 6. 508; divisions of the visible world, ib. 509 foll.

Vision, Theaet. 156.
Voluntary and involuntary, Hipp. min. 373; 374; in actions, Laws 9. 861.

W.

Walls injurious, Laws 6. 778, 779.
War, causes of, Rep. 2. 373, 4. 422 foll.; 1 Alcib. 113; men, women, and children to go to, ib. 5. 467; experience in, ibid.; regulations concerning, ib. 467-471; the object of, Laws 1. 626-628; the natural state, ib. 626; civil war, ib. 1. 628, 629; war inferior to peace, ib. 803; dances of, ib. 7. 815, 816; war most serious, ibid.; practice of war in peace, ib. 8. 829; necessity of practising, ib. 830; why not practised, ib. 831, 832.

Warden of the city, Laws 6. 759, 763; of the agora, ib. 559, 764; election of wardens of the country, ib. 760; if unjust, ib. 761, 762; of the city to have common meals, ib. 762; to have no servants, ib. 763; to know geography, ib.

Warp, the, Pol. 282.

Water, laws concerning, Laws 8. 844; pollution of, ib. 845.
INDEX. 607

Water, nature of, Tim. 49; form of, ib. 56; compounds of water and earth, ib. 60, 61.

Wax, block of, in the mind, Theaet. 191.

Wealth, the advantage of in old age, Rep. 1. 329, 330; the greatest blessing of, ib. 330, 331; destruction of the arts, ib. 4. 421; influence of on state, Laws 4. 705; of little use, ib. 5. 729; evil of, ib. 742, 743; wealth and happiness, ib. 743; limit of in the state, 745 (cp. Community of Property); prevents the practice of war, 8. 831; a cause of murder, ib. 9. 870; wealth and poverty, ib. 11. 919; of the Persians, 1 Alcib. 121 foll.; of the Lacedaemonian kings, ib. 122; of Alcibiades, ibid.

Weaver's coat, the, Phaedo 87.

Weaving, divisions of, Pol. 279-283; defined, ib. 283, Laws 5. 734, 735.

Web, the political, Pol. 309, 310.

White lead, Lysis 217.

Whiteness in hair, Lysis 217.

Whole and parts, Theaet. 204.

Whorl, the great, Rep. 10. 616.


Wild animals, Tim. 91.

Wills, freedom in making, restricted, Laws 11. 922; regulations concerning, ib. 923.

Wine, Tim. 60; = fear potion, Laws 1. 647 foll.; in education, ibid.; use of, ib. 2. 646; why given to men, ib. 672; not to be drunk on a campaign, ib. 674; or by slaves, ibid.; or by rulers or officers, ibid.; nor in the daytime, ibid.; cure for drinking hemlock, Lysis 219.

Wings of the soul, Phaedr. 246, 251.

Wisdom (σοφία, φρόνησις) in the State, Rep. 4. 428; the power of, ib. 7. 518, 519; wisdom and temperance, Charm. 170, Protag. 332; cannot distinguish good and bad physicians, ib. 171; wisdom and friendship, Lysis 210; = good fortune, the only good, Euthyd. 282; most valuable of treasures, ibid.; can it be taught, ibid.; wisdom and virtue, Meno 88; of Socrates, Apol. 20; nature of, Phaedo, 69, 79; the only release from evil, ib. 107; loveliness of, Phaedr. 250; unseen, ibid.; to be ascribed to God only, ib. 278; fairest wisdom concerned with states, Symp. 209; a good, Phil. 11; needs additions, ib. 21; insufficient, ib. 60; the true, Theaet. 176; wisdom and opinion, Pol. 278; to be prayed for, Laws 3. 688; wisdom and harmony, ib. 689; wisdom and courage, ib. 12. 963; the source of happiness, 1 Alcib. 134.

Wise man, life of the, Rep. 9. 591; the seven wise men, Protag. 343.

Witchcraft, Laws 11. 933.


Wives to be common in the state, Rep. 5. 457.

Wizards, punishment of, Laws 10. 909.

Wolves and tyrants akin, Phaedo 82; men changed into wolves, Rep. 8. 565; wolf and flock (proverb), ib. 3. 415.

Women, to be trained like men, Rep. 5. 451; in the gymnasia, ib. 452; nature of women and men, ib. 453; difference of women and men, ib. 455; inferior to men, ibid., Tim. 42; difference of tastes in, Rep. 5. 456; employment of, Lysis 208, Rep. 5. 455; Lacedaemonian, Laws 1. 637, ib. 6. 780, 7. 806; given to concealment, ib. 6. 781; inferior in capacity for virtue, ib. 781; to have meals in public, ibid.; controllers of marriage, ib. 784, 7. 794; at war, ib. 785; to learn martial exercises, ib. 7. 794; to share with men, ib. 805; in Thrace, ibid.; of the Sauromatides, ib. 806; to fight if necessary, ib. 806; to be trained in gymnastic exercises, ib. 813, 814, 8. 833; women soldiers, ib. 7. 814; women's festivals, ib. 8. 828.

Woof, Pol. 282, 283.

Wool-making, Pol. 282.


Work honourable, Charm. 163.

World below, the, Rep. 2. 366; not to be reviled, ib. 3. 386 foll.

World, the creation of, Tim. 28 foll.; pattern of, ib. 29; an animal, ib. 30; only one, ib. 31; figure of the, ib. 33; world-soul, ib. 34, Phil. 39; motion of, Tim. 34.

Words not infinite, Tim. 55.

Wounds, a question of fact, Laws 9. 875, 876.
INDEX.

Wounding, voluntary and involuntary, Laws 9. 874, 875; enactments concerning, ib. 876-879.
Writing, invention of, Phaedr. 274; apt to be unintelligible, ib. 275; compared with dialectic, ib. 276; an amusement, ib. 277; value of written compositions, ib. 278.

X.

Xanthias, a famous wrestler, Meno 94 C.
Xanthippe, wife of Socrates, Phaedo 60 A.
Xanthippus, father of Pericles, i Alcib. 104 B, Menex. 235 E.
Xanthippus, son of Pericles, Protag. 315 A, 328 C, Meno 94 B.
Xanthus, a river of Troy (=Scamander), Crat. 391 E.
Xenelasia, Protag. 342; Laws 12. 950 (cp. ib. 953).
Xenophanes of Elea, Soph. 242 D.
Xerxes, invaded Hellas, Gorg. 483 D; author of the maxim that justice = paying one's debts, Rep. 1. 336 A; Xerxes and Alcibiades, i Alcib. 105 C; father of Artaxerxes, ib. 121 B, 123 C; brought up in the royal and luxurious fashion, Laws 3. 695 E.

Y.

Year, the perfect, Tim. 39.
Young, easily influenced, Laws 2. 664; restlessness of young creatures, ib. 653; 664, 665.
Youthful body, the, Tim. 81.

Z.

Zamolxis, the Thracian physician, Charm. 156 D, 158 B (cp. 175 E).
Zeno, Soph. 216 A; the Eleatic Palamedes, Phaedr. 261 D; the friend of Pythodorus, Parm. 126 B; description of, ib. 126 B, C; a person in the dialogue Parmenides, 128 A-130 A, 136 D, E; well paid for teaching, i Alcib. 119 A.
Zethus, in the play of Euripides, Gorg. 485 E, 489 E, 506 B.
Zeus, author of the laws of Crete, Laws 1. 624 A; judgment of Zeus = equality, ib. 6. 757; keeper of political wisdom, Protag. 321 D (cp. 329 C); processions of in heaven, Phaedr. 246 E foll.; attendants of, ib. 252 C foll.; the saviour, Charm. 167 B; the god of boundaries, of kindred, of strangers, Laws 8. 842 E, 843 A; Poliuchus, ib. 11. 921 C; the god of hospitality, ib. 12. 953 E; ancestral Zeus unknown among Ionians, Euthyd. 302 C, D, E; his treatment of mankind, Symp. 190 C foll.; his empire due to love, ib. 197 B; in love with Ganymede, Phaedr. 255 C (cp. Laws 1. 636 C); son of Cronus, Tim. 41 A; treatment of his father, Euryphe. 6 A, 8 B; Rep. 3. 377 E; in mythology, Rep. 2. 379 D, 383 A, 3. 390 B; the sons of, Laws 11. 941 B; Achilles descended from, Rep. 3. 391 C; ancestor of the Lacedaemonian and Persian kings, i Alcib. 120 E; of Alcibiades, ib. 121 A; of Lysis, Lysis 205 D; makes his sons judges in the world below, Gorg. 523 A foll.; temple of, Laws 5. 745 B, 8. 848 D; fines sacred to, ib. 6. 774 D; oath of the witness by, ib. 11. 936 E; office of ambassadors and heralds sacred to, ib. 12. 941 A; at Olympia, ib. 950 E.
Zeuxippus of Heraclea, a famous painter, Protag. 318 B, C.
Zeuxis, the painter, Gorg. 453 C, D.
Zopyrus, the Thracian, tutor of Alcibiades, i Alcib. 122 B.
Zoroaster, son of Oromasus, his magianism, i Alcib. 122 A.